



OBSERVADOR RURAL
No. 151
December 2024

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AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION
AMONG "PEASANT" FAMILIES**

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The texts published in OBSERVADOR RURAL are in draft form. The authors are grateful for contributions to deepening and corrections to improve the document.

THE NEW COAL BORDERS IN MOATIZE: CONFLICTS AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AMONG “PEASANT” FAMILIES

Alberto Tovele

Summary

The large-scale takeover of land for agriculture, biofuel production, forestry plantations, mining and the development of protected areas in rural zones has been seen as a means of bringing capital into rural areas. These projects are hailed in speeches by both investors and governments of the target countries, who point to their potential benefits for local development, such as the promotion of employment, increased productivity and economic growth.

Using a combination of techniques for collecting and analysing information (literature review, interviews, questionnaire surveys, participant observation, content analysis and descriptive statistics), this study examines large-scale land concession processes in Mozambique, particularly those aimed at implementing mining investment projects. On the one hand, the study analyses Vale Moçambique's activities in the district of Moatize, in the province of Tete, with a focus on the issues of compensation and indemnity for local families. On the other hand, Vale's withdrawal, with Vulcan as the new owner of the assets. It also examines some of the compensation, employment and corporate social responsibility mechanisms that arise in the context of large-scale land concessions.

The results of the study show that mining in Moatize has been at the root of socio-spatial transformations and several conflicts in recent years. The Mozambican State often appears to legitimize the grabbing of people's land by mining companies. The advance of the coal frontiers, given the expansion of the Moatize mining areas, has aggravated the crisis of social reproduction, which occurs on a daily and intergenerational basis in families whose main livelihoods originated from agriculture and brick production. This mining expansion has also exacerbated conflicts between mining companies and communities over unpaid compensation. It is concluded that the compensation mechanisms defined by the companies have been ineffective and insufficient to compensate for the loss of land. Companies have used corporate social responsibility as a countermeasure to social risks.

Keywords: usurpation of land, mining, conflicts; compensation mechanisms, Tete.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since 2007, African countries began to receive a large inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) amounting to more than USD 30 thousand million. The African countries that receive the most FDI are those with mineral resources, oil and gas, and arable land, including Mozambique (Cotula *et al.*, 2009).

The Mozambican government developed the National Development Strategy with the aim of improving the living conditions of the population through structural changes in the economy. This strategy defined the need to attract investment to exploit strategic resources, namely coal, gas, iron and heavy sands, in order to boost development. Similarly, the government programs (Five-Year Plans, 2015-2019; 2020-2024) have identified attracting investment to stimulate economic growth, productivity and job creation as one of the strategic objectives.

The existence of deposits with large quantities of thermal and metallurgical coal in Moatize has made Mozambique a recipient of investments in megaprojects linked to the coal mining industry (Monié and Carvalho, 2019). The extractive industry was and is considered a driver of economic development. The coal mining *boom* has boosted several local economic sectors, such as short and long-distance transportation, real estate, hotels and restaurants, fuel and energy, and banking and financial services (Mosca and Selemene, 2011). Indeed, foreign direct investment projects are important for the development process, with potential positive effects on the economies of recipient countries (Sambo, 2020). FDI flows contributed to the growth of the Mozambican economy at an average rate of 7% per year between 2000 and 2019¹, (Muianga, 2022). From 2000 to 2019, Mozambique attracted around USD 39 thousand million in FDI and commercial loans (Muianga, 2022).

Among the countries of the global south, Mozambique is one of the land rush target countries, which has led to the granting of large tracts of land for investment projects, often resulting in land grabbing. In the province of Tete, in the district of Moatize, land usurpation has occurred mainly due to interests in the coal mining sector, specifically the exploitation of coal in that district. This confluence made it possible to establish mining megaprojects, such as those implemented by Vale Moçambique² at the end of the first decade of 2000s. Since 2015, there have been further expropriations of land, as the areas under coal exploitation have increased. The existence of conflicts over the years has marked the relationship between local populations and Vale Moçambique.

In 2022, after more than 10 years of operation, Vale S.A. sold all its assets in the Moatize mine to Vulcan, a company belonging to the Jindal Group³. This company took over not only the assets, but

¹ Afterwards, it slowed down to an annual average of around 3%.

² Vale Mozambique is a branch of the Brazilian company Vale S.A., founded on 1 June 1942, initially under the name Companhia do Vale do Rio Doce and, since 2007, named as Vale S.A., whose main business areas are the production of iron ore and nickel. It became the largest mining company in America and the second largest in the world (Mosca and Selemene, 2011). Vale S.A. won a public tender to exploit one of Mozambique's existing coal mines in the Moatize district.

³ Vulcan is a subsidiary of Vulcan International, part of the Jindal Group, which is an Indian business conglomerate founded in 1952 by Shri B.C. At the time of its constitution, Jindal's main activity was the manufacture of steel

also the problems left behind by Vale's mining activities. The dynamics generated by the expansion of the mine have raised questions about access to and use of land, land tenure and livelihoods in a context characterized by problematic trade-offs: who owns what, who earns what and who benefits from what in the implementation of large land-based projects?

This paper presents the results of a case study of coal mining in Moatize by Vale, now Vulcan, with the aim of broadening our understanding of the social impacts of large land-based investments which, in their actions, tend to favour the "predatory" interests of investors over the rights of local populations. This paper examines the ways in which the Mozambican State legitimizes processes of land grabbing. In the context of Vale's divestment and Vulcan's entry into the Moatize mine, the implications of the compensation mechanisms put in place for local communities and the role of the State are presented.

2. THEORETICAL-CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Land usurpation and social reproduction

The rise in food prices in 2007/2008, combined with the fuel, financial and climate crises, led to an unbridled race to acquire large tracts of land in the countries of the global south (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010; Zoomers, 2010; Ra, 2022). Some authors speak of large-scale land acquisitions (Abdallah, Ayamga & Awuni, 2023), others, such as Zoomers (2010), prefer the term "foreignization of land" and still others speak of land grabbing (Graham *et al.*, 2010)⁴ or land dispossession (Levien, 2018)⁵. In this paper, we have chosen to use the concept of land grabbing in view of the aspects that this concept allows us to capture and highlight, in particular, the unfair nature of land negotiations or transactions, the characteristics of the actors involved, and the size of the areas (Cotula *et al.*, 2009; Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010).

Land grabbing is not a new phenomenon. As Gilbert (2017) shows that the expropriation/dispossession of land from local populations to make way for resource exploitation is part of world history. He adds that the forced displacement of local populations and the granting of rights to exploit land and other resources date back to the period of colonization (Gellert, 2015). In the current context, this race for land, which intensified after the 2007/2008 financial crisis, has led to the penetration of capital into agriculture (Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010), the transformation of subsistence agriculture into large-scale export-oriented agriculture and the conversion of forest-covered land into fields for biofuel production (Gilbert, 2017; Borras Jr. and Franco, 2010, Cotula *et al.*, 2009). The land rush in Africa is also driven by the need for transnational companies to gain strategic access to regions of Africa rich in oil and other minerals (Geenen and Honke, 2014).

pipes and pipe accessories. Today, it has a diversified business portfolio and has operations in Mozambique in the coal mining sector in the province of Tete, through Jindal Mozambique Minerais Lda, part of JINDAL AFRICA.

⁴<https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/16632-the-impact-of-europes-policies-and-practices-on-african-agriculture-and-food-security-land-grab-study>.

⁵<https://global.oup.com/academic/product/dispossession-without-development9780190859152?cc=us&lang=en&#>

There are different definitions of the concept of *land grabbing*. Some elements seem similar to us and others differ, considering the nature of the actors involved, the size of the areas and the purpose of the land negotiation. It is not intended to present an exhaustive discussion of these, but just a few definitions that highlight the issues mentioned above.

The literature on land grabbing differs in some respects, such as the actors involved and the areas in question. For example, Gilbert (2017) argues that land grabbing involves the acquisition of more than 200 hectares by investors, often foreigners, to the detriment of local producers. Zoomers (2010) presents a similar understanding and considers that the term 'land grabbing' refers to large-scale cross-border land deals or transactions carried out by transnational companies or initiated by foreign governments. This definition points to two dimensions: firstly, the acquisition of large areas of land; secondly, the actors at the origin of the transactions are foreign. However, state actors and national investors may also be involved in this type of land transaction.

Batterbury and Ndi (2018) argue that land grabbing in the African context refers to the purchase or acquisition of land use rights for the production of food, biofuels or animal feed. This definition considers the purpose of the land acquisition, without, however, taking into account the characteristic of the actors involved and the size of the areas.

Borras Jr. *et al.* (2012: 405) define land grabbing as the seizure of control over relatively large tracts of land and other natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms involving capital in large-scale. This capital is often applied for extractive purposes, to satisfy international or national interests, and also as capital's response to the convergence of the food, energy and financial crises, seeking to meet the imperatives of climate change mitigation and the resources' demands from new global capital centres.

