



**OBSERVADOR RURAL**

**No. 121**

**February 2022**

**INGREDIENTS FOR A YOUTH REVOLT  
- POVERTY, CONSUMER SOCIETY AND  
FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS**

**João Feijó, Jerry Maquenzi  
and Aleia Rachide Agy**

The working paper OBSERVADOR RURAL (OMR) is a publication of the Observatório do Meio Rural. It is a non-periodical publication for institutional and individual distribution. The OBSERVADOR RURAL can also be accessed on the OMR website ([www.omrmz.org](http://www.omrmz.org)).

The objectives of the OBSERVADOR RURAL are:

- Reflect and promote the exchange of opinions on current Mozambican topics and international affairs.
- Make society aware of the results of debates, research, and reflections on relevant themes in the agricultural sector and rural areas.

The OBSERVADOR RURAL is a publication space intended mainly for researchers and technicians who research, work or have some interest in the area covered by the OMR. Other nationals or foreigners may also propose works for publication.

The contents are the exclusive responsibility of the authors, not binding, for any purpose, the Observatório do Meio Rural or its partners or sponsors.

The texts published in OBSERVADOR RURAL are in draft form. The authors are grateful for contributions to deepening and corrections to improve the document.

# INGREDIENTS FOR A YOUTH REVOLT - POVERTY, CONSUMER SOCIETY AND FRUSTRATED EXPECTATIONS

João Feijó, Jerry Maquenzi, and Aleia Rachide Agy<sup>1</sup>

## SUMMARY

This text describes the difficulties of socio-economic integration of Mozambican youth, in general, and of the Northeast of Cabo Delgado, in particular, explaining that their vulnerability in accessing quality public services puts them at a competitive disadvantage in relation to people from outside the region, in a context of aggressive capital penetration. At a time when thousands of displaced people seek for returning to their places of origin, it is important to give particular importance to investment in public services for young people related to education and health, and support for business creation, but also the institutionalization of spaces for social participation. The stabilization of the North of the Country in terms of security is strongly conditioned by the ability to create mechanisms for the citizens socio-economic inclusion, particularly the younger ones.

## INTRODUCTION

From the mid-2010s, in the North of Cabo Delgado, a group of young people, locally called *machababos*, emerged. The concept comes from the prefix *ma* (used in many Bantu languages for plural designation) and from the Arabic word *shabaab*, which designates youth. From the beginning, the movement was designated as a group of young people with radical and violent interpretations of Islam, with the capacity to recruit and entice other local young people. Over the last few years, multiple explanations have emerged for the origin of the conflict, emphasizing not only religious radicalism with international connections, but also poverty and social exclusion, socio-spatial inequalities, and historical feelings of lack of protection, ethnic tensions and frustrated policies and expectations.

Throughout this text it is proposed that this phenomenon deserves to be framed in a broader perspective, related to the socio-economic conditions of youth, in general, and of sub-Saharan Africa and Mozambique, in particular. In less developed countries, such as those in the region, there have been, over the last decades, phenomena of reduction in infant mortality, accompanied by the maintenance of high fertility rates<sup>2</sup>, turning into a phenomenon known as *youth bulge*, in which a large part of the population is composed by children and young people. The proliferation of young people creates enormous pressure on certain public services, namely education and maternal and childcare, on the labour market, in a bad business environment<sup>3</sup>, high levels of

---

<sup>1</sup> This text is dedicated to our colleague Aleia Rachide Agy, to whom we wish strength and courage for a quick return to our conviviality.

<sup>2</sup> Rural areas of Mozambique, in general, and the province of Cabo Delgado, in particular, have high fertility rates. In 2007, the average fertility rate in rural areas in Mozambique was 6 children per woman, decreasing to 5.5 in 2017, remaining among the highest in the world. National average values decreased from 5.7 children per woman to 5.2 during the month period.

<sup>3</sup> In 2020, Mozambique ranked 138<sup>th</sup> (out of 190) countries in the Doing Business ranking (WBG, 2020), down three places from the previous year. In the analysis dimensions of "opening a business", "access to credit", "protection of minority investors" and "fulfillment of contracts", Mozambique appeared in last place among the analyzed countries in the region.

unemployment and informalisation of economic activities. In peri-urban areas and district capital towns, there is a high concentration of young people, with levels of education higher than their parents and, therefore, with greater social expectations, who compete with each other for poorly paid activities (informal vendors, motorcycle taxi, small workshops, stevedores, artisanal mining, etc.) in an emerging consumer society. Despite representing the majority of the population, it is a social group with associative deficits, little or no representation in political decision-making centres, with difficulty to organize themselves into pressure groups, capable of presenting its social concerns.

This text aims to understand the difficulties of socio-economic integration of youth in Cabo Delgado. It is about analysing the conditions of access to education, health, but also to the labour market and employment, the possibilities of consumption, access to housing, energy, and transport and, through these capacities, social reproduction. It is argued that, in a scenario of large international investment and an emerging consumer society, the difficulties of socio-economic integration of populations generate feelings of lack of protection by the State and great social dissatisfaction. Faced with the absence of channels for social participation and associative deficit, where young people can form themselves into organized groups, with interlocutors who represent them in decision-making bodies, populist and violent groups function as an outlet for social tension.

## **1. CONCEPT OF YOUTH AND INTEGRATION DYNAMICS IN CRISIS CONTEXTS**

Age categories are not a natural phenomenon, but a socially constructed one. The social construction of the concept of youth is a recent phenomenon, dating back to modernity and the industrial revolution. The demands for citizens' technical training and the necessary expansion of education (which became mandatory) formed a student population, which, in this condition, extended for several years, accentuating a gap between generations. Youth has become an intermediate social situation, between childhood and adulthood, marked by a certain instability associated with specific social problems. From the joint interaction between young people, social representations, attitudes and converging models of conduct are formed, creating their own culture and a certain social unity. This common social condition gives rise to generational interests, skilfully exploited (and manipulated), both by advertising and the consumer society, or by the various political forces in confrontation (Pais, 1990). However, this attachment to the youth condition (similar to the attachment to class) is not manifested in the same way for all young people, reflecting the heterogeneous character of youth. In fact, the existence of different class trajectories, belonging or reference groups, gender or racial conditions does not allow us to talk of a youth, but of youths, often under construction and transformation, depending on social conditions. The rigid age definitions adopted by international organizations<sup>4</sup> do not help to understand youth as a socially constructed group.

---

<sup>4</sup> The United Nations defines Youth as the age group between 15 and 24 years old; the Commonwealth from 15 to 29 years old; the CPLP from 15 to 29 years old and the African Union from 15 to 35 years old. In the Republic of Mozambique, young people are defined as any individual between the ages of 15 and 35 (MJD, 2015: 8).

Youth in African societies is still influenced by the socio-economic characteristics of the continent, marked by colonial heritages, turbulent post-colonial transitions, the effects of Structural Adjustment Programs, high levels of corruption, the fragility of infrastructure and the education system, high unemployment rates and economic vulnerability.

When explaining the difficulties of economic integration of young people, the concept of *waithood* has been used, which results from the combination of the word *wait* and the suffix *hood* (condition or temporal period). The concept was used by Diane Singerman (2007: 38) and Navtej Dhillon and Tarique Yousef (2009: 5) in their works on youth in the Middle East, and later replicated by Alcinda Honwana (2013) in several African countries, seeking to describe the transition process from adolescence to adulthood<sup>5</sup>. The term reflects the "*state of limbo*" experienced by young people, faced with the difficulties of integration into the labour market, obtaining income and, thereby, the possibility of consumption and social reproduction, or even civic participation. Unable to become economically independent, young adults are not considered social adults, living, involuntarily, a prolonged adolescence, which constitutes a new way of being an adult. The concept is applicable to all areas of the globe, although it is more evident in countries where *youth bulge* phenomena occur, accompanied by the State's inability to promote public policies that promote employment and economic inclusion.

Despite the concept conveying an idea of "*passive waiting*", the behaviour of many young people expresses reactive and contesting attitudes, even in contexts of absence or limitation of formal spaces for participation. Most young people are dynamic and creative in their search for alternatives, finding new forms of survival and social interaction, exploring opportunities in informal commerce and small, odd jobs, in illegal activities, including theft, trafficking or crime. Honwana (2013) identifies, across the continent, several concepts used to designate the exploitation of precarious opportunities and lack of prospects for job stability, such as the expression "*desenrasca*" ("*make do*", in Mozambique), the term "*débrouillage*" ("*unrolling*" used in Senegal and Tunisia) or "*just getting by*" (in South Africa). Accelerated urbanization was accompanied by phenomena of de-industrialization, as well as of emergence of low-meritocratic societies, based on the exploitation of *boladas* ("*to make a killing*")<sup>6</sup>, taking away from young people the guarantees that investment in education is rewarded. Many young people resort to temporary jobs that appear, most of the time, unrelated to their training. In face of uncertainty, the capacity of future planning has decreased, so that a large part of the peri-urban youth or the district headquarters villages focuses on the present and on daily survival. In a scenario of reduced profitability of agriculture and of "de-agrarianisation of societies" (Bryceson, 1993:3), there are phenomena among rural young people of increased pluriactivity, complementing agricultural activity with commerce, exploitation of natural resources (wood, minerals, etc.) or provision of services, establishing circular movements with urban centres and district headquarters (Farré, 2016; Feijó, 2017).

---

<sup>5</sup> Honwana (2013: 32) identifies similar terms to describe the single adult male living with his parents who has not reached the age social adulthood, such as the term *youthman* (used in West Africa) or the term zulu *umngolo* (used in South Africa).

<sup>6</sup> In popular Mozambican slang, a *bolada* designates a stroke of luck, an opportunity to provide a well-paid service, usually of short duration, both in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. The expression *bolar* is even defined in the *Minidicionário de Moçambicanismos* (Dias, 2002: 67), which refers to "*Making, executing (...) [or] selling*", as, for example, "*To make a deal*" or "*to deal some things*".

Despite the poor quality of education and the difficulty of professional integration, today's young people are more educated than their parents, having greater contact with the global world. The penetration of social media (mobile phones, internet, television, advertising) connect young people in their micro-societies to symbols of global culture (of which they become enthusiastic consumers), contrasting with the difficulties of accessing basic resources, promoting social tensions. Post-colonial studies have demonstrated how, through music, IT, or social networks (Israel, 2014; Siteo, 2018), young people have been presenting their social problems, exerting pressure and confronting the *status quo*.

This social condition ends up having an impact on gender relations and on the very structure of the family. A woman's ability to achieve social status is dependent on a man's ability to surpass the state of *waithood* (Singerman, 2007; Honwana, 2013), so that many young women become involved with married men, attracted by material goals (Balane, 2021). Men's difficulty in finding a job and supporting their families ends up having an impact not only on gender identities, but also on the stability of the marital group<sup>7</sup>, resulting in breakups and divided families, cohabitation with parents, children raised by uncles and grandparents or in the increased pressure on women to find the means of subsistence to raise their children.<sup>8</sup>


This whole problem takes on a greater dimension if we consider the phenomenon of *youth bulge*, experienced in many situations in sub-Saharan Africa. The term is used to designate the process of mortality rates decreasing, accompanied by the persistence of high birth rates, contributing to the rejuvenation of the demographic pyramid.

Graphics 1 and 2 describe the Mozambican demographic pyramid, illustrating its very young nature: in 2017, 56% of the Mozambican population was under 20 years old. The large base of the demographic pyramid exerts a deep pressure on the educational and maternal and child health systems, increasing the State's difficulties in developing quality public services, competitive and capable to respond to job market demands.

---

<sup>7</sup> Migratory labor to South Africa or *chibalo* (forced labor) had already had an impact on the African family. Since the end of the XIX century hundreds of thousands of young people moved to large plantations, industrial areas or large cities, while women and children remained in rural areas (CEA, 1998). However, breakups caused by unemployment, poverty, alcoholism, HIV or crime currently reach unprecedented levels, affecting almost half of South Africa children (Honwana, 2013:38).

<sup>8</sup> The expansion of education, the emerging consumer society and the rising cost of living, as well as greater exposure to the modern world, are other factors responsible for the insertion of many women into the labour market, including those integrated in gender equality policies.



Slight decreases in the fertility rate (especially among the urban population) are beginning to cause slight changes in the demographic pyramid. Growth projections indicate that the age group between 20 and 29 will increase, both in percentage and, above all, in absolute terms, with an expectation that it will reach 6.9 million individuals in 2027, increasing the challenge of job creation and economic inclusion.

