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João Mosca

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THE CONCEPT OF THE SMALL FARMER AND THE MOZAMBICAN REALITY FROM A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE

João Mosca[1]

1. DISCUSSION ON THE CONCEPT OF SMALL FARMER

1.1 Introduction

This paper seeks to discuss the concept of the small farmer in the different contexts of the evolution of societies and the political and ideological influences involved, as well as the dynamics of evolution according to realities. In addition to debating the concept, the paper seeks to reflect on its potential as a decoder of the complexity of realities and its role in structuring differentiated public policies. In Mozambique, the concept oscillates between peasant and small producer, without clearly defined boundaries, and the transitions between them are blurred over time, and sometimes are both used synonymous.

The work has been carried out exclusively with bibliographical support, with the aim of covering different perspectives, historical moments and political and economic contexts.

Small farmers, as the majority social class until the phase of industrial capitalism, have always been "used/instrumentalized" during the processes of change (revolutionary or not, and even in reformist processes) by the elites of different periods in the evolution of societies (feudal, petty-bourgeois, bourgeois, proto-nationalist, elites of slave and patriarchal societies). However, once the elites' objectives have been achieved, they not only betray the small farmers' convictions, but also distance themselves from them.

The paper reflects on the role of the small farmers, whether in the "socialist revolutions", in the national liberation struggles or, in the past, in the different phases of colonialism. It also reflects on the role of the small farmers in periods dominated by commercial capital in the Indian Ocean corridor. The aim, therefore, is to question the reasons for the small farmers' movements of resistance and revolt and why their struggles have not led to changes in regimes, political systems, or even economic systems. The author studies the case of Mozambique in more detail.

In summary, the aim is to contribute to: (1) an analysis of the concept of the small farmer and the transitions and changes in the bases of production and social organization throughout history, using the case of Mozambique; and, (2) the role of small farmers in the different types of ethnic alliances and with economic and political forces, before, during and after colonisation.

In addition to the introduction, the paper is divided into four sections: the first section briefly summarises the discussion on the definitions and perspectives about the small farmer within the framework of what is mentioned in this introduction; the second section presents how the multiple definitions of the small farmer have been and are being discussed, but mainly how the transformations of farming have taken place throughout the history of Mozambique, with a particular focus on the period of intensive colonisation (mid-19th century). The third section analyses the participation of the small farmers in the national liberation struggle and the

[1] PhD in Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology. OMR researcher.

construction of post-colonial Mozambique. Finally, the discussions raised in the sections that make up the article are summarised.

1.2 The concept of small farmer

A small farmer, in a simple/general sense, is someone who lives or works on the land. This definition is neither universal nor accepted in all contexts, as not everyone who works the land can be considered a small farmer[2]. There are people who live in the 'countryside' but are not farmers. On the other hand, there are people living on the outskirts of cities who are farmers and whose main activity is peri-urban agriculture. The concepts of family farming, smallholders, small producers, commodity producers and peasants are not entirely different. Thus, "... small-scale agricultural producers with labour-intensive technology, mainly family members, with little integration into the factor market (inputs, machinery and money - land, wage labour and other sources of non-agricultural income), producing essentially for the family, are considered as family farmers, as an economic and social unit, who do' not always have the market as the only and main reference in their production choices, who do 'not necessarily have profit as their main objective and, whenever they can, supplement their agricultural income with other income, from within or outside the sector" (Mosca 2017:69).[3]

Broadly speaking, small farmers can be understood as "a social class and not merely an economic sector, a form of production organization or a way of life".[4] For Shanin (1979:228)[5] , ""the peasantry is, at the same time, a different social class and a different world, which presents distinct patterns of social relations - that is, what we can also call a way of life". For him, the peasantry is a social class of low 'classicity'[6] that inserts itself into capitalist society in a subordinate way and rises up in moments of crisis ".[7] In this way of thinking, "the peasantry is characterised by a specific social organization that sometimes serves feudal or capitalist interests and sometimes opposes them. The small farmer way of life is at the same time a relationship of subordination and alienation from capitalist society. If, on the one hand, the market influences the small farmer´s 'productive choices and social relations, on the other hand, it does not organise them" (Taussig, 1980:10).[8] Nevertheless, according to Woortmann (1990), the small farmer´s ethic considers land, work and the family as moral values and nuclear/structural categories that are closely related to each other, and has honour, hierarchy and reciprocity (solidarity) as its central organising principles". It is based on a moral order with a strong religious inspiration and tends to constitute a traditional ideology opposed to the social order of modernity".[9]

In Marxist theory, the peasantry is considered a residual class, separate from the organic division of labour and from the markets. For Marx, the deepening of socialism, as a transitional mode of

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[2] For example, families who own property (smallholdings and farms), live in towns and have other main activities.

[3] Mosca, João (2017). *Agricultura familiar em Moçambique: ideologias e políticas.*. Revista NERA, Ano 20, nº. 38. UNESP. Brazil.

[4] Marta Inez Medeiros Marques (2000): *A atualidade do uso do conceito de camponês*. University of São Paulo, Department of Geography.

[5] Shanin, Teodor (1979). Campesinos y sociedades campesinas. Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica.

[6] Expression taken from the book translated into Spanish. Classicity can be understood as a class without a defined class position in Marx's terms, as discussed in this text.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

production between capitalism and communism, would lead to the disappearance of the peasantry, to be transformed into workers. For Rosa Luxemburg, the peasantry would remain under capitalism. According to the definitions of Marx and Engels, peasants are/were not a social class "in itself" nor "for itself".[10] For Marx, there are two social classes: the (capitalist) bourgeoisie, i.e. the owners of the means of production, and the proletariat. The former is called the dominant class and the latter the dominated class.

Previously, during the transformation of the feudal mode of production, the peasant was an agricultural labour class (the "serfs"), whose members did not have the status of citizens and had limited mobility and were obliged to pay taxes to the feudal lords. During feudalism, there were peasant revolts due to the harsh conditions of labour and survival, but above all as a result of increases in the amounts to be paid to the feudal lord[11] .

With the development of agriculture and of industrialisation, and above all with the commercialisation of trade due to the discoveries, the peasantry, as it existed during feudalism, tended to shrink or disappear, giving rise to a smaller social group with less economic and political weight, in which the total production of the agricultural sector began to decline having reached, today, less than 10% of GDP and of the population[12].

The bourgeois revolution in France ended on the 18th of Brumaire[13], and led to Napoleon Bonaparte and the bourgeoisie to ascend to power [14]. The "bourgs" (urban settlements of various sizes) emerged, where the liberal merchant class and trade were concentrated, and where the "serfs" sought to emigrate and work (being exploited) for the bourgeois capitalists. In the bourgeois revolution, the peasants are the social base of feudalism and are "regimented" by the bourgeoisie against the aristocracies. After the bourgeois revolution, the peasants continue as a

[10] "Class in itself" is defined on the basis of the place that the individual occupies in the production process. It can also be seen as a category of people who have a relationship with the means of production (land, equipment, productive organization, etc.); and a "class for itself" is a social group that has become aware that its interests are antagonistic to those of the other group. It can also be seen as a social stratum organized in the active pursuit of its own purposes. Summarized and transcribed from https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=classe+social+in+itself%2C+marx. "Class consciousness, for Marx and Engels, is the perception of a given social stratum's own role in the productive system, either as a producer of wealth or as the owner of the means of generating wealth. This perception is built up over time through the class struggle and involves recognizing one's own economic condition, identifying other individuals in the same situation, developing a range of common interests and organizing politically to make the demands of this group viable. For these authors, just as the bourgeoisie had dismantled and replaced feudal society, the proletariat, through class struggle, would dismantle and replace bourgeois society. At https://mundoeducacao.uol.com.br/sociologia/consciencia-de-classe.htm.