There is literature that links land grabbing to accumulation by dispossession. This shows that the processes of acquiring large tracts of land that take the form of land grabbing constitute contemporary transformations of capitalism, in which these land transactions are seen as accumulation by dispossession (Pereira, 2019; Hall, 2013). Hall (2013) explains that the concept of accumulation by dispossession is crucial to understanding land grabbing in its dynamics of creating, expanding and reproducing capitalist social relations of accumulation by extra-economic means, as well as the consequent dispossession that arises in response to capitalist crises. Gellert, (2014) uses Harvey's (2003) concept which, in essence, refers to the acquisition of means of production for the purpose of capital accumulation of extra-economic means of coercion. The author demonstrates that the problem of overaccumulation, i.e. surplus capital lying idle, requires the incorporation of new territories. The author demonstrates, for example, how the exploitation of palm oil in Indonesia has been characterized by the access of capitalist interests to land at low cost, which over time has led to the accumulation of capital. Hence, accumulation by dispossession has led to the deterritorialization of local populations, sometimes violently, so that capital has control over the territory (Pereira, 2019).

In this work, we have used Baker-Smith and Attila's (2016) definition of land grabbing as the control (whether by ownership, lease, concession, contract, quota or general power) of areas larger than the areas/fields in common at the local level by persons or entities (public or private, foreign or national) through legal or illegal means for the purposes of speculation, extraction, resource control or

commodification at the expense of peasants, agro-ecology, land management, , food sovereignty and human rights (Baker-Smith and Attila, 20162).

Another concept that serves as a theoretical lens for reading the phenomena we set out to study is social reproduction, which refers to the activities, attitudes, behaviours, emotions, responsibilities and relations that are directly related to sustaining life on a daily and intergenerational basis (Bhattacharya, 2017). Social reproduction includes, among other elements, issues about how people obtain food, clothing and shelter for consumption (White, 2020, Bathacharya, 2017). This concept makes it possible to understand the ways in which families reproduce themselves on a daily basis. The concept adopted is broader than that established in Marxist feminist theories of social reproduction, which look specifically at the role played by women in the complex mechanisms and activities that shape the formation of the working class under capitalism.

Theories of social reproduction have fuelled important debates as the space of social reproduction is profoundly transformed under capitalism with the emergence of new forms of accumulation (Muianga, 2022). The concept of social reproduction has become widely known since the academic work of Marxist feminists, which explores the role of women's unpaid work in the family for the reproduction of the working class (Bathacharya, 2017). In this context, the theory of social reproduction develops around the subalternization of women's role in capitalist production systems.

At the core of this concept is the importance of human work in the reproduction of families, communities and society, whether through paid work (employed in the production of goods and services for the market) or unpaid work, also called reproductive work. The processes of production and reproduction reinforce each other in such a way that "reproduction is a necessary condition for production and vice versa" (Muianga, 2022: 89). However, Munro (2019) reminds us that there is no social reproduction without the reproduction of society, and that all production and social reproduction in capitalist societies is shaped by processes of accumulation.

3. METHODOLOGY

A mixed qualitative and quantitative approach was adopted to carry out the intended research. The research was initially based on a consultation and review of the literature on large-scale land acquisition and on mining in Mozambique and other countries in the global South. This was followed by an analysis of information contained in reports and databases from government institutions, the Vale company, civil society organizations and other sources relevant to the topic. To supplement the information gathered, fieldwork was carried out in the district of Moatize, in Tete province, in June and September 2023, using questionnaire surveys, which were treated with descriptive statistics.

Description of the study area

The district of Moatize is located in the province of Tete, in central Mozambique, and has a total surface area of 8,462 Km². Moatize borders the districts of Chiúta and Tsangano to the north, the Republic of Malawi to the east and the districts of Tambara, Guro, Changara and the Municipality of Tete to the south. It is bordered by the Zambezi River and the districts of Changara and Chiúta to the west.

The district of Moatize is divided into three administrative posts: Moatize, Kambulatsitsi and Zobué. This research focused only on the Moatize Administrative Post, which has a total population of 58,368 according to the 2017 census. Moatize has large deposits of coal, iron, titanium and vanadium. There are also deposits of other minerals, such as gold, silver, tungsten and lead. The forest contains timber species of high economic value, such as *umbila*, *chanfuta* and ebony (MAE, 2014).

The main ethnolinguistic groups are Nhungué, the majority group, and Chewa, and the minority ethnolinguistic groups Cicena, Ci-Ndau and Citawara (MAE, 2014). Moatize is the second most populous district in Tete Province with approximately 321,574 inhabitants, of whom 100,431 live in urban areas and 221,143 in rural areas; the economically active population is 166,477 (INE, n.d.).

Information collection and analysis techniques

Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews (95 individual and two in groups) and participatory observation in the Moatize district. This took place in two stages: the first fieldwork, from 27 June to 12 July; and the second, from 10 to 23 September 2023. The target population was made up of those affected by the expansion of the mine, farmers, potters and cattle herders, households resettled on 25 September and in Cateme, workers in the Moatize project companies and residents of the district's main town. The following actors were also interviewed: representatives of the local government (district administrator, SDAE and SDPI), representatives of the private sector, representatives of CSOs and humanitarian organizations. The selection of the interviewees followed a *purposive* sampling approach, in which the cases to be included are selected based on the researcher's judgment of the existence of a set of singularities, or particular characteristics, which meet the specific needs of the research (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007).

In addition, a questionnaire survey was carried out to the inhabitants of Moatize. A sample of 68 households was defined based on the total population of the administrative post, according to the 2017 census n=58368 (INE, 2019), a confidence level of 90% and a sampling error of 10%.

$$n = \frac{N * p * q * (Z_{\alpha/2})^2}{(N - 1) * E^2 + p * q * (Z_{\alpha/2})^2}$$

N number of individuals in the sample;
 $Z_{\alpha/2}$ critical value that corresponds to the desired confidence level;
P population proportion of individuals belonging to the category we are interested in studying;
q population proportion of individuals who do not belong to the category we are interested in studying;
E Margin of error;
N The size of the population.

$$n = \frac{58368 * 0.5 * 0.5 * (1.645)^2}{(58368 - 1) * 0.1^2 + 0.5 * 0.5 * (1.645)^2} \qquad n = \frac{39486,32}{585,02} \qquad n = 68$$

The secondary data was collected from public institutions (provincial and local) including the District Secretary, SDAE, the Provincial Labour Directorate, among others. Secondary data was also collected from Vale reports and CSO reports.

One of the main difficulties was obtaining information by interviewing the Vulcan company which, despite some insistence on our part, did not respond to our requests for an interview, either at its head office in Maputo or at the company's offices in Moatize.

4. THE STATE AS A CENTRAL STAKEHOLDER IN LAND GRABBING

a. Retraction of the State and adoption of neoliberal policies

Mozambique achieved independence in 1975 and during this period, a State-building process began, characterized by the strong supremacy of the State over society. At that time, the first Constitution of the Republic was promulgated, and land, natural resources, health and education were nationalized (Mandamule 2015, José, 2006).

In 1977, Mozambique adopted a one-party regime with a Marxist-Leninist orientation, a centrally planned economy, the emergence of a State business sector and the shrinking of private sector to become almost non-existent, a reduction in freedoms and in the boundaries between the party and the State (Matos, 2016; Tovele, 2015).

The global context in the 1980s was one of the Cold War (bipolarization of the world), regional dynamics, the existence of white minority regimes that sought to undermine the Mozambican State, as well as of internal dynamics, with the formation of the MNR, later Renamo, facilitated by minority regimes and Mozambique's social and political situation, having led to one of the biggest economic and social crises of the post-independence period, with the country plunging into war (Abrahamsson, H. and Nilsson, 1994). Mozambique asked to join the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) group of countries that received aid from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), but was not accepted (Tovele, 2015, Veloso, 2011).

In order to deal with the crisis in question, Mozambique began to move closer to the West in 1984, joining the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and WB). From this period onwards, Mozambique began implementing neoliberal policies and, consequently, transitioned to a market economy (Lamas, 2018; Veloso, 2011; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994). These policies materialized through the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs, which, in Mozambique, were designed in 1986 and implemented in 1987 (Veloso, 2011). In Mozambique, these programs involved deregulation, privatization and a reduction of certain economic and social functions by the State, and trade liberalization (Lamas, 2018).

From this period onwards, the State withdrew from the economy and the economic model changed. In addition, multiparty politics also emerged as one of the IMF's prescriptions. In the 1990s, the country entered into a second republic with the introduction of a new constitution, establishing multiparty elections, increased freedoms, guaranteed fundamental rights and separation of powers (Tovele, 2015; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1994).

The opening up to the entry of big capital from transnational companies is one of the IMF's prescriptions for countries that faced economic and social crises during the 80s. In fact, the implementation of this and other IMF and World Bank prescriptions has brought a new approach to the exploitation of natural resources. In implementing neoliberal policies, the Mozambican State also incorporated policy measures to attract foreign direct investment to sectors, such as mining, which, shortly after independence, was already considered central to the country's economic development (Monie and Carvalho, 2019; Matos, 2016). These measures include granting a set of tax benefits to large-scale foreign investments, guarantees of profit repatriation, and improved labour relations (Castel-Branco, 2010; Mosca and Selemene, 2011).

The existing potential in natural resources, particularly minerals, has been seen by financing institutions (IMF, 2014) as a way of boosting development and reducing poverty. In this context, the World Bank (2014: 3) argues that:

The development of Mozambique's gas and coal sectors represents a unique opportunity to accelerate inclusive growth and to reduce poverty. If progress in the gas and coal sectors goes ahead as planned, public revenues will increase dramatically; revenues from natural resources could reach 9 billion US dollars by 2032, representing 7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 21 percent of total State revenues. The enormous growth expected from Mozambique's extractive industry could drastically reduce poverty in the medium term and help lay the foundations for sustainable growth and shared prosperity.