## 2. METHODOLOGY

To meet the objectives of understanding the difficulties of youth socio-economic integration in Cabo Delgado, it was sought to collect speeches from young people about their problems and experiences, representations of their problems, giving voice to those who do not have many formal spaces for participation. In pursuit of this objective 82 individuals residing in the municipality of Pemba, in the districts of Montepuez, Nangade, Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia and Muidumbe were interviewed. The selection of these locations is explained by the fact that they are located in conflict zones or are marked by great uncertainty, but also because they reflect the ethnolinguistic diversity of the region. The interviews were conducted in the mother languages of the interviewed, namely Makonde (37), Makua (31), Mwani (13) and Portuguese (1). As a way to gather different sensitivities about the difficulties of socio-economic integration of youth in Cabo Delgado, young people residing in rural (31) and urban areas (51), men (52) and women (30) were interviewed. The majority of respondents were young people aged between 21 and 30 years (48), in addition to 6 respondents between 17 and 20 years old, and 28 aged between 31 and 40 years. Interviewees' school level is relatively higher than the provincial average, with only 7 being illiterate, 29 interviewees (more than a third) having grade 7, 11 to 10<sup>th</sup> grade, 20 with 12<sup>th</sup> grade and 8 attended or completed higher education. The sample was constituted by convenience, depending on the availability of respondents, but seeking to be representative of the social diversity existing in the region. To this end, it was sought to diversify individuals in terms of area of residence, sex, age, mother language and level of education. The sample is described in table 1.

**Table 1: Sociodemographic description of the sample**

Profile Description		District of residence of the Interviewee						Sub-Total	TOTAL
		Mocímboa da Praia	Muidumbe	Macomia	Montepuez	Nangade	Pemba		
Residence Zone	Rural	1	5	1	4	20	0	31	82
	Urban	15	0	0	15	0	21	51	
Gender	Male	9	5	0	11	10	17	52	82
	Female	7	0	1	8	10	4	30	
Age	17 - 20	0	2	1	1	2	0	6	82
	21 - 30	6	3	0	18	18	3	48	
	31 - 40	10	0	0	0	0	18	28	
Mother tongue	Makonde	11	5	0	3	18	0	37	82
	Makua	1	0	0	15	2	13	31	
	Mwani	4	0	1	0	0	8	13	
	Portuguese	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
Academic Level	illiterate	3	2	0	1	1	0	7	82
	up to grade 5th	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	
	up to grade 7th	3	1	1	2	5	17	29	
	up to grade 10th	4	1	0	2	3	1	11	
	up to grade 12th	6	1	0	7	5	1	20	
	Technical education	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
	Graduate	0	0	0	6	0	2	8	

The interviews were carried out, throughout the year 2020, by young people residing in the respective districts and speakers of local languages, who had the task of identifying young people for be interviewed.

Although a demographic range between 15 to 35 years old was defined (according to the Mozambican official definition of "youth"), during data analysis, three situations were identified in which respondents were aged between 37 and 39 years. Due to the fact that they were considered "young" by the young local interviewers, it was decided to keep these individuals in the sample. With the consent of the interlocutors, the interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed to text, and translated into Portuguese.

In addition, in April 2021 interviews were carried out with several representatives of the health and education sectors, both at provincial and district levels. In the districts of Pemba, Montepuez, Metuge, Mecúfi and Chiúre, teachers, doctors, nurses, district directors of District Services for Women's Health and Social Action, the District Services for Education, Youth and Sports were interviewed. The interviews were complemented with field observations, namely in informal markets, with the aim of observing economic activities, schools, and hospitals, in order to assess the quality of public services (class sizes, classrooms, waiting times, number of users, infrastructure conditions, staff on the job, among others).

At the same time, secondary data were used, collected from the 2019 and 2020 district reports (which were available<sup>9</sup>), namely, the Social Economic Plan and District Budget (PESOD) and annual reports from the District Services for Education, Youth and Technology (SDEJT) and District Services of Health, Women and Social Action (SDSMAS).

The analytical dimensions of socio-economic integration relate to access to education, health, land and housing, energy, transport, employment, income, and consumption. The dimensions analysed are part of the concept of multidimensional poverty (education, health, housing, energy, and access to durable goods) and income poverty. The inclusion of the transport dimension is justified by the importance of geographic mobility for accessing public services, income generation and socio-economic inclusion.

### **3. DIFFICULTIES OF SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF YOUTH IN CABO DELGADO**

#### **3.1. Access to education**

The problems in the education sector are common in almost all provinces of the country, especially in rural areas. While in the country's capital and main urban centres numerous private and international schools emerge, in rural areas the only alternative are the precarious public schools, largely without classrooms and furniture, with high student-teacher ratios. Cabo Delgado is no exception. In 2019, there was a high deficit of classroom desks in districts such as Montepuez (3.898), Nangade (1.217) and city of Pemba (1.272). The student to teacher ratio in primary education reached, in some districts, 74 students per teacher, reaching 84 students per teacher in secondary education. The quantitative growth in the number of schools enrolments<sup>10</sup> was accompanied by serious problems in the quality of education. In the field, teachers are unmotivated and with difficulties in writing, reading, mathematic calculus, planning and pedagogical execution; little or no school inspection by the provincial and district education services (too centralized and with few human, technical and financial resources for field trips); by instituting a semi-automatic progression system (which reduces investment in learning assessment and discourages learning effort); by the reduced monitoring of the children by their guardians, already marked by illiteracy. All these factors contribute to low levels of learning on the part of children, low levels of proficiency in the Portuguese language at the end of grade 5,

---

<sup>9</sup> The military insecurity and the destruction of several district headquarters villages resulted in the abandonment of the State administration, which resulted in the respective inability to produce documents and statistical reports with economic and social development indicators.

<sup>10</sup> In Montepuez district, the number of students increased from 64,047 students in 2019 to 69,836 students in 2020. In the city of Pemba, the number of students increased from 72,759 to 84,385 students in 2019 and 2020, respectively (GDM, 2019). ; 2020; GDP, 2019; 2020).

reading and mathematical calculation deficiencies, as demonstrated in international reports (Kellaghan, *et al.*, 2009: 113-115; Macatane, 2013: 20). The interviewees' reports denounce the reduced public investment in the education system, which is heavily dependent on the contributions of the families, as well as the lack of motivation and corruption of the teaching staff, locally called "starved" and with an opportunistic and promiscuous behaviour. However, the teacher is also represented as a victim of a system that neglects education services:

- "[...] *It is the government that makes this to happen; every day the government asks for support and is supported [for the construction of classrooms]. We, the people of Cabo Delgado, cannot see where this support is going; I think [the population] in the South can see, as the "head" is there*" (Male, Makua, Urbano, Pemba).

- "[...] *this thing of paying [the teacher] is increasing; what makes it worse is that teachers go to school hungry. When they arrive at school, they just sit and the students do not study, and, as the teachers go hungry, they tell the students 'to pass the class you have to take so much [money]' and the student gives*" (Female, Mwani, Urbano, Pemba);

- "*When you're a woman, he says 'if you want to pass, ask me to date'. If he likes you, he asks you out on a date; if he doesn't like, he asks for money, saying 'I ask for money so you can pass'. To men, he only asks for money [...]"* (Female, Makonde, 20 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Unemployed).

- "*It's too much, corruption in money, or sex, as to the girls. Teachers say you don't go to next grade without having sex with me' or 'you don't get through this grade without giving me money'; so, this happens much more here, in these districts where we are in Cabo Delgado*" (Female, Makua, 22 years old, Urbano, Montepuez, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Peasant).

In addition to the low quality of education, another problem is school dropout. In several schools analysed in the south of the province, it was found that only about a third of students enrolled in grade 1 complete the first cycle of primary education. The increase in international demand for wood and precious stones has diverted many young people to furtive activities, making it possible to generate uncertain, but substantial at times, economic income. Among the local youth, the emerging reference models become fortunate young people, who were successful in the extraction of precious stones, to the detriment of school investment. In coastal areas, young men tend to engage, from an early age, in economic activities that provide a quick monetary return, such as fishing and commerce, as a form of immediate relief from situations of poverty:

- "*given that currently have precious stones [...] many students drop out from school and go to the artisanal mining, some with the intend of buying something, some [...] see a friend who already has a motorbike; so, that's what they always want to have [...]. Many students are no longer interested in their studies. There are few who study and they do it because they have to obey to their parents*" (Male, Makua, 26 years old, Urbano, Montepuez, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Merchant);

- "*Those who have more difficulties can well see for the Mwanis. This has to do with their own upbringing; they have more difficulties; they grow up learning that life is made through the fish business; then, they grow more like this and, when they reach a level a little more like this, it becomes difficult to think about studying; so, for them, education creates a complication*

*due to their own education, their own family life"* (Female, Makonde, 27 years old, Urbano, Montepuez, Graduate, Student);

- *"Some, like us [Mwanis], in the 1<sup>st</sup> grade, didn't see the gains; then, we followed the mother to Messalo, to cultivate the land. We even considered school as a setback because, even studying, we didn't see how to have a job through school. [...] we disregard the school in favour of fishing and collecting crabs for sale and immediate profits. They didn't have reference examples of school-generated earnings of other young people"* (Male, Mwani, 34 years old, Rural, Mocimboa da Praia, Illiterate, Farmer).

Faced with the reduced investment in public education and as a way of maintaining cultural identity, for decades the population of the coast found in *madrassas* an alternative to formal education. On the other hand, the social importance given to *arrussi* (marriage with virginity) continues to be responsible for premature marriages and the early school drop out by young girls<sup>11</sup>. In the last decade, there has been an expansion of the educational offer at the primary and secondary levels in many areas of the coast. However, most teachers, especially at the secondary level, do not come from the ethnolinguistic groups of the coast, removing local reference models from young people that encourage them to invest in education.

Difficulties in accessing education become more evident at secondary and higher levels. The distances to the education centres and the lack of financial conditions (to pay enrolment fees and school supplies, transport or accommodation) appear as the main impediments for rural youth. In this scenario, many young people are prevented from progressing in their studies, making it difficult for them to integrate into the modern sector of the economy:

- *"The difficulties are enormous; initially, there was a problem of poverty, many families did not have the money to take their children to school. Worse now, when a child is forced to go to the classroom in a uniform [...] Another thing that is related to the lack of money: a child can finish 7<sup>th</sup> grade and the possibility of paying tuition doesn't exist, because one can find a father with 10 children"* (Male, Makonde, 29 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 5<sup>th</sup>, Peasant);

- *"The University is money, [...] you yourself, when you look at yourself, you don't have a back or a front, no matter how much you have been approved to enter university to study, you need to have a job; with lack of funds you do not enter the University. Therefore, many gave up and they all are here on the beach, fishing, great students with their 12<sup>th</sup> grade; they are all drinking the salt water."* (Female, Mwani, 29 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, grade 9<sup>th</sup>, Unemployed).

---

<sup>11</sup>Although it can be understood as a strategy for adolescents to escape family control, albeit revealing a subaltern identity construction, premature marriages are also used to explain high rates of female school dropout. They are even understood as a practice that leads to the exclusion of the exercise of human rights, with an impact on early pregnancy and risk of obstetric fistulas. On the influence of premature marriages on school dropout in Mozambique, see Osório and Macuácu (2013), César *et al.* (2014) or Chauma and Alves (2020).

The problems of access to education have worsened with the beginning of the armed insurgency and with COVID 19. The destruction of numerous schools in coastal areas, the flight of teachers (generally the main victims of the armed groups) and the increase in the needs of survival were responsible for the widespread paralysation of education in the northeast of Cabo Delgado (Matias, 2020) and for a migratory movement towards the south of the province, saturating its school park. In addition, the restrictions caused by COVID 19 have seriously damaged the academic years of 2020 and 2021.

