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**MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CAUSES  
AND CONFLICTS. THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE**

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## MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO CAUSES AND CONFLICTS. THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE

João Mosca

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Conflicts can take on different natures, from latent situations (stages) to mass conditions, of part or the majority of the population of a country or region (for example, indignation or perception of injustices in access to and distribution of resources, income and accessibility to basic welfare services, etc.). Other conflicts are of a labour nature, mainly related to wage levels and differences, working conditions, late payment of wages and overtime, professional careers, benefits for certain functions and professional positions, among others. There are conflicts rooted in or instrumentalised by religious, civilizational, racial and ethnic sentiments, which are always imbued with political and power, economic and social objectives<sup>1</sup>. There are wars of border delimitation (land and sea), national liberation, territorial delimitation, for security reasons or ideologies.

The paper argues that understanding conflicts requires multidisciplinary analyses<sup>2</sup> of their causes, which are necessarily multifaceted. It also argues that causes and effects feed on and reinforce each other, with causal relations that vary in time and space. Multidisciplinary analysis must be complemented by specialised analyses in different areas of knowledge.

The analyses that are generally carried out are hardly influenced by multiple reasons, and there are different motivations for this. In this case, the author attempts an analysis in the hope that the principle of multidisciplinary will be adopted, at least at the level of decision-making centres, commentators and academics, personalities in society and, if possible, the media. This objective becomes all the more difficult the greater the geostrategic, political, economic interests or claims to socio-cultural, civilizational or ethnic identities of the realities under analysis.

In addition to the introduction, the text has four more sections. The second section presents an outline for analysing some of the types of conflicts that have taken place in Mozambique in recent years. The second section makes a brief reference to the hypothesis of the text and the sources used. Section three provides a multidisciplinary analysis of the factors behind conflicts in Mozambique, highlighting: (1) the political system, in particular the fragility/strength of the State and institutions; (2) military conflicts; (3) drug trafficking; (4) the economy; (5) poverty

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<sup>1</sup> France's religious wars between Catholics and Reformed Protestant /Calvinists between 1562 and 1598 (with short periods of peace during those years) are well known, having taken the nature of a civil war. This war also included political confrontations, social struggles and cultural differences. Knecht, Robert J. (1996). *The French Wars of Religion 1559-1598*. Seminar Studies in History (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.

More recently, there are authors who consider that the wars in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Iraq, Israel, Sudan and Tibet were also (but not only) religious and ethnic in nature. Jessica Soares, <https://super.abril.com.br/coluna/superlistas/7-current-conflicts-caused-by-religious-differences>.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1999). *O Choque das Civilizações*. Gradiva. The book's summary States: "the current climate and the range of possibilities for the evolution of world politics, the author presents his thesis (naturally controversial in some of its aspects and implications) on how "civilisations" have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force of global politics. <https://www.fnac.pt/>.

<sup>2</sup> See section 2 for some notes on the concepts of multidisciplinary, pluridisciplinary, interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, based on the work by Jairo Gonçalves Carlos, *Interdisciplinaridade no Ensino Médio: desafios e potencialidades*. <https://www.pucsp.br/>.

and social and territorial inequalities; (6) employment and the minimum wage; (7) education and health; (8) labour and social issues; (9) the environment; and (10) demography. The final section summarises the issues.

## **2. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESIS**

The author considers that, although they differ in relative importance, the causes of conflicts are common, but varying in intensity, spatial scope and economic, social and human consequences. The causes (or factors) of conflicts are mainly geostrategic, economic (e.g. access to resources), territorial, climatic events, labour and social conflicts. There are cases in which factors of conflict are used as justifications, political and ideological propaganda, such as ideological, religious, civilizational, ethnic and racial reasons, among others.

The author seeks to substantiate the following hypothesis: Conflicts of different kinds manifest themselves in different ways and are the result of a combination of mutually reinforcing factors that generate political, economic and social dynamics that can result in the reproduction and amplification of conflicts.

This paper is based on a multidisciplinary approach, referring to the factors and effects considered most important today and in the past in Mozambique, with an emphasis on the period after independence.


The paper is based on secondary data and makes references to various texts and authors. It was prepared for publication after a presentation at the OMR Annual Conference, held on 6 and 7 August 2024, on the theme "Factors driving conflict in Mozambique".

## **3. TYPES OF CONFLICT**

### **3.1 Factors and types of conflict**

Conflicts can take different forms, especially the following: war (conventional, guerrilla, etc.); social demonstrations, for reasons of injustice and political, economic and social inequalities, labour, resettlements, etc.), and can take the passive/silent form.

Figure 1  
Factors and types of conflict



Source: Prepared by the author.

Figure 1 shows the factors that normally generate different types of conflict, distinguishing between what the author considers to be primary and secondary factors, i.e. those that generally have the greatest impact on the generation and reproduction of conflicts. Secondary factors are those that do not generally cause conflicts but are used in political narratives and in propaganda to justify them.

This paper focuses on the conflicts in Mozambique which have or have had the most significant impact on people's lives (human losses - food, shelter, health, schools, productive assets, displacement), humanitarian situations<sup>3</sup>) and on the economy (economic growth, foreign and domestic investment, employment, poverty, economic relations with the outside world and public finances). Conflicts or situations of potential conflict are also mentioned, as are and/or have been the cases of post-electoral moments, labour claims (especially in the areas of health and education and in some business sectors), illegal or illegitimate land occupations, forced displacement without compliance with the law and agreements between the parties (compensation, alternative land for production and community access to resources, housing conditions, provision of services in the resettlement areas, etc.).

The interconnections between the conflict factors are not the result of a study that quantifies the cause-effect relations, the levels of dependence and interdependence (degrees of determination - influence) and the intensity of the factors in time and space.

Conflicts are to a large extent dependent on a combination of factors, such as the existence of an undemocratic political environment, where human rights are systematically disregarded, the misuse of repressive forces, or the capture of political organisations and civil society and of opposing personalities or simply critics in the exercise of their sovereign functions. Conflicts arise

<sup>3</sup> Feijó, João, Maquenzi, Jerry and Rachide, Aleia (2022). *Ingredientes para uma revolta de jovens – Pobreza, sociedade de consumo e expectativas frustradas* Observador Rural N° 121- OMR. Maputo.

when economic and business opportunities are concentrated among elites and in regions that may or may not coincide with those elites' regions of origin<sup>4</sup>. These factors are exacerbated by the persistent presence of corruption in the upper echelons of bureaucracies, involving large economic values, access to resources, extra-legal business facilities or political cover.

There are conflicts resulting from the existence of strategic factors, such as the control of trade routes, the presence of military and security forces or access to strategic natural resources. In these cases, multiple relations are established between international and national or regional interests in order to establish favourable conditions for the deployment of military bases, security apparatuses and multinational companies to exploit resources. These territories are often the scene of non-converging international interests, which can lead to internationalised conflicts, whether military or of other dimensions/involvements.

Conflicts can evolve from non-violent to violent forms, with varying frequency, duration and intensity. They can range from democratic (political debate in different *forums*, labour demonstrations, strikes, demonstrations by social groups for various reasons, etc.) to unconstitutional and violent (e.g. wars, cross-border invasions, coups d'état, military instability, disproportionate use of force during elections, demonstrations and strikes). On other occasions, conflicts are motivated and directed from outside a country, with or without the involvement of internal forces, and with mobilisation actions to support populations in a situation of passive indignation or revolt (resistance). The periods immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict are usually preceded by negotiations.

The following factors are important in violent conflicts: (1) geo-strategic issues (whether economic, such as domination of maritime or land routes); (2) economic aspects, such as disputes over access to strategic resources and domination of inland routes from the (above mentioned) coast.

In the case of Mozambique, the identity factors and historical pasts that make up the current ethnic groups mean that ethno-linguistic groups are demanding greater representation in political systems, greater access to resources and business, as well as recognition and valorisation of their socio-cultural identities and participation in the construction of a unitary State.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Feijó, João (2024). The weakening of the State, the fraying of the social fabric and the lack of prospects for resolving the conflict. *Destaque Rural* No. 268. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>5</sup> In Africa and Mozambique, the borders drawn up at the Berlin Conference in 1884/1885 basically persist. The Berlin Conference (the text of which is available online) did not specifically draw the borders of States. It was convened to delimit borders on the Congo and Niger rivers and to define the rules for the annexation of territories by the (15) signatory countries. The rule of effective occupation was defined as a *sine-qua-non* condition for claiming possession of territories, which could be contested by any of the signatories; this is what Great Britain did, in an imperial and aggressive manner, in the case of the pink map (it is interesting to note that the British Empire voted against the criterion of effective occupation). The ownership of the Delagoa Bay region was settled by arbitration, decided by Mac-Mahon. The bulk of the borders, with an emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, were drawn up over the following decades, with greater or lesser armed resistance from those who inhabited the annexed territories. It should be noted, however, that there were later border dispute wars, such as the clashes with British colonialism in Mozambique, for example in the Rio region and in the province of Tete.

In the case of Mozambique, see sections 3.2 (military conflicts) and 3.8 (labour, social and post-election conflicts).

Citizens and civil society (workers' organisations, religious organisations, professional organisations and organisations with other objectives - humanitarian, research and advocacy, etc.), which bring together the interests and rights of their members on the basis of democratic values and principles, can play an important role in conflict prevention, negotiation and management and, in post-conflict situations, in monitoring peace and understanding agreements, in order to reduce the risk of new conflicts or the reactivation of existing ones.

Conflicts usually end when the negotiations have at least four dimensions: (1) solutions that are in the interests of the parties involved and therefore a possible lasting solution; (2) agreements that do not fully satisfy one of the parties or with unrealistic deadlines for resolving the negotiated aspects, which generally do not materialise in the end; (3) the breakdown of negotiations when one or more of the parties involved do not see their requests/positions satisfied; (4) the ability of the parties to fulfil the commitments made in the agreements.<sup>6</sup> Peace negotiations usually take place when there is a situation of great military supremacy on the part of one of the parties, great popular support and an unsustainable economic and social crisis.

### 3.2 Multidisciplinarity in conflict analysis

"Multidisciplinarity represents the first level of integration between disciplinary knowledge (...). In this method of analysis, (...) "knowledge is watertight and is all at the same hierarchical level and, furthermore, there is no 'bridge' between such disciplinary domains, suggesting that there is no organisation or coordination between such knowledge.