[11] For example, in the German-speaking countries of Central Europe (1524-1525) and in England. In 1358, there was a peasant revolt in France. The main peasants´ demands concerned the fight against hunger and poor living conditions, which had been accentuated during the crisis of the 14th century due to the Black Death and the 100 Years War. German is spoken in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Liechtenstein and South Tyrol (Italy), either as a mother language or regularly as a second language.

[12] In France, the largest agricultural power in the European Union, agriculture accounted for 5.6 percent of employment and 3.5 percent of GDP in 2014.

[13] It corresponds to 9 November 1799 in the Gregorian calendar.

[14] That is why it was called the bourgeois revolution by the Girondins, the French upper bourgeois class. It was called a bourgeois revolution because it was fuelled by the bourgeoisie, born out of the development of the mercantile and small craft/manufacturing industries, who considered the privileges and domination of power by the aristocracy to be an obstacle to the development of their businesses.

class without access to power and incapable of organising themselves as a "class in itself" and "for itself", subsequently transforming themselves, in most cases, into proletarians, without ownership of the means of production and initiating a new form of exploitation, in this case capitalist surplus value in the terms set out by Marx.

The concept of the peasant has changed to that of the small farmer[15], a producer of goods for the market, whose aim is to maximise monetary income, who has a more intensive technology in fix capital (inputs and equipment) and who is directly linked to value chains. Abramovay (1992, p.127)[16] argues that, in this reality, "the modern family farmer corresponds to a profession, as opposed to peasantry, which is a way of life. While the peasant has, as a basic feature, partial integration into incomplete markets, lifestyles that differ from those found in cities, the labour force is mostly family members, and production is mainly for family consumption, the modern family farmer represents a type of family production that is totally integrated into the market, without presenting any conflict or contradiction in relation to capitalist development[17]. The author also emphasises the entrepreneurial nature, the technical dynamism and the capacity for innovation as features of the contemporary form of family production".

In many writings, such as those of Mao Zedong and other Marxist parties/leaders or self-proclaimed Marxists, instead of peasantry, "people" is mentioned, not as a theoretical entity, but as a catalyst for an intended unity against the "enemy", especially the "external" one. "People" with the aim of creating the unity of ethnic, racial, religious and other groups around a nation-building project with national identities that relate harmoniously to the specific identities occupying a territory. The instrumentalization of the concept of people arises from the absence of a numerically important proletariat or, if it exists, it does not yet constitute a class "in itself" and "for itself", that is, without a structured and consolidated class consciousness. Liang Qichao emphasised that, in terms of internal affairs, China's political development depended on the strength and cohesion of its people, and that a new people was the basis for a new system, a new government and a new State. In terms of foreign affairs, at a time when nationalism was the foundation of the country, a strong people would be indispensable if China was to use nationalism to resist the powers, especially the USSR.

Karl Kautsky is one of the most prominent Marxist theoreticians, especially of the agrarian transformation, and in his book "The Agrarian Question", one of the mainstays of Marxist theory, during the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, stated that the disappearance of the peasantry would result from the concentration of private property and the transformation of peasants into workers and bourgeois-capitalists. The peasants were referred to pejoratively as "barbarians, ignorant, unintelligent, unstable, disorganised, etc". He considered that the genesis of the capitalist was to be found in the countryside, insofar as surplus labour and production would lead to proletarian employment and industrialisation. For these Marxists, the peasant was unstable, lacking class consciousness and therefore taking circumstantial positions according to the immediate benefits that could fade away at any given moment. Lenin defends interpretations similar to Kautsky's regarding the Marxist theory on the peasantry and the development of capitalism and imperialism. Other aurors, such as Trotsky, Chayanov and Preobazhenky, had

[15] As a result of the reforms and of structural transformation of European economies, it is said that in Europe there are no longer peasants in the economic, political and social sense.

[16] Abramovay, Ricardo (1992). *Paradigmas do capitalismo agrário em questão.* São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Campinas, UNICAMP.

[17] Throughout the text it will be seen that this statement is not confirmed by other authors.

different positions on various aspects and there were strong internal disputes and purges in the Communist Party of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Chayanov (1974) concentrates on the rationalities and logics of the productive and consumption options of the family unit, as a productive (economic) and social unit, comparing peasants living in "traditional" contexts with those living in "modern" contexts, in order to ensure the reproduction of the family. "What differentiates the peasant unit from the capitalist enterprise is that the former accumulates capital resources to guarantee the social reproduction of the family, being this factor the reason for its existence; the latter, on the other hand, assumes the centrality of profit as the foundation of the decision-making rationality of its components. Therefore, unlike enterprises that accumulate to maximise profit, the peasant unit accumulates to make family social reproduction more efficient (...). In any case, the farmer, producer or family unit have the family at the centre of production decisions, and its evolution, capacities and needs.

These contributions have been conceptualised in what is known as the "Asian mode of production". C.E.R.M´s book describes this mode of production, integrating historical, cultural and economic aspects and "modernity", questioning the succession of the five modes of production, it considers dogmatic. In relation to the African mode of production, the same book also rejects the five phases, pointing out that in vast areas of Africa, social organization was previously based on what it calls "primitive community" and "tribal society" or "patriarchal tribe", where subsistence, based on hunting and gathering ("collecting"), did not allow for individual/private accumulation. It was the head of the clan (patriarch or head of the family) who distributed subsistence goods and land to family members and members of the village/communities. In both the African and Asian cases, the C.E.R.M. refutes the feudal mode of production, advocating an immediate transition to capitalism or, in other cases, the transition from feudalism to socialism, as advocated by Mao Zedong and Chinese authors and scholars of the Chinese process. These theories on the mode of production and the stages of evolution of societies are not consensual due to the sequential dynamics and non-overlapping characteristics that develop over time (between modes of production) and because they are often impregnated with political assumptions (prejudices), such as "savage peoples", without culture, "barbarians", among other adjectives.

The idea of the individualist small farmer is countered by other authors[18], stating that "small farmer sociability is adverse to individualism. On the contrary, solidarity, participation and social redistribution are practices of a socialisation that is culturally native to the Being small farmer. Solidarity within the family and wider social spheres manifests itself above all in moments of family or individual crisis, which contradicts the individualistic character attributed to the small farmer. Small farmers have economic and social reproduction rationalities and strategies for defending their interests and integrating or resisting capital.

Even with the modernisation of the means of communication, transport and production, the adoption of contemporary proposals and technologies is done with a critical eye that does not deny the small farmer´s way of being and living, which is full of its own culture and originality. If there are traces of individualism in the contemporary small farmer, this already denotes the adoption of liberal-bourgeois values in the production process, in the housework[19] and in their aspirations and desires. Those values introduce the bourgeois central idea of profit maximisation,

[18] Carvalho, Horácio Martins de (2013). *O camponês, guardião da agro-biodiversidade*. Biodiversidade LA. Curitiba..