The vision of the potential of natural resources is shared by the ruling elite, as obtaining income from the extractive sector has been seen as a way of boosting other essential sectors and economic growth and reducing poverty (Frei, 2019; Brynildsen and Nombora, 2013). The Mozambican State has therefore responded to the need to attract investment to the extractive sector by reforming legislation in sectors such as land, mining and oil.

The reforms implemented have allowed transnational companies to exploit natural resources in an institutional, fiscal, regulatory and land regime context that suits their interests (Monié and Carvalho, 2019; Matos, 2016). According to the IDA (2009:2), "The consistent implementation of fundamental reforms has led to considerable increases in foreign direct investment in aluminium, natural gas and titanium". For Monié and Carvalho (2019) these reforms are a sign that the public interest has been subordinated to the production and logistical needs of transnational companies.

b. Institutional-legal dynamics of access to land for mining that contribute to land grabbing

This section discusses two institutional dynamics of access to land for the extractive mining industry that contribute to land grabbing. Firstly, the role of the Mozambican State in the context of the governance of mineral resources which, in exercising its functions of promoting investment, has formulated public policies that have determined the use of land for mining as a priority and interest of the State. Secondly, the processes for awarding mining titles, which take place exclusively at central level, follow procedures that undermine pre-existing rights.

On the one hand, in relation to the role of the State, the Mozambican State ensures access to land for investment projects in the mining sector. Pereira (2019) explains that analyses of land grabbing often fail to consider the role of the State, which often appears to legitimize land grabbing processes.

In Mozambique, the State owns all the mineral resources⁶ existing in the national territory and, in its actions, the State seeks to encourage investment in the mining sector. It follows that mining, because of its relationship with the land, is a determining factor in land use and occupation in Mozambique.

The legal framework, particularly the mining and land legislation, has been reformulated over the years to reflect the State's interest in promoting investment in mining, attracting foreign investment to boost economic and social development. Since the period of the one-party system, holders of land use rights in Mozambique had a duty to accept mining activities on their land as long as they were compensated⁷. During the multiparty period, the regulation of the law maintained this duty⁸. Furthermore, Law 14/2002 of June 26 (the Mining Law) established that: "*the use of land for mining operations has priority over other land uses when the economic and social benefit of mining operations is greater*". The discovery of mineral and hydrocarbon resources has led to the revision of public policies. In this context, Law No. 20/2014 of August 18 (Mining Law, which repeals the previous one) was drafted and enacted, establishing in Article 27 (Preexisting Rights) that "*the State has primacy over other pre-existing use and exploitation the land rights*".

Furthermore, it can be seen that the legislator deleted the paragraph establishing the priority of mining over other land uses; however, in its place, the legislation now grants the State the priority and preference over pre-existing land use and exploitation rights. However, practice shows that mining continues to have priority over other land uses (Tovele, 2022).

The State has emerged as a central player in promoting investment in the mining industry in Mozambique by creating facilities through the formulation of public policies favourable to FDI into Mozambique (Monié and Carvalho, 2019). In this context, Frei (2019) and Matos (2016) explain that the decisive role of the State was to reformulate and strengthen land and mining legislation in order to attract investment and not to guarantee or ensure ownership and control by local communities. Mosca and Selemene (2011), Matos (2016) and Frei (2019) state that, in addition to land and mining legislation, the tax system has played a major role in attracting investment to the extractive sector by granting a series of benefits to megaprojects in contracts with the government.

Matos and Medeiros (2015) argue that the 1997 Land Law and the 2002 Mining Law formalized the grounds for legalizing the expropriation of rural families' land. However, there are studies (Bruna *et al*, 2023, Tanner, 2010) that present a different understanding of land law. For example, Bruna *et al* (2023:9):

The legal and political framework for land in Mozambique, specifically the National Land Policy (PNT), approved in 1995, and the Land Law, approved in 1997, contain provisions that ensure access to land by nationals and foreigners and have the

⁶ See article 4 of Law no. 20/2014 (Mining Law).

⁷ See Article 15(e) of Decree 16/87 of 15 July (Regulation of the Land Law).

⁸ See Article 14(d) of Decree 66/98 of 8 December.

potential to improve rural livelihoods and alleviate poverty, among other benefits linked to prioritizing the well-being of the rural population.

Bruna *et al* (2023: 9) explain that, although there have been advances in the wording of the law, which is considered one of the best laws in Africa, there have been no advances in the behaviour and practices of the actors responsible for land administration and management. Furthermore, Tanner (2010) corroborates this argument and states that, in order to protect pre-existing rights, the necessary conditions to guarantee investment were incorporated into the legislation. However, the persistent lack of effective implementation has threatened the rights of local communities and the potential of the 1997 legislation.

In fact, large-scale land allocations for investment projects repeatedly result in land usurpation without proper compensation. The asymmetry of information between communities and investors, on the one hand, and investors and the government, on the other, the incorrect application of procedures, the lack of community consultations, the exclusion of certain groups, such as women, from negotiation processes, the promises of employment and improved living conditions to entice communities to accept investment projects are among the main problems of these transactions (Bruna *et al*/2023, Salomão, 2021, Tankar 2015, JA and UNAC, 2011).

In the circumstances described above, where citizens' land rights and the procedures for extinguishing pre-existing rights for economic or public utility purposes are violated, it has not been the practice to hold State institutions and public officials accountable.

On the other hand, the procedures for awarding mining titles, which take place exclusively at central level, undermine pre-existing rights. The government is the entity responsible for managing natural resources, signing contracts and awarding mining titles⁹. The government awards mining titles to applicants in areas declared available. According to the Mining Law (Law No. 20/2014 of August 18, 2014), the areas of mining activity are called the available area, the reserved area and the designated area¹⁰. In the Mining Law, an available area is one that is not the subject of a mining title, is not subject to a public tender and is not the subject of a mining title application in progress or pending and which has not been declared closed to mining activity.¹¹

Although the Mining Law regulates the rights to use and exploit land, the awarding of mining titles by public tender takes place in available areas, which does not mean an area without occupants.

In fact, the Mining Law distinguishes between the rights and clarifies that the right to mine is different from the right to use and exploit the land and other pre-existing rights¹². The Mining Law determines that there is no overlap between rights and, for this reason, the granting of a mining title by the State does not presuppose the granting of the right to use and exploit the land¹³. However, in practice, the

⁹ See article 13 of Law 20/2014 of 18 August.

¹⁰ See Article 6(1) of Law 20/2014 of 18 August.

¹¹ See Article 2 of Law 20/2014 of 18 August.

¹² See article 28 of Law 20/2014 of 18 August.

¹³ See article 29 of Law 20/2014 of 18 August.

usufruct of mining rights makes it inevitable that communities lose their land. In relation to the inevitability of communities losing their land, Matos (2016:113-114) states that:

The stage was set for the struggle for access to and ownership of the land and the investor had the conditions he needed to plunder the land from the natives, because as soon as the investment project was approved by the government as being important for economic growth, negotiations would begin with the landowners and, whether they wanted it or not, the land would become the investor's "property".

In the light of the 1997 legislation, the way in which mining titles have been awarded excludes any possibility of communities obtaining prior information on investments, as well as the possibility of consenting, or not, the projects. For this reason, community consultations, which are one of the procedures defined for obtaining the DUAT by holders of mining rights, take the form of a mechanism for communicating to communities about the existence of previously approved investment projects, which the State has an interest in and seeks to promote.

c. Territorialization of mining in Tete: Grabbing of land in favour of Vale Moçambique.

The socio-spatial transformations and conflicts that oppose peasants and capitalist interests around territory can be analysed based on processes of territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization (Fuini, 2017, Matos and Medeiros, 2015). Territorialization refers to *the process of appropriation, concrete or symbolic domination of spaces* (Martins and Chagas, 2022: 314). Fuini (2017:21) understands that deterritorialization is the *exclusion and extroversion of spaces of origin, destruction and disintegration of new spaces, and (re)territorialization as the political, economic and symbolic reappropriation of new spaces*.

According to Fernandes (2004: 19) "*the territorialization of capital in a region and its different forms of intensity, socializes and expropriates, incorporates and excludes, not only the peasants, but also the capitalists themselves*." Nowadays, the processes of deterritorialization and territorialization are the most common and inseparable (Matos 2016). Territorial dynamics have led to a movement that territorializes capital (large transnational corporations) and de-territorializes and reterritorializes peasants.


Deterritorialization is linked to the processes of modernization and globalization (Matos and Medeiros, 2015). Indeed, the construction, destruction and reconstruction of a territory depend on the interests that exist in it. Development, the discovery of resources, capitalist accumulation and other elements are determining factors in the destruction and construction of new territories (Matos, 2016). According to Pereira (2019), by moving spatially, capital incorporates new territories that were not under its *modus operandi*, which is based on accumulation via dispossession.

The territorialization of mining in Tete, especially coal mining, began in the colonial period, continued in the post-independence period (Matos and Medeiros, 2018; Matos 2016) and intensified since 2004-2007. The discovery of coal dates back to the 19th century, when three deposits were discovered covering an area of 350 km² distributed in three coal basins: Moatize-Mijonva, Chicooa-Pangura and

Sanagoe-Mefidezi, the first being the best known (Matos and Medeiros, 2018, Matos 2016). In the colonial period, mining was done on a small scale for domestic consumption and private economic agents dominated the sector¹⁴ (Monié and Carvalho, 2019; Matos 2016). In the post-independence period, after the adoption of the Marxist-Leninist one-party system, mining was seen by the State as a sector that would make a major contribution to economic development (Matos and Medeiros, 2018). State-owned companies were created, including Empresa Carbonífera de Moçambique (CARBOMOC), which was responsible for coal mining in the Moatize coal basin. However, coal mining was discontinued due to the 16-year civil war, which led to the destruction of the railway and production plummeted (Monié and Carvalho, 2019).