(...) In pluridisciplinarity, unlike the previous level, we observe the presence of some kind of interaction between interdisciplinary knowledge, although they are still at the same hierarchical level, and there is still no kind of coordination coming from a hierarchically higher level". The boundaries between multidisciplinarity and pluridisciplinarity are very blurred and many authors do not consider them to be two different methods.<sup>7</sup>

(...) Interdisciplinarity implies an integrating axis that can be the object of knowledge, a research project, an intervention plan. Thus, it must start from the need felt by schools, teachers and students to explain, understand, intervene, change, predict, something that challenges an isolated discipline and attracts the attention of more than one eye, perhaps several (...)

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In reality, a narrative based on the concept of a unitary State with respect for socio-cultural identities and their representativeness in political systems and the economy, in a democratic and inclusive environment, might be more unifying.


<sup>6</sup> "...in no part of the world is reconciliation made up of speeches, it is made up of concrete actions from the point of view of the process of building institutions" warning that the current fragility of the State "is the result of our choices as a country over the years". Salvador Forquilha spoke at a conference celebrating the 12<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE). In A Verdade newspaper, 20 September 2019.

<sup>7</sup> "There's something strange about this group of words. Sometimes some are used, sometimes others. Some people like one more and use it in all circumstances, others more than others. As if it were a matter of like or dislike. But that is how things work. Pombo, Olga (2004). *Interdisciplinarity and the Integration of Knowledge*. Luso-Brazilian Congress on Epistemology and Interdisciplinarity in Postgraduate Studies", held in Porto Alegre, Brazil, at the Pontifical University of Rio Grande do Sul.

(...) Transdisciplinarity represents a level of disciplinary integration beyond interdisciplinarity. This is a relatively recent proposal in the epistemological field. Japiassú<sup>8</sup> defines it as a kind of coordination of all the disciplines and interdisciplines of the innovative teaching system, on the basis of a general axiom. As shown in Figure 4, this is a type of interaction in which there is a kind of integration of various interdisciplinary systems in a broader and more general context, generating a more holistic interpretation of facts and phenomena”.<sup>9</sup>

The author adopts these approaches for the integrated analysis of factors and conflicts and their impact on the Mozambican reality. Figure 2 shows the main disciplines for analysing conflict situations, representing only those areas of knowledge that the author considers fundamental to understanding the different types of conflict. It should also be noted that the arrows indicate two-way relations between the disciplines, which represents the multidisciplinary nature of the analysis.

Figure 2  
Multidisciplinary approach to conflict analysis



Note: Geostrategy itself has a military component. In this case it has been included for emphasis.  
Source: Prepared by the author.

Military sciences deal with aspects of military strategy and tactics, equipment, the internal organisation of the army in its various branches, the mobility of soldiers and equipment, logistics (weapons, ammunition, food, uniforms, etc.) and the training of soldiers prepared for the demands of the type of war. The security and intelligence apparatus are fundamental in situations of conflict or simple espionage, as information or prevention, and is closely linked to military and economic strategies. The internal relations, organisation and capacity of the military and security sector are more important in conflict conditions, which generally implies military cooperation with other countries, especially in terms of equipment, training, exchange of security information and, in extreme cases, the presence of armies on national territory.

In addition to specialised military relations, conflicts require specific diplomatic relations so that the international community, and in particular the supranational organisations of which the

<sup>8</sup> Japiassu, Hilton (1976). *Interdisciplinaridade e patologia do saber*. Rio de Janeiro. Imago.

<sup>9</sup> Jairo Gonçalves Carlos. Work cited.



country in conflict is a member, and with which it has the greatest geostrategic, economic and political influence interests can understand the conflicts and support the points of view presented.

Military cooperation generally does not have direct counterparts, but rather facilitates access to and use of resources by multinational, medium and large companies in the cooperating countries, thus facilitating border mobility and residence, especially for the companies' technicians.

Conflict situations are conducive to the development of various types of trafficking (drugs, minerals, timber, rhino horn and ivory, etc.), as well as illicit (or non-transparent) business within the national business fabric, with stronger links to the political and military authorities.

Military affairs, in addition to relations with the political powers, require knowledge and the development of close relations with the population in the territories where the conflicts are taking place. This requires knowledge of ethnic relations, local and community power, the population's feelings between national and ethnic/regional/religious identities, relations between the local powers of the State and society, etc. in order to minimise or eliminate local conflict factors. These aspects require knowledge and research in the fields of sociology, politics, anthropology and history.

The conflicts are related to the economy, in terms of State spending, with an increase in defence and security spending and a reduction in social spending, with implications for economic growth, investment, production, employment, inflation, public and external deficits and debt, external flows of goods and capital, relations and alliances with foreign countries, among other indicators, which are reflected in global crises in societies.

It is important that the government, armed forces, civil society, local authorities, with the support of the international community, strengthen capacities and increase resources to respond to emergency situations (resettlement - housing, food, medical assistance, schools, etc.), in order to gain popular support or avoid relations between the population and the other parties to the conflict. Conflict conditions open up space for the strengthening of political authoritarianism, the reduction of citizens' rights and freedoms, the control of information and the lack of respect for human rights. In these respects, the intervention of civil society (including the churches) is of great importance, especially at national level, in order to prevent, denounce and publicise abuses arising from conflicts practised by the parties to the conflict. International organisations, non-governmental organisations, embassies accredited to the country, etc. are also important in denouncing these abuses.

The nature and importance of conflict factors, the frequency and intensity of conflicts, are also associated with the weaknesses of the State<sup>10</sup>, both as a conflict factor and in terms of its ability

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<sup>10</sup> "According to an OECD definition, a fragile region or state is one that "has a weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society. Fragile regions or States are also more vulnerable to internal and external shocks such as economic crises or natural disasters ...

... With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (and taking into account SDG 16 - Peaceful and Stable Societies and Effective Institutions), a new approach to fragility was defined, applicable to all countries in the world, based on five dimensions: (i) Violence; (ii) Justice; (iii) Responsible and inclusive institutions; (iv) Economic inclusion and stability; (v) Capacity to adapt to social, economic and environmental shocks and disasters," <https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/>.

to resolve conflicts through negotiation and overcoming conflicts through subsequent processes of reducing/eliminating risk factors.

#### 4. FACTORS AND CONFLICTS IN MOZAMBIQUE

There are several conflict factors in Mozambique, including: (1) the political system - weaknesses/strengths of the State and institutions, both public and private; (2) the cyclical frequency of military conflicts over the past seventy years<sup>11</sup>; (3) drug trafficking; (4) economic problems/crises; (5) poverty and social and territorial inequalities; (6) unemployment; (7) the quality and availability of education and health services; (8) labour and social issues; and (9) violent environmental events.

##### 4.1 Political system - weaknesses/strengths of the State and institutions

Mozambique began as a one-party State (Frelimo<sup>12</sup>) of an authoritarian nature (from independence in 1975 until the first general elections in 1994, after the end of the civil war). Since then, Frelimo has remained in power as the dominant party through general elections that have always been contested by competing parties and sectors of society. The 2014 and 2019 elections were followed by armed conflicts<sup>13</sup>. During this period, there were moments of greater democratic openness and moments of greater restrictions on citizens' freedoms, in some circumstances with police repression and political assassinations<sup>14</sup>. The partisan State became a platform for the distribution of resources and business in favour of the party elites and the government<sup>15</sup>, with a fragile, or when convenient, separation between the legislative, executive and judicial powers, with a strong concentration of powers in the President of the Republic and centralisation of decision-making powers in the highest State bodies. The political narratives were not adjusted to the social and anthropological realities of the national territory, propagating the idea of a nation State, when it should have been a unitary State with respect for religious and other cultural diversities, where the feeling of nationality would, in the long run, overcome ethnicity, race, religion, etc.<sup>16</sup>

The weakening of the State and of private institutions and civil society is both a cause and a consequence of the political system, the lack of a tradition of active citizenship, a weak productive

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<sup>11</sup> National liberation war, civil war, war of (in Cabo Delgado) and two post-election military conflicts, totalling almost 40 years.

<sup>12</sup> At the Third Frelimo Congress, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique was transformed from a national liberation movement into a Marxist, authoritarian political party of military origin.

<sup>13</sup> Designated by the State as wars of destabilisation, they lasted a relatively short time (2 to 3 years) and covered small parts of the national territory, especially in the central part of the country.

<sup>14</sup> The example of the murder of Giles Cistac was the most publicised and had the greatest impact on society.

<sup>15</sup> "In practice, Frelimo's position of dominance is enhanced by a series of conjunctural elements and mechanisms that help to consolidate the party's power in the State machine and that are potentiated by the control of economic resources and by dynamics of patronage and clientelism." Maschietto, Roberta Holanda (2023). *The challenges and resilience of democracy in Mozambique*. São Paulo State University. Mosca, João (2023). *Frelimo DNA: power and money*. Centre for Public Integrity. Maputo.

<sup>16</sup> According to the 2022 Afrobarometer, 47 percent of Mozambicans said they were both members of the Mozambican nationality and members of an ethnic group, and only a quarter of the population attached greater importance to nationality. Around 8 percent said they identified more with their ethnicity and 9 percent prioritised their national identity. Source: Afrobarometer (2024). Summary of Results: Afrobarometer Round 9 Survey in Mozambique, 2022.

and competitive Weberian private sector<sup>17</sup> and a capitalist spirit<sup>18</sup>. It is also the result of authoritarianism, management methods (hierarchical military command), the presence of party committees within public institutions, security and repressive control and the domination of institutions by party appointments, which results in a strong domination of the State over citizens, stifling the growth of citizenship. Social repression is a reality during demonstrations and strikes, and the abusive use of force is a common feature of these occasions. In these aspects of defence and reproduction of power and social control, the State is not weak; on the contrary, it is very strong.

On the other hand, the fragility of the State is proportional to that of the economy. Poverty and low wages facilitate, in the short term, profitability<sup>19</sup>, competitiveness and the extroversion of the economy, where foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated<sup>20</sup>, reducing and differentiating income levels in favour of the elites and civil servants, particularly the middle and upper echelons. The domestic market shrinks as a result of poverty and low wages, and the demand of middle and upper income social groups is met by imports.