[19] In this case, the expression "housework" can be interpreted as "domestic chores".

immediacy, exploitation of their fellow human beings and of nature".[20] Basically, the idea of being the guardian of biodiversity and of nature comes from sustainable production practices and the use of the territory as a whole (soil, water, forests, mines, public and private/family/individual infrastructures) as a way of ensuring life in the countryside within the framework of the reproduction of social and power relations, albeit with varying levels of differentiation.

Many theorists refer to the different conceptions of the peasantry according to the contexts and realities of the development of societies, mainly what Marx defines as feudalism, capitalism and socialism/communism, pre-colonial and colonial societies, as well as what is known as the Asian mode of production. In essence, the debate centres on the revolutionary character of the peasantry and its positions and role in revolutionary processes and liberation struggles, and above all on the evolution of societies according to the five stages (modes of production) of Marxist theory.

For Shanin (2005), "we are faced not with a differentiation and proletarianization of the majority, but with a process of *pauperisation* expressed in the phenomenon of the 'surplus population', 'rural underemployment', the 'culture of poverty', slums, etc. What is produced is not an "industrial reserve army", because no one should call on these reserves in the decades to come. Nor are they 'deviants', 'marginal', or any other word that implies exceptionality, because the social group to which it refers is central and constant in such a society.**"** [21]

Bernardo Fernandes[22] sees territory as a space of disputes and of production of different social relations. He does not refer just to the State´s physical space[23]. For this author, the small farmer has a different social profile from that of the capitalist and the wage-earner. This author emphasised that the small farmer recreates the concept of territory, shifting its sense of ownership to a space that is a condition of his own existence. Unlike agribusiness, which seeks territory for the production of *commodities* such as soya, cowpeas, sugar cane and oranges. "This difference of interests creates a huge field of conflict." For him, public development policies can minimise this. Jaime Coronado, Professor in the Department of Iberian and Latin American Studies at the University of Guadalajara (Mexico), said that "Latin American integration and the transformation of land into a *commodity* contributes to the destruction of indigenous territory". Carolina Pedroso, researcher at IEEI/UNESP, presented the concept of well-living, which comes from the Andean vision of promoting harmony between man and nature, respecting natural cycles.[24] The coordinator of the Defence and Security Studies Group (GEDES-UNESP), Héctor Saint-Pierre,

[20] https://www.biodiversidadla.org/Documentos/O_campones_guardiao_da_agrobiodiversidade.

[21] Shanin, Teodor (2005). *A definição de camponês: conceituações e desconceituações – o velho e o novo em uma discussão marxista*. Revista NERA Ano 8, n. 7. Em Paulo Ribeiro da Cunha *O campesinato* (2005), *A teoria da organização e a questão agrária: apontamentos para uma reflexão* Revista NERA, ano 8, n..

[22] State University of São Paulo, this author being very close to or linked to the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil. Geographer.

[23] State, referring to the administrative division of Brazil.

[24] Synthesis of https://www2.unesp.br/portal#!/. For peasants and indigenous people, territory is a space of existence. Sovereignty and Territoriality debated at UNESP seminar.

pointed out that social and indigenous movements are important players, but lack international representation. [25]

The transformation/differentiation of the farming is considered, in most cases, to be the result of the different forms of capital penetration, through the commodification (money, capital factor and land) of surpluses and of wage labour (labour factor), and the ownership and use of land (land factor). A change in one of the three factors of production causes changes in the productive structure, in the social relations of production (mode of production), and it is necessary to clarify the boundaries between the modes of production or evolutionary stages of societies (for the case of the advocates of the Asian and the African modes of production).

For FAO[26] , the management of the family property/farm is shared by the family and agri-livestock production is the main source of income. In addition, the family farmer has a particular relationship with the land, his place of work and home. Productive diversity is also a marked characteristic of this sector".[27] These aspects correspond to the farmers' strategies of integration and/or resistance in the evolution of the economy and societies, even though, for FAO, there is a conception of small farmer rather isolated from his contexts, as a preserver of his production systems, culture and ways of life.

The instrumentalization of concept of family farming in very diverse in each country. FAO and INCRA[28] (1996) delimit the universe of family farming in Brazil on the basis of four factors: "a) the work is managed by the producer; b) do not carry out contract work[29] ; c) have no permanent employees and have an average number of temporary employees of less than or equal to four, or one permanent employee and an average number of temporary employees of less than or equal to three; d) have a total area of less than or equal to five hundred hectares for the Southeast and South regions, and one thousand hectares for other regions"[30] . In Mozambique, a family sector/small producer is one that cultivates less than 10 hectares of rainfed land or 5 hectares of irrigated land, has less than 10 head of cattle, less than 50 sheep, goats and pigs, less than 5,000 birds and less than 149 different trees. In Mozambique, farms with more than 50 hectares are considered large farms (producers) - 10% of the family farmer limit in Brazil. 'It is easy to see the great difference in criteria depending on the context, which necessarily implies a great lack of definition of the same concept.

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[25] Saint-Pierre's statement about indigenous farming in South America does not correspond to the evolution of organic farming in Europe. For example, in Spain, 10 per cent of the country's agricultural area is already organic (in 2021) and will exceed 2.4 million hectares in 2020. The European Green Pact aims to allocate 25% of agricultural land to organic production by 2030. https://www.agrolink.com.br/noticias/html, closed on 27/4/2022. The lack of representativeness may be debatable, depending on what is meant by representativeness.

[26] https://www.fao.org/family-farming/detail/es/c/454156/, accessed on 26 April 2022.

[27] "There are more than 500 million family farms in the world and, in addition to producing 80 per cent of the world's food, many of them can and do play key roles in preserving biodiversity and represent the first step towards rural transformation ... The multiple income and livelihood strategies generated by family farming play a critical role in agri-food systems." https://portalods.com.br/noticias/plataforma-para-agricultura-familiar/. Accessed 26 April 2022.

[28] *National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform.*

[29] Services provided by third parties (outside the family), such as labour (more than 50% of working hours, mechanisation, spraying, marketing, selling inputs, etc.)

[30] Feitosa, Antônio Maurílio Alencar (2011). *Agronegócio. A Agricultura e a Agricultura Familiar.* Universidade de Montes Claros. Unimontes. Brasil..

As a result of historical, political, economic and social contexts, with constantly changing dynamics in the evolutionary processes of societies and capital, there are no clear boundaries as to what the small farmer is and the transitions to the family sector, small commodity producer, semi-wage labourer/proletarian.

The question arises as to whether the small farmer being a "guardian" of nature is the result of the need to preserve and reproduce itself in the long term, as a political, social and economic unit, assuming there is no integration into the market and/or occupation in other economic and social activities. The production techniques, taking into account the means of production available, preserve the soil, the environment and produce healthy food, because food is produced without machines or agro-chemicals, and not contributing to the pollution of land, water and air.

The small farmer ceases to be the "guardian of nature", of the seeds, of the forest, etc.[31] when he leaves his "traditional" living environment (a space inhabited intergenerationally by families, clans, ethnic groups...), usually due to forced reasons (resettlements, conflicts, penetration by capital, whether agrarian, commercial, industrial, tourist, etc.). Sometimes small farmer moves or are removed, from the natural environment, with which he has material, productive, spiritual and symbolic relationships that shape feelings of belonging to the space and the need to ensure the survival of future generations. When this happens, the small farmer goes from "guardian" to aggressor. He disputes/conflicts over the occupation of land[32] , deforests in order to open up new agricultural fields and obtain income from forestry products, practises artisanal mining, works as employee in environmentally damaging and extractive companies, among other activities that remove him from the category of "small farmer" in its broad sense.