### 3.2. Health conditions

Despite the public investment made in the health sector, expanding the health network, there is still a lack of medical staff<sup>12</sup>, equipment for clinical analysis and medicines on the ground. The discourses of the young people interviewed highlighted, above all, two aspects. Firstly, they highlighted the problems of professionalism, laxity, lack of sensitivity and unkindness of the medical staff towards patients, translated into the slowness of care. Regarding the health staff, it is alleged that they charge undue amounts to the population and that they divert medicines, later found for sale in informal markets<sup>13</sup>:

- “[...] *only* [goes to the health centre] *to be present. When the doctor arrives at the hospital, he looks at those in the waiting room; first, shows off to the patients and wants them to ask for favours. To be served, you must call him to a corner and give him credit. It’s normal to go in the morning and come back the next day just because of stomach pains*” (Male, Mwani, Urbano, Pemba);

- *“Because the workers themselves, sometimes, when they understand, start working at 9 am or 10 am. Sometimes, the patient dies at the hands of family members, for not taking care of him”* (Female, Makonde, 24 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 10<sup>th</sup>, Social activist);

- *“Nangade Hospital does not work [...] because, when a person goes and stays in the queue, it turns out that the workers do not care about the patient”* (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 10<sup>th</sup>, Peasant);

- *“[...] the nurses despise us a lot; they despise us very much when we arrive there sick. They don’t call you, they get angry at you instead of caressing you; they start to getting angry with you right away. They become angry without you having done anything”* (Female, Makonde, 27 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 5<sup>th</sup>, Peasant).

---

<sup>12</sup> According to the Economic and Social Plan and District Budget reports, in 2019, some districts in the province (Montepuez, Mocimboa da Praia, Namuno, Nangade and Metuge) had a ratio of doctors per inhabitant much higher than that stipulated by the World Health Organization. (one doctor per 10,000 inhabitants), ranging from one doctor per 61,986 inhabitants (in Mocimboa da Praia) to one doctor per 136,557 inhabitants (in Namuno). Observations in hospitals and health centers in Pemba and Montepuez reveal the existence of large dozens of patients and reduced medical staff, resulting in long waiting lines.

<sup>13</sup> A little throughout the province, but less so in the city of Pemba, it was reported the phenomena of sale of medicines in informal markets, acquired from technicians assigned to the district health services, diverted from the health units. After the beginning of the armed conflict and with the fear that the medicines would be diverted to support the group of insurgents, the control of these products became more effective. This reality is in line with studies carried out in other areas of the country (Mosse and Cortez, 2006), where situations of bribery, theft of medicines and equipment, weaknesses in procurement and lack of inspection were identified.

Secondly, the lack of human resources (doctors, nurses and clinical analysis technicians) was highlighted, as well as hospital equipment and medicines:

- *"The doctor at my hospital does not have equipment to work; I say so, because even instruments that they use to operate someone, they don't have. I mean, all those instruments and materials that are important to save lives, they don't have"* (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 10<sup>th</sup>, Peasant);

- *"When you get there and say you are sick, they ask you where it hurts [...] They just take the medicine and give it to you. They don't do clinical analysis. Now, saying that they want to improve the population's health, is not true"* (Male, Makonde, 35 years old, Urbano, Mocimboa da Praia, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Unemployed);

- *"[...] of Corona virus (...) they don't even test us. Other hospitals, such as those in Mueda, they test and we, here in Muidumbe, do not. You, when you get there and say you have a headache, they give you the same medicine. When you say, I have malaria, they give the same medicines"* (Male, Makonde, 30 years old, Rural, Muidumbe, Illiterate, Farmer).

The situation worsened with the armed conflict, due to the destruction and looting of hospital units and the flight of medical staff. Population displacements due to the conflict were responsible for the saturation of the health system in the South of the province, largely helped by international humanitarian organizations. There are accusations of medicines diversion from hospitals by health personnel, or reports of assaults to vehicles transporting medical material, carried out by the *machababos*<sup>14</sup>:

- *"currently, due to the war situation that we are experiencing, none of the hospitals are working. When you get sick, now, you must find a way to treat yourself"* (Male, Makonde, 21 years old, Urbano, Mocimboa da Praia, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Unemployed);

- *"but after these friends entered the forest, [...] even medicines in hospitals are lacking, because they are always on the move. But here, at [district] headquarters, they still haven't entered. But they are confusing. When they see that this car is going to Nangade with medicines, they steal it so they can use it in the bush"* (Male, Makonde, 26 years old, Rural, Nangade, grade 5<sup>th</sup>, Unemployed).

### 3.3 Access to land and housing

High unemployment rates, a largely informal economy, low real wages, lack of public support and capital have a profound impact on the housing sector, generally resolved by resorting to self-construction (especially in rural and peri-urban areas), using natural materials (vegetables and woody, and soil). In addition, there are technical and financial difficulties, faced by the municipalities in expanding infrastructure for self-construction with security of land tenure.

In terms of access to land and housing, the interviewees' reports varied depending on their area of residence. Young people living in urban areas presented the greatest difficulties. Population densification, the development of a land market, with particularly inflated prices, especially as a result of large foreign investment, make it difficult to access land for construction and leave the parents' house. The alternative consists of population densification in the areas closer to the city

---

<sup>14</sup> Interviews with abducted women show that one of the preferred targets of *machababos* are health professionals (who are usually kidnapped and enlisted in the ranks of the rebels), as well as drug warehouses (Feijó, 2021).

centres or in the search for land in areas further away from urban centres, lacking infrastructure and public services, namely roads, transport, education and health. As a young Makua from Montepuez said "(...) *many people do not want to leave here to live in Marmonte or Narió; many want to live in the city. That's why it's difficult, we make it difficult ourselves*" (Male, Makua, 28 years old, Urbana, Montepuez, Illiterate, Handyman). In the largest urban centres, the difficulties to enter into an active life and to acquire land for construction, translate into prolonging the residence at the family house, in a close relationship of dependence, enhancing family tensions and conflicts:

- *"If a child grows, his thinking also changes; when he grows up and continues to live at his parents' house, then problems arise, [...] because he already thinks about having a friend, walking whenever he wants. Living with his parents, he may be subject to limited hours out of the house; so, that brings problems"* (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Rural, Nangade, 10<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *"How are you going to do? You end up living perhaps among your relatives who already have a plot of land, a house; they end up infiltrating there and continue to be people who are not by themselves, who don't get away with it. They end up being bossed around while they are old enough to be responsible for themselves. But, because of some difficulties, they end up staying with their families"* (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, grade 12<sup>th</sup>, Teacher).

Like in other urban areas of the country (Nielsen, 2011), in the municipal areas of Cabo Delgado province, marked by the unavailability of plant materials (poles, grass, reeds, bamboo, mud), house construction is a slow and unfinished process, subjected to undertaking irregular odd jobs or obtaining family support, for the purchase of construction materials:

- *"[...] most people sell the land; not everyone has access to land, [...] [especially] young people who don't have money or who can't easily get money to build; [young people] have difficulties to build due to lack of money [...]"* (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Teacher);

- *"[...] they are young, mostly without a job; then, they end up doing some odd jobs to get a value, so that they can then build. So, if, by chance, you don't have something to do, it's really difficult to build; that's why we ended up seeing a lot of homeless young people"* (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Teacher);

- *"[...] I go to my parents to ask for support, they will help me, or I will ask any other family member and then I will build"* (Male, Makonde, 26 years old, Rural, Nangade, 5<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed).

In rural areas, with lower population density and greater presence of forests, the construction of housing is facilitated by the greater possibility of accessing plant material, although in precarious conditions. The situation was reversed with the increase in insecurity, making the search for wood poles a risky activity. The constant fear of attacks and the constant need to escape were reflected in housing construction and maintenance capabilities:

- “[...] *to build, [young people] use precarious materials. We are talking about bamboo, sticks, grass, which you don't need to buy. For example, parents go to the bush, cut sticks, bamboo. Mothers also go into the bush, cut grass; so, they help their children to build*” (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *“There are problems for the construction because there are no poles. It is dangerous to go into the bush due to fear. To build, you have to cut sticks and, in the bush, you don't go in anymore because of the fear you have of the people called al-Shabaab”* (Female, Mwani, 20 years old, Rural, Macomia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- “[...] *In the current situation, to build or have an occupation, there is no time because we all have to flee constantly in fear*” (Male, Mwani, 34 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, 7<sup>th</sup> grade, Rescuer).

### 3.4 Access to energy

Notwithstanding the electrification efforts made over the last decade, the reality is that access to EDM's energy remains mainly the privilege of municipal areas or district headquarters villages<sup>15</sup>. In most of the territory, access to energy is only possible using flashlights and solar panel systems. In the places with access to EDM's energy, the interviewees' reports emphasize the high installation and consumption costs, as well as illegal charges from the public company's technicians. In a scenario of great opportunism, the strategies found are related to clandestine energy connections, to the detriment of EDM and the quality of the network:

- *“At the beginning, I said that in these places there is always corruption [...] And there they wanted 3.500 meticaís for a contract; but within the 3.500 they charged more money. [...] reaching 10.000 meticaís. [...] But, within that 10.000, you may not get that energy, they eat the money, and you go after them until you get tired and you don't have the energy in your house. Because of corruption”* (Male, Makua, 37 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *“Here, to have access to energy, it is difficult. Because the EDM office is in the city of Montepuez and it is 40 km from here to there [...] Many young people steal, some go out with their 400 meticaís, buy wires, and climb the power pole and make clandestine connections. And, when the EDM technicians arrive, they cut the clandestine connections and, later, the clandestine customers bribe the technicians and restore the energy again”* (Male, Makua, 26 years old, Rural, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Trader).

---

<sup>15</sup> Data from the 2017 Census show that the highest percentage of access to energy from Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) is registered in municipal areas, namely in the city of Pemba (71.4%), Montepuez (35.4%), Ibo (34, 7%) and Mocimboa da Praia (17.8%). Conversely, 13 of the 58 administrative posts in Cabo Delgado province still do not benefit from energy from EDM.

Due to the possibility of using refrigeration systems and generating business for the sale of food products, access to illumination (allowing the performance of other activities) and to information (radio and television), access to energy is a clear indicator of differentiation and, therefore, becoming a highly valued service:

- *“Someone who has energy in his house, he looks for a freezer and puts it in his house and that helps for many things. He puts water for people to buy and it can also conserve fish or anything else. Make maheu [homemade yogurt] and put it there; any business you put there to be able to buy curry. Therefore, it brings numerous benefits to society. And also, the person has access to news. When someone has energy, he automatically gets a TV, watch it and stay abreast of everything that happens every day in the world. So, these things bring income to society due to this energy”* (Male, Makonde, 35 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed).

### 3.5 Transport access and availability

Studies on transport services in rural Mozambican contexts (Dadá, 2018; Ibraimo and Feijó, 2018) have identified a set of problems related to the high cost of fares, the scarcity of operators, irregularity, unpredictability and opportunism of drivers, poor roads, insecurity in transport and deregulation of the sector. Transport difficulties in rural areas have an impact on the access to public services and markets, aggravating the isolation of populations. As in the rest of the country, the availability of transport in Cabo Delgado is one of the major problems for the population. From the 2010s onwards, the involvement of tens of thousands of young people in timber and gemstone exploitation activities allowed the acquisition of numerous motor vehicles, witnessing a general increase in motorcycles and transport vehicles, stimulating commercial exchanges. Due to the mobility that it allows for medium distances and the possibility for transporting people and goods, the motorbike has acquired a high social value, in a scenario where public transport is characterized by irregularity, uncertainty and insecurity:

- *“In terms of transport, we live in a district where we do not have intercity transport; we can only depend on motorcycles, known as motorcycle taxis, which do not always meet our capabilities. So, at some point we need. In cities we travel on foot because of costs. The reality is this. We only have public transport to go from one district to another or over long distances”* (Male, Makua, 29 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, preventive medicine technician);

In the district of Montepuez, young people’s mobility was strongly affected by inspections of the artisanal miner activities, with profound impacts on their ability to generate income:

- *“We, young people, when we analyse the issue of transport, I think the difficulty lies in the fact that we have these precious stones, and the number of people here in the village has increased. There are a lot of people, there are several types of businesses currently. Transporters also make business with minibus. Hence, they raise transport prices to earn a good profit margin. When they raise prices, we, the poor, who have nothing, who depended on precious stones, which they are currently banned; then, it makes it difficult for us to access to those transports”* (Male, Makua, 26 years old, Rural, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Merchant).