With economic and political liberalization, the State restarted to promote mining through private economic agents by granting mining rights to transnational companies. For this reason, mining has led to profound socio-spatial transformations in rural areas and land uses.

Graphic 1. Land occupation by sector in Tete province (in Hectares)



Source: prepared by the author based on data obtained from DNTA and SPA TETE

Graphic 1 shows data on land occupation in Tete Province in September 2023. This data was collected from the Provincial Directorate for Territorial Development and the Environment (DPDTA) and the Provincial Environmental Services (SPA). According to this information, mining appears among the five main purposes of land use. However, as mentioned before, the right to use and exploit the land is distinct from the right to exploit it granted in mining titles, even though the usufruct of the latter implies the acquisition of the right to use and exploit the land.

However, an analysis of the data on exploration licenses shows a different scenario. The sum of the areas covered by exploitation rights in the mining concession licenses and mining certificates in force until July 2023 (see table 1 below) shows that the areas covered by mining rights correspond to

¹⁴ According to Matos and Medeiros (2018), the first company to exploit coal in Moatize was the multinational "La Societé Géologique et Minérale du Zambeze", made up mostly of Belgian capital. According to the authors, this company exploited the coal from 1922 to 1948, and was then replaced by Companhia Carbonífera de Moçambique, with South African and Mozambican capital.

447,449.47 ha under which DUATs exist. These figures show that only 36.04% of the mining titles issued are actually being exploited and that the holders of the mining titles do not yet have the title to the right to use and exploit the land, which explains the discrepancy between the titles issued and the land actually occupied.

Table 1. Mining titles in force and areas with concession for mining until July 2023

Type of mining title	Area (ha)
Prospecting and research license	1 492 466.17
Mining concession	439 296.03
Mining certificate license	8203.44

Source: prepared by the author based on the mining registration map

The effective enjoyment of mining rights by the holders of mining titles will lead to the need to obtain rights of use and exploitation and, thereafter, mining will become the main form of land use with the largest area occupied areas. Contributing to this understanding is the fact that the number of prospecting and exploration licenses, mining concessions and mining certificates issued up to July 2023 cover a larger area than the area included in DUATs fall and that which is actually occupied.

The confirmation of the existence of minerals of a quality and quantity favourable to commercialization in the areas for which prospecting and exploration licenses have been issued could lead to the granting of exploration licenses, which will contribute to a process of deterritorialization and the constitution of new forms of territoriality in the province, with mining being the structuring factor of land occupation.

The data collected from the Tete Provincial Environmental Services show that, of the 9,841,700 ha that correspond to the entire territory of the province, the area occupied is 1,720,919.9 ha, which corresponds to 17.5%, and that 82.5% of the province's land area is available. However, the territorialization of mining is a process that is underway at provincial level and the Moatize district is one of its main hotspots. In addition, of the three coal basins in the Moatize district, the Moatize coal basin is the best known and is where exploitation takes place due to the quality of the coal and the geological conditions for extraction, which allows for open-cast mining (Monié and Carvalho, 2019). This has made it possible to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to coal mining and, consequently, the entry of transnational companies, such as Vale Moçambique, Riversdale Mining, Rio Tinto, International Coal Ventures Private Limited, Jindal Steel and Power limited, and other smaller companies, such as Minas Moatize and Midwest África Lda (Viera, 2021, Mosca and Selemene, 2011).

Table 2. mining concessions in force in Moatize until 2021

Holder	Mineral	Area occupied (hectares)	Date of Concession
Vale Moçambique	Coal	25 323,40	03-07-2007
Minas de Moatize	Coal and building stone	266.90	15-07-2005
Minas de Benga Limitada	Coal and associated minerals	5 563,74	05-05-2009
Minas de Revubué	Coal	3 964.46	01-04-2013
Midwest	Coal and associated minerals	15 840	01-10-2013
ICVL Zambeze, limitada	Coal and associated minerals	5 595.62	01-10-2013
Eta Star	Coal	4 106.26	27-10-2014
Ncondezi Coal Company Mozambique	Coal	25 137.28	22-08-2013
Osho Gremach	Coal and associated minerals	903.28	08-02-2017
ICVL Zambeze, limitada	Coal and associated minerals	8 334.63	13-01-2017
ICVL Zambeze, limitada	Coal and associated minerals	9501.92	13-01-2017
ICVL Zambeze, limitada	Coal and associated minerals	5 789.17	13-01-2017
ICVL Zambeze, limitada	Coal and associated minerals	1 724.42	13-01-2017
Helin Mining	Granite	677.95	17-03-2017
Red Soils mining limitada	Iron and associated minerals	712,17	09-07-2020

Source: National Mining Institute

d. Expansion of Vale's coal mines in Moatize


The territorialization of mining in Moatize has led to the land grabbing in favour of mining companies, including Vale Moçambique, which is implementing the largest foreign direct investment project in coal mining (Mosca and Selemene, 2011). The land grabbing in favour of Vale Moçambique took place in two phases. The first phase of land grabbing by Vale began between 2007 and 2011, with the announcement of the winner (Vale S.A) of the public tender to exploit the coal mines, the signing of contracts between the Mozambican government and the company, the implementation of land transactions and the resettlement of people elsewhere. It was also in 2011 that the company began mining operations.

The second phase of land grabbing began in 2015 and lasted until the end of 2019, when the company expanded its coal mining areas. This expansion of the mine resulted in the dispossession of the land and means of production and subsistence of the families whose main activities were farming, fishing, cattle and goat raising and pottery, specifically the production of bricks.

The expansion of mining operations into new areas led to the need for more compensation. At this stage, around 3,000 farmers and more than 1,500 potters and 130 cattle herders were affected¹⁵. Before the compensations were made, there were discussions about the boundaries of the DUAT held by the Vale company, which claimed that these areas were part of its DUAT title. Meanwhile, the peasants, cattle herders and potters who carried out activities in the areas stretching along the Moatize River claimed that the areas belonging to the company were fenced off and that the practice of agriculture, grazing and pottery in these areas claimed by Vale and actually occupied by the communities had been impossible since before the company's presence.¹⁶

5. UNSUSTAINABILITY OF THE COAL BUSINESS: DIVESTMENT BY VALE S.A. AND THE CONFLICTS SURROUNDING COMPENSATION AND INDEMNIFICATION.

In its 2020 management report, Vale S.A. announced the divestment of its coal business, through the sale of all its assets in the Moatize mine and in the Nacala logistics corridor. According to Vale's management report (2020), the decision comes as a strategy to focus on its core businesses and its climate agenda, which consists of becoming a carbon-neutral company by 2050. One of the first steps towards divestment in the coal business was the establishment of a purchase agreement for Mitsui's stake in the Moatize mine and the Nacala logistics corridor (Management Report, 2020).




Source: prepared by the author based on Vale's management reports

However, analysis of the company's management reports for the years 2016 to 2022 revealed that, in addition to its climate agenda, the decision to divest from the coal business by selling the coal assets in Mozambique and its stake in the Henan Longyu coal mine in China was mainly because the coal business was no longer sustainable due to a number of factors (see figure 2), including low net

¹⁵ Information obtained from interviews with the heads of the farmers', potters' and cattle herders' committees.
¹⁶ Information obtained from interviews in June and September 2023.

revenue. EBITIDA is one of the indicators used to measure business performance and measures the profits before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Vale's 2017 management report indicates that since 2011 EBITIDA has remained negative, with the exception of the years 2017, 2018 and 2022 when there were no longer any Vale operations in the sector influenced by the increase in the cost of products sold and services provided, a reduction in the price on the international market; in other words, the coal business was not profitable for Vale.

Graphic 3. Adjusted EBITIDA in Millions



Source: prepared by the author based on Vale's management reports and the 2018 financial statements report

According to EBITIDA, the performance of the coal business segment is the one that shows low and negative results. The most profitable business Vale S.A.'s segment is ferrous minerals, with iron ores showing the highest profits, followed by iron pellets.

Vale therefore looked for interested parties in the coal business and, in December 2021, Vale announced that it had signed an agreement with Vulcan Resources for the sale of the Moatize mine and the Nacala logistics corridor. The declared transaction value was 270 million dollars, consisting of 80 million dollars at the conclusion of the transaction and 190 million dollars from the existing business until completion. Furthermore, a 10-year *royalty* agreement was established¹⁷. The effectiveness of the agreement was dependent on the approval by the government and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy. Vale S.A.'s sale of the coal assets in Mozambique took place in a context in which legal proceedings were underway in the Administrative Court. The purpose of these was to guarantee the availability of information of public interest, environmental performance reports, agreements signed with communities and governments. On the other hand, the Bar Association filed a lawsuit against Vale demanding the payment of damages and compensation to 760 families in Cateme.