Since land and labour are relatively fix (rigid) factors, increasing productivity only happens with changes in production systems (e.g. crop rotation) and the use of local materials for soil conservation (manure, tree leaves, etc.), the possibilities of which to increase production end up being limited and uncompetitive. This limitation is only possible when there is an almost absolute maintenance of autarchism[33]. Increasing production by integrating into the market implies changing production systems and the inclusion of capital factors. For these reasons, agro-ecology and food sovereignty are, above all, anti-system philosophies, which imply small farmers´ resistance to the penetration of capital, changes in lifestyles and the rejection of authorities and institutions (the State)

To summarise, the different approaches to the concept of small farmer are based on it being a socio-economic unit, based on production mainly for self-consumption, with various, multifaceted degrees of relations with the market in a condition of subalternity in relation to capital. The concept includes the different social and power relations within the family and with society (primarily within communities, clan and tribal-patriarchal systems considering autarchism (localism), relations and factors of reproduction), the diversity of relations with nature, seeking to derive part of the means of life from it in a sustainable or predatory way. An extensive debate

[31] The literature gives these names depending on the focus of the texts.

[32] Mandamule (2020) verified the existence of conflicts between native families and migrants in the district of Nhamatanda. Mandamule, Uacitissa (2020). *Senhor, passar para onde?" Estrutura fundiária e mapeamento de conflitos de terra no distrito de Nhamatanda*. Observador Rural, Nº 86. Observatório do Meio Rural..

[33] Autarchism is a concept used at various levels and is even a political philosophy close to anarchism. In this case, the autarchism of rural communities is used in the sense of their conscious/resistant isolation from political systems, with the ability to produce and consume what their families need and with ways of life of self-reproduction of customs.

persists on whether the small farmer is a social class "in itself" and "for itself", seeking to study its contribution to the different processes of production and social transformation, and its revolutionary/conservative stance. The great differences in the instrumentalization of the concept of small farmer in terms of the delimitation of productive activity have diluted the concept itself, subjecting it to diverse criticisms.

There is no consensus on whether small farmers constitute a social class within Marxist theory, their role in different types of revolution, nationalist struggles and movements demanding rights and, depending on the context, the processes of integration into and resistance to the market as a surplus producer or wage earner, in their relations with nature and individual and groups (clan, ethnicity, etc.) ways of life and of power, nor on the processes of transition from peasantry to other forms of integration and resistance to capital, in their various manifestations.

Ecology and food security

Ecological agriculture is a concept similar to conservation agriculture, whose main characteristics are diversified organic farming, "products are grown with the aim of guaranteeing environmental balance, especially of the soil. To do this, it uses low environmental impact techniques with a focus on sustainability and the conservation of natural resources." One objective of organic farming is to guarantee the quality of food, ensuring the health of consumers and eliminating the impacts of rural production. "Another objective is to preserve or improve biodiversity, strengthen rural livelihoods and develop agriculture in a sustainable way, producing in harmony with nature, taking environmental services into account. Agro-ecology is the development of sustainable agriculture, using practices that include cultural, political, social, environmental and energy issues, among others, optimising crops and agro-ecosystems. There are studies[34], which encompass various areas of knowledge, including taking into account popular and traditional knowledge, with the aim of reducing the damage caused to nature by the practice of monocultures, transgenics, agro-toxins and mineral fertilisers." [35]

There is a growing environmental movement that is gaining market share, still on a small scale, not only because of production volumes, but also because of productivity/profitability, and also because prices to consumers are generally higher than non-ecological, similar products. These factors may suggest that it is the conscious middle and upper classes who consume these goods and are part of environmentalist and ecologist movements. There are important studies of a political nature on social classes, within the framework of the new democratic or left-wing movements involved in ecological agriculture, about massification in the agri-food system (from production to distribution) of technological innovations that enable greater productivity and scale of production, and the structures of alternative markets ("fair trade/price" movements[36]) and food education.

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[34] See, for example, Altieri, Miguel (1998). *Agroecologia A dinâmica produtiva da agricultura sustentável*, Chambers R. (1983). R. *Rural development: putting the last first*. London: Longman e Toledo, V. M.; Cararbias, J.; Mapes, C.; Toledo (1985). C. *Ecologia y autosuficiencia alimentaria. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno*.

[35] https://www.infoescola.com/ecologia/ecoagricultura/

[36] "Fair trade is a practice that emerged in the 1960s in Western Europe with the aim of implementing more egalitarian relations in favour of disadvantaged producers in the South. Since then, associations, shops, federations of producer co-operatives and private companies have all joined the movement. The main objective of the fair trade movement is to guarantee small agricultural producers and artisans more direct access to the market for their products, under fairer and more equitable conditions." (Cary, Paul /S/ date).

In Europe, under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), what is known as organic farming is emerging, which encourages the "responsible management of production factors such as pesticides and fertilisers" (author's quotes). To ensure or incentivise these practices, the CAP contains a set of measures and incentives. These "environmentally friendly" CAP measures seek to integrate the transition. In addition to the above-mentioned objectives, the EU wants to reduce the effects of the capital-intensive, non-inclusive, productivist CAP model, which has led to the human desertification of large territories of Europe, high emissions of toxic gases and soil, water and air pollution. It was this productivist agriculture that made the EU fight the post-World War II famine and become the second largest food producer. The EU's ecological agriculture is based on a technological perspective (environmentally sensitive or respectful) and is different from the original concept of organic farming. The former presupposes non-aggression against the environment, biodiversity and natural reproduction, while the latter even allows for environmental aggression up to certain limits or accompanied by corrective measures.

However, environmentalism, which is both a form of production and a way of life, faces the dilemma between being a conscious manifestation of anti- capital penetration and absorption by capital, transforming ecological production systems and logics.

Proponents of agro-ecology are also trying to resist to the agri-food system value chains (agri-business, large-scale distribution and fast food), which impose quality, standardised product presentation, regularity of supply and are dominated by multinationals.

> "Food sovereignty is a different concept from food security. The concepts of food security and food sovereignty are opposed in that the first concept is the need to guarantee access to quality food (that meets nutritional needs), while food sovereignty is closely linked to issues of economic and political sovereignty, as the guarantee that a people can produce food in their own way and of their own choosing without depending on external powers.
> (...)
> "Food sovereignty is thus a concept that is a clear alternative to the concept of food security, because food security says nothing about the terms and conditions under which food is produced, and, in this concept, it is vital to know what food is produced, who grows it, where and how this food is produced, the scale of food production, as well as the environmental and health impacts of food production (Patel 2009).[37] (...) Food security says nothing about the unequal structures and policies that have destroyed livelihoods and the environment and thus produced food that may be unhealthy and environmentally harmful. In contrast, food sovereignty offers an alternative idea to the further vertical integration of agriculture and its domination by global agri-food transnationals, which is seen by many advocates as a way to exploit small farmers and workers. and to concentrate and exert economic and political power in an undemocratic way. Instead, food sovereignty advocates argue that the food system needs to be based on decentralised agriculture, where production, processing, distribution and consumption are controlled by people and their communities. In this way, food sovereignty offers a vision of an alternative food system, and this vision has become, in less than 20 years, a global movement''.[38]

"Comércio justo e a reinscrição da economia: as dimensões políticas do comércio justo ". *Estudos de Sociologia*, da UFPE, Vol. 10, N. 1,2, p. 107- 122.