The beginning of the armed conflict resulted in the worsening of transport conditions. The increase in violence represented the theft and destruction of thousands of motorcycles, increasing traffic risks and reducing the number of operators. The consequences were the increase in prices, conditioning the flow of people and goods, isolating populations, and paralyzing economic activities (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2019: 3). Reports refer to an increase of police and military checkpoints, where elements of the Defence and Security Forces (DSF) demanded identification documents and travel guides, resulting in extortion and illicit collections, increasing travel costs. With the setbacks caused at the military checkpoints (where there are reports of violence against populations), travel becomes more time-consuming and unsafe:

- *"Transports are not equitable, because sometimes, when we take transport, you will see that you are told to stop at the control. They ask for documents and you hand in. 'I ask for a declaration', in the past they did not ask for a declaration, they asked for ID; but now they want a declaration [from the neighbourhood]. Besides, they don't just ask for those papers. Other times, you pay money when you don't have money. Now, this way of taking transport I won't say is better. It is not better. We travel with uncertainty. You cannot leave here for Mueda with 300 meticaís; you have to add at least 50 meticaís to be able to pay the police along the way (Male, Makonde, 35 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, Unemployed)";*

- *"From cars and motorcycles, now, they do not circulate, they do not circulate well. Many leave them in their homes, because of this situation. When they catch you with a motorcycle, they catch you and charge you money. Bosses are very fond of money. So, some leave their vehicles at home, because they don't have the money to pay the authorities. You find about 10 controls for a single road" (Female, Makonde, 27 years old, Rural, Nangade, 5<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);*

- *"Now that the war has entered, even for someone to go out for a walk, you have to be brave; wherever you're going they'll take money from you. When you ask, [the FDS] say you don't have documents. That's what we must complain about right now. (...) Some, when you show the documents, ask you for money again, about 200 meticaís, knowing that you showed them the documents. We live like that" (Male, Makonde, 30 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, 10<sup>th</sup> grade, Merchant);*

- *"But now, the way they make us stop when you leave Mocimboa, every village you find must stop (...) all these places only have military personnel. Others suddenly come out in the middle of the bush and order the car to stop, and you are amazed. Are these our brothers or our enemies? They stop and start asking for documents. Other times, they tell you to get out of the car and tell us to lay down on the ground, they grab your documents and keep them. Now, what do they ask next? They ask for a declaration. Some people go from here to Palma, back and forth, ask for a declaration, ask you, 'why are you walking around without a declaration? Where is the declaration?' He replied, 'I don't have a declaration, I only have an ID'. So, they would say 'cut straw and sweep here'. If you don't sweep, they'll tell you to bend over and you'll get chamboco [beaten up]. After staying there for about an hour, you were ordered to get in the car. There, ahead, the work was the same until the destination. The place you used to arrive at 2 pm, now you arrive at 3 or 4 pm" (Female, Makonde, 34 years old, Urban, Mocimboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, mentor mother)".*

### 3.6. Access to employment and income

#### a) Employment opportunities before and after the armed attacks

In a scenario of great international investment and public announcements of job creation and well-being, in the Northeast of Cabo Delgado there was an inflation of social expectations. Being capital-intensive investment, the *billions* of dollars of investment announced did not turn into a proportional growth in the number of jobs, mostly retained outside the country or in the large urban centres of Mozambique. At the same time, attempts were made to formalize the exploitation of natural resources, interrupting informal circuits of exploitation of wood, precious stones, and ivory. This situation has affected tens of thousands of young people, in a scenario where agriculture is not a viable alternative, leaving countless individuals unemployed or pushing them into deviant activities. On the ground, a feeling of threat from abroad and lack of protection from the State develops, especially when it concerns to the lack of employment, presented as one of the main sources of discontent among young people in the province.

In a *youth bulge* scenario, the lack of employment was the problem most emphasized by young people throughout their discourses. Respondents highlight the lack of formal jobs and the lack of protection of local youth in relation to competition from outside. Secondly, they emphasize the opportunistic and arbitrary nature of recruitment and selection processes, as well as the inequalities of some local ethnolinguistic groups.

The absence of formal jobs and unfulfilled job promises are an aspect that deeply affects local youth, confirming the lack of relationship between large investment projects and the local economic fabric. Despite the increase in investment, the informal activities of the economy (uncertain and poorly paid), persist as the only alternatives for local youth:

*- "Rare opportunities. Practically, the opportunities here are, if I have to define it in percentage terms, I will talk about something around 5% job facilities. This causes the population to end up adopting personal measures to be able to produce. As it is a district with minerals, it has a majority based on artisanal mining and, another part of the youth, are taxi drivers. This is, unfortunately or fortunately, the reality of the district. But this is due to lack of employment"* (Male, Makua, 29 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Technician).

A feeling that is largely present in the speeches and that crosses all ethnolinguistic groups is related to the lack of protection of the locals in relation to the competition by workers from abroad or from the South of the country, commonly known as "*maputecos*". Assuming the inexistence of local qualifications, the reports emphasize the lack of public investment in education<sup>16</sup> and the absence of pressure mechanisms for the constitution of public policies to defend local people. According to the interviewees, the best jobs are filled from outside the region, leaving for the locals the socially less prestigious opportunities (guards, servants, cleaning), poorly paid and subordinated to the power of the former. These phenomena generated intense conflict, particularly in the district of Palma, due to the works to install the gas projects and inequalities in the reward systems:

---

<sup>16</sup> In only seven of the 17 districts of the province of Cabo Delgado there is a center for technical and professional training. Data from the 2017 Census show that, even in urban centers, the population with the 12<sup>th</sup> grade completed does not exceed 12%, with the percentage clearly lower in rural areas.

- "(...) No. Those that manage are mostly young people who come from the central and southern areas. (...) They are the ones who come to work, yes, because jobs, when they first arrive, must come from Maputo. After they sign there, they are sent here. So, when they sign there, you find those who are divided there and, when they arrive here, they leave those jobs for guards, sweeping, washing dishes, only. Work is really divided there, and we are just keeping the tail while the owners are at work (Male, Makonde, 21 years old, Urbano, Mocímboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed)".

- "(...) I'll give you an example. We, Mozambicans, didn't want the other to have, can't you see? When businessmen arrived to the district asking for people to work, they didn't want them, they brought them from there in Maputo, don't know where from, to come here to work. They didn't want local people, they wanted vientes [outsiders]. That's why they started to have problems, vientes and locals started to argue. We asked ourselves 'do we not have the strength? why do people from Maputo, Niassa come to work here in the district of Mocímboa da Praia? There are no people here?' This happened, I will give an example, it happened in the district of Palma, in the oil sector. They brought people from Maputo to Palma, people from Palma, owners of the land, when they went out to ask for a job, they didn't accept. They wanted vientes. From there, problems began to arise. That's why we couldn't get a job, they brought them from there, in Maputo (Male, Makua, 37 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant)".

The feeling of discrimination is extended in terms of access to the best income. The discourses emphasize that the best paid jobs are occupied by the "vientes". Allegedly, the salary differences are structured in the extra benefits that displaced staff receive (including in terms of accommodation and food), in different qualifications, but also in the prejudice of employers towards the populations of the North:

- "if an employee leaves Maputo and comes here to work, they differentiate their salaries. Why? They claim they took a person from one province to another. But, in my opinion, it should not be so. Because if we look at it, most companies, these in-coming employees, are provided with accommodation, food; they give everything. The natives do not. Why do they differ in salaries if the vientes have this facility for accommodation and food? Why? This is what we often notice. Vientes have higher salaries than natives" (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, Vocational technical education, Student);

- "Because I think they count, as is a viente, don't have a house, don't have a place, they pay more to have access to rent a house, food, sustenance, I don't know what. So, vientes earn more than natives. (...) An example, if Mozambique pays minimum wage to workers, then they already know that this one is of the Makua race, did not study, let's suppose it's a simple person, here they call what..., let's suppose [at Montepuez Rubi Mining], they call them some macatana [a group of people with machetes], who is an alpha<sup>17</sup> who has a weapon, I don't know what... that must work. What do they do, being a macatana Makua from Cabo Delgado I'm not going to pay him the minimum wage. I can pay less. Now, this one, who is from Maputo, more civilized, who has more knowledge, they pay the minimum wage" (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant).

---

<sup>17</sup> Security guard, after the security company named Alpha Segurança.

In a scenario of intense competition for access to scarce resources, many speeches refer to the inequality of access to employment among the populations of Cabo Delgado themselves. In line with previous findings (Israel, 2006; Santos, 2010; Feijó, 2020), stigmatization discourses mainly affect Mwanis in Mocímboa da Praia. In several reports, a feeling of injustice towards the Makonde majority stands out:

- *"Well, they were Makonde, Makua, leaving aside the Mwani, because the Mwani have their custom, don't want to work and return without having a package to take home; they don't want to go out without a package. That's why they didn't want to work; they wanted to go to sea so that at the same time they would have money. So, we, Makua, Makonde, are used to working from 1 to 30, after that we have money"* (Male, Makua, 37 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *"They were Makonde, there were party controllers who sometimes imposed that, at least three should be local, but not so much. We, like most people, were very helpful when voting [during the election period]"* (Female, Mwani, 29 years old, Urbano, Mocímboa da Praia, 9<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed).

Finally, discourses emphasize that the recruitment and selection of personnel is a predominantly flawed process, full of injustices and nepotism, involving the payment of monetary amounts. According to reports, far from emerging a meritocratic labour market, based on the valorisation of the skills of individuals, an opportunistic system is consolidated, to the detriment of those who do not have the capital to bribe the selection technicians:

- *"They are not announced live, I can say, nor to the public. Because, I think, to have a job or to have a vacancy in an institution or in one of the projects here, money is preferred. You must pay for a place. If you are going to receive 5.000 meticaís, you pay 10.000 to 15.000 meticaís for a vacancy for you to work. Now, for young people, who don't have anything, that's why they have nothing, they can't access those vacancies and the vacancies are limited. If they say from the 20<sup>th</sup> to the 25<sup>th</sup> we have vacancies, until the 21<sup>st</sup> you don't get a vacancy anymore because those who have money have already paid for the vacancies. You don't have any vacancies, because you don't have money"* (Female, Makua, 30 years old, Urbano, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *"They put up papers, like, for example, there at the hospital, they had glued a paper [an announcement] for people to apply for some job vacancies. Now, those ads are often just simple papers. They put themselves between them, they say, 'I have my nephew, put him there, I have my son, put him there, I have an uncle, put his name there'. Until the day of the interview, you find everyone there working from the family. If you meet someone from the outside, you must know that that person paid money. Without paying money, that person does not get a job"* (Female, Makonde, 34 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Mother mentor).

The possibilities of generating income worsened with the armed conflict, which profoundly affected agricultural activity and timber extraction, fishing and trade between the coast and the hinterland, as well as transport, small hotels, and restaurants. Armed violence resulted in the abandonment or destruction of the means of production (shops, workshops, tools, transport, etc.), as well as an increase in mistrust, opportunism, and extortion of goods by members of the defence and security forces:

- *"(...) but now, yields have dropped because of the war, there is nothing better to do. When someone goes to the farm, they return in a stampede (...) because of fear"* (Female, Makonde, 28 years old, Rural, Nangade, 7<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);

- *"(...) but now yields are falling because we are afraid. The fear is that I am doing something better and, on the day these young people show up, there will be nothing good. You end up losing those things. So, people would rather be idle than give other people an advantage with their effort. Because you will only be offering other people. The day they come, they'll take your things, and you'll lose out"* (Male, Makonde, 21 years old, Urbano, Mocímboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);

- *"The level is low, for example, here where we are, I want to sell my horse mackerel. Will not see any customers. All people stay at home afraid to go out. Because, if you leave the house, you may encounter a thief or a police man. Because now you can't laugh; they ask what you are laughing about"* (Male, Makua, 27 years old, Urban, Pemba, Graduate, Technician);

- *"(...) nowadays, to get 1.000 meticaís, you must be a thief. The income to live currently does not reach half when compared to the previous one [before the war]. (...) Currently, if you have 5.000 meticaís, you are ripped off on suspicion of being Al-shabaab. Worse in the Paquitequete area"* (Male, Mwani, Urbano, Pemba);

- *"(...) As soon as the war started, everything ended. That young man who was rich has now fallen. Even if the war ends, the one who survives will never be rich. It will be drowned. Even a needle, will be borrowed"* (Male, Mwani, 34 years old, Rural, Mocímboa da Praia, Illiterate, Peasant).