Likewise, some small-scale farmers and potters have been demanding payment of compensation for the loss of their land, which was ceded to Vale during the expansion of the mine area between 2015

¹⁷Available at <https://revista.negocios.co.mz/vale-anuncia-venda-dos-seus-ativos-de-carvao-a-vulcan-minerals/> [accessed on May 17, 2023].

and 2019. Many families are waiting for compensation and damage repair. There are families living in the vicinity of the mine who have been waiting for many years to be resettled by Vale, being exposed to risks of disease due to pollution, *stress* and violence (AIAAV, 2021; ADECRU *et al*, 2022). Some civil society organizations, together with potters' groups, farmers and grassroots community organizations, carried out advocacy actions, putting pressure on the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, Max Tonela, not to approve the agreement to buy and sell the Moatize mine and the Nacala logistics corridor before the company paid the indemnities and compensation and repaired the damage caused to the families living near the mine¹⁸. The company reacted and informed the press that it would fulfil its responsibilities and that whatever was not fulfilled would be done by the new owner of the assets¹⁹. Meanwhile, on 23 March 2022, an order was issued authorizing the sale of the assets to Vulcan Resources.

The decision exacerbated the existing conflicts between the mining company and the people who lost their land as a result of the mining expansion. Thus, the new owner of the coal assets, Vulcan, inherited the conflicts over compensation owed by Vale. Relations between Vale Moçambique and local populations have always been marked by conflicts that have led to revolts and demonstrations by potters, farmers and resettled people²⁰ (Eusébio, 2020; Osório e Silva, 2017). These revolts and demonstrations took place again on 16 and 18 June and on 20 August 2023, putting the communities against the Vulcan company²¹. In an interview, a small farmer explained the following:

In terms of the farm, here is what happened: When Vale arrived, it held a meeting with the Secretary and the people who were there. The word that Vale gave was: we want this space and we're going to compensate you; but for now, as you have already laid down your strength, you have vegetables, others have not yet harvested corn, we are just going to give you some money from your seed. So that you do not lose the seed, you will buy the seed and keep it, and then we will come and discuss with you whether we are going to give you your farms and your compensation. From the cadastre, your names will be printed and the people whose names appear on the list will have to bring their documents to receive the money for the seed that was lost. Because they did not want to see anyone on the farms anymore, and we only went there to harvest nhemba beans, boér beans. That money was received and, since 2019, the promises they made about the farms are no longer there, nor are the indemnifications. (Man, farmer, interview on 30 June 2023, Moatize)

In the same line, two other interviewees explained:

In 2019 they came here, they started registering us. They said, after registering us, you cannot continue here anymore, what you have in your farm you can take away,

¹⁸ Available at <https://justica-ambiental.org/2022/02/17/carta-aberta-ao-mireme-e-ao-governo-de-mocambique-a-respeito-da-venda-da-vale-mocambique/> [accessed on 23 February 2023].

¹⁹ "Vale Moçambique says it will fulfill commitments with the government and communities before abandoning the Moatize mine. It also says that what is not done will be continued by the new owner of the mine" in CanalMoz newspaper, digital daily, Year 11 | number 3157 Maputo, Thursday 24 February 2022.

²⁰ There were demonstrations on 12 January 2012, 16 April 2013, October 2018 and in June and August this year 2023.

²¹ Information obtained from interviews with focus groups with potters and farmers, held on 17 September 2023.

you cannot continue here anymore, we will be able to open another farm elsewhere. After the end of 2019, when they banned us, we were called; I am the head or leader of the group; there are 178 of us. From that first Moatize bridge to there we are 179 farmers. So, when I was called by the company (...); but then they said no, the payment here will be different because the areas, the cubic meters that each one had, I had 500 meters, others had a few cubic meters, depending on the value of the cubic meters, so. So, they said: we're going to calculate; what we measured gave us how many cubic meters. For example, in my field there was maize, nhemba beans, pumpkin, nhangolo beans and cucumbers, so they did a calculation of that. I only received 18,000 meticaís. So, before I signed, I complained that this 18 does not help. So, I said: the money you want to give me will not be enough for me to open another farm because, at the moment, this 18,000 I can only [buy] a hoe, a few things; and money to give to those other men to open a field will not be enough. So, they said: no, you will receive this money and then you will submit other documents to receive the 119,000 meticaís, which is compensation; after compensation, there will be other project money. (Man, interview on 21 September 2023).

The mining company Vale transited the shareholding in the new company to VULCAN. We asked these questions to the manager who was there at the time and the same person who is still there today, Mr. Horácio, who is the manager of the VULCAN company in the social area, with his supervisors, Luís Amudo, and Hélio. In addition to this, we wrote a letter questioning this transition between VULCAN and VALE, and knowing that the company has unfinished issues that has not yet been resolved: dealing with the potters, assisted compensation, farmers; what is it going to be like? Will things stop like this when VALE leaves? They said: no, the change of shareholder does not mean that all the problems have stopped: it is this new company, VULCAN, who is going to take over, and it is going to start carrying out mining activities on the ground. (Man, potter, Moatize interviewed on 19 September 2023).

In order to resolve the compensation issues, a platform for dialogue was established between the local government, the Vulcan company and members of the affected communities. However, the dialogue platform did not reach any consensus as the company claims that the data in its possession indicates that all issues of payment of compensation and indemnities have been resolved. The Moatize district government has said that it is not in a position to decide on this and that there are cases of opportunism in which people who were not affected are now included in the groups claiming payment. The Moatize District Government has therefore submitted the case to the district attorney's office²². The decision taken by the district government shows how decisions taken at central level tend to dislocate conflicts to the peripheries, which have no power to decide on their solution.

²² Interview with the Moatize District Administrator, held on 11 July 2023.

6. NEW COMPANY, SAME PRACTICES: INEFFECTIVE AND EXCLUDING COMPENSATION MECHANISMS AND THE HOLLOWING OUT OF THE STATE

The penetration of large capital (Foreign Direct Investment) into rural areas has been considered by the national governments of developing countries as fundamental for socio-economic development (Sambo, 2020). In this context, compensation mechanisms linked to the implementation of investment projects have been set up as a way of including mainly the affected families in rural development processes (Bruna, 2023). Bruna's (2023) definition of a compensation mechanism has been adopted, according to which:

Compensation mechanisms include those provided for in land expropriation legislation (compensation, resettlement, among others, which can be negotiated in community consultation), but also include other processes such as job creation, corporate social responsibility programs, social and community development plans, which aim to provide alternative livelihood and income generation strategies. In other words, these are all ways of compensating the communities affected by the loss of land and resources, and by the disruption of their livelihood strategies, with the aim of incorporating them into the rural development promoted by the investment or project (Bruna, 2023: 2-3).

In this paper, the compensation mechanisms addressed are employment and corporate social responsibility.

a. Employment

In debates about large-scale land acquisition, the idea is that investment projects bring with them a range of material benefits. These include integration into global markets, the expansion of formal State institutions, and compensation schemes such as corporate social responsibility that accompany investment (Gerber and Haller, 2020). The promotion of employment in areas where mining activities take place has been identified by governments and investors as one of the greatest benefits generated by extractive industries (Cordes, Ostensson and Toledano, 2016).

This vision is found in the 2015-2035 Mozambique's National Development Strategy and in the government's five-year programs, which present a discourse that points to the benefits of attracting foreign investment to extractive industries to create jobs and a new working class and is therefore one of the Mozambican government's strategies for promoting employment. In the extractive sector, coal mining has contributed to job creation. In Tete Province and Mozambique, Vale was once the largest employer in Mozambique with more than 11,000 direct employees and subcontractors (Tsuji and Otsuki, 2023, Management Report 2021). Vulcan is currently the largest employer with a total of 17,120 employees, including 5,603 direct employees and 11,571 subcontractors, of which 97% are nationals. The gender distribution is 89% men and 11% women.

However, the issue of job creation and hiring local labour is to some extent controversial. There are public policies²³ that oblige the preferential hiring of national labour, and there are quotas established


²³ See Law no. 13/2023 (Labor Law that repeals Law no. 23/2007, of August 1); Decree no. 63/2011 (Regulations for Hiring Foreign Nationals in the Petroleum and Mining Sector).

for hiring foreign labour depending on the size of the company. Large companies, such as Vulcan, have a 5% quota for hiring foreign labour. However, as Cordes, Ostensson and Toledano (2016) explain, hiring local labour have different meanings: at a national level, local would mean a citizen of the country; in the project area, local would mean a native of the area hosting the project. Therefore, the hiring of local labour may not be host areas natives.

However, although acclaimed by the ruling elites, the creation of jobs by the mining companies in Moatize has been the subject of much debate and criticism in academic circles and among CSOs. The latter say that although the coal megaproject in Moatize is the one that employs the most people in Mozambique, in practice there is an unequal distribution of opportunities. Foreign workers and Mozambicans with better academic qualifications, generally from urban centres (Maputo, Beira, Tete, Nampula) and the southern provinces of the country, obtain better positions and contractual conditions than locals (Mosca and Selemene, 2011; Kirshner and Power, 2015; Osório and Silva, 2017; Tsuji and Otsuki, 2023). For Kirshner and Power (2015), the limited number of positions is the result of recruitment procedures, which are carried out by specialized companies.

Residents of Moatize had high expectations in terms of employability. However, the opening of applications in Tete to people from the project host areas, particularly Valeś, was limited to a small number of vacancies for specialized technicians, drivers and security guards, which do not demanding in terms of qualifications (Tsuji and Otsuki, 20-23; Kirshner and Power, 2015).