[37] Patel, R. (2009) 'What does food sovereignty look like?', *Journal of Peasant Studies* 36 (3): 663-706.

[38] Akram-Lodhi Haroon (2013). *How to Build Food Sovereignty. Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue*. International Conference. Yale University. September 2013.

In the context of the political aspects of the concepts, current social movements related to the environment, animals, food, sexual choices and others, all have legitimacy in terms of identity and the defence of rights and freedoms; however, in Marxist terms and the division of society into classes, these movements segment what could be the disadvantaged classes or subordinate them to capitalist systems and to authoritarian or one-party democracy regimes. If this is the case, these movements, in terms of the political transformation of regimes, end up being functional with the dominant "establishment" rather than provoking ruptures in political systems and regimes and modes of production. It could even be considered that these movements are more representative of the middle classes and petty bourgeoisies, thus distancing them from their supposedly natural revolutionary character.

At the risk of repeating what has been said in previous paragraphs, Abbas *et al.* (2022) summarise the concept of food sovereignty as follows: "Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agricultural systems. Food sovereignty puts the aspirations and needs of those who produce, distribute and consume food at the centre of food policies and systems, rather than the demands of international markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of future generations. It offers a strategy for resisting and dismantling the corporate food and trade regime, and guidelines for food, agricultural, pastoral and fisheries systems to be determined by local and national producers and consumers. Food sovereignty prioritises local and national economies and markets, and empowers small farmers and family producers - agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralism - and promotes the production, distribution and consumption of food based on environmental, social and economic sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees fair incomes for all peoples, as well as the right of consumers to control their food and nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage land, territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are held by those who produce the food and are protected by States. Food sovereignty implies new social relations free from oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic classes and generations (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007)".[39]

For agro-ecologists, from a long-term perspective, the small farmer establishes relationships of balance with nature, maintaining sustainability and ecological diversity as a condition for reproducing the natural conditions for survival. These equilibriums are disrupted by the penetration of capital, mainly through land occupation, wage-earning and the modernisation of agriculture, which mainly takes place in the most economically competitive family units or by extending the agricultural frontier[40] . Silva said that the extension into new agricultural areas implies the reduction of forest, savannah and other forms of soil cover, and is carried out by the expansion of agrarian capitalism, crossing borders of two or more countries, or by poor small farmers in search of land for survival.

However, small farmers have an opportunistic and utilitarian relationship with nature, in the sense of simultaneously extracting and conserving ecosystems in contexts of equilibrium. This duality (extraction and conservation) can be altered in situations of imbalance (economic crisis, poverty,

[39] Máriam Abbas, Boaventura Monjane, Isidro Macaringue, Mateus Costa Santos, René Machoco, Vanessa Cabanelas (2022)SISTEMAS ALIMENTARES EM MOÇAMBIQUE: Rumo a uma Política Alimentar Nacional. AFSA, Alternativa, JA, SEA, OMR e UNAC. Edição do OMR.

[40] Silva, José Graciano da (1982): *A Modernização Dolorosa. Estrutura Agrária, Fronteira Agrícola e Trabalhadores Rurais no Brasil.* Rio de Janeiro, Zahar Editores.

conflicts, forced migration, etc.) and small farmers can turn from "guardians" into aggressors of nature. In these circumstances, the small farmer extracts resources for survival, such as deforestation for the commercialisation of forest products, overexploitation of the land, mining activities, among others.

1.3 SMALL FARMERS AND REVOLUTIONS

For Wolf (1984)[41] , the "small farmer will never stop fighting fiercely to stay on the land, even though it is doubly threatened by the pressures of commercialisation from above and the prospects of misery from below". This aspect underpins the Marxist position of considering the "fickle" nature of the farming, and therefore considering them, in class language, as petty-bourgeois.

In the socialist/communist systems, which began in the former Soviet Union, the *kulak*[42] was a class of wealthy farmers, latifundia who owned private land and hired paid labour, and were therefore considered to be the rural bourgeoisie, opposed to the socialisation of the countryside and of the means of production, and to the revolution. "The farmer *kulaks* were the result of the Stolypin reform introduced in 1906 to create a group of prosperous farmers who would support the Tsars government. Later, in the 1930s, the *kulaks* were targeted by Joseph Stalin's policies of collectivisation of the countryside, who believed that they were the last bastion of capitalism in the countryside."[43] There was severe repression of the *kulaks* in order to eliminate them as private farmers, also known as the process of "*deskulakisation*"[44].

Peasants played an important role in the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917, as soldiers and in revolts in urban centres (such as the revolt against feudal serfdom). Previously, the peasants had led several rebellions[45] and always had radical (revolutionary) attitudes, as Wolf (1984, digital version[46]) notes. However, after the Bolshevik victory, Lenin stated: "It will take tens of thousands

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[41] Wolf, Erik R. (1984). Guerras camponesas no século XX. Global Editora, São Paulo. Em Cunha, Ob. citada, pp. 80..

[42] In May 1929, a decree formalised the notion of the '*kulak* family', according to which any of the following criteria defined a person as a *kulak*.

- Use of hired labour.
- Ownership of a mill, ... butter-making machine, other processing equipment or a complex machine with a motor.
- Systematic renting of agricultural equipment or installations.
- Involvement in trading, money loaning, commercial brokerage or "other sources of non-labour income". At https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/cúlaque. On 21/04/2022.

The *Kulaks* were therefore subjected to "deskulakisation", being sent to inhospitable regions whose land was extremely unproductive, which led to the deaths of 6 million peasants, according to Aleksander Soljenitsin. Official Soviet sources estimate the number of victims at 700,000.

[43] Ibid.

[44]The solution to annul the economic and political influence of the *kulaks*' anti-collectivisation of agriculture was "to transfer them to inferior lands far from where they lived or to arrest them and send them to forced labour camps. This process of attacking the *kulaks* came to be known as 'deskulakisation' and resulted in some 2.5 million people being targeted by the Soviet State in 1933 alone." At https://mundoeducacao.uol.com.br/historiageral/revolucao-russagoverno-stalin.htm. Ceased 27/4/2022.

[45] For example, the Pugatchev Rebellion (1773-1775), in which thousands of peasants took part, was only defeated by the Tsarist army after much fighting.

[46] Wolf, Erik. As guerras camponesas do século XX. Editora Global, 1984 [digital version, São Paulo.

of advanced, temperate proletarians, sufficiently conscious to explain things to the millions of poor people in every part of the country and to stand at the head of these millions; sufficiently firm to drive away and ruthlessly shoot anyone who 'allows himself to be seduced' - it happens - by the seductions of speculation and turns from a fighter for the people's cause into a plunderer; firm and faithful enough to the revolution to bear the full weight of the campaign in every corner of the country to establish order, to strengthen the local organs of Soviet power, to watch over every *pud* of wheat and every *pud* of fuel locally. (Lenin, 1978)[47]. In short, the Russian peasantry was "useful" or instrumentalised by the "workers' vanguard" and afterwards there was a phase of marginalisation of the countryside and the peasants[48].