### 3.7. Consumption aspirations

Over the last few years and in Cabo Delgado urban centres and district headquarters, electrical appliance stores have opened (selling solar panels, batteries, televisions, radios, or motorbikes), often managed by Tanzanians or Africans of other nationalities. In a scenario of generalized poverty, there was the emergence of a consumer society, and increasing expectations of access to durable goods. On the other hand, the entry of new telephone operators resulted in the expansion of network coverage in rural areas, enabling the integration of populations into the markets. In addition to translating consumption capacity, smartphones guarantee access to digital multimedia platforms, information, and entertainment, ensuring the connection with the global world. Through social networks, smartphones allow the recreation of identity profiles integrated in the modern and global world, expanding the network of contacts in the modern sector of society, and allowing the distinction between peers (Archambault, 2010). The telephone makes it possible to reduce information asymmetries in accessing the labour market (jobs and existing vacancies), odd jobs and market prices, reducing distances and facilitating market integration. On its turn, motor vehicles are also desirable goods and indicators of social differentiation, due to the

mobility and independence they guarantee, in terms of transporting people and goods, as well as the possibility of carrying out transport business:

- *"Many young people want all this, be it a cell phone, a motorcycle, because we are currently in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we want modern things and the thing that is in fashion is the internet"* (Male, Makua, 23 years old, Urban, Montepuez, Graduating, Student);
- *"Every young person is ambitious; so, first thing, these goods are in front of young people. Everyone wants to carry an iPhone 11, we want a good phone, we want an Apple or Mac computer, among others. So, I would say that this is more of a focus for young people, who want a car without having a home. Always priority to material goods"* (Male, Makua, 26 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Student);
- *"In my district, motorcycles in particular. It is the dream consumption for the majority. But for young people who have a certain financial power, they already aspire to mobile phones and cars. But a motorbike is always the dream of consumption because, not so much because of access, but because of the profitability and they can still take the opportunity to operate a taxi. So, they have some income through motorcycles"* (Male, Makua, 29 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Preventive Medicine and Sanitation Technician);
- *"They are very fond of telephones. (...) Yes, I have seen. Many young people have these things and like them. Some go to the bush to mine, get money and buy telephones and motorcycles. When the money is too much, some manage to buy a car"* (Female, Makonde, 22 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);
- *"here, in our district, what we, young people, really like to use, I'll say there are many things; but for things we played with in our hands, the most desirable were telephones, motorcycles and cars to get around. Those things, here in Mocímboa, we use and were being used frequently. They were used and, even now, they are being used"* (Male, Makonde, 35 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed).

On the other hand, the possession of this equipment raises new problems, related to its use, maintenance, and conservation. The difficulties relate to the poor quality of the telephone network, the costs of charging batteries and of fuel, the poor state of roads and vehicle repair costs, the absence of parts and mechanics, and risks of damage, theft, or extortion. In this scenario, the durability of these consumer goods tends to be limited, with small cemeteries of telephone equipment and motor vehicles multiplying:

- *"Those who drive car and motorbike feel the high price of fuel and those who use phones have nowhere to charge because they don't have energy. There are network problems here in Nangade and we know why"* (Female, Makonde, 30 years old, Rural, Nangade, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);
- *"(...) they also face greater problems in buying fuel. You can see that fuel has this price today and another price tomorrow; today, burst a tire and buy at a certain price, today, and tomorrow another. If we look at the case of telecommunications, we have the problem of the network, the network fluctuates a lot. So, things don't go well"* (Male, Makonde, 28 years old, Rural, Nangade, 10<sup>th</sup> grade, Literacy teacher);

- *"The difficulties they face, sometimes, are not having a good network; their motorcycles are seized, they stay there at the police (...) for about a week, until they take thousands of meticais to pay (Female, Makonde, 22 years old, Rural, Nangade, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed)".*

### 3.8. Family constitution strategies

The possession of socially valued consumer goods, in a scenario of increasing social differentiation, has a profound impact on social relations and on the structuring of urban sociability networks and on family reproduction strategies themselves. In sexist realities based on patriarchal domination, which represents the man as responsible for providing for the well-being of his wife and family, the selection of a marital partner becomes particularly influenced by materialistic criteria, increasing the pressure on young adults in waitthood. The pressure to marry and form an independent family coexists with the inability to obtain material independence, prolonging residence with the parents, with an impact on the dignity and frustration of the youngest. The following excerpts are illustrative:

- *"Are you going to marry somebody's daughter to give what? A long time ago you could get married, stay with your parents, and be fed by them. Nowadays you're going to marry somebody's daughter to give what? nothing! She wants to eat, dress, have a nice phone, like her friends. This is difficult"* (Female, Mwani, Urban, Pemba);

- *"It's not easy, because to marry women nowadays you must have something. If you don't have anything, they say 'who is that young man? If I accept him, what will he give me?'"* (Male, Makua, Urbano, Pemba);

- *"Today's women like to receive things. There is no woman who wants to be married and not be given anything. If you don't have a job, if you don't have a house, you don't get married"* (Male, Makua, 23 years old, Urban, Pemba, 10<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);

- *"Because we can't afford to buy anything to eat at dawn, a woman needs to dress, a woman wants to smell good. Man wants to eat when he comes back from work. Now you don't work, you don't wash clothes, and to wash clothes you need money to buy soap, and you don't do anything that people can see, like that, how are you going to get married?"* (Male, Makua, Urban, Pemba);

- *"There is no way. I say this because, here in the city of Pemba, to live, you need money like all other cities; we here, in Pemba, are not like in Balama, there, in the countryside, where you can marry a woman and you have farm, you have rice, and you survive. It's complicated for us here, you don't get married"* (Male, Makua, Urban, Pemba);

- *"those young people who don't have a job, don't even have a motorcycle, end up having greater difficulties, because even the telephone is the least thing; because, if he has a motorcycle, maybe he can be a motorcycle taxi driver, he ends up getting some tips; then, with that, he can feed his partner as well as himself, and he can afford a house; if he doesn't have a house of his own, he can even rent a house and pay with that tip, that profit he makes. So, if you don't have that, it ends up being difficult. Because love does not satisfy, it does not fill the belly"* (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, Vocational Technical Education, Student).

The scenario tends to change in rural areas. Less inserted in the markets, more integrated in community logics and in scenarios of less social differentiation, greater dependence on agriculture and early school dropout tend to generate other forms of social relationships. Although materialistic attitudes can be identified, compared to peri-urban areas, the reports of young people from rural areas reflect less self-interested social relationships. However, it is important to abandon any simplistic interpretation based on the linear distinction between modern and traditional societies, where in the latter relationships are structured devoid of interest, especially in contexts of greater penetration of consumer markets, where greater social differentiation takes place. Rural societies are full of miscegenation:

- *"when someone has no home and marries a woman, where will he leave her? Because one important thing is to have a house and you don't, and when you get a wife, where are you going to put her? (...) like me, last year, I lived with my parents and, when I got money and gave her for house needs, there were always problems with my family members; she ended up abandoning me [and] went to her parents' house. This is the concrete example"* (Male, Makonde, 30 years old, Rural, Muidumbe, Illiterate, Peasant);

- *"here, it is enough to enter the initiation rites, that is enough. People here are not interested if the person has a mobile phone, motorcycle, bicycle, job; he gets married here and the two of them go to the farm to weed"* (Female, Makua, 28 years old, Rural, Montepuez, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *"It's difficult to get married, as, for example, I'm young and, if I don't have these things, women won't like me very much; they will run away from me because I don't have those things. Even if I marry a woman what will I give her to eat if I have no money; so, it's hard to get married. (...) she can even run away from me"* (Male, Makua, 28 years old, Rural, Montepuez, 7<sup>th</sup> grade, Merchant).

This scenario has an impact on the logic of interpersonal relationships among young adults, structuring a complex game of appearances and deceit, based on lies or even deviant behaviours:

- *"currently, what exists is to be deceived. There is no marriage. 'I'm going to marry you, I'm going to buy you a mobile phone', you wait until..., full of false promises, neither car nor plane; Does this person really lie like that?"* (Female, Makua, Urban, Pemba).

- *"That's why I said that the issue of thievery comes in, because there are no choices; how to have a house, to have a car, it is necessary to join the thieves; want to have and can't. Due to lack of a job, how will you get a job? Even you walk [from] one side to another, you won't get money. You must go to a house to steal to get money, and if you're not lucky, you're killed right there. We young people are in a bad situation"* (Male, Makua, 37 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant).

#### 4. REASONS TO “ENTER IN THE BUSH”

Following the increase in violence in the Northeast of Cabo Delgado, as populations abandoned the villages to take refuge in the more protected urban centres, “entering the bush” became the expression used to designate the adherence to the groups of insurgents that operated in the Northeast of the province. When asked about the reasons that lead young people to choose this path, the answers tended to be structured around four factors. In the first place, the lack of employment and the situation of vulnerability and economic need of the populations. Secondly, and related to the previous one, the discovery of natural resources and (inter)national instigation. Thirdly, this process is associated with the revolt against the State and against the opportunism of public officials. Finally, psychological aspects related to mental disorders and aggression are pointed out.

The lack of employment and the economic needs of the youngest are the reasons most mentioned by the interviewees to justify the option for violence. The reports reflect a deep feeling of vulnerability on the part of young people, in terms of lack of employment and difficulty in integrating into consumer markets. In a scenario in which agriculture is not a profitable activity, the violent expulsion of thousands of artisanal miners, an activity that generates numerous complementary jobs (taxi-motorcycles, food preparation, local rental, commerce, etc.), had a negative impact on local microeconomies (Maquenzi and Feijó, 2019). The increase in schooling of many young people contrasts with the difficulties of integrating into the labour market, so the economic precariousness and lack of alternatives make young people quite vulnerable to recruitment by radical and violent groups, especially in the face of promises of payment of monetary sums (Forquilha, Pereira and Habibe, 2019):

- *“in the years 2015, 2016, 2017, in the ruby mines, many young people were busy digging, getting their own money; until the thievery, we didn't cry so much anymore, because the thieves were all there (...) after the whole massacre that happened in Namanhumbir, many of them disappeared and we didn't even know their whereabouts. I think it's due to lack of jobs, money, conditions that they end up getting involved with the insurgents”* (Female, Makua, 24 years old, Urban, Montepuez, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Teacher);

- *“we had a friend named Áscote [name of a movie actor], he already went into the bush; but when you ask him why he went into the bush, he says 'because of money'; others (...) went [not] because of religion, they went because of money”* (Male, Makonde, 35 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 7<sup>th</sup> grade, Unemployed);

- *“this conflict that we have is full of young people because of money, they are attracted with money; as today's young people want money, that's why everyone runs there; for example, in the neighbourhood I'm in. They started to build mosques, and everyone ran there and said they got money; so, we said, 'hee hee, it has already started, they are the same”* (Male, Makua, 37 years old, Urban, Mocímboa da Praia, 6<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant);

- *“I heard on the radio [that] they caught a young man in Montepuez, another in Nampula; all these were attracted by money”* (Male, Makonde, 25 years old, Rural, Muidumbe, 12<sup>th</sup> grade, Sculptor);

- *“some young people who have already finished secondary school and have no incentive to continue their studies or to get a job. So, he feels, at some point, excluded in society and he also thinks that the government no longer good and does not pay attention to young people. Social injustices may contribute [to] the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. (...). They found fertile ground in young people and instilled in them this kind of thinking: that the Government doesn't like you, officials are the government's right-hand man; So, this type of situation has just been created”* (Male, Makonde, Rural, Muidumbe).

Secondly, the causes of the conflict appear to be strongly related to the discovery of natural resources, namely gas and precious stones. The comments suggest the existence of an international intrigue motivated by the control of the gas markets, generating instigation and political instability in the province of Cabo Delgado:

- *“What I see today, what creates suffering, is this oil and gas thing because, in the past, we didn't have those things. For me to say that [is because] I saw other countries at war because of these things, this war began with the discovery of these resources. So, when we discovered these things, the war also started”* (Male, Makua, 27 years old, Urban, Pemba, Graduate, Technician);

- *“Cabo Delgado has no development, it is an area that has many resources, precious stones, such as ruby, oil, gas in Palma. Because, along the Rovuma River, we have a lot of resources, in terms of gas; things like that, when they start extracting, Mozambique will not be caught, it will have a lot of development; so, the person who is jealous of that saw that it was necessary to do things of destruction, so there is no development here in Cabo Delgado”* (Male, Makua, 27 years old, Urban, Pemba, Graduate, Technician).