The fragility of the state manifests itself in various ways in the economic sphere, such as: (1) in its ability to negotiate with multinationals, in the granting of high tax benefits and in the absence of financial controls that affect tax revenues; (2) in the low wages and social control of workers as a condition for the profitability and competitiveness of companies, to which must be added the granting of hundreds of thousands of hectares of land to foreign companies, practically at zero land cost, i.e. the state facilitates or grants low-cost conditions to companies (especially multinationals that exploit natural resources); (3) the weakness of the tax system in controlling the accounts of large companies, in contrast to the very high taxation of small and medium-sized companies, most of which have national capital.

These and other weaknesses facilitate FDI and, on the other hand, result in low tax and foreign exchange revenues (because it is not known exactly what has actually been exported) and have strong impacts that exacerbate poverty in the places of exploitation (land occupation, resettlement, families' production conditions, people's mobility, access to services, environmental impacts and effects on public health).

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<sup>17</sup> Economic success with capitalist ethics concerns those "who expanded modern capitalism, proposing the complete rationalisation of production, generating increased labour productivity, openness to innovation and cost reduction", Max Weber in Daniel de Abreu Pereira Uhr, Sílvio da Rosa Paula, Marcus Vinicius Bastos dos Santos, Luciane Machim Vieira, Júlia Gallego Ziero Uhr (2021), "Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism: preferences regarding the labour market, entrepreneurship and the family structure in Brazil". *Economia Aplicada*, v. 25, n. 3, 2021, pp. 395-420. Federal University of Pelotas.

<sup>18</sup> With the exception of businesspeople of mostly Asian origin, who are mainly involved in commerce and more recently in hotels, passenger transport and trucking, the Mozambican business tradition is very recent and has developed anchored in affiliation and hierarchical position in the ruling party, configuring an economy of rent and loot, which is not very productive. See Dadá, Yasser Arafat (2023). *Low wages: the trap of economic competitiveness*. Destaque Rural No. 232. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>19</sup> As mentioned above, low wages can only contribute to greater competitiveness, especially in labour-intensive goods with a low capital composition. In the long term, low wages inhibit innovation and the modernisation of the economic fabric and institutions, becoming an obstacle to competitiveness.

<sup>20</sup> See figure 4 below.

According to Mendes, Mozambique is one of the 10 countries that have worsened the most in terms of fragility between 2011 and 2021, especially in terms of the impact of terrorism. According to Countryeconomy, Mozambique ranks 36th lowest out of 178 countries assessed according to the 2018 fragile state ranking.

## 4.2 Military conflicts

In almost 50 years of war since independence, Mozambique has been in violent conflict more than 50 percent of the time<sup>21</sup>. According to the Museu AfroDigital - Estação Portugal<sup>22</sup>, the effects of the civil war were as follows: "one million dead; 454,000 children under the age of 15 killed between 1981 and 1988 (45% of the victims); 7,000 children disabled by landmines between 1980 and 1993; 50,000 people amputated, of which 7,000 were children and women; 92,881 demobilised soldiers and guerrillas (76.3% from the government army and 23.7% from Renamo), of which around 28% were under the age of 18; over 250.000 orphaned and unaccompanied children; 2/3 absolute poverty; more than 150 villages and towns destroyed; around 4.5 million internally displaced people; more than 1.5 million refugees abroad; more than half of the road network destroyed or rendered unviable; more than 50% of health facilities, over 1,800 schools and more than 1,500 rural shops destroyed".....

The war in Cabo Delgado is not yet over and the balance sheet hasn't been drawn up, although it can already be estimated that more than a million people have been displaced, and in 2017 the province had around 2.333 million inhabitants<sup>23</sup>. By June 2022, there had been 4,398 deaths.

Spending on national defence, according to the CIP<sup>24</sup>, is shown in Figure 1. According to the same source, "the comparative analysis between projected nominal expenditure without structural changes and actual expenditure from 2018 to 2022 suggests a total increase of approximately MZN 106.8 billion attributable to the conflict".

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
<sup>21</sup> The civil war lasted 17 years (known as the 16-year war), seven years in Cabo Delgado and between two and three years of post-election conflict, first with Dlakhama and then with Chongo). The civil war began in 1976 with the first attack in Nhaz'onia, in Manica province. This attack was carried out by forces from Ian Smith's Rhodesia, which had already incorporated soldiers from the Free Movement of Mozambique, later the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).

<sup>22</sup><https://museudigitalafroportugues.wordpress.com/2015/01/15/consequencias-da-guerra-civil-em-mocambique-19761992/>.

<sup>23</sup> Population Census. National Institute of Mozambique.

<sup>24</sup> The Centre for Public Integrity (2023). *Revealing the Costs of War in Cabo Delgado. A Comprehensive Analysis of Fiscal Impacts and Multidimensional Challenges*. CIP. Maputo.


Figure 1  
Changes in National Security expenditure



Source: CIP. Work cited.

Figure 2 shows that expenditure on the Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) increased later than the increase in national security but follows a similar pattern in terms of expenditure growth.


Figure 2  
Changes in Police (PRM) expenditure



Source: CIP. Work cited.

Figure 3 shows the fluctuations and intensity of terrorist actions, with a downward trend in the number of "incidents" and "reported deaths". In the context of a guerrilla-like war, changes in strategy are normal, whether in terms of intensity and frequency, the nature of targets, areas of operation, relations with the population, or the impact of incidents. At different times, the official narrative speaks of a slowing down of the war, as if victory were imminent, which is not the case. In parallel with military action, these wars are fuelled by powerful propaganda apparatuses.

Figure 3  
Political violence and deaths reported in Cabo Delgado  
(January 2021 – March 2024)



Source: CaboLigado<sup>25</sup>

As can be seen, it is confirmed that periods of conflict are conducive to great social instability (forced displacement), economic crisis, low production, human rights violations, destruction of infrastructure, strengthening of the repressive apparatus (military, police and security), restrictions on human rights and citizens' freedoms. In the case of Cabo Delgado, the weaknesses of the defence and security apparatus opened up space for the entry of foreign troops. With regard to this war, the factors mentioned above are confirmed, but the following stand out: (1) the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel, in terms of military and security domination of trade routes, drug trafficking and maritime piracy; (2) access to natural resources by multinationals, with or without political support, within the framework of the geostrategies of certain countries, not only in the Rovuma basin, but also in landlocked countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and Congo. The literature and commentators also claim that there are religious motivations: "Notwithstanding the relevance of other theories, it is clear that the motivations that sparked the conflict in Cabo Delgado are religious in nature and follow an ideology and a civilizational model of their own inspired by the most radical interpretations of Islam, namely in the terms of the Salafi movement, seeking to implement its religious and social customs and habits in the population, as Fernando Jorge Cardoso argues<sup>26</sup>". The same source also claims that the "mashababos" are related to the "Ansar-Al-Sunaa" terrorist group, which has links to the self-proclaimed Islamic State.<sup>27</sup>

In Cabo Delgado, researchers also refer to ethnic cleavages, especially between the Makonde and the Makua, which, although historical, are taking on new dimensions, including changes in ethnic "hierarchies"<sup>28</sup> and their relations with local institutions and their elites positioned in the central powers of Frelimo and the state. These cleavages are based on and reinforced by the control of

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.cabologado.com/portugues/cabo-ligado-mensal-marco-2024>.

<sup>26</sup> EuroDefense Portugal. <https://eurodefense.pt/conflito-em-cabo-delgado/>

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> The ethnic differentiation between the Makonde and the Makua is centuries old, dating back to the slave trade, the Arab trade and routes and the different alliances between local powers and Portuguese colonialism and FRELIMO. During the war of national liberation, Frelimo had great difficulty entering "Macau lands". See Cahen, Michel (2006). *Anti-colonial emancipation struggle or national liberation movement? Historical process and ideological discourse - the case of the Portuguese colonies and Mozambique in particular*. Africana Studia. Porto, Faculty of Letters, Centre for African Studies.

trafficking in natural resources (minerals, timber, maritime products, etc.), involving trafficking networks and traffic with various relations with the outside world and types of economic agents. Currently, there are migratory phenomena of Makonde to the south (traditionally a Makua and Muani area); many of these are former Frelimo guerrillas who have pensions and annuities, creating income disparities from the outset.

### 4.3 Drug trafficking

In many cases of conflict, illicit deals emerge involving the interests of high-ranking military personnel and national businessmen in connection with foreign companies related to logistics, facilitating transit with illicitly obtained goods, including drug trafficking.

This reality is only possible with the involvement of internal forces: "This Thursday, the Attorney General of the Republic of Mozambique asked for support in the fight against drug trafficking, given the "networks" that this type of crime already has "in the public institutions" of the country, from the police to politics<sup>29</sup>". She added on the same occasion: "Our country, traditionally considered a place of transit, is now witnessing cases of production, sale and consumption of hard drugs such as heroin, hashish and cocaine".<sup>30</sup>

"The United Nations is concerned about the possible links between drug trafficking, terrorism and kidnapping in Mozambique and points to international cooperation as one of the ways to combat them.

Drug trafficking generates an "underground" economy associated with transport, storage and production, high profits for the economic agents involved, institutional links between traffickers, links with security and defence apparatuses, investment in money laundering processes (for example, in real estate, hotels and restaurants), exports and the financing of terrorism<sup>31</sup>".

It should be noted that drug trafficking in Mozambique predates the start of the war in Cabo Delgado. This conflict shifted landings and clandestine transport to other points along the Mozambican coast and altered transit routes to other southern African countries, especially South Africa.

Figure 3 shows the global trafficking routes for heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine, with Mozambique as one of the countries involved.


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<sup>29</sup> Beatriz Buchili, speaking in Maputo at the opening ceremony of the 2024 judicial year. <https://observador.pt/>, 01/02/2024.

<sup>30</sup> <https://www.rtp.pt/noticias/mundo/mocambique>

<sup>31</sup> "For the representative of the UN Agency on Drugs and Crime, António De Vivo, there is a possibility that terrorists operating in Cabo Delgado are being financed by international drug trafficking." <https://www.voaportugues.com/a/mocambique>, 14 February 2024.