Mao Zedong, in the specifics of Chinese society, reinforced the idea that the peasantry was the main support force, as it was the majority of the social composition in that country, where the working class and intellectuals had a residual importance[49]. However, possibly in an instrumental change to this concept, due to China's demographic weight and class structure, this view was altered by Mao himself, when he said: "It is necessary to immediately rectify all comments about the small farmer movement and correct, as soon as possible, the erroneous measures that the revolutionary authorities took in relation to it..."[50]. Mao declared and realised the constitution of the People's Liberation Army, made up mostly of small farmers[51]. During the Chinese civil war (1946-1949), the Communist forces were stronger in the countryside, while the Kuomitang forces[52] were stronger in the cities. Mao established the strategy of encircling the cities as a way of destabilising the Kuomitang forces and thus penetrating, both militarily and politically, what the Chinese Communists considered to be the bastion of the reactionaries.

Tanzania and Ethiopia (1974) opted for the "villagization" of small farmers under authoritarian and centralised regimes that forced small farmers to come together, with the main objectives of

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[47] Vladimir I. Lenin (1978). Os Bolcheviques devem tomar o Poder. Obras Escolhidas em Três Tomos. Edições Avante.

[48] The repression and control of prices and the obligation to hand over a large part of the peasants' production to the State ("compulsory requisition") resulted in a long period of famine, with an estimated 6 to 8 million deaths. https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-d&q=fome+uni%C3%A3o+sovi%C3%A9tica. The famine resulted from a succession of events, such as a major drought and World War II.

[49] At a certain point, Mao Zedong showed a certain resistance to the small farmers´ incorporation as a class capable of undertaking a revolutionary project, especially because of its petty-bourgeois character; an aspect that has always permeated some Marxist theoretical currents.

[50] Tsé-Tung, Mao (1985). *Política*. Organização de Eder Sader. São Paulo: Ática. Em Paulo Ribeiro da Cunha (2005), O campesinato, *A teoria da organização e a questão agrária: apontamentos para uma reflexão.* Revista NERA, ano 8, n.7.

[51] "Hunger, brutal exploitation and repression of small farmers, that joined the movements of revolt and uprising, gave rise to an unsustainable situation, which transformed the countryside of China's interior provinces into a markedly violent environment." - See more at https://educacao.uol.com.br/disciplinas/historia/china-republicana-2-camponeses-abrem-caminho-para-a-revolucao.htm?cmpid=copiaecola.

[52] The Kuomitang was the republican movement led by the Nationalist Party of China. The party was led by the military man Chiang Kai-shek, who tried at all costs to unify China by forming a national government. In order to achieve this, the republicans who made up the Kuomitang fought tirelessly against the communists and the "warlords" (which was the name given to the landowners who had formed regional armies to maintain political and economic control in their respective territorial domains) - See more at https://educacao.uol.com.br/disciplinas/historia/china-republicana-1-chiang-kai-shek-e-o-dominio-do-kuomintang.htm?cmpid=copiaecola.

collectivisation (keeping individual plots) and the introduction of technification to increase production and facilitate the provision of public services. The villages were also a way of socially, politically and ideologically controlling the population and of reinforcing the instituted authorities, eliminating the powers of the "traditional" local structures and the consequent penetration of the influence of the existing authorities. The villages were, in a way, an approximation to the Chinese communes, including the discourse of "people" (rather than the classic Marxist class approach), in an attempt to create national "unity" (proto-nationalist discourse) and defence against enemies (internal and external).

2. THE PEASANTRY IN MOZAMBIQUE: A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE

2.1 Introduction

This section seeks to discuss the forms of colonisation in their components of political-administrative and economic occupation, with an emphasis on the rural environment, and how the processes of transformation (integration, resistance and absorption) of small farmers/small producers were carried out as a result of political-administrative occupation and the penetration of different forms of capital, considering the historical contexts. This work focuses on the period from the mid-19th century onwards and fits in with the restructuring and transformation of the Portuguese economy, especially after the establishment of the Estado Novo in 1933 and, then after the mid-20th century, with the growth of capitalism in Portugal[53] and Salazar's economic nationalism and the intensification of the production of goods for industrialisation in Portugal. The regional context of relations with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia is also considered, especially with regard to emigration from the South and Centre, respectively. Considering the forms of colonisation, the political regimes, the actions of capital and, on the other hand, the resistance, contestation and integration of small farmers within the framework of economic and agrarian policies, the following periods were adopted: From the beginnings of colonisation until the Berlin Conference (late 19th century), then until 1930 of the 20th century, immediately after the establishment of the Estado Novo in Portugal, followed by the period of what can be called late colonialism, (derived from the process of industrialisation in Portugal and its stage of late capitalism), when important political and economic reforms and the national liberation struggle took place. This was followed by the "socialist" period and ended with the liberalisation of the economy.

[53] It is called late because it involved more intensive economic colonisation in the colonies, characterised by political and economic reforms in the colonies to respond to the growth in Portugal. Mosca, João (2007): " Salazar e a Política Económica do Estado Novo ". *Lusíada. História*, Série II, Número 4, pp. 339-364. In summary, he argues that the development of capitalism in Portugal, driven by the textile, naval and other industrial sectors, restructured economic policy and social hierarchies. The landowners of the Alentejo lost political influence in favour of the new industrial and banking elite. Industrial growth in Portugal demanded more raw materials, thus forcing a greater intensification of capital in the colonies.

2.2 The beginning of colonisation: the processes of small farmers disintegration

The *Prazos da Coroa* between the 17th and 19th centuries, and thenafter the majestic companies[54] and lessees, were the result of Portugal's economic inability to occupy and colonise its colonial territories. From the end of the 19th century, the *Prazos da Coroa* ceased to exist, and the majestic companies were given large tracts of territory in Niassa, Zambézia, Tete and Sofala, which remained in force until 1930[55]. The *Prazos* were assigned to Portuguese vassals (from the metropolis) or of Goan origin[56] (the majority), who controlled the respective areas through alliances with local ethnic leaders, possessing militarised people (the "*achicunda*" or *chicundas*, plural of "*chicunda*"), known as "slave hunters"[57], initially led by citizens of the colony of Goa who, as the name suggests, forced people from other areas of Zambézia, Sofala, Tete and along the Zambezi River to work in agriculture, public and military works, establishing a slavery/feudal relationship in functional combination, through alliances with some local organisations/hierarchies. Slavery did not only occur in the relationship between settler and the local population. According to Capela, local chiefs practised and traded in slaves.

In reality, "Zambézia, as well as most of Mozambique, was conquered by Africans paid by Portuguese and Goans[58]. There was a "complicated and centuries-old game of alliances with some of the local ruling classes in exchange for different products[59], depending on the historical phases, and as long as the relationship with the merchants represented an increase in power and military strength for the local ruling classes". [60]

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[54] The majestic companies resulted from the *prazos*. However, they were essentially made up of non-Portuguese capital. Leite presents a summary of the three companies (Mozambique, Zambézia and Niassa) in Leite, Joana Pereira (2000): "A Formação da Economia Colonial em Moçambique. Pacto Colonial e Industrialização: Do Colonialismo Português às Redes Informais de Submissão Mercantil, 1930-74". Em *Estudos de Desenvolvimento. África em Transição*. UTL, ISEG, CEsA. TRINOVA, pp. 39-51.
From the end of the 19th century, three companies were set up: Mozambique, Zambézia and Niassa, covering, respectively, the territories of the current provinces of Manica, Sofala and Tete, of Zambézia and of the provinces of Nampula, Niassa and Cabo Delgado. Around two thirds of Mozambique's territory fell under the sovereignty of these companies. For a more detailed reading, see Mosca, João (2005).). *Economia de Moçambique, século XX*. Editora Piaget. Lisboa..
The southern part of the country came under the direct administration of the colonial State, which introduced important nuances into the structuring of Mozambique's economy.