Thirdly, the motives relate to a feeling of revolt against the State, essentially for two reasons. On the one hand, as a result of the lack of protection in the face of the arrival of countless *“vientes”*, who absorb the best job opportunities, to the detriment of the locals. On the other hand, as a result of opportunism, abuse of authority and violence by State officials. The repression of artisanal miners carried out by agents of the Rapid Intervention Unit in Montepuez, as well as the attitude of the traffic or municipal police, in the inspection of motorcycle taxi drivers or informal sellers, confiscating goods and demanding monetary values, is understood as an obstacle to the economic emancipation of the populations.

In a scenario of economic recession, caused by the restriction of artisanal mining activities, war and the state of emergency, the authorities' overzealous attitude was badly received by the populations, even triggering aggressive attitudes against authorities. During the first half of 2021, several videos circulated on social media, in which young people assaulted staff of the municipal police or the Mozambican traffic police (Feijó and Maquenzi, 2021). These phenomena stimulate feelings of the State against the population, triggering attitudes of the population against the State:

- *“What leads young people to become bandits are the bosses who do not recognize us as their children”* (Male, Makua, Urban, Pemba);

- *"When they drink, what they say indicates that they are revolted by the lack of consideration on the part of the State. Many young people have certificates, but only those from the South are considered"* (Female, Mwani, Urban, Pemba);

- *"They wonder if the resources are in our area, why can't we have the right to work in those companies that are installed there; then they, in turn, may have this anger, this revolt; they end up getting together and start creating all these conflicts in the form of manifesting, in the form of showing the government that they are angry with this type of attitude, I think"* (Female, Makonde, 27 years old, Urban, Montepuez, Graduate, Student).

Finally, violence is explained by psychological factors, related to emotional fragility, making young people vulnerable and easily influenced:

- *"The young people went into the bush; some young people, for not thinking well, are hindered. Your friend comes and deceives you, my friend, let's do it, so, the one without ideas ends up accepting to enter the bush and gets in the way. Because a young man with good ideas, like me, I must cultivate, what do I have to look for? something, so that my life goes well, and not go into the bush; people who run to enter the bush are clumsy people who don't think well"* (Male, Makonde, 30 years old, Rural, Nangade, 5<sup>th</sup> grade, Peasant).

## **5. AND BEYOND THE MILITARY INTERVENTION? THE CHALLENGES OF YOUTH POLITICAL-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL STABILIZATION**

In Central and Northern Mozambique, in general, and in Cabo Delgado, in particular, we are witnessing the implementation of a predominantly extractive and capital-intensive development model, which generates little employment and has limited relations with the local economic fabric. Long forgotten by public investment, the population of Northern Mozambique has high illiteracy rates, especially compared to the capital. In a scenario of increasing international investment, the education system has not adapted to the demands on the ground, leaving local youth (the majority of the population) unable to compete with the global market. Globalization has intensified imbalances in training systems and labour markets. Competition for access to scarce resources generated feelings of lack of protection and threat, with numerous protests taking place, particularly in areas with greater penetration of capital.

The lack of employment and the frustration of high initial expectations were aggravated by repressive actions of clandestine economic activities that guaranteed income to thousands of local young people, in a scenario in which agriculture is not a profitable alternative. At the same time, monitoring of informal activities (namely urban commerce or transport services) is intensified, either as a result of the armed conflict, the measures to contain COVID 19, or urban space planning initiatives. The serious human rights violations carried out by the authority forces aggravated local resentment, especially in a scenario of lack of spaces and channels for participation, or difficulties in accessing justice.

Paradoxically, the absence of social protection and the worsening of economic restrictions, in a scenario of opportunism and brutality of the FDS, coexisted with the intensification of governmental appeals to patriotism and messages of peace and social cohesion, conveyed in churches and mosques. It is in this contrast between discourse and reality that young people build their identities and outline their social strategies.

On the other hand, the phenomena of generalized poverty coexist with an emerging consumer society, increasing social differentiation. In the district headquarters towns and peri-urban areas, the supply of goods and services increases. The internet access provided by smartphones allows the confrontation of local constraints with the opportunities of the global world, increasing expectations of integration in modernity. A more materialistic and immediate-oriented society emerges, putting greater pressure on youth. In more (peri)urban areas, there is greater calculus in social relations, with an impact on gender relations, increasing the pressure of young men to meet the needs of their wives and guarantee social reproduction. As Honwana (2012: 27; 35) emphasizes, the social problems experienced by youth should not be understood as the result of a pathology or a "failed transition" to adulthood, but a consequence of unfavourable socioeconomic conditions of existence.

The increase in access to information tends to generate more critical perspectives and more aggressive and contesting political cultures, in a scenario of limited formal spaces for participation. In more radical circles, aggressiveness comes to be understood as a possible form of social participation, fuelling the military conflict.

Four years after the start of hostilities, the population affected by the war appears to be severely undercapitalized. The armed conflict and COVID 19 have aggravated the education system, compromising the education of an entire generation of young people, with impacts on their socio-professional integration. The stabilization of security in the region could trigger, in the medium term, an increase in investment, which will imply a greater demand for qualified staff and the arrival of countless workers from abroad or from the South of the country. New scenarios of exclusion of local populations and an increase in social inequalities (to more worrying levels than those prior to the conflict) are expected, as well as an increase in feelings of lack of protection on the part of the State.

If the scenario of serious local tensions (social, ethnic, and political) continues, Total's resumption of operations will only be possible at the cost of a large investment in military security, with collateral damage to many populations. The persistence of hundreds of thousands of young people in a precarious social situation will constitute the greatest obstacle to social stabilization. In a context strongly familiar with violence, the risks of conflict increase, in the form of labour strikes or riots, the formation of bands of robbers (acting on the roads, in residential areas and economic targets) or armed groups, either in the areas of greater concentration of extractive industry or suburban areas, or in more remote areas. If the Rwandan military intervention provided increased security in the region, social and economic stabilization will only be possible through a deep investment in more and better public services (particularly in terms of health, education and professional training), but also in small support to the creation of small businesses (and the elimination of existing obstacles), paying particular attention to young people and women, including investments in infrastructure (energy, transport, etc.). It is, in fact, a change in the development model (heavily based on the extractive industry and intensive capital), investing in labour intensive models, capable of generating more employment and income opportunities for

young people<sup>18</sup>. Stabilization implies the existence of formal channels of participation and access to justice, earning the trust of the populations.

It is important to mention that there were no inter-ethnic differences in terms of discourses, so the difficulties of socio-economic integration are transversal to a large part of the youth. The most tense speeches were expressed by young people from large cities, where young people, relatively more educated and with more social expectations, find that these qualifications, after all, are of no use to them.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY:

ANEME (2018), Levantamento e caracterização das empresas das empresas comerciais e industriais: Estudo Cabo delgado. Associação Nacional das Empresas Metalúrgicas e Electromecânicas. Lisboa. Disponível em: [https://www.aneme.pt/site/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Estudo CABO-DELGADO 2017.pdf](https://www.aneme.pt/site/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Estudo_CABO-DELGADO_2017.pdf), acesso a 30.03.2021.

ARCHAMBAULT, Julie (2010) "À procura de rede": redes de redistribuição e modalidades de género na utilização do telefone móvel no sul de Moçambique" in Luís de Brito, Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, Sérgio Chichava e António Francisco (2010) *Economia Extractiva e Desafios de Industrialização em Moçambique*. Maputo: IESE, pp. 163-173.

BALANE, Neusa (forthcoming) "'Marandza': um estudo sobre a contribuição e gestão da identidade das namoradas de homens casados" in Aleia Rachide Agy (Org.) *Género, Cidadania e Desenvolvimento*. Maputo: Escolar Editora.

BRYCESON, Deborah (1999) "Sub-Saharan Africa Betwixt and Between: Rural Livelihood Practices and Policies" in *Afrika-Studiecentrum Working Paper*, 43, pp. 1-69

CEA (1998) *O Mineiro Moçambicano: um estudo sobre a exportação de mão-de-obra em Inhambane*. Maputo: Imprensa Universitária

CÉSAR, Nilza, COSSA, Eugénia; BUQUE, Domingos; CHILAULE, Egídio; MABASSO, Quiteria (2014) "Investigando o impacto dos ritos de iniciação no acesso à educação e formação de crianças adolescentes: o caso da Alta Zambézia" in *Revista Científica da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, série Ciências da Educação*, pp. 48-62.

CHAUMA, Sebastião e ALVES, Maria Isabel (2020) "Produções científicas acerca dos ritos de iniciação e suas influências no processo educacional em Moçambique" in *Revista Humanidades e Inovação*, 7 (7), pp. 129-139.

DADA, Yasser (2018) "Estradas rurais" in *Destaque Rural*, 36, disponível em <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Destaque-Rural-36-Estradas-Rurais.pdf>, acesso a 15.10.2021.

DHILLON, Navtej e YOUSEF, Tarique (2009) *Inclusion: meeting the 100 million youth challenge*. Washington e Dubai. Brookings.

DIAS, Hildizina (2002) *Minidicionário de Moçambicanismos*. Maputo: Edição da autora.

---

<sup>18</sup> Work-intensive models refer to processes and sectors of activity that require a high amount of labour to produce goods and services. In this sense, economic sectors, such as agriculture, fishing, catering or artisanal mining, constitute economic sectors that absorb a large amount of labour, although tending to be poorly qualified and poorly paid. Mozambican demographic trends show that the country will face, in the short and medium term, the challenge of integration.

FARRÉ, Albert (2016) "A mobilidade, os recursos e o político no meio rural – questões em torno do conceito de comunidade rural em Moçambique" in João Feijó (Org) *Movimentos Migratórios e relações rural-urbanas: estudos de caso em Moçambique*. Maputo: Escolar Editora, pp. 69-90.

FEIJÓ, João (2017) "Investimentos económicos, assimetrias socio-espaciais e movimentos migratórios" in João Feijó e Inês Macamo Raimundo (Org) *Movimentos migratórios para áreas de concentração de grandes projectos*. Maputo: Publifix, pp. 17-61.

FEIJÓ, João (2020) "Assimetrias no acesso ao Estado: um terreno fértil de penetração do Jihadismo Islâmico?" in *Observador Rural*, 93, disponível em <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/Observador-Rural-93-Assimetrias-no-acesso-ao-Estado.pdf>, acesso a 15.10.2021.

FEIJÓ, João (2021) "Caracterização e Organização social dos machababos a partir dos discursos de mulheres raptadas" in *Observador Rural*, nº 109, disponível em <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/publicacoes/or-109/>, acesso a 02.09.2021.

FEIJÓ, João e MAQUENZI, Jerry (2019) "Consequências socio-económicas dos ataques no Norte de Cabo Delgado" in *Destaque Rural*, 65, disponível em <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/DR-65-III.pdf>, acesso a 02.09.2021.

FEIJÓ, João e MAQUENZI, Jerry (2021) "Gerir um problema institucional, para prevenir um problema social: reflexão sobre a violência de populares contra agentes da polícia" in *IDeIAS*, 144, pp. 1-2, disponível em [https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ideias-144\\_JF\\_JM-port.pdf](https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ideias-144_JF_JM-port.pdf), acesso a 14.09.2021.

FORQUILHA, Salvador; PEREIRA, João; e HABIBE, Saide (2019) "Radicalização Islâmica no Norte de Moçambique – o caso de Mocimboa da Praia" in *Cadernos IESE*, 17, disponível em [https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/cadernos\\_17.pdf](https://www.iese.ac.mz/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/cadernos_17.pdf), consultado a 15.10.2021.

GDM, (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Montepuez: Secretaria Distrital.

\_\_\_\_ (2020). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Montepuez: Secretaria Distrital.

GDP (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Pemba-Cidade: Secretaria Distrital.

\_\_\_\_, (2020). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Pemba-Cidade: Secretaria Distrital.

GDMP (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Mocimboa da Praia: Secretaria Distrital.

GDM (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Metuge: Secretaria Distrital.

GDN (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Nangade: Secretaria Distrital.

GDN (2019). Relatório anual do Plano Económico e Social e Orçamento do Distrito (PESOD), Governo do Distrito de Namuno: Secretaria Distrital.

HONWANA, Alcinda (2013) *O tempo da juventude – emprego, política e mudanças sociais em África*. Maputo: Kapicua.