Figure 3  
Heroin, Cocaine and Methamphetamine Traffick Routes



Source: adapted from the GPCPD Report, 2019. In Cossa.<sup>32</sup>

#### 4.4 Economy

The economic model implemented after the Economic Rehabilitation Programme<sup>33</sup>, especially after the end of the 20th century, led to or reinforced the configuration of the economy: (1) extroversion of the economy<sup>34</sup>, on the one hand due to the growing importance of the production and export of natural resources (coal, gas, heavy sands, rubies, precious stones, gold, wood and ivory and *commodities* - cotton, cowpeas, sesame and tobacco) and, on the other hand, due to the growing import of oil, equipment (related to the large investments in natural resources), vehicles and foodstuffs; (2) an economy dependent on foreign capital (through FDI, loans and international aid and cooperation), reproducing internally the characteristics of an

<sup>32</sup> Cossa, Carlos Simão (2021). International drug trafficking in Mozambique. Challenges for drug trafficking prevention. Integrated master's thesis in police sciences. Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security. Lisbon, Portugal.

<sup>33</sup> In the mid-1980s, Mozambique went through a serious economic crisis as a result of a combination of factors: (1) the civil war at the height of guerrilla activity covering a large part of the national territory and the most important economic zones; (2) the collapse of the socialist economies of Europe with which Mozambique had established much of its economic and technical and military cooperation; (3) misalignments of realities and the radicalisation of economic measures in the implementation of the model that aimed to build socialism; (4) the side-lining of agriculture and, in particular, the marginalisation of small-scale agricultural producers who represented around 75% of the population, among other aspects. Faced with the political, military and economic crisis and growing international isolation, Mozambique had no choice but to opt for the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) led by the Bretton Woods Institutions, which in Mozambique was called the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP).

<sup>34</sup> Mosca, João and Dadá (2023). *Financialisation and agrarian extroversion in Mozambique*. Destaque Rural No. 202. OMR. Maputo.



underdeveloped and poor economy<sup>35</sup>; (3) the side-lining of agriculture<sup>36</sup>, especially the production of basic foodstuffs (peanuts, rice, beans, with the exception of those exported, sorghum) carried out by small producers (peasants), which is revealed by the low variation in productivity and lack of growth (or decline in production per inhabitant); on the other hand, there is growth in the production and productivity per hectare of exportable goods (mainly cotton, pigeon peas, sesame, tobacco and bananas) and of goods mainly consumed in urban areas and produced by medium and large producers (potatoes, onions, tomatoes, cabbage, etc.), which together make it possible to increase the production per hectare of exportable goods (mainly cotton, pigeon peas, sesame, tobacco and banana.), which together make the country dependent on food, reflected in the growing deficit in the food trade balance, which exacerbates the situation of food insecurity; (4) deindustrialisation of the economy, especially in the agro-industry (flour, rice husks, milk and dairy products) and in the manufacturing industry (packaging, furniture, textiles, etc.) and metalworking (see figure 5 below); (5) growth in urbanisation without any corresponding infrastructure, sanitation, etc., making cities and their inhabitants highly exposed to climatic shocks, difficulties in public transport and creating an unemployed population and increased insecurity (lumpen proletariat<sup>37</sup>); (6) suffocation of the national business fabric<sup>38</sup>, mainly due to: (a) high interest rates with the counterproductive aim of controlling inflation; (b) a high tax burden; (c) high profit rates considering that Mozambique is a high-risk country; (d) commission payments (corruption); (e) a slow judicial system; (f) markets distorted by ineffective and unreasonable "regulatory" interventions; (g) low entrepreneurial tradition of the majority of entrepreneurs with party coverage; (h) poorly trained workers; (i) low technological level; (j) existence of state monopolies and politically protected companies, among those that make up the *Doing Business Index*.<sup>39</sup>

Mosca (2024)<sup>40</sup> States: "The emergence of a strong, endogenous and patriotic private sector is not in the interest of the political system. Firstly, because the broadening of this economic base would hinder or compete with the economy of looting and "bolada"<sup>41</sup>. Secondly, because it would create a politically non-aligned social group and possible alternatives to the current power in the long term".

Table 1 clearly shows the country's deindustrialisation process, which is now concentrated in the extractive industry (large mining companies) (coal, heavy sands and other minerals) and in the

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<sup>35</sup> Mosca, João (2024). *Mozambique more underdeveloped. A theoretical revisit to development and underdevelopment*. Observador Rural N° 144. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>36</sup> Mosca, João, and Nova, Yara (2023). *The agrarian structural counter-transformation in Mozambique*. OMR. Maputo. <https://omrmz.org/livros/>.

<sup>37</sup> This paper uses the expression "lumpen" (from the Marxist term lumpen proletariat) to characterise the population that has recently arrived in the cities, without means of subsistence, unemployed, delinquents, petty thieves, wandering the city streets and living in neighbourhoods without minimum living conditions. In southern Mozambique, there is an expression that somehow summarises the lumpen defined here as "moluenes".

<sup>38</sup> " Mosca, João (2024). *The deliberate asphyxiation of the national business community*. Destaque Rural No. 264. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>39</sup> "In 2006 Mozambique's score on the index was 42.7 and it rose to 53.5 in 2020. In 2006, Mozambique was ranked 144th out of 175 countries and in 2020 it was 131st out of 190 countries. In World Bank (2020). *Doing Business 2020: Comparing Business Regulation in 190 Economies*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

It can be seen that although the score on the index has evolved positively, the country's position in the *ranking* among the countries evaluated has fallen.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Mosca, João (2024). *Mozambique. Economy of plunder*. In press.

manufacturing industry, basically in aluminium smelting at the MOZAL company<sup>42</sup>, which began operating at the beginning of this century. Around 66% of total industrial production in 2019 was carried out by these two branches (metal processing - 30% and mining - 36%), whereas in 1999 these two branches produced 6% of total industrial output (4% for metal processing and 2% for mining). It should be noted that the importance of "other manufacturing" has decreased from 50% in 1999 to 4.9% in 2019. The category ("nomenclature") of "other manufacturing" mainly included the metal industry, agro-industry, packaging, agricultural inputs, among others.

Table 1  
Changes in the percentage contribution of industrial branches to total industrial production - 1999 and 2019

	1999	2019
Food products	15	19
Wood and cork	2	0,1
Textiles	13	0,2
Tobacco	5	1,1
Drinks	7	8,7
Metal processing industry	4	30
Other manufacturing	50	4,9
Paper and its articles	2	-
Extractive industry	2	36

Source: Mosca, João and Nova, Yara (2023). Ibid.

FDI is concentrated in the extraction of natural resources, transport and agriculture. The withering away of the national private sector is functional to the extroverted economic model, which is sectorally and territorially narrow, lacks a socially broad base for accumulation and generates more poverty and greater social and territorial inequalities.


"With regard to the distribution of FDI by sector of activity, it can be seen that the extractive industry has been the main destination, accounting for 70 percent of total FDI between 2002 and 2021. Investments in agriculture were concentrated in forestry, tobacco and sugar. The growth of other sectors, such as transport, storage and communications (railways and ports), trade, construction, real eState, among others, mainly serves the extractive industry."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> South32 holds 47.1% of Mozal's shares and has been operating the plant since 2015, replacing BHP. The other shareholders are Mitsubishi (25 percent), the Industrial Development Corporation - IDC (24 percent) and the Mozambican State, a minority shareholder with 3.9 percent. The company is located in the Balaluane Industrial Park, in Maputo province (on the outskirts of the city of Matola). Exports are mainly to European markets (the Netherlands). It produces around 500,000 tonnes of aluminium ingots a year. Raw materials are imported from Australia (alumina) and petrochemical coke from the United States. Electricity is supplied by the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Power Station, via an exclusive direct line from South Africa.

<sup>43</sup> Mosca, João and Nova, Yara (2023). *The agrarian structural counter-transformation in Mozambique*. OMR. Maputo.

Figure 6  
Distribution of FDI by sector (2002-2021)



Note: "Other" sectors refer to fishing, electricity, gas and water production and distribution, financial activities, public administration, education, health, among others.

Source: Central Bank of Mozambique<sup>44</sup>.

A number of factors explain the low level of domestic savings, which has been between 10% and 12% of GDP in recent years, which is insufficient to amortise fixed capital, both public and private. The following factors stand out: (1) poverty and high concentration of national income (see figure 5 and table 1); (2) low bankisation of the economy and difficulties in accessing financial services; (3) monetary policy that does not encourage savings; (3) low savings culture among Mozambicans.

#### 4.5 Poverty and social and territorial inequalities

According to Dadá<sup>45</sup>, the main determinants of poverty are: (1) low incomes for small and medium-sized industrial enterprises and small agricultural producers, who provide the food base for the population (especially in rural areas) and receive low monetary incomes due to low agricultural productivity and low wages; (2) low employment and low wages in and outside agriculture (see Figure 7); (3) low access to and quality of education and health care. Although the model used in this text does not include infrastructure and the environment, these are equally important drivers of poverty.

Table 2 and Figure 7 show the evolution of poverty, according to the results of the Household Survey (IAF), later known as the Family Budget Survey (IOF). There is evidence that: (1) the percentage of the poor population has tended to decrease, except in the latest survey for 2019/20, possibly due to the combined consequences of Covid-19<sup>46</sup>, the economic crisis, hidden debts<sup>47</sup>

<sup>44</sup> In Nova, Yara Nova and Mosca, João (2022). *Foreign direct investment: "extractivising" the Mozambican economy*. Destaque Rural No. 169. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>45</sup> Dadá, Yasser Arafat Ismael (2024). *Socio-economic determinants of poverty in Mozambique*. PhD Thesis. University of Lisbon.

<sup>46</sup> Mussagy, Ibraimo Hassane and Mosca, João Mosca (2020). *Micro-simulations of the impacts of COVID-19 on poverty and inequality in Mozambique*. Observador Rural N° 96- OMR. Maputo.

<sup>47</sup> Centre for Public Integrity and Chr. Michelsen Institute (2019). *Costs and Consequences of Hidden Debts for Mozambique*. CIP. Maputo.


and the first moments of the war in Cabo Delgado<sup>48</sup>. However, despite the evolution of the population percentages, the total number of poor (in the figure in *bold red*), has had a stationary evolution with slight increases or decreases between 1996/07 and 2014/15, and a very sharp increase between 2016 and 2020; (3) poverty is increasing more in rural areas than in urban centres, both as a percentage and in terms of the number of poor people. Female-headed households have a higher incidence of poverty on average (not shown in the table or figure).