[55] Cross, Michael (1994): "O Capitalismo colonial e a força de trabalho. A economia política nas plantações de chá do Norte de Moçambique 1930-1975". *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*, Nos 16 e 17, pp. 131-154..

[56] The land was granted "to a female European[56] , married to a European settler, with the obligation for the couple to live on it and cultivate it". Capela, José (1995): *Mistresses, Lords and Slaves*. Porto: Afrontamento. There is a debate about the concept of *Prazo* between Alexandre Lobato and Allen Isaacman, which Capela tries to interpret in the work cited.

[57] Historians are unanimous in their view that the slave trade predates the Portuguese presence. Merchants from other colonial powers and Arabs were already engaged in this activity. There were also production relationships within and between ethnic groups that could be categorised as slave trade.

[58] Capela, José (1991): "O apriorismo ideológico na história de Moçambique". Em *Moçambique, 16 anos de Historiografia*. Maputo, colecção Painel Moçambicano, pp.73-78.

[59] "Consumer goods, gunpowder and firearms were the main commodities used in the exchange for slaves, naturally all contrabanded", Capela (1993). CAPELA, José (1993): *O Escravismo Colonial em Moçambique*. Oporto: Afrontamento.

[60] On this point, Capela (cited work) is clear: "... And the resistance was often not to this occupation, but to the stripping away of class privileges. When the occupation respected the privileges of the dominant class or segment, it benefited from their collaboration. The resistance was not nationalist. It was class-based.

In addition to the political occupation ("sovereignty"), the *prazos* were economically based on the production and acquisition of agricultural goods and the Monomotapa gold trade, which was commercialised in the Zambezi River valley, especially in the present-day city of Tete and the town of Sena and reached the port of Quelimane by river. Ivory and gold[61] were also traded in southern Mozambique, from the Monomotapa and also at the border (now Manica province).[62] Colonial disputes took place in the territories of the *prazos*: "In 1890, in the valley of the River Chire, against the "*macololo*", the campaign is launched that would provoke the British *Ultimatum* to Portugal [45]. By *macololo* they meant people upstream of the River Ruo who were said to be descendants of Livingstone's companions who had settled there in the middle of the century"[63] .

Many *prazeiros* married or got married to local ladies, who consequently assumed powers greater than those of the local population, due to their relationship with the *prazeiro*, whether Portuguese or Goan. Ladies were also given *prazos*, initially Goan women, who owned land of the *prazos*[64].

In the context of this study, it can be seen that the *prazos* introduced important transformations or accelerations in the integration of the population, mainly small farmers and small subsistence producers, into the markets: (1) the arrival and establishment of a system of territorial governance with land occupation and expropriation, supported by local elites who organised or recruited the "*achicundas*" for labour and slave trade, both in agriculture and in the defence of the *prazos*, forming private armies; (2) the colonisation established alliances with the local elites - the *régulos* (traditional leaders), exploiting the conflicts between them, in this case as a result of slaves flight, mainly due to natural disasters and famines, who became raiders[65] ; (3) the start of colonial exploitation was not based on agriculture, but on the extraction of natural resources (minerals and wildlife - ivory) and service sectors related to traffic; (4) the delayed development of the Portuguese economy, which based its occupation on Goan settlers through family farming (*prazos* granted to women as a way of attracting settlers) and through miscenaginization; (5) the development of societies based on multiple economic, social and racial/ethnic relations, albeit

[61] "These metals, gold in particular, were exchanged through trade with the Arabs (until the beginning of the 16th century), for cotton, silk, beads, small pearls, porcelain, medicinal drugs, perfumes, etc (...). (...) However, it was not the German community that carried out these exchanges, but a specialised caste - the merchants - often employees of a vassal King or the Monomotapa, who travelled to the coastal places where the Arabs were: Mogadishu, Melinde, Mombasa, Kilova, Ilha de Moçambique (city), Angoxe and Sofala. (...). The Empire's gold came mainly through Sofala.
It seems that the purpose of this work in the mines was the exchange, since the gold was channelled essentially for export in order to obtain, above all, prestige goods." In Orta, José A. (1988). *O Império Zimbabwe-Monomotapa. Breve caracterização de uma sociedade tributária africana*. Análise Psicológica. Lisboa.

[62] "The lords of the *prazos* did not have the cultivation of the land as their main source of income, but rather trade, gold digging or mining and transport on the Zambezi." In *Como as aringas de Moçambique se transformaram em quilombos*, by José Capela, accessed on 14/6/2022.

[63] Capela, work cited.

[64] Land parcelled out, usually for three lifetimes and passed down from parents to children, and, in some cases, with a preference for granting land to women as a way of attracting settlers by marrying such endowed women in Mozambique, like Goa .

[65] There were also conflicts due to invasions of territories occupied by different ethnic groups, such as the invasions of Gungunhana and of the Barué empire. The slaves resisted colonisation in various battles to defend their fortified points. "The collection of the hut tax and other factors provoked constant revolts in Zambézia in the last decades of the 1800s. Slaves and settlers organised themselves into bands that ravaged the territory." Capela, work cited.

with obvious economic and political differentiations, based on the possession of contemporary factors of production and wealth.

To summarise, it can be said that the *prazos* system had an extractivist economic base with production relations that combined slave and feudal characteristics. These characteristics were mixed with those derived from military and clan clashes between native peoples[66] , aggravated by occupations and internal military struggles and various forms of resistance, and in situations of instability caused by forced migrations, due to climatic shocks that led to conflicts between emigrants and residents, and between *prazos*. From the beginning of colonisation, there were the first manifestations of protest in various forms by the *prazeiros* against the Crown's decisions, for example and above all, regarding the payment of taxes. The acceleration of trade and the introduction of agriculture, miscegenation and alliances with local rulers and kingdoms, gradually altered local social and political structures and the wage-earning or compulsory extraction of labour, introduced changes in local economies and a disruption with absorption and/or resistance of ways of life, production and social organization.

From a long-term perspective, the extractivist nature of the economy and the political and military equilibriums (alliances and conflicts), both internal and external, and climate shocks, have continued to this day. Other political and economic characteristics, especially those relating to the subject of this article, have subsequently undergone more profound transformations, which will be discussed in sections that follow.

In the 20th century, the contradictions between the development of the colonies and the metropolitan impositions[67] began to emerge, for example, in a division of labour between Portugal and the colonies, miners' contracts for South Africa and payment for their work in gold to Lisbon, and restrictions on foreign trade with third countries[68]. With the new economic policy of the Estado Novo (above all with the Development Plan III - 1968-1973), there was some openness to the entry of foreign capital, above all for investment in infrastructure. The economic opening was largely due to international pressure and the independence movements in Africa. In addition, the rapid growth of the economy in the 1960s required staff and technicians in public administration and companies that Portugal did not have. Domestic policy measures were taken, such as the licensing of businesses to black Mozambicans, inclusion in subordinate positions in the administrative apparatus, greater access to education at different levels. In short, the shortage

[66] According to the online dictionary, native means: "of one's place of birth; from a certain place; a native speaker. Original." https://www.dicio.com.br/nativos/, accessed 16/6/2022.