- IBRAIMO, Momade e FEIJÓ, João (2018) "Serviço de transporte: um problema não só urbano em Moçambique" in *Destaque Rural*, 37, disponível em <https://omrmz.org/omrweb/wp-content/uploads/DR-Transporte-rural-37.pdf>, consultado a 15.10.2021.
- ISRAEL, Paolo (2006) "Kummwanglela Guebuza - The Mozambican General Elections of 2004 in Muidumbe and the Roots of the Loyalty of Makonde People to Frelimo" in *Lusotopie*, 13 (2), pp. 103-125)
- ISRAEL, Paolo (2014) *In Step with Times – Mapiko masquerades of Mozambique*. Ohio: Ohio University Press.
- JONES, Sam e TARP, Finn (2016) *Understanding Mozambique's growth experience through an employment lens*. UNU-WIDER, disponível em <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/WP2015109-Jones-and-Tarp.pdf>, consultado a 20.10.2021.
- KELLAGHAN, Thomas; GREANEY, Vincent; MURRAY, Scott (2009) *O uso dos resultados da avaliação do desempenho educacional*. Rio de Janeiro: Banco Mundial, disponível em <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2667/501710PUB00POR00Box0361492B0PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y>, acesso a 01.09.2021.
- MJD (2015) *Política da Juventude*. Maputo: Ministério da Juventude e Desporto. Disponível em: <https://www.seje.gov.mz/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Brochura-da-Politica-da-Juventude.pdf>, acesso a 19.10.2021.
- MACATANE, Isabel Senda (2013) *Formação continuada de professores: uma análise das modalidades e práticas mais frequentes em algumas escolas primárias públicas moçambicanas*, Dissertação de Mestrado em Profissional em Gestão e Avaliação da Educação Pública. Universidade. Faculdade de Educação da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, disponível em <http://www.mestrado.caedufjf.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/dissertacao-2011-isabel-senda-macatane.pdf>, acesso a 01.09.2021.
- MAQUENZI, Jerry e FEIJÓ, João (2019) "A maldição dos recursos naturais – mineração artesanal e conflitualidade em Namanhumbir" in João Feijó (Org.) *Tensões e conflitos sociais no campo*. Maputo: Escolar Editora, pp. 143-168.
- MATIAS, Achegar (2020) *Impacto do conflito armado sobre o sector da educação: caso da zona Norte e Centro de Cabo Delgado (2015-2020)*. Projecto Aplicado apresentado ao Instituto Superior Monitor para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Sociologia do Trabalho e das Organizações. Maputo: Instituto Superior Monitor.
- MOSSE, Marcelo e CORTEZ, Edson (2006) *A corrupção no sector da saúde em Moçambique*, documento de discussão nº 4. Maputo: Centro de Integridade Pública.
- NIELSEN, Morten (2011) "Futures within: Reversible time and house-building in Maputo, Mozambique" in *Anthropological Theory*, 11(4), pp. 397-423.
- OSÓRIO, Conceição e MACUACUA, Ernesto (2013) *Os ritos de iniciação no contexto actual – ajustamentos, rupturas e confrontos, construindo identidades de género*. Maputo: WLSA, disponível em <https://www.wlsa.org.mz/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Ritos2013.pdf>, acesso a 20.10.2021
- PAIS, José Machado (1990) "A construção sociológica da juventude – alguns contributos" in *Análise Social*, 25, pp. 139-165.

SANTOS, Ana Margarida (2010) *History, memory and violence: changing patterns of group relationship in Mocímboa da Praia, Mozambique*, Thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Anthropology. Oxford: University of Oxford.

SINGERMAN, Diane (2007) "The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East" in *The Middle East Youth Initiative, working paper*, n. 6. Wolfensohn Center for Development e Dubai School of Government.

SITOE, Tirso (2018) "Para além de uma escolha: Da música de crítica e protesto social às identidades político-partidárias em Moçambique" in *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, 35, pp. 135-148.

LIST OF TITLES PUBLISHED BY THE OMR OF THE OBSERVADOR RURAL SERIES			
No.	Title	Author(s)	Year
120	Caminhos para a segurança alimentar em moçambique: Uma abordagem de sistemas de produção	Máriam Abbas	Janeiro de 2022
119	<b>A configuração da estrutura económica de Manica e Sofala e processos de resistência à colonização</b>	<b>Janete Cravino</b>	<b>Julho de 2021</b>
118	Caracterização socioeconómica da zona centro de Moçambique. Enfoque no corredor da Beira	João Mosca	Julho de 2021
117	<b>Cobertura Florestal em Moçambique</b>	<b>Mélica Chandamela</b>	<b>Julho de 2021</b>
116	Processos administrativos e práticas na titulação da terra em Moçambique: O caso dos municípios de Maputo e Matola	Nelson Capaina	Junho de 2021
115	<b>Mudanças nos padrões tradicionais de exploração da terra e do trabalho: O caso da açucareira de Xinavane</b>	<b>Joana Manuel Matusse Joaquim, João Mosca, Ana Sampaio</b>	<b>Junho de 2021</b>
114	O papel das mulheres no conflito em Cabo delgado: entendendo ciclos viciosos da violência	João Feijó	Maio de 2021
113	<b>Pobreza e desigualdades em Moçambique: um estudo de caso em seis distritos</b>	<b>Jerry Maquenzi</b>	<b>Maio de 2021</b>
112	Os determinantes do desmatamento em moçambique: uma abordagem econométrica para o período de 2000-2016	Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy, João Mosca, Mélica Chandamela e Natasha Ribeiro	Maio de 2021
111	<b>Des(continuidades) políticas e económicas de longa duração do sector familiar (camponeses) em moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Abril de 2021</b>
110	Política Monetária do Banco de Moçambique: Qual É O Gato Escondido?	João Mosca	Abril de 2021
109	<b>Caracterização e organização social dos machababos a Partir de discursos de Mulheres raptadas</b>	<b>João Feijó</b>	<b>Abril de 2021</b>
108	Moçambique e a Importação do Carapau: Um desafio sem Alternativas (!)	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2021
107	<b>Por Uma política Monetária Ajustada à Economia Real em Contexto de Crise: Humanidade e Sabedoria</b>	<b>Fáusio Mussá, Roberto Tibana, Inocência Mussipe Coordenador: João Mosca</b>	<b>Março de 2021</b>
106	Comércio Externo e crescimento económico em Moçambique	João Mosca, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Yulla Marques	Março de 2021
105	<b>Macroeconomia das pescas em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
104	Influência de factores institucionais no desempenho do sector agrícola em Moçambique	João Carrilho e Rui Ribeiro	Fevereiro de 2021
103	<b>Evolução de preços e bens alimentares em 2020</b>	<b>Yulla Marques e Jonas Mbiza</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
102	<b>Contributo para o planeamento e Desenvolvimento de Cabo Delgado</b>	<b>João Mosca e Jerry Maquenzi</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2021</b>
101	Desenvolvimento socioeconómico de Cabo Delgado num contexto de conflito	João Feijó, António Souto e Jerry Maquenzi	Fevereiro de 2021
100	<b>Caracterização do sector das pescas em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2021</b>
99	Dificuldades de Realização de Pesquisa em Moçambique	João Feijó	Setembro de 2020
98	<b>Análise de conjuntura económica 2º trimestre de 2020</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Setembro de 2020</b>
97	Género e desenvolvimento: Factores para o empoderamento da mulher rural	Aleia Rachide Agy	Agosto de 2020
96	<b>Micro-simulações dos impactos da COVID-19 na pobreza e desigualdade em Moçambique</b>	<b>Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy e João Mosca</b>	<b>Julho de 2020</b>
95	Contributo para um debate necessário da política fiscal em Moçambique	João Mosca e Rabia Aiuba	Junho de 2020
94	<b>Economia de Moçambique: Análise de conjuntura pré COVID-19</b>	<b>João Mosca e Rabia Aiuba</b>	<b>Junho de 2020</b>
93	Assimetrias no acesso ao Estado: Um terreno fértil de penetração do jihadismo islâmico	João Feijó	Junho de 2020
92	<b>Implementação das medidas de prevenção do COVID-19: Uma avaliação intercalar nas cidades de Maputo, Beira e Nampula</b>	<b>João Feijó e Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy</b>	<b>Junho de 2020</b>
91	Secundarização da agricultura e persistência da pobreza rural: Reprodução de cidadanias desiguais	João Feijó	Maio de 2020
90	<b>Transição florestal: Estudo socioeconómico do desmatamento em Nhamatanda</b>	<b>Mélica Chandamela</b>	<b>Abril de 2020</b>

LIST OF TITLES PUBLISHED BY THE OMR OF THE OBSERVADOR RURAL SERIES			
No.	Title	Author(s)	Year
89	Produção bovina em Moçambique: Desafios e perspectivas – O caso da província de Maputo	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2020
88	<b>Avaliação dos impactos dos investimentos nas plantações florestais da Portucel-Moçambique na província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Almeida Siteo e Sá Nogueira Lisboa</b>	<b>Março de 2020</b>
87	Terra e crises climáticas: percepções de populações deslocadas pelo ciclone IDAI no distrito de Nhamatanda	Uacitissa Mandamule	Fevereiro de 2020
86	<b>“senhor, passar para onde?” Estrutura fundiária e mapeamento de conflitos de terra no distrito de Nhamatanda</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2020</b>
85	Evolução dos preços dos bens essenciais de consumo em 2019	Rabia Aiuba e Jonas Mbiza	Fevereiro de 2020
84	<b>Repensar a segurança alimentar e nutricional: Alterações no sistema agro-alimentar e o direito à alimentação em Moçambique</b>	<b>Refiloe Joala, Máriam Abbas, Lázaro dos Santos, Natacha Bruna, Carlos Serra, e Natacha Ribeiro</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2020</b>
83	Pobreza no meio rural: Situação de famílias monoparentais chefiadas por mulheres	Aleia Rachide Agy	Janeiro de 2020
82	<b>Ascensão e queda do PROSAVANA: Da cooperação triangular à cooperação bilateral contra-resistência / The rise and fall of PROSAVANA: From triangular cooperation to bilateral cooperation in counter-resistance</b>	<b>Sayaka Funada-Classen</b>	<b>Dezembro de 2019</b>
81	Investimento público na agricultura: O caso dos centros de prestação de serviços agrários; complexo de silos da bolsa de mercadorias de Moçambique e dos regadios	Yasser Arafat Dadá, Yara Nova e Cerina Mussá	Novembro de 2019
80	<b>Agricultura: Assim, não é possível reduzir a pobreza em Moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca e Yara Nova</b>	<b>Outubro de 2019</b>
79	Corredores de desenvolvimento: Reestruturação produtiva ou continuidade histórica. O caso do corredor da Beira, Moçambique	Rabia Aiuba	Setembro de 2019
78	<b>Condições socioeconómicas das mulheres associadas na província de Nampula: Estudos de caso nos distritos de Malema, Ribaué e Monapo</b>	<b>Aleia Rachide Agy</b>	Agosto de 2019
77	Pobreza e desigualdades em zonas de penetração de grandes projectos: Estudo de caso em Namanhumbir - Cabo Delgado	Jerry Maquenzi	Agosto de 2019
76	<b>Pobreza, desigualdades e conflitos no norte de Cabo Delgado</b>	<b>Jerry Maquenzi e João Feijó</b>	<b>Julho de 2019</b>
75	A maldição dos recursos naturais: Mineração artesanal e conflitualidade em Namanhumbir	Jerry Maquenzi e João Feijó	Junho de 2019
74	<b>Agricultura em números: Análise do orçamento do estado, investimento, crédito e balança comercial</b>	<b>Yara Nova, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Cerina Mussá</b>	<b>Maió de 2019</b>
73	Titulação e subaproveitamento da terra em Moçambique: Algumas causas e implicações	Nelson Capaina	Abril de 2019
72	<b>Os mercados de terras rurais no corredor da Beira: tipos, dinâmicas e conflitos.</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule e Tomás Manhicane</b>	<b>Março de 2019</b>
71	Evolução dos preços dos bens alimentares 2018	Yara Nova	Fevereiro de 2019
70	<b>A economia política do Corredor da Beira: Consolidação de um enclave ao serviço do Hinterland</b>	<b>Thomas Selemane</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2019</b>
69	Indicadores de Moçambique, da África subsaariana e do mundo	Rabia Aiuba e Yara Nova	Dezembro de 2018
68	Médios produtores comerciais no corredor da beira: dimensão do fenómeno e caracterização	João Feijó Yasser Arafat Dadá	<b>Novembro de 2018</b>
67	<b>Pólos de crescimento e os efeitos sobre a pequena produção: O caso de Nacala-porto</b>	<b>Yasser Arafat Dadá e Yara Nova</b>	<b>Outubro de 2018</b>
66	Os Sistemas Agro-Alimentares no Mundo e em Moçambique	Rabia Aiuba	Setembro de 2018
65	Agro-negócio e campesinato. Continuidade e descontinuidade de Longa Duração. O Caso de Moçambique.	João Mosca	Agosto de 2018
64	<b>Determinantes da Indústria Têxtil e de vestuário em Moçambique (1960-2014)</b>	<b>Cerina Mussá e Yasser Dadá</b>	<b>Julho de 2018</b>
63	Participação das mulheres em projectos de investimento agrário no Distrito de Monapo	Aleia Rachide Agy	Junho de 2018
62	<b>Chokwé: efeitos locais de políticas Instáveis, erráticas e contraditórias</b>	<b>Márium Abbas</b>	<b>Maió de 2018</b>
61	Pobreza, diferenciação social e (des) alianças políticas no meio rural	João Feijó	Abril de 2018
60	<b>Evolução dos Preços de Bens alimentares e Serviços 2017</b>	<b>Yara Nova</b>	<b>Março de 2018</b>
59	Estruturas de Mercado e sua influência na formação dos preços dos produtos agrícolas ao longo das suas cadeias de valor	Yara Pedro Nova	Fevereiro de 2018
58	<b>Avaliação dos impactos dos investimentos das plantações florestais da Portucel-Moçambique nas tecnologias agrícolas das populações locais nos distritos de Ile e Namarrói, Província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Almeida Siteo e Sá Nogueira Lisboa</b>	<b>Novembro de 2017</b>
57	<b>Desenvolvimento Rural em Moçambique: Discursos e Realidades – Um estudo de caso do distrito de Pebane, Província da Zambézia</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Outubro de 2017</b>