Table 2  
Percentage of poor population

	1996/07	2002/03	2008/09	2014/15	2019/20
Total poor population	74	60	59	48	63
Rural poor/total poor	76	80	78	77	78

Source: World Bank<sup>49</sup>, based on household surveys (INE).

Figure 7  
Evolution in the number of poor people



Source: World Bank<sup>50</sup>, based on household surveys (INE).

Figure 8 shows that poverty in the provinces highlights the disparity between Maputo province and city and the other provinces, not only in the percentage of poor people, but also in the number of poor people. Zambézia, Niassa, Manica and Nampula are the provinces with the highest poverty rates, and where poverty reduction has been the lowest. Zambézia and Nampula are the most populous provinces and those with the greatest potential for agricultural production. The largest reductions in the proportion of poor people have occurred in the provinces of Tete, Inhambane and Manica.


<sup>48</sup> Various publications by Caboligado.

<sup>49</sup> <https://www.scribd.com/document/687817570/Relato-rio-da-Avaliac-a-o-da-Pobreza-em-Mocambique-2023-v2>.

<sup>50</sup> <https://www.scribd.com/document/687817570/Relato-rio-da-Avaliac-a-o-da-Pobreza-em-Mocambique-2023-v2>.

The data on the number of poor people and poverty percentages show that economic growth and the distribution of wealth are not enough to reduce poverty or its social (table 2) and territorial concentration (figure 8).

Figure 8  
Percentage of poor people by province



Source, Dadá (20124, work cited).

Although the GDP per inhabitant indicator is analytically limited, Figure 9 shows the evolution of GDP between 2007 and 2020, by province. It can be seen that; (1) there is a big difference between Maputo (above all) and Maputo province and the other provinces; (2) the biggest increases are in Maputo city, Inhambane and Tete; (3) only three provinces have GDP per inhabitant above the national average in the years shown; (4) very low values in all provinces except Maputo city, Maputo province and Inhambane; (5) there is some coincidence, in terms of qualitative analysis, between GDP per inhabitant and poverty levels.

Figure 9  
GDP per capita in USD




Table 3 shows a strong social concentration of national income, with an increase in the last decile and a decrease in the first nine deciles, which means that, on average, only 10 percent of the population increased their income and the remaining 90 percent, became poorer, on average.

Figure 10  
Lorenz curve




Table 3  
Distribution of national income by decile

População	2000	2020
10%	0,20%	0,10%
20%	1,20%	1,00%
30%	2,10%	1,80%
40%	2,80%	2,40%
50%	3,60%	3,00%
60%	4,50%	3,90%
70%	5,80%	5,00%
80%	7,80%	7,00%
90%	12,20%	11,20%
100%	59,80%	64,60%


Source: Dadá (2024)<sup>51</sup>, based on data from INE surveys.

#### 4.6 Employment and minimum wage

Figure 11 shows: (1) a sharp percentage decline in employment in agriculture; and (2) industry and services generate little employment and account for a very low percentage of total

<sup>51</sup> Dadá, Yasser Arafat Ismael (2024), Ibid.

employment<sup>52</sup>; (3) in percentage terms, the decline in the population employed in agriculture has not been offset by job creation in industry and services, which, considering the increase in population, means an increase in unemployment.



Source: Prepared by Dadá (cited work) based on Trading Economics20.


According to the same author, “the share of vulnerable employment<sup>53</sup> in total employment is high (89.38 percent in 1992 and 82 percent in 2019). The number of unemployed rose from 2.4 million in 1992 to 5.75 million in 2017 and to around 6 million in 2019. The agricultural sector employs 78 percent of the working population, followed by the services sector (17 percent) and, lastly, industry (5 percent).”

Although the percentage and number of people in non-precarious employment is low, minimum wages are an important indicator of poverty, especially in cities where the population with stable employment is concentrated. Figure 12 mainly shows: (1) the evolution of real wages between 2014 and 2022 was very low, with a sharp drop in the extractive industry, remaining almost unchanged in the agricultural sector and in construction, and increased in financial services and in the large mining industry; (2) wages in the agricultural sector and in the extractive industry are the lowest, these being the activities that take place in rural areas; (3) large mining companies pay higher wages than the agricultural sector and the mining industry, because they require work with some specialisation and stability, even if unskilled; (4) wages are higher in activities that require work with higher levels of training (financial and non-financial services), located in urban centres; (5) intermediate level wages are paid in sectors that require workers with some qualifications and experience (manufacturing and construction).

<sup>52</sup> Employment is defined as all people who are aged 15 or over and are in at least one of the following situations: (1) worked for at least one hour in the last 7 days prior to the survey, in order to produce goods or services, for payment in cash or in kind; (2) helped a family member in the production of goods and services, without remuneration; (3) did not work, but had a job during the reference period, i.e. was on holiday, maternity leave, on strike, etc. (IOF 2019/2020).

<sup>53</sup> Labour vulnerability refers to unpaid family workers and the self-employed as a percentage of total employment. The proportion of unpaid family workers and the self-employed in total employment is derived from information on employment status (World Bank 2023).

Figure 12  
Nominal and real minimum wage by sector for 2014 and 2022 (in meticaís)



Note: The figures in red correspond to the real minimum wage for 2022 at 2014 prices.

Source: Dadá, ibidem, based on <https://meusalario.org/mocambique/salario/salario-minimo>. Real salaries calculated by Yara Nova.

Converting salaries to dollars (table 4) shows a significant loss in the value of salaries in dollars (due to the devaluation of the Metical and the evolution of real salaries), with a greater penalty for the lowest paid sectors and a smaller reduction in the highest salaries in meticaís, which is logical considering the same conversion values (exchange rate of the respective years<sup>54</sup>).

Table 4  
Nominal wages in 2014 and 2022 in USD

	Agricultural sector	Large mining companies	Extractive Industry	Manufacturing Industry	Construction	Non-financial sectors	Financial sectors
2014	98	174	141	143	129	138	243
2020	75	149	84	114	96	112	206
Percentage 2020/2014	76,5	85,6	60	79,7	74,4	81,2	84,8

Source: Bank of Mozambique and author's calculations.

## 4.7 Education and health


### Education

The low coverage and poor quality of services to citizens (mainly health and education) reveal public policy choices that support the State's weakness in providing essential services that should be universal and tend to be free of charge. The budgetary allocation to these social sectors and the territorial distribution of budgetary and human resources reveal a low prioritisation of education and health within the framework of public policies.

<sup>54</sup> Bank of Mozambique: 30.69MZN/USD in 2017 and 69.47 in 2020).



However, there has been an increase in schooling, as shown in Figures 13 and 14.



Source: Dadá, work cited.

Figure 13 shows that: (1) in 2014/2015, 63.5 percent of females had no schooling or had not completed primary school, while the percentage for males was 48.1 percent, which could be considered functional illiteracy; (b) the percentages for the remaining levels of education show a higher level of schooling for males; (3) there is a large decrease, and an increase in the differentiation towards females, of people with some technical and higher education, as well as a greater disproportion between the genders.

Figure 14 shows that, in 2019, the population of Maputo city and Maputo province had much higher levels of education than the average for the country and the other provinces. Manica and Sofala are the provinces that had education levels close to the national average in 2019. The provinces of Cabo Delgado, Tete, Zambézia and Nampula are the provinces with the least educated population on average.

According to Dadá<sup>55</sup>, "the average number of years of schooling increased from 1.1 years in 1992 to 3.5 years in 2019. The literacy rate is 47 percent, 28 percent for women and 60 percent for men. (...) Less than half of the population finishes primary school and only 8 percent of them go on to secondary school. "

Regarding the quality of teaching, a World Bank study (2015)<sup>56</sup> reached the following conclusions: (1) almost half (45 percent) of teachers were not in school during an unannounced visit and 11 percent were in school but not in the classroom where they should have been teaching; (2) pupils only receive an average of one hour and 41 minutes of teaching per day; (3) the average score obtained in the teacher evaluation (in Portuguese, maths and pedagogy) was 29 percent; (4) only


<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> World Bank (2015). Mozambique, service provision indicators. <https://documents1.worldbank.org>

65 percent of maths teachers were able to do two-digit subtraction (e.g. 86-55), and only 39 percent could do subtraction with decimal numbers (e.g. 12.15-11.83); (5) among the pupils enrolled at the school, on average 56 percent of pupils were absent; (6) only 49 percent of pupils could do one-digit addition (e.g. 7+8) and only 5 percent could do a two-digit subtraction operation (e.g. 57-49); (7) Although there are more than 40 students enrolled per class, only an average of 17 turn up for lessons, with student absenteeism being higher in the Centre (62%) and North (65%) regions and relatively lower in the South (24%) .<sup>57</sup>

The increase in the school-age population, the construction of new infrastructures or the maintenance of the existing ones, the qualification of teachers and the growing number of students per class and per teacher, the volumes allocated to education, are some of the factors that can justify the perceptible decline in the quality of education at all levels and in different ways throughout the national territory .<sup>58</sup>

According to the aforementioned CIP study, spending on education in the General State Budget (GSB) has increased in nominal terms (figure 15). However, in proportional terms (as a percentage of total budgeted spending on education) it has fallen from around 21 percent in 2017 to 17 percent in 2022 (figure 16). The war factor in Cabo Delgado and the corresponding increase in defence and security spending, and the economic crisis stemming from the combined effects of hidden debts and Covid-19, may explain the reduction in the proportion of public funds allocated to education.




Source: CIP. Work cited.

<sup>57</sup> More information about the survey instruments and data from the Service Provision Indicators (IPS) and, in general, about the IPS initiative can be found on the websites: [www.SDIndicators.org](http://www.SDIndicators.org) and [www.worldbank.org/sdi](http://www.worldbank.org/sdi), or by contacting [sdi@worldbank.org](mailto:sdi@worldbank.org).