Graphic 4 Employment in mining companies



Source: Prepared by the author based on the surveys

Graphic 4 shows the results obtained in the survey regarding access to employment in the mining companies by Moatize residents, with a total of 68 respondents; of whom, 79.4% answered that they do not work in the mining companies and 20.6% answered that they work in the mining companies as contractors and for subcontractors. Approximately 14.7% (10) work for Vulcan (formerly Vale) and 5.9% (4) work for other mining companies (ICVL and Minas Moatize) of the 20.6% of respondents who indicated that they work in the mines.

Table 3. Positions occupied and educational level of respondents employed by mining companies

Position	Primary level	Secondary level	Total
Cleaning agent	2		2
Security	2		2
Mechanic assistant		1	1
Mechanic	1		1
Construction assistant	1		1
Driver		2	2
Monitor		2	2
Mine operator		1	1
Supervisor	1	1	2
Grand Total	7	7	14

Source: prepared by the author based on the surveys.

Table 3 shows the distribution of functions and respective educational level of the respondents who said they worked in the mining companies. Among the 14 interviewees that reported working for the mining company, 7 had primary education and 7 had secondary education.

Cordes, Ostensson and Toledano (2016) note that there is often a degree of frustration among the inhabitants of the host areas regarding employment opportunities, as there is generally no match between the skills required by the mining companies or their subcontractors and those of the local population. This leads to the import of foreign labour and better qualified Mozambicans, mostly from Maputo (Tsuji and Otsuki, 2023).

Employment promotion is seen as one of the main benefits of major investment. Labour laws require most employees to be of national origin. However, this is of little benefit to the inhabitants of the host areas of investment projects. For Osório and Silva (2017), the lack of inclusion of local (native) workers is the result of the Mozambican government's lack of strategies to privilege local communities. However, there is legislation regulating labour relations and recruitment, which do not leave room for recruitment processes that take into account the duality local citizen/native - citizen from other regions; in other words, they do not allow for the preferential recruitment of host areas' natives by investment projects. On the one hand, the Mining Law stipulates that the recruitment of personnel must be carried out through public tender and published in newspapers with the largest circulation, radio, television or the Internet. On the other hand, the Labour Law (Law No. 13/2023 of 25 August), which establishes, among other principles, the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of race, colour, ethnic origin or place of birth, does not allow recruitment that discriminates on the basis of place of birth. Therefore, the qualification requirements and recruitment rules a priori discriminate against local residents.

b. Corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility is defined in different ways. In this research we have adopted the simple and objective definition presented in Reinhardt, Stavins and Vietor (2008): sacrificing profits for the sake of social interest. In this context, Gerber and Haller (2020) argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a nebulous idea because it implies that companies have obligations other than making profits, creating jobs and paying taxes. For other authors, corporate social responsibility would be a risk management tool for transnational companies operating in environments characterized by social conflicts arising from mining activities. In such contexts, CSR functions as a mechanism to guarantee the company's operability (Hoelscher and Rustad, 2019), i.e. as a countermeasure to social risk.

In addition to risk management, Frynas (2005) points to other reasons why companies in the extractive industry engage in CSR activities, such as gaining a competitive advantage, managing external perceptions, keeping employees satisfied and maintaining a stable working environment. In fact, one of the central aspects in the debates on CSR is how inclusive or exclusionary CSR programs are, to what extent these programs contribute to the reproduction of pre-existing logics of inclusion and exclusion in society.

In Mozambique, corporate social responsibility in the extractive sector is mandatory: companies operating in the extractive industry are required to prepare social investment plans, the value of which is defined in the concession contract or memorandum with the government. The investment plans must be the result of consultation between the companies and the affected communities. Investment plans are established through Local Development Agreements or Memoranda of Understanding. The provincial and district governments are responsible for approving them.

In Mozambique, there is a corporate social responsibility policy for the extractive industry (Resolution No. 21/2014 of May 16, 2014)²⁴ and an implementation guide (Ministerial Diploma No. 8/2017 of 16 January 2017). However, these instruments are not binding, and their obligation to implement CSR initiatives is based on the contract with the government in the clause relating to local development²⁵. The CSR policy implementation guide sets out the procedures.

The corporate social responsibility initiatives implemented by the companies, Vale and currently Vulcan, have two similar logics. On the one hand, the initiatives focused on social services, such as the construction and rehabilitation of schools, hospitals, water supply, ambulance service, among others. On the other hand, there have been initiatives to generate income, support production, support mobility and technical vocational training through the distribution of bicycles.

Vulcan's presence in Moatize has not brought with it a new approach to the design and practices of CSR programs, as it does not have a *sui generis* CSR program, i.e. the initiatives are a continuation of the programs implemented by Vale Mozambique (see table 1). The continuity of social responsibility

²⁴ These instruments were drawn up in 2014, at a time when there was much discussion about the role of the extractive industry in development in Mozambique and the tax benefits granted to large companies.

²⁵ The concession contract for the Moatize mine between the government and Vale did not yet have a local development clause, although support for social programs was provided for.

actions has a positive and a negative side. On the one hand, it prevents disruption of the activities planned for the financial year²⁶. On the other hand, it means that Vulcan has to deal with the legacies and shortcomings of the CSR programs implemented by Vale Moçambique. The interviews revealed that during the period in which Vale operated in Moatize and currently with Vulcan, households had different access to CSR initiatives. Vale promoted income generation projects through chicken production in Cateme and Moatize. Local leaders were co-opted as a strategy to maintain alliances and ensure control over the populations affected by mining. The selection of beneficiaries was controlled by neighbourhood structures and traditional authorities. Beneficiary households were part of the local leadership structures or had links to them, as evidenced by the following quotes from interviewees:

Yes, I received that chicken project. For me, it was random because I did not fit in; someone else received it [and] who was the secretary of the unit; then, the secretary of the unit was a disabled person, he could not move [and], then, he gave it to the secretary of the neighbourhood, [who] was also afraid that (...) I won't be able to do this activity. So, he randomly asked me if I could do it; I said, write my name; then he sent me to the municipality to replace the secretary's name. I received two batches [of chickens]: the first batch was 200 in 2018, then the second batch also, although it took a long time, we were waiting to receive the second batch for more than a year (Man, 65, retired from Moatize Minas, Moatize, interviewed in June/July 2023).

Another interviewee explained:

It was an effort to get in, to fit in; it was an effort because there was always this system of pick and choose; for me to get in, even because I went to these madalas because they work there too. I asked for my name to be included. It was a gentleman who lives there, because he was one of the first groups to get in at the time when the company gave out four lots; so, as he was already known there, I ran after him, and he helped me. (...) It was in December 2021 that they started, [and] they gave me the first lot. Then, when I finished selling, in April, (...) they did not give me anymore (Man, poultry farmer, Moatize, interviewed on 18 September 2023).

Vulcan inherited the social conflicts over compensation, which led to demonstrations by groups of potters and farmers in Moatize in June and August 2023. One of the immediate responses to this issue was to grant benefits to certain segments of the population. It turned out that Vulcan continued the program to prepare for the job market, which consists of technical-vocational training in areas such as locksmithing, electricity, welding, cooking and entrepreneurship, among others. The beneficiaries were chosen from among young people from households whose main source of livelihood was agriculture and whose land had been usurped in the process of expanding the mine area between 2018-2020.

According to Hoelscher and Rustad (2019), unmitigated conflicts of a social and environmental nature can negatively affect the financial performance and operations of megaprojects in the extractive

²⁶ With the purchase of the coal mine assets, the staff remained the same, in particular those responsible for the social area of Vulcan, which took control of the operations in April 2022.

industries, putting political pressure on companies and governments. To mitigate the risk of further uprisings, Vulcan decided that the beneficiaries of the labour market preparation program would be the children of farmers who had lost their land to Vale, which we believe is a move by the company to use CSR initiatives as a countermeasure to social risk. The following reports are evidence of this trend:

So, as the person in charge of some fields, I am talking about Tibo; so, me and another colleague there ended up [and] the company gave us this responsibility to sign up all the young people from the town of Moatize to take part in this training; that Aldelia and Tecnicol are in charge of that training. For us, me and my colleague, who I am referring to by Nhantchere, we were told to select only those children whose parents owned the fields in Tibo. (Tibo peasant committee leader, interviewed on 1 July 2023)

I was told by those on the committee who are behind the program that... we have to bring our children's names to do the training. So, I spoke to my son and my son went to give his name there. They are men from our committee; a committee was set up for those people who did not want to be given their right to compensation. So, they were supposed to pursue this matter with Vulcan company and, when they were given information, they came to give it to the community. Those informants said that the company is promising that others will be given chickens to raise, for projects, others will be given jobs, others will benefit from training. So, I replied that I would prefer my son to be trained rather than be given chickens. They said: the people on the committee who have two farms cannot be told that they will benefit from the project on two farms; they just have to take their son to come and do training here. (Peasant woman, Moatize interviewed on July 9, 2023)

The lack of evaluation of the impact of CSR initiatives has led to the continuation of ineffective programs. For example, in the case of the labour market preparation program, which will run from September 2021 to October 2023, the continuity of the project has neglected some aspects, such as the degree of employability of the graduates and the total number of self-employment created after the training, as pointed out by Osório and Silva (2017). As a result, the training is ineffective because the trainees remain unemployed.

With regard to the training of human capital, the extractive industry companies have an obligation to contribute to the training of Mozambicans in areas of interest and to contribute to the development of human capital as part of their social responsibility, without, however, indicating the limits of these actions. With regard to the chicken production initiative, most of the interviewees who benefited from this project are not continuing the activity for various reasons: poor management of the amounts obtained, inputs rising prices such as chicks, feed and vaccines, high losses in the summer period due to high temperatures, but also because of problems related to supply, as the producing families in Cateme and the town of Moatize sell at the Moatize municipal market, where there is an excess of supply.²⁷

²⁷ Information obtained from interviews with those resettled and affected by mining in Moatize.