LIST OF TITLES PUBLISHED BY THE OMR OF THE OBSERVADOR RURAL SERIES			
No.	Title	Author(s)	Year
56	A Economia política do corredor de Nacala: Consolidação do padrão de economia extrovertida em Moçambique	Thomas Selemane	Setembro de 2017
<b>55</b>	<b>Segurança Alimentar Auto-suficiência alimentar: Mito ou verdade?</b>	<b>Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Agosto de 2017</b>
54	A inflação e a produção agrícola em Moçambique	Soraya Fenita e Máriam Abbas	Julho de 2017
<b>53</b>	<b>Plantações florestais e a instrumentalização do estado em Moçambique</b>	<b>Natacha Bruna</b>	<b>Junho de 2017</b>
<b>52</b>	<b>Sofala: Desenvolvimento e Desigualdades Territoriais</b>	<b>Yara Pedro Nova</b>	<b>Junho de 2017</b>
51	<b>Estratégia de produção camponesa em Moçambique: estudo de caso no sul do Save - Chókwe, Guijá e KaMavota</b>	<b>Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Maió de 2017</b>
50	Género e relações de poder na região sul de Moçambique – uma análise sobre a localidade de Mucotuene na província de Gaza	Aleia Rachide Agy	Abril de 2017
<b>49</b>	<b>Criando capacidades para o desenvolvimento: o género no acesso aos recursos produtivos no meio rural em Moçambique</b>	<b>Nelson Capaina</b>	<b>Março de 2017</b>
48	Perfil socio-económico dos pequenos agricultores do sul de Moçambique: realidades de Chókwe, Guijá e KaMavota	Momade Ibraimo	Março de 2017
47	Agricultura, diversificação e Transformação estrutural da economia	João Mosca	Fevereiro de 2017
<b>46</b>	<b>Processos e debates relacionados com DUATs. Estudos de caso em Nampula e Zambézia.</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Novembro de 2016</b>
45	Tete e Cateme: entre a implosão do el dorado e a contínua degradação das condições de	Thomas Selemane	Outubro de 2016
<b>44</b>	<b>Investimentos, assimetrias e movimentos de protesto na província de Tete</b>	<b>João Feijó</b>	<b>Setembro de 2016</b>
43	Motivações migratórias rural-urbanas e perspectivas de regresso ao campo – uma análise do desenvolvimento rural em moçambique a partir de Maputo	João Feijó e Aleia Rachide Agy e Momade Ibraimo	Agosto de 2016
42	<b>Políticas públicas e desigualdades sociais e territoriais em Moçambique</b>	<b>João Mosca e Máriam Abbas</b>	Julho de 2016
41	Metodologia de estudo dos impactos dos megaprojectos	João Mosca e Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2016
<b>40</b>	<b>Cadeias de valor e ambiente de negócios na agricultura em Moçambique</b>	<b>Mota Lopes</b>	<b>Maió de 2016</b>
39	Zambézia: Rica e Empobrecida	João Mosca e Yara Nova	Abril de 2016
<b>38</b>	<b>Exploração artesanal de ouro em Manica</b>	<b>António Júnior, Momade Ibraimo e João Mosca</b>	<b>Março de 2016</b>
37	Tipologia dos conflitos sobre ocupação da terra em Moçambique	Uacitissa Mandamule	Fevereiro de 2016
<b>36</b>	<b>Políticas públicas e agricultura</b>	<b>João Mosca e Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Janeiro de 2016</b>
35	Pardais da china, jatropa e tractores de Moçambique: remédios que não prestam para o desenvolvimento rural	Luis Artur	Dezembro de 2015
<b>34</b>	<b>A política monetária e a agricultura em Moçambique</b>	<b>Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Novembro de 2015</b>
33	A influência do estado de saúde da população na produção agrícola em Moçambique	Luis Artur e Arsénio Jorge	Outubro de 2015
<b>32</b>	<b>Discursos à volta do regime de propriedade da terra em Moçambique</b>	<b>Uacitissa Mandamule</b>	<b>Setembro de 2015</b>
31	Prosavana: discursos, práticas e realidades	João Mosca e Natacha Bruna	Agosto de 2015
<b>30</b>	<b>Do modo de vida camponês à pluriactividade impacto do assalariamento urbano na economia familiar rural</b>	<b>João Feijó e Aleia Rachide</b>	<b>Julho de 2015</b>
29	Educação e produção agrícola em Moçambique: o caso do milho	Natacha Bruna	Junho de 2015
<b>28</b>	<b>Legislação sobre os recursos naturais em Moçambique: convergências e conflitos na relação com a terra</b>	<b>Eduardo Chiziane</b>	<b>Maió de 2015</b>
27	Relações Transfronteiriças de Moçambique	António Júnior, Yasser Arafat Dadá e João Mosca	Abril de 2015
<b>26</b>	<b>Macroeconomia e a produção agrícola em Moçambique</b>	<b>Máriam Abbas</b>	<b>Abril de 2015</b>
25	Entre discurso e prática: dinâmicas locais no acesso aos fundos de desenvolvimento distrital em Memba	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2015
<b>24</b>	<b>Agricultura familiar em Moçambique: Ideologias e Políticas</b>	<b>João Mosca</b>	<b>Fevereiro de 2015</b>
23	Transportes públicos rodoviários na cidade de Maputo: entre os TPM e os My Love	Kayola da Barca Vieira Yasser Arafat Dadá e Margarida Martins	Dezembro de 2014
<b>22</b>	<b>Lei de Terras: Entre a Lei e as Práticas na defesa de Direitos sobre a terra</b>	<b>Eduardo Chiziane</b>	<b>Novembro de 2014</b>

LIST OF TITLES PUBLISHED BY THE OMR OF THE OBSERVADOR RURAL SERIES			
No.	Title	Author(s)	Year
21	Associações de pequenos produtores do sul de Moçambique: constrangimentos e desafios	António Júnior, Yasser Arafat Dadá e João Mosca	Outubro de 2014
<b>20</b>	<b>Influência das taxas de câmbio na agricultura</b>	<b>João Mosca, Yasser Arafat Dadá e Kátia Amreén Pereira</b>	<b>Setembro de 2014</b>
19	Competitividade do Algodão Em Moçambique	Natacha Bruna	Agosto de 2014
<b>18</b>	<b>O Impacto da Exploração Florestal no Desenvolvimento das Comunidades Locais nas Áreas de Exploração dos Recursos Faunísticos na Província de Nampula</b>	<b>Carlos Manuel Serra, António Cuna, Assane Amade e Félix Goia</b>	<b>Julho de 2014</b>
17	Competitividade do subsector do caju em Moçambique	Máriam Abbas	Junho de 2014
<b>16</b>	<b>Mercantilização do gado bovino no distrito de Chicualacuala</b>	<b>António Manuel Júnior</b>	<b>Maió de 2014</b>
15	Os efeitos do HIV e SIDA no sector agrário e no bem-estar nas províncias de Tete e Niassa	Luís Artur, Ussene Buleza, Mateus Marassiro, Garcia Júnior	Abril de 2015
<b>14</b>	<b>Investimento no sector agrário</b>	<b>João Mosca e Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Março de 2014</b>
13	Subsídios à Agricultura	João Mosca, Kátia Amreén Pereira e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Fevereiro de 2014
<b>12</b>	<b>Anatomia Pós-Fukushima dos Estudos sobre o ProSAVANA: Focalizando no "Os mitos por trás do ProSavana" de Natalia Finger mann</b>	<b>Sayaka Funada-Classen</b>	<b>Dezembro de 2013</b>
11	Crédito Agrário	João Mosca, Natacha Bruna, Katia Amreén Pereira e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Novembro de 2013
<b>10</b>	<b>Shallow roots of local development or branching out for new opportunities: how local communities in Mozambique may benefit from investments in land and forestry Exploitation</b>	<b>Emelie Blomgren &amp; Jessica Lindkvist</b>	<b>Setembro de 2013</b>
9	Orçamento do estado para a agricultura	Américo Izaltino Casamo, João Mosca e Yasser Arafat	Setembro de 2013
<b>8</b>	<b>Agricultural Intensification in Mozambique. Opportunities and Obstacles—Lessons from Ten Villages</b>	<b>Peter E. Coughlin, Nícia Givá</b>	<b>Julho de 2013</b>
7	Agro-Negócio em Nampula: casos e expectativas do ProSAVANA	Dipac Jaantilal	Junho de 2013
<b>6</b>	<b>Estrangeirização da terra, agronegócio e campesinato no Brasil e em Moçambique</b>	<b>Elizabeth Alice Clements e Bernardo Mançano Fernandes</b>	<b>Maió de 2013</b>
5	Contributo para o estudo dos determinantes da produção agrícola	João Mosca e Yasser Arafat Dadá	Abril de 2013
<b>4</b>	<b>Algumas dinâmicas estruturais do sector agrário.</b>	<b>João Mosca, Vitor Matavel e Yasser Arafat Dadá</b>	<b>Março de 2013</b>
3	Preços e mercados de produtos agrícolas alimentares.	João Mosca e Máriam Abbas	Janeiro de 2013
<b>2</b>	<b>Balança Comercial Agrícola: Para uma estratégia de substituição de importações?</b>	<b>João Mosca e Natacha Bruna</b>	<b>Novembro de 2012</b>
1	Porque é que a produção alimentar não é prioritária?	João Mosca	Setembro de 2012




The OMR is a civil society association whose general objective is to contribute to agrarian and rural development in an integrated and interdisciplinary perspective, through research, studies and debates on policies and other agrarian and rural development issues.

OMR focuses its actions on the pursuit of the following specific objectives:

- Promote and carry out studies and research on policies and other issues related to rural development;
- Disseminate research results and reflections;
- Make the results of the debates known to society, either through press releases or through the publication of texts;
- Create an updated bibliographic database, in digitized form;
- Establish relationships with national and international research institutions for the exchange of information and partnerships in specific research work on agrarian and rural development issues in Mozambique;
- Develop partnerships with higher education institutions to involve students in research according to the topics of analysis and discussion scheduled;
- Create conditions for editing the texts presented for OMR analysis and debate.

Sponsors:



Faustino Vanombe Street, no. 81, 1<sup>st</sup> Floor  
Maputo – Moçambique

**[www.omrmz.org](http://www.omrmz.org)**