<sup>58</sup> With regard to the case of Covid-19, Muzime and Zimbico (2021) State: "... in the educational field, the crisis has brought about a necessary reform, especially in the teacher/student ratio, the need to improve ICTs, reduce working time, initiatives to create infrastructure, hygiene, biosafety, components that were not of great importance before the pandemic." Muzime, Fernando André, and Zimbico, Octávio José (2021). *Covid-19 e a educação em moçambique: entraves, desafios e possibilidades de reinvenção da educação*. DOI 10.21573/vol37n32021.109849. <https://seer.ufrgs.br/index.php/rbpae/article/view/109849/65759>.

Figure 16  
Proportional change in education expenditure



Source: CIP, work cited.

As a result of the decline in quality at all levels of education and the lack of supply to meet demand (especially in urban centres), a private education market has rapidly emerged, the quality of which has yet to be assessed, although there are data on higher education, which is generally of equal or lower quality, taking into account the qualifications of teachers, scientific production, teaching infrastructures (classrooms, libraries, laboratories, Internet access, internationalisation of teaching, etc.).

## Health

The latest World Bank data on the number of doctors per 1,000 inhabitants shows that Mozambique has one of the worst ratios in the world. In 2020, the country ranked 180th out of 197 countries assessed, with 0.08 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants.<sup>59</sup>

The variation in the number of health facilities between 2008 and 2020 was 32 percent and the variation in the population was around 40 percent. There was an increase in the number of inhabitants per health facility (HF) - the ratio in 2020 was 17,975 inhabitants per HF and in 2008 it rose to 16,982 inhabitants per HF. The international recommendation is 10,000 inhabitants per health facility (Bassi, Medina, and Nhamossa, 2018). The provinces with the worst ratios of inhabitants per health facility are Nampula (23,297), Tete (20,805) and Zambézia (20,178) (INE, 2020).

<sup>59</sup> CIA World Facebook, 2020. Cuba was the country with the best indicator (8.3 doctors per thousand inhabitants), proportionally more than 100 times the number of Mozambique. <https://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?v=2226&l=pt>.

The study carried out by the WB on Education and Health Service Delivery Indicators in 2015, (World Bank, 2015)<sup>60</sup>, shows:

- The average estimates of the individual components of infrastructure availability were as follows: 80.0 percent of the facilities had drinking water, 73.4 percent had access to electricity and 56.8 percent had an improved toilet. Considering the simultaneous availability of all three infrastructure components, it was concluded that 34 percent of facilities had both drinking water, sanitation and electricity. 54.3 percent of facilities in urban areas met the minimum infrastructure requirements compared to 32.1 percent of rural facilities.
- More than three quarters of all health facilities throughout the country (79.5%) have the equipment considered basic (sphygmomanometer, thermometer, refrigerator, sterilisation equipment) (World Bank, 2015). The availability of equipment varied considerably in the three regions of Mozambique. In the centre of the country, 82.9% of facilities met the minimum requirements, followed by the south (79.3%) and the north (74.1%).
- More than half the population has to walk an hour or more to the nearest health centre. These figures and others presented in the WB and WHO databases, when compared with other countries, show that Mozambique is among the worst in the world.
- The maternal mortality rate is 289/100,000 pregnant women, ranking 143rd out of 188 countries in the world (CIA World 2020). The rate of underweight in children under 5 is estimated at 44 percent, which is much higher than the rate in most countries (CIA World 2020, MISAU Sep 2023).
- Life expectancy at birth is among the worst in the world, ranking 196th out of 216 countries. Infant mortality rates are among the worst in the world, ranking 189th out of 206 countries. Nevertheless, the number of under-five deaths has been on a downward trend (from 155 per 1,000 in 1990 to 54 per 1,000 in 2019) (World Bank, 2022)," Dadá's work cites.
- "The variation in the number of health facilities between 2008 and 2020 was 32 percent and the variation in the population was around 40 percent, i.e. the expansion of the health system has been slower than population growth. There has been an increase in the number of inhabitants per Health facility (HU) (the ratio in 2020 was 17,975 inhabitants per HU and in 2008 it was 16,982 inhabitants per HU). The international recommendation is 10,000 inhabitants per HU (Bassi, Medina, and Nhampossa, 2018). The provinces of Nampula (23,297), Tete (20,805) and Zambézia (20,178) have the worst ratios of inhabitants per health facility, (INE, 2020)
- Around 42.7 percent of health facilities have priority medicines available (World Bank, 2016). The availability of these medicines for mothers was lower than for children at 39.4 percent and 49.4 percent respectively. The results show some geographical differences in the availability of priority medicines for mothers and children (the availability of medicines in health facilities was as follows: 44.6% in the South, 41.3% in the Centre and 43.6% in the North). Southern Mozambique also had the highest availability of priority medicines for mothers (42.4%), compared to the Centre (36.9%) and North (40.8%) zones. In contrast, Central Mozambique had the highest availability of priority medicines for children (49.7%).
- According to the Ministry of Health, between 2008 and 2020 the number of people working in health services grew by around 45 percent. In total, there are around 42,500 professionals, of whom around 10,000 have higher education qualifications. However, the ratio of doctors and nurses per inhabitant is low compared to the WHO recommendation. The WHO recommends that 2.5 health professionals per 1,000 inhabitants are needed to ensure adequate coverage of the population (INE, various years; World Bank, 2022). The time series

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<sup>60</sup> World Bank (2015). Health service delivery in Mozambique. Washington DC. United States.

shows an upward trend in the number of nurses per inhabitant: in 1990 it was 0.012 and in 2019 it rose to 0.47 nurses per 1,000 inhabitants. Between 2000 and 2019, the trend in this ratio was upwards (in 2000, the number of nurses per 1,000 inhabitants was 0.287),” Dadá, work cited.

Table 5 shows: (1) health's operating costs are around 10 percent of the total operating costs of the State Budget; (2) investment in health as a percentage of total public investment has seen significant variations, ranging from 15.8 percent in 2016 to 8.8 percent in 2021, with a peak of 6 percent in 2018; (3) the indicator for the weight of health in total State Budget expenditure has seen a similar evolution; (4) the health sector spends its budget mainly on operating costs, with a marked upward trend, in the opposite direction to investment in the sector.

Table 5  
Health budget

	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Health workers/Total GBS staff	9	9,0	10	9,0	10,4	10,8
Health investment/Total investment	15,8	11,8	6	8,6	11,5	8,8
Health GBS/Total GBS	9,6	8,1	8	7,8	9,2	9,0
Health employees/ Total health	63,4	70,2	79	74,3	75,0	82,4

Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance. Budget Execution Report.<sup>61</sup>

#### 4.8 Labour, social and post-electoral conflicts

##### Labour and social conflicts

At different times, there have been more or less organised demonstrations of a corporate demand nature, particularly by doctors, health professionals and secondary school teachers. These groups have some negotiating power for the following reasons: (1) they work in social sectors of great importance and political and social sensitivity; (2) they generally have a greater awareness of citizenship due to their level of education and the nature of their profession; (3) their workplace facilitates contacts/conversations and discussion of their issues.

Professional organisations generally demand better salaries and overtime pay, working conditions and safety, professional dignity and compliance with or review of professional careers.

The other negotiating party, the government, is aware of the social sensitivity of the sectors and is trying to highlight the effects of the strike on the population with calls for awareness and professionalism, which often divides the professionals, generally segregating those who are not members of organisations. On the basis of minimum services and the saturation of negotiating time, professionals are returning to their workplaces. At the same time, the government is threatening professionals with time off and salary deductions, in some circumstances unconstitutionally.

During the first medical doctors' strike, the government imposed compulsory transfers from Maputo to the provinces and early retirement. Some of these promises were not kept, and the organisations responded by threatening to return to strike action, which was often carried out.

<sup>61</sup> <https://www.mef.gov.mz/>.

There have also been strikes and demonstrations, especially in the big mining companies<sup>62</sup> and in the monoculture agricultural companies<sup>63</sup>, which are generally repressed by the police and/or conciliatory promises that are not always kept. The reasons for labour conflicts are low wages, working conditions (safety, health, etc.), population resettlements (type of construction, size of houses and yards, production conditions, distance from services and markets, among other aspects).

In general, the political establishment supports government irregularities, from non-compliance with laws<sup>64</sup>, including through the abusive use of police force, to political and diplomatic support for multinationals.<sup>65</sup>

Despite the existence of labour and social conflicts, these can be considered short-lived, low frequency and low intensity. These characteristics are justified by the following factors: (1) a low sense of citizenship and civil society organisation; (2) violent repression in the event of demonstrations and strikes; and (3) preventive social control, both by those in charge of civil society organisations and by the "leaders" of strikes and demonstrations, with threats of various kinds.

Artisanal mining (also known as *garimpo*) gives rise to conflicts of different kinds, involving national citizens and foreigners belonging to trafficking networks, and also motivated by 'invasions' by *garimpeiros* of mining concession areas, whether they are being exploited or not<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> On Tete coal (Moatize), see, for example: Mosca, João and Selemene, Tomás (2011): *EL DORADO TETE: the mining megaprojects*. Centre for Public Integrity. Maputo, and Selemene, Thomas (2016). *Between the Implosion of El Dorado and the Continued Degradation of the Living Conditions of the Resettled*. Observador Rural N° 45. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>63</sup> Joaquim Joana, Sampaio Ana, and Mosca João (2018). *International Agribusiness and the Multidimensionality of Smallholder Farmers' Perception of Value in Xinavane, Mozambique: A Confirmatory Factor Analysis*. Development and Society. Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Sciences, No. 4, Universidade de Évora.

<sup>64</sup> The Mozambican government has accepted that there were irregularities in the granting of the Right to Use and Exploit Land (DUAT) in Afungi, Cabo Delgado province, to the company Rovuma Basin LNG Land, Limitada (RBLL), for the establishment of the Natural Gas Liquefaction Plant in the Palma district. <https://www.folhademaputo.co.mz/pt/noticias/nacional/duat-atribuido-a-rbll-em-palma-e-ilegal-conclui-relatorio/>, 19-05-2015. The irregularities occurred from the consultation process with the populations concerned to the decision-making process.

<sup>65</sup> For example, the presence of then President Armando Guebuza and Joaquim Chissano at the opening of the Moatize mine. Alberto Vaquina, then governor of Tete province, said in an interview with the weekly SAVANA that mineral exploration in Tete was a "laboratory for social and economic change". SAVANA, 30.09.2011.