Table 4: Vulcan's corporate social responsibility program

CSR programs with exclusive access	Objective	Number of beneficiaries	CSR programs without exclusive access	Objective	Number of beneficiaries
Agriculture	Certified seeds, technical assistance to producers, production tools, and mechanized tillage are provided. The project involves hiring agricultural companies to provide inputs, technical assistance, off take agreements, and cartographic and geographic mapping to farmers, to be carried out with their own staff.	1523	Water Supply	The project, which focuses on risk and impact management, aims to hire companies to build boreholes, maintain independent water supply systems, expand FIPAG's water system and supply water via tanker trucks to the communities of Trecho Sul, Moatize and Cateme.	42.000
Empowering girls: Going further	Reduce dropout rates and promote reintegration into secondary school.	400 girls			
Preparing for the job market	Train young people living in Tete in interpersonal and technical skills	1000			
Poultry farming	Supporting chicken production as an income-generating activity	120			
Mobility: Go by bike	Facilitating travel and transportation in communities by distributing bicycles and setting up bicycle workshops	2700			
Social support: Orphanages: Friendly hand	Supporting orphanages and shelters for the elderly in terms of promoting health and well-being, through social actions	354			
Cattle breeding	Providing technical assistance to livestock farmers	218			

Source: prepared by the author based on data available on the Vulcan website (<https://www.vulcaninternational.com/pt/sustainability/us-in-the-community/>).

c. Hollowing out of the State by mining companies through corporate social responsibility measures

The provision of basic services has changed in the 20th century: public services are no longer the monopoly of the State and take place outside State bureaucracies, as a result of modern public management practices that involve market solutions in the provision of public services (Kjaer, 2004; Milward and Provan, 2000). This process has led to a hollowing out of the State in the process of providing public services.

In developing countries, transnational extractive companies operate in rural areas and are generally the main economic agents, often being called upon to carry out activities that are the responsibility of the government (Hoelscher and Rustad, 2019). Langa and Massingue (2014), when analysing the role of corporate social responsibility policies in Mozambique, state that these actions have the potential to create a certain dependence on megaprojects, because communities in host areas lack various public services that are now provided by mining megaprojects.

As part of the implementation of social projects, Vale has implemented a series of initiatives involving the construction and rehabilitation of hospitals and health centres, the provision of real estate, equipment and ambulances, the opening of boreholes, the construction of markets, the rehabilitation of roads, the construction of schools and houses for teachers, vocational training, among others (Jesus, 2017). These investments in public services are apparently voluntary, but practice shows that they have a binding nature that arises from compliance with the clauses in the concession contracts with the Mozambican State. As a result, the provision of public services in rural Mozambique, in areas where extractive industry investment projects are located, is characterized by a process of hollowing out the State, which occurs not because of the inclusion of market solutions in the provision of public services, but because transnational companies appear to be performing functions that are the responsibility of the State.

In this context, in the particular case of coal mining in Moatize, there is a tendency for a relationship of dependence to emerge, both on the part of local governments and the communities living in the host areas, in relation to the mining companies' CSR programs, which focus on activities of a public nature and of responsibility of the State. As one interviewee put it:

We made our priorities document for the district. For example, for me, the main priority was to produce around 900 desks for the schools; by having these desks in the district, all the schools would have desks, [and] no pupils would be sitting on the floor. In other words, it is a priority that we set and that has an impact on society. It is just that the companies, currently Vulcan... But Vale had a slightly strange procedure with regard to instructions, because they made direct contact with the people to find out what they wanted; so we worked with them to show them that this is not how it should be done, it is the district's government that makes contact with the people, that surveys the needs, and submits them to you so that you can help solve them (Administrator of Moatize, Moatize, interviewed on 11 July 2023).

The company is not doing anything here in our district of Moatize. Speaking of roads: you have been on this road, [and] you have seen it; it does not make sense for a big company to be based here in the district of Moatize; we could not have bumpy access. There is a lot of money here. For me, the company does nothing (Moatize resident interviewed on 3 July 2023).

We have this commitment with Vulcan, the company that does most of the work here. At the beginning of this year, we even asked them to inform us of the amount available for social responsibility for this year; it is true that, with the problem of decentralization, things often get complicated; I know they sent it, but they sent it to the Secretary of State, they did not send it to the district government. Just yesterday, just to give you an example, I received a document here from the Secretary of State, who did not consult us about an activity that the company wanted to do; it reads like this: good afternoon; they're asking for a proposed guide for rehabilitation, from the Vulcan company, of the following roads; they're asking me to indicate the roads, so that we can choose one that we think is a priority for the district. So, what we do is to inform the province that our preference is this road here; now, how much that will cost is then at provincial level, there, where the bodies that manage the mining companies are, because these mining companies at provincial level have bodies that relate directly with them, and, if we go in directly, we are also causing the company to not know who to deal with (Administrator of Moatize, Moatize, interviewed on 11 July 2023).

In fact, mining megaprojects, initially implemented by Vale Moçambique and currently by Vulcan, are required to solve social problems that are the responsibility of the State. Companies are therefore obliged to design a social responsibility program, which can take the form of a memorandum of understanding or development agreement, which should involve interested parties, including communities. In fact, Vale, Vulcan, the provincial or district government and the communities have not signed any local development agreements or memoranda of understanding, even if they are incorporated into their CSR initiative management practices. On the other hand, there is a deviation from the procedures established in the guide for implementing CSR policy in the extractive industry regarding inter-institutional coordination, in which CSR actions appear as a reproduction of practices being implemented elsewhere, and which Vulcan has only continued with, rather than a vision shared and coordinated by the stakeholders. Similarly, the origin of the CSR initiatives implemented by mining companies is not clearly defined, whether they are the result of memoranda of understanding or local development agreements.

Furthermore, corporate social responsibility actions in the extractive industry not only contribute to the hollowing out of the State, but they can also have other effects. According to Epifania and Massingue (2014), communities affected by mining lack various public services, hence mining companies, by providing such services, can lead to the discrediting of the State as a provider of basic services, facilitating the increase in the power of companies over communities and, in this way, reducing the autonomy and possibilities for communities to make claims about the adverse effects of mining on their lives.

7. IMPACTS OF COAL MINING ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN MOATIZE

a. Intensification of the crisis of social reproduction of the "peasantry"

The way in which rural families choose the areas where they will socially reproduce is influenced by the presence of certain conditions, such as the proximity to water sources, rivers, lakes and the availability of fertile land for agriculture, because although rural families are involved in multiple activities, agriculture is generally the main subsistence activity and the guarantor of social reproduction (White, 2020, Matos and Medeiros, 2015). Together, these elements allow the organization of space by rural families to be characterized by dispersed settlement under a traditional authority representing their ancestors, where productive and residential spaces are close to each other (Matos and Medeiros, 2015).

According to Bernstein (2010), reproduction involves the reproduction of means of production (seeds, tools, livestock), of future producers (generations), and of relationships between producers and between producers and other people. Agriculture plays a central role in reproduction in two ways: firstly, part of the harvest is allocated for consumption; secondly, part of the harvest is allocated for the replacement of applied inputs, such as seed selection and storage, and for the creation and re-creation of culture, such as pre- and post-harvest festivals, initiation rites and weddings. However, White (2020) notes that a large proportion of the rural population may not qualify as farmers because they, sometimes and for long periods, do not have the land or other means to farm themselves, or because they engage in marginal and seasonal farming. The population of Moatize district is predominantly agrarian, with around 78% of the population having farming as their main activity, practiced on small family farms (MAE, 2014). This tends to be the same throughout Tete province where, over the years, the occupation of the working population by sector of activity has not changed, based on the latest 2022 Household Budget Survey (IOF), which indicates that agriculture, forestry and fishing employ around 73.3% of the working population.

The interviews made it possible to understand that, as the coal frontiers grew, so did the number of peasants and brick producers who lost their land rights. Some of the families interviewed began to base their livelihoods on the sale of their labour, including precarious jobs, the production of beverages and the renting of properties, properties either received as compensation or built for rent.

In addition, families whose main source of livelihood was agriculture used most of their production for consumption, and their participation in the market was marginal, limited to the years when there was a surplus. This connection to the market is not linked to the logic of accumulation, but rather to reproduction (subsistence). The agrarian question, especially with regard to access to land for subsistence production, is important for the peasants whose land was usurped in favour of the transnational company Vale. No new land has been allocated to farmers, with the exception of the group of cattle farmers, for whom new pasture fields have been opened up, but which are far from water sources. And even for this group, the terms of the compensation and indemnification did not consider various aspects that resettlements for economic interests involve. As a result, landless peasants are forced to reinvent themselves in order to socially reproduce, leaving them to look for alternatives outside of agriculture.

We are suffering from hunger; what do you mean, getting better? We're suffering from hunger. I used to weed, fill barns; I used to fill barns; neither my sons nor my daughters suffered from hunger, did not you hear, and today we are suffering; I am going to buy a can of corn [for] five hundred? Seven hundred? A can of corn now, you see, seven hundred meticais! As an old widow, my husband died, where am I going to get the money to buy this? I have to suffer like this, I am not old enough to do pombe²⁸; I am over my age, I am already old, I am already old; all I can afford is for someone to feed me, you know? I cannot rely on the children; the children also have their own children, their own children, and they have to support [their] children and support the women; and I am going to get upset, give me the money to buy a can of corn. That is why I make pombe so I can eat, so I do not make my children suffer. Tomorrow they will say: you are a sorcerer, you always ask me, what do you ask me for? (Peasant woman, 77 years old, Moatize, interviewed on 29 June 2023)

²⁸ A traditional homemade drink typical of Tete province, made with different ingredients: bran, sugar, corn flour or sorghum flour.