<sup>66</sup> Maquenzi, Jerry (2023). *Interests in mineral resources in Cabo Delgado: An application of Cluster Analysis*. Destaques Rural No. 226. OMR. Maputo.

Maquenzi, Jerry and Feijó, João (2023). *Forced displacements and increased pressure on mining in Namanhumbir*. Observador Rural N° 134. OMR. Maputo.

Maquenzi, Jerry and Feijó, João (2019) *The curse of natural resources: Artisanal mining and conflict in Namanhumbir*. Observador Rural N° 75. OMR. Maputo.

## Post-electoral conflicts

In all elections there were complaints of fraud and illegal acts by the judicial system and use of force by the police. In some cases, this was followed by periods of armed conflict of short and medium duration (between 2 and 3 years). The opposition's main complaints relate to ballot boxes being stuffed before or after the elections, people moving to vote in constituencies other than their own, police intimidation at polling stations, including shootings and injuries or deaths, counting of votes at polling stations and the exchange of notices immediately after the end of voting, illegal filling in of minutes, power failures, among other irregularities.

It should be noted that the post-electoral armed conflicts took place in the centre of the country, where there is a debate in society about ethnic motivations with historical roots, not only of an identity nature, but also in terms of access to resources and business, and representation in the institutions of the political system. The civil war and post-election conflicts originated in areas of Sofala and Manica, where there is a large presence of voting for opposition parties, also known as ethnic voting.<sup>67</sup>

All these practices are systematic and occur in every general and local election. The judiciary contradicts itself at different levels, violating the electoral law and debating the competences of the different levels of the judicial system, except in a few cases of repetition of local elections.

The international community, through observers and diplomatic services, and despite the complicated accreditation procedures for observers (possibly to hinder or avoid their duties), generally recognises the illegality and illegal acts and calls for more integrity and democracy, but always ends up siding with illegality and the government, claiming that they are not enough to change the results. These discourses are unacceptable and cannot exist in countries with consolidated democracies.

Civil society observers issue communiqués condemning irregular situations, but they do not have the strength to press for changes or to raise the government's concerns.

Finally, the parties that win parliamentary seats do not take decisive action and take their seats in the Parliament.

## 4.9 Environment

The central issue of long-term climate change is climate and soils, with increasing areas of arid and semi-desert (see figure 4). There is statistical evidence indicating an increase in the frequency and intensity of climate shocks (see figure 17). These phenomena are the result of long-term global and regional changes.


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<sup>67</sup> Florêncio, Fernando (2002). Ethnic identity and political practices among the VaNdau of Mozambique. *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* No. 3. Centre for International Studies. <https://journals.openedition.org/cea/1085>.

On the first elections after the end of the civil war, see De Brito, Luís (1995). "O comportamento eleitoral nas primeiras eleições multipartidárias em Moçambique". In Brazão Mazula (org), *Moçambique, eleições, democracia e desenvolvimento*, Maputo, 1995, pp. 473-499.

It is possible to observe: (1) an increase in occurrences between 2000 and 2011, and a lower frequency between 2012 and 2023, but an average of more intense shocks, especially cyclones associated with floods; (2) between 1980 and 2000, both frequency and intensity were lower than in the following decades. Figure 18 shows great variability in the number of people affected between 1981 and 2024, on average a lower intensity of shocks (measured by the number of people affected).


Figure 17  
Extreme weather events in Mozambique



In the short term, the following aspects contribute to climate change: (1) accelerated deforestation as a result of strategies to obtain income for rural families (charcoal, stakes, honey and other forest products) and for family consumption (mainly for building housing, protecting backyards and various fences) as well as logging for commercial purposes, including, to a large extent, for legal export or various trafficking in exotic timber; (2) deforestation of the coastal areas (especially mangroves) for the production of fuel, building materials, salt production, exploitation of coastal sands, minerals and *shrimp farming*; (3) disorderly urbanisation or ruralisation without corresponding infrastructure or maintenance of existing infrastructure, leading to land disputes and land deals, poor urban sanitation, etc.(4) poor maintenance of the valleys of the main flooding rivers (defence dykes and bed drainage), as well as irrigation systems, causing soil deterioration and a reduction in productive potential; (5) the practice of agroforestry and livestock systems that are aggressive to the environment, causing a loss of biodiversity and greater vulnerability to global and local climatic phenomena and in the medium and long term; and (6) civil construction (housing, roads and bridges) that is vulnerable to cyclones and floods.



Figure 4  
Simulations on the long-term evolution of climate aridity



Source: Abbas *et al.* (2023) available at <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-023-10082-5>, based on the author's doctoral thesis.

The advance of arid zones means migration, reduced economic activity and family incomes, mobility difficulties and fewer services for citizens. As mentioned above, they are a major factor in conflict in these areas and in the places to which migration is directed.

Mozambique has shown, on the one hand, a low capacity to increase resilience against environmental phenomena and, on the other hand, the permissibility of exploiting natural resources that increase the effects of environmental shocks<sup>68</sup>. In this respect, the State has shown itself to be weak in taking measures against the illegal exploitation of forest and maritime resources, in implementing town and country planning, in defending the coast and agricultural fields, and in maintaining or introducing “environmentally friendly” agricultural production systems, among other measures.

When cooperation resources are available to reduce the impact of climate shocks, whether in the form of emergency aid or funds to rebuild infrastructure, the State (schools, health centres, drainage systems, etc.) proves to be ineffective. “The process of rebuilding houses after Cyclone Idai in Sofala is well behind schedule. By September this year, according to figures published by “O País”, 15,000 houses in four districts should have been renovated, but so far only 300 have been completed<sup>69</sup> “. “The government office is accused of favouring the reconstruction of public infrastructure and not giving direct support to the population affected by the cyclones in the city of Beira...<sup>70</sup> “. Various international organisations, governments and financial institutions implement emergency programmes in post-disaster situations, but there is no global, independent assessment of the recovery of infrastructure, housing, employment and small businesses, recovery of livelihoods, etc. Institutions act in isolation, often uncoordinated with each other and with a lack of reconstruction planning on the part of public institutions. Promises of resources are generally not fulfilled in time or in volume; the executive director of the Idai Post-Cyclone Reconstruction Office told @verdade<sup>71</sup>: “Immediately after the disaster we estimated the

<sup>68</sup> Mosca, João, and Lasse, Nehemias (2023). Flooding in Mozambique: the human factor as an aggravating factor. *Destaque Rural* No. 209. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>69</sup><https://opais.co.mz/reconstrucao-pos-idai-concluidas- apenas-300-das-15-mil-casas-previstas-em-sofala/>, 20/02(2024).

<sup>70</sup><https://www.dw.com/pt-002/beira-reconstru%C3%A7%C3%A3o-p%C3%B3s-ciclones-s%C3%B3-para-edif%C3%ADcios-p%C3%BAblicos/a-68385085>, 27/02/2024.

<sup>71</sup> Published on 19 September 2019.

cost of the Housing Programme at 600 million dollars. At the moment, we have less than 100 million from the World Bank and other organisations”.

The ability to give advance warning of shocks may be effective at a central and transnational level, but there are still shortcomings in getting information to the places where the greatest impact is expected. On the other hand, there is resistance on the part of the population to moving from their places of residence, production and employment, as well as for religious and cultural reasons.

State institutions are vulnerable to situations of corruption (trafficking in timber, precious stones, gold, illegal fishing, etc.) that increase climate vulnerability and resilience, by allowing environmentally aggressive exploitation by large mining companies and monoculture agriculture, not taking sufficient measures against the destruction of coastal vegetation, among other aspects. On the other hand, the carbon business is starting<sup>72</sup> which, under the narrative of environmental conservation, represents revenue for the country and strong restrictions on the use of natural resources by populations and resettlement processes within the framework of what are known as “reserve” buffer zones.

Environmental shocks are also factors of conflict, such as land occupation by people displaced by floods, droughts and resettlements, and migration, which increases the pressure on natural resources, leading to local conflicts<sup>73</sup>. In post-disaster recovery situations, there are questions about the transparency of the use of funds and reconstruction priorities, as well as discontent among the population about promises that have not been kept or have been made too late.

It is important to have policies aimed at arid areas, such as: (1) strengthening support for local production, such as livestock and hunting; (2) introducing a variety of crops and drought-resistant seeds; (3) building dams of varying size and channels to divert watercourses from areas with abundant water for supply and irrigation in arid areas; (4) strengthening education, health and other services to improve the lives of the population; (5) encouraging entrepreneurs to invest in harnessing local resources and potential (e.g. livestock farming, agriculture with controlled irrigation, slaughterhouses, *game farms* and other tourist activities, etc.); (6) providing incentives for the development of the local economy.); (6) providing incentives for technicians to carry out professional activities in these regions (housing, preferences for attending and scholarships for training courses and career development, etc.).

#### 4.10 Demography

Demographic change has and will have important effects on society as a whole. Demographic growth of around 3% requires, under Mozambican conditions, economic growth above that rate and, above all, public policies for redistributing wealth, contrary to those that have been adopted and which this text specifies, above all: (1) the side-lining of agriculture and, in particular, of small

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<sup>72</sup> Bruna, Natacha (2024). *Deve Moçambique embarcar para o mercado de carbono? Uma análise crítica dos mercados de carbono como solução para a crise socioambiental*. Destaque Rural No. 266. OMR. Maputo. By the same author, 2023, *Ouro invisível: o carbono e a usurpação de direitos de emissão*. Destaque Rural No. 212. OMR. Maputo.

<sup>73</sup> See, for example, Mandamule, Uacitissa (2024). *“Para viver longe do risco”. Das aldeias comunais aos bairros de reassentamentos pós-desastres em Moçambique, um déjà-vu?* Rural Spotlight No. 263. OMR. Maputo. By the same author, 2024, *Post-Idai resettlement and access to land for women and young people in Búzi, Sofala*. Destaque Rural No. 262. OMR. Maputo.


Bruna, Natacha (2020). *Ambiente como novo veículo de usurpação de recursos em Moçambique: Um enfoque nos reassentamentos*. Destaque Rural No. 83. OMR. Maputo.

producers who create more than 95% of primary agrarian production (agricultural and livestock goods), based on labour-intensive production systems with low productivity and, therefore, poorly integrated into the markets and with low monetary income; (2) the stifling of the national business fabric and the preponderance of foreign investment and savings, generating a dependent economy, where activities destined for the domestic market are of low volume due to scarce demand, considering the scale/size of the market and the national economy; (3) the increase in poverty in terms of the population covered and social and territorial inequalities, as a result of sectoral growth tapering off in sectors located in limited spaces, which generate little employment and have a narrow social base, giving rise to low-income informal economies; (4) the dominant concentrated and extroverted model causes macroeconomic imbalances, especially in the balance of payments components, the General State Budget, low national investment capacity and low domestic savings; (5) a low capacity of the State to provide basic services to citizens (education, health, social security and physical safety and social stability, among others).

Population growth is also based on cultural values, the economic and social reproduction strategies of (mainly rural) families, in a context of poverty, low literacy and integration into markets. Population growth is also supported by improvements in the primary and prenatal care health system and increased life expectancy.

Migration is mainly in search of work and new living conditions, especially for the poorest and most numerous families (especially the number of young dependents). Migration to urban centres began and continued over time due to contexts of military instability and, especially in the last two decades, due to climatic shocks and the economic attraction of major investments that created more expectations than actual job creation.

Figures 5 and 6 show population growth and density



Source: INE.

Figures (maps) 5 and 6 show very different average growth rates between the districts, and it can be said that, in general, the districts with the highest growth are those with the highest population density. It can be inferred that this is the result of historical factors, but also current ones; conversely, this finding confirms that the districts with the lowest density are those with the lowest population growth, which reveals emigration phenomena. Roughly speaking, the highest density and population growth are in the urban areas and neighbouring districts, in most of the border districts, along the coast, in the development corridors (Beira and Nacala) and in the areas with the greatest agricultural potential and the presence of agribusiness and mining. Figures 4, 5 and 6 are consistent with each other.

Migration generates conflicts, such as the emergence of unemployment and consequent social instability, disputes over land and places to live and do business, and social and labour conflicts. Increased population density increases pressure on resources, causing deforestation, reduced soil fertility, water and soil contamination, which increases vulnerability (reduces resilience) to climate shocks.

There are also illegal migrations, especially in areas with abundant mineral resources and where there is artisanal mining, associated with traffickers with links to local authorities and elites, generating business that ends up benefiting groups of people of local origin.

If, on the one hand, the population growth forecast for 2050 is taken into account (the population will reach between 50 and 60 million, according to the scenarios<sup>74</sup>), with an increase in life expectancy and an ageing population and, on the other hand, the deficits that currently exist in terms of employment, food production and other consumer goods (agro-industry, textiles, footwear, construction materials, packaging, etc.), infrastructures, the provision of education, health, transport and social security services and the capacity for public investment, among other aspects, one can get a sense of the levels of average economic growth required. Francisco (2020)<sup>75</sup> States that an expansion in capital and infrastructure of 14 percent per year would be needed to cover the increase in population by an average of 3 percent, rather than the current 8 percent projected for the next decade.

## **5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

### **5.1 Summary**

Mozambique has experienced crises of medium and long duration, with multiple and combined crisis factors (political, military, economic and social), where multidisciplinary factors and effects of internal and external origin reinforce each other. Wars and political and military instability, as well as economic circles of short and medium duration and large scale, are based on external factors related to the exploitation of natural resources and foreign investment, associated in some cases with geopolitical factors derived from the country's geographical position and its natural wealth. This reality finds, in the weaknesses of the State and its institutions, spaces that facilitate alliances between foreign capital and local elites, where corruption is endemic and the country's interests are secondary. The fragile State and, in some areas, some characteristics of a failed State,

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<sup>74</sup>According to the government, 60 million inhabitants are expected. On <https://e-global.pt/noticias/lusofonia/mocambique>, 27 February 2020.

<sup>75</sup> <https://e-global.pt/noticias/lusofonia/mocambique>, *ibid*.

access to and the quality of basic services for citizens, labour issues and post-electoral crises, are the only reasons that conflict is not greater, due to the weaknesses of civil society and the low awareness of citizenship among the majority of Mozambicans. Development cooperation and humanitarian aid have been "cushions" for situations in which the population lives in contexts of armed conflict, climatic shocks and food insecurity.

The ruling party has a concentrated and centralised government with militaristic methods and is effective in social control with mechanisms to defend and reproduce power, such as the non-division of powers in accordance with a republican State, control of information, methods of coercion and, if necessary, coercion and threats to civil society organisations and political parties with and without parliamentary seats. These mechanisms, which are designed to defend power and thus to silence/control conflict factors, can worsen over time and turn into social and political movements, with or without armed violence.

A suitably fragile and strong State is structured. Fragile, in terms of regulating and administering the functions of the State in society and the economy, in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration, in terms of guaranteeing the security of the State and society in the provision of services to citizens and in terms of defending the security and integrity of Mozambicans and the country. On the other hand, the State is strong in its repressive apparatus against citizens, in its capacity to capture opposition forces and civil society, in diplomatic relations to attract resources and development cooperation and humanitarian programmes, in granting facilities for foreign investment, while at the same time public and monetary policies deliberately stifle the national economic fabric and the emergence of a competitive, ethical and patriotic business class, as well as an organised citizenry aware of its duties and obligations

These factors and conflicts have led to cycles of acute economic and social crises, which are reflected in the variability of economic growth, macroeconomic balances, poverty and social and territorial inequalities, in social indicators reflected internally and in international rankings (human development index, poverty, inequalities, in the areas of education, health, etc., human rights, democracy, among others). In addition to these and other positions in international rankings, the country's external (and internal) image has evolved through undignified classifications, such as that of a fragile State, a financier of terrorism, and a drug-trafficking country.

Poverty, along with outward manifestations of wealth of dubious origin, inequalities in social and territorial income and business opportunities, unemployment and wage levels, the size of informal economies, and regional representativeness in the centres of real power, raise questions about ethnicity and national unity around a State that should bring together diverse historical, cultural, economic and social identities. These aspects are difficult to understand for Frelimo, whose discourse refers to one nation and one people.

Unequal access to, and quality of, the various civic services opens up space for a private sector, especially in urban centres, and the benefits of public office and outward displays of wealth aggravate social and territorial differences, contributing to feelings that can trigger regional, ethnic and resentful motivations and make it difficult to create a sense of nationality, patriotism, i.e. belonging to a common State and territory, above region and ethnicity.

Conflicts have different degrees of impact and that the dynamics between factors, impacts and types of conflict can alter and deepen the political, economic, social and environmental sustainability impacts/consequences.

The hypothesis of this paper is confirmed: conflicts in Mozambique are of different types, manifest in different ways, result from a combination of mutually reinforcing factors and generate political, economic and social dynamics that can lead to the proliferation and intensification of conflicts.

<b>LISTA DOS ÚLTIMOS 20 TÍTULOS PUBLICADOS PELO OMR DA SÉRIE OBSERVADOR RURAL*</b>			
<b>Nº</b>	<b>Título</b>	<b>Autor(es)</b>	<b>Ano</b>
150	Experiências de violência em cabo delgado: o passado e o presente de mulheres afectadas pelo conflito armado	João Feijó e Neuza Balane	Novembro de 2024
149	A integração socioeconómica das mulheres deslocadas internamente devido ao conflito em Pemba, Cabo Delgado	Daniel Missell	Outubro de 2024
148	Factores determinantes de preços de produtos alimentares na cidade de Maputo	Rabia Aiuba	Setembro de 2024
147	O conceito de camponês e a realidade de Moçambique numa perspectiva de longa duração	João Mosca	Agosto de 2024
146	Avaliação do impacto do desmatamento e degradação floresta nos meios de subsistência das famílias rurais da província do Niassa, norte de Moçambique	Aires Afonso Mbanze e Cremildo Ribas Dias	Julho de 2024
145	Uma fraude chamada ensino primário público? Reprodução de diferentes níveis da cidadania e comprometimento de um projecto de unidade nacional	João Feijó e Neuza Balane	Junho de 2024
144	Moçambique mais subdesenvolvido um revisitar teórico sobre o desenvolvimento e o subdesenvolvimento	João Mosca	Maiço de 2024
143	Configuração da estrutura económica de Moçambique Nuna perspectiva de longa duração	João Mosca	Abril de 2024
142	Bases para a elaboração de um índice de dependência externa. Exemplo de Moçambique	João Mosca, Yara Nova e Rabia Aiuba	Março de 2024
141	Análise do projecto SUSTENTA (2017-2019)	Nelson Capaina, Yara Nova e João Mosca	Fevereiro de 2024
140	Alguns determinantes da produtividade agrícola em Moçambique	Yasser Arafat Dadá e João Mosca	Janeiro de 2024
139	Instrumentos de política agrícola e a produção agrícola em Moçambique	Rabia Aiuba	Agosto de 2023
138	"Antes de as mineradoras chegarem, produzíamos muito... agora, já não": impacto da mineração do carvão na produção agrícola das comunidades circunvizinhas às minas em Moatize	Mélica Chandamela	Julho de 2023
137	Após o ciclone idai, as inundações: narrativas e lições de um desastre (in)esperado e "excepcional"	Uacitissa Mandamule	Maiço de 2023
136	Penetração de capital no meio rural, exclusão e expropriação: mecanismos de compensação em contexto de desigualdades pré-existentes	Natacha Bruna	Abril de 2023
135	Reforma legal e o mercado de terras em Moçambique	Nelson Capaina	Março de 2023
134	Deslocações forçadas e aumento da pressão sobre o garimpo em Namanhumbir	Jerry Maquenzi e João Feijó	Fevereiro de 2023
133	Os espaços de participação e de exercício da cidadania, na voz de líderes associativos da província de Cabo Delgado	João Feijó	Janeiro de 2023
132	Desafios e oportunidades na produção orizícola no baixo Zambeze: O caso da província da Zambézia	Nelson Capaina	Novembro de 2022
131	Acesso e alocação de terras para além dos grandes investimentos: O papel das elites políticas e económicas em Boane	Josefina Tamele	Outubro de 2022
130	Produção Agrícola e Empoderamento de Mulheres em Contextos Rurais: análise do projecto AgriMulheres em três povoados da província de Nampula (2018-2021)	Neuza Balane e João Feijó	Setembro de 2022

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