Normally, our work was farming; my fields were there, where the companies are now operating. I had four fields; where I grew peanuts, sorghum, maize, pumpkin leaves, some nhemba bean leaves. They came, registered the fields, handed over part of the money, saying it was for seed, and to this day we have not received anything else. I stopped cultivating for good (...) Now I make homemade drinks and I do not do anything else. I have not made much profit; (...) the profit sometimes reaches 1500.00 Meticais, [which] cannot be enough for something at home; I only do it because I have nothing else to do. (Woman, Farmer, Moatize, interviewed on 4 July 2023).

I am a potter. The first place I learned to make pottery was [in] Chipanga, where they resettled at the time [2009]. I did not have a house there; I lived at my grandparents' elsewhere, but I had my kiln in Chipanga. When the time came to remove those people, the people who had already finished selling the bricks were not given anything, they were not benefited in any way. I made my bricks there, but I did not have a house; I did not benefit there. I lost that place; that is why I am in that group of 121 potters who were not given anything. They came there, took ashes from where I was making and said that we do not pay for ashes, we pay for production; if you have a brick, then we pay. So, when they came here, to Moatize, they set up another system: the person indicated, for example, the hole where they were making, they took a picture and it was in the system; [and] the person was paid. Then I started making pottery in Chamotte, in the Bairro 1º de Maio. There, they also came to paralyze us. In 2018, they came for the first time; we continued to produce; we just demanded to be compensated. Then, in 2020, they came with police and forcibly removed us. They recorded [our] names in a notebook and the phone number and carried our bricks wherever the person wanted, and since then we have been like this: I am at home without working, we sell this oil in small quantities to survive. These are the bricks you see here in the yard, which no longer have any value to resell. (Man, potter, 43 years old, Moatize, interview on 28 June 2023).

The Vale company's inability to acquire new land to distribute to the peasants in the second phase of land usurpation created the basis for the emergence of a crisis of social reproduction on a daily basis for farmer and pottery groups, as the way in which families were able to secure food for immediate consumption changed drastically. There is also a crisis of social reproduction on an intergenerational basis, as White (2020) points out, in that the possibilities of passing on agricultural resources, land, knowledge and skills are closed as there are family members waiting to take over the land that is no longer available.

Despite the allocation of land for agriculture, the agro-ecological conditions do not allow for good productivity. The accounts presented above are only a representation of the reports collected, which make it clear that farming families in Cateme and Moatize are increasingly finding it difficult to secure their livelihoods on the basis of agricultural activities alone. These accounts are consistent with Munro's (2019) observations that companies and families are intrinsically linked in their own processes of production and reproduction, all shaped by the imperatives of accumulation, and that families are forced to rely on the state and companies to guarantee their existence on a daily and intergenerational basis.

However, the allocation of stony and infertile land is the reality for some of the resettled people in Cateme. However, there are some resettled families who have been allocated good land and who are able to make a living exclusively from agriculture. The allocation of fertile land to some resettled families is an element that creates, albeit unintentionally, a social differentiation between the peasant families resettled in Cateme and Moatize.

I received 119,000 meticais as compensation. Everyone used it as they saw fit; there are certain people who acquired new land. [With] this amount I cannot say that I went and bought other land; no, I used it in another way. The promise was of 2 hectares, here we received 1 hectare for each person to work; then, we were 1 hectare short of making 2 hectares and, for this reason, we received 119,000 meticais because there was no more land here for us to be allocated (...) In my field, I have normal production, insofar as land is land; there is other land, true; and there are other people who have not received good land. I received good land, I do not have any stone problems, but the land itself does not cost much; I mean, without ploughing, you do not get anything out... [with the production from the field allocated] I, here at home, usually get as far as the other sowing, consuming my production; but also the number of households here, in my house, is small (Resettled Man, 66 years old, Cateme, interview on 3 July 2023).

They took away [our] land where we used to farm; we did not have to pay for corn, vegetables, firewood; now we have to pay for everything. The people who can live here are those who have values. When they paralyzed us in 2018, they did not allocate new [areas] for agriculture. The field I have, I bought, it is not big, and we do not produce much here (Woman, Farmer, Moatize, interview on 2 July 2023).

In Moatize, one of the ways in which social differentiation was exacerbated was by the choices families made about how to use the money they received as compensation. Since no new land was allocated for cultivation, some families used the money they received to open up new land in other, more distant places, and some families chose to use it to meet other family needs. There are also families who have used the money they received as compensation for their houses to build other properties and annexes to rent out. As a result, there is a certain social differentiation, where we find families who have means of production, especially land, and families who do not have means of production, as well as families who do not have land but earn income from investments in real estate.

Matos and Medeiros (2015:110) state that *'economic and political-ideological interests have often led to changes in the way residential and productive spaces are organized'*. The impact of mining on the social reproduction of peasant families in Moatize is ultimately the result of neoliberal policies. Mining legislation has emerged as a structuring factor in the organization of residential and productive spaces, suppressing any logic around determining factors such as proximity to water sources and availability of fertile land in the choice of spaces for social reproduction. In this sense, these choices are no longer the decision of rural families but are determined by the State's interest in promoting mining activity, in a context where the use of land for mining takes precedence over other uses as long as the economic and social value is higher, in a context where the State takes precedence over pre-existing rights to land in the context of mining.

8. CONCLUSIONS

Mozambique is among the African countries most affected by large-scale land acquisition by land-based investment projects mainly for the agro-forestry sectors (planting fast-growing species, pine and eucalyptus), biofuels and mining. The Mozambican State has shown interest in promoting mining and the exploitation of mineral resources to boost economic growth, promote employment and increase productivity.

The analysis of the results shows that, firstly, land-based investment projects in the mining sector in Mozambique have found legal and institutional conditions that facilitate the transfer of large areas to private,

national or foreign, investors. In the period following political and economic liberalization, the State has adopted a series of neoliberal policies aimed at attracting investment in the mining sector and facilitating the transfer of land rights to investors. Public policies, in particular mining and land legislation, have been formulated over the years to reflect the State's interest in promoting mining investment to boost economic and social development.

Although the primacy of land use for mining over other uses has been suppressed in legislation, practice shows that it remains a priority for the Mozambican State. In fact, it is in the law that the State seeks investment in mining, that it takes precedence over pre-existing rights, and that once it pays fair compensation to the holders of mining titles, the rights are extinguished in favour of the State. Thus, the State appears to legitimize the process of acquisition of large tracts of land by investors, which has led to land usurpation.

Secondly, mining was found to be a structuring factor for land occupation in Tete Province. Mining ranks fifth among the main forms of land occupation. However, mining has the potential to become the main form of land occupation and use in the province, as there are several mining concessions and mining certificates whose exploitation rights have not yet been used. In addition, there are prospecting and exploration licenses in force, covering an area of 1,492,466.17 ha, which could lead to new mines if mineral reserves are found. In fact, there is a territorialization of mining in the Moatize district, as the mining areas have expanded, causing negative socio-spatial transformations in the district.

Thirdly, the compensation mechanisms have not been effective in minimizing the impact of mining activities, as it can be seen that employment (one of the main benefits mentioned) has not benefited the inhabitants of the areas where the investment projects are located, either because they do not have the skills required by the megaprojects or for reasons arising from the recruitment procedures. It can be seen that corporate social responsibility initiatives have failed to provide livelihoods for communities affected by mining. Furthermore, corporate social responsibility initiatives in the extractive industry in Mozambique are not voluntary and have contributed to the erosion of the State by appearing to provide basic public services that are the responsibility of the State.

Fourthly, Vale's divestment in Mozambique, motivated above all by the unprofitability of the coal business, comes at a time when there is a worsening of conflicts over compensation arising from the expansion of mining areas into areas where Moatize residents farm and make bricks. Since then, landless people (without fields to cultivate) have reappeared in Moatize and the crisis of social reproduction has intensified for groups whose livelihoods were based on agriculture and brick making. We believe that the popular demonstrations that have arisen around the problems of compensation are the result of the crisis of social reproduction of specific groups in Moatize.

a. Recommendations

- There is a need to introduce the concept of social licence to operate (SLO) into mining and petroleum legislation, which consists of ensuring communities' acceptance as a condition for resource exploitation. This concept aims to go beyond legal compliance and introduce social legitimacy.
- Clauses in mining concession contracts should be reviewed with regard to the conditions for the transfer of mining assets to other companies, with safeguards to prevent the transfer of assets while court cases are pending or while there are problems affecting communities in the host areas.

- In the context of the revision of the Land Law (currently underway), the Land Law must prioritise the interests of Mozambicans, with a long-term vision, in order to respond to the development and poverty reduction needs of Mozambicans, regardless of which government is in power.
- There is also a need to review the regulation of compensation and indemnification. The legislator must clarify what fair compensation is in the context of expropriation of land for economic purposes and in the public interest.
- There is a need to broaden the debate by conducting research on the processes of large-scale land allocation and the resulting benefits and losses, and to provide evidence to inform public policy and program design.

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