[67] See Development Plans I (1953-1958), II (1959-1964) and III (1968-1973). "The Plan I and the Plan II (1959-1964) continued the autarchic model of the dictatorship led by Oliveira Salazar. In the Plan II, basic manufacturing was chosen as the favoured sector (steel, oil refining, fertilisers, chemicals...). For the first time, the industrialisation policy was unambiguously assumed, subordinating agriculture, which would suffer the positive effects of industrialisation. In the Development Plan III, industrialisation dominated the reinforcement of a new Estado Novo economic policy that confirmed the internationalisation of the Portuguese economy, the development of private manufacture as the dominant sector of the national economy and the subsequent consolidation of the large economic and financial groups, as well as the growth of the tertiary sector with the consequent urban increase." http://unidcom.iade.pt/designportugal/planos-de-fomento.html.

[68] Particularly from the mid-20th century onwards, the development of capitalism in Mozambique and other colonies (mainly Angola) clashed with Lisbon's impositions, which led to the emergence of anti-metropolitan sentiment in these colonies and the embryos of "*à la Ian Smith* " independence organisations, which were accelerated as counterpoints/alternatives to the liberation movement of Frelimo and other nationalist or anti-colonial forces.

of capital, managers and technicians, capitalist development in the colonies, international pressure and the liberation movements forced Lisbon, which was also undergoing reforms, to introduce political and economic changes (while remaining nationalist) in order to safeguard the still desired Portuguese empire.

2.3 The significant transformations of the farming

The majestic companies mostly originated from investments by non-Portuguese capital. They were dedicated to export crops such as cotton, tea, copra and sisal. These companies began operating at the end of the 19th century and closed down in the 1930s and 1940s, when the territories passed to Portugal´s direct administration.

The companies moved on from paying chiefs and the local population in kind, mainly in exchange for gold from the Monomotapa empire and ivory and exporting slaves[69] . Later, the companies produced export goods for the emerging Portuguese industry, especially cotton.

The companies needed a large number of workers, mostly at certain times of the year (when cultivation operations required a lot of unskilled labour), and coercively recruited in areas far from where the plantations were located. The seasonal workers lived in camps, in precarious living conditions and for low wages. This practice implied partial wage labour (semi-proletarians or "semi-peasants"/small producers), without completely uprooting them from the countryside and agriculture. Part of the wages was transferred to the families and, as a result of the level of wages and the living and eating conditions in the camps, the family maintained agricultural production and sent food to the displaced person recruited by the company[70] . Cash transfers contributed to the integration of families and agriculture into the markets, which in time led to processes of social differentiation with little economic basis. As a result, pockets of poverty and hunger emerged. This was one of the first vicious circles of poverty.

Until the 1950s, seasonal labour was largely compulsory (known as "*chibalo*"), in which the colonial administrators and *régulos* were responsible for recruiting a certain number of persons for "delivery" to the companies, as well as for building infrastructure. The Compulsory Labour Regulation (*Regulamento de Trabalho Obrigatório* - RTI)[71] made it compulsory for all men to work for six months a year, with the exception of a small minority (interpreters, administration guards, *régulos* and *regedores*, and *sipaios*)[72],[73].

> "Any worker who refused forced labour, who did not pay the hut tax[74] , who gave up growing cotton in certain parts of the country, or who in any way showed the slightest

[69] It should be noted that slavery predates the entry of colonisation via the *prazos*. There was internal slavery, between clans, resulting from military confrontations and disputes over territories, as well as by other peoples, such as the Arabs and the French (for the plantations on the Indian islands).

[70] "... it was in the capitalist's interest that the peasant family should not be destroyed or removed, since it was the family that supported the maintenance (period of non-employment) and reproduction (children, future workers) of the workers", which allowed the capitalists to maintain low wages and extract surplus value. Serra, C. (1980). O capitalismo colonial na Zambézia. *Estudos Moçambicanos*, (1), 33-52.

[71] It regulated all aspects of "indigenous" labour.

[72] These Mozambicans can be seen as part of the process of assimilation of Mozambicans.

[73] Judith Head (1980). " A Sena Sugar Estates e o trabalho migratório ". Mozambican Studies, No. 1.

[74] The hut tax ("*mussoco*" in the Zambezi valley, but also in northern of the river Pungué) came into force in 1887 by decree of the Ministry of the Navy and Overseas Territories. The tax was collected by the companies

resistance to the settler, was immediately deported to other parts of the colony and to São Tomé. The same thing happened with accusations of a sexual nature (for example, when the lady owner masked the rape, cases of conscious sexual relations with blacks, to save her dignity and good name), as well as "vagrancy" (when a Mozambican was found on the street for no reason, he was arrested and deported by the colonial authorities). Thus, the aggravation of punishments for minor or even non-existent offences became the most effective means of guaranteeing the flow of deportees to São Tomé"[75], where they would work as slaves on the cocoa plantations.

Migration to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had a major impact on the economies and agriculture in the centre and south of the country. Remittances from migrants to their families not only improved their lives, but also enabled them to acquire working means for agriculture, especially cattle and ploughs. The social differentiations in these cases were due not only to the income from wage labour, but also to the deeper and more sustainable increases in production, cultivated areas and livestock ownership (mainly cattle), based on agricultural production. Migration, which was initially by compulsory recruitment, became voluntary due to the resulting benefits and reforms in the colonial regime, pressured by the international community. Emigrants gained social status, had resources for various "*lobolos*[76]" and bigger extended families who contributed with agricultural labour, initiating in these cases an expanded reproduction of capital, giving way to family self-exploitation, where the man was the main beneficiary. This process also initiated a new social hierarchy, while at the same time keeping the peasant base in transformation (or restructuring)[77] .

Alongside the plantations[78] (agrarian capital) of export goods (cotton, copra, sisal, tea, among other crops), a commercial network emerged in rural areas. The companies also had shops to sell various goods to the workers and, at the same time, absorb the wages, closing the money circuit in the area. The supply creates new demands[79]/needs of wage earners (seasonal or full-time or

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and remitted to the State. It was paid in cash and, initially, also in kind by Mozambicans to the *régulo* of their area of jurisdiction. Non-payment in cash implied labour on plantations or public works. As the peasant economy was at the time not very monetised, payment was made through work up to the amount owed. Santos, Maciel (2012). I*mposto camponês no Norte de Moçambique (1929-1939) – um cultivo forçado, factor de crescimento?CEAUP* - Centre for African Studies. Faculty of Letters, University of Porto.

The payment of the "hut tax" in cash was a way of forcing the peasant to own money, presuming his wage-labour and the consequent monetisation of the peasant economy and its integration into the market,

Between 1904-1907, the administrative districts of southern Save (Lourenço Marques and Inhambane) accounted for 94 per cent of the "hut tax" directly collected by the State in the colony.

[75] Luca Bussotti (2019). Marcas do Desterro. Moçambicanos deportados para São Tomé e Príncipe (1947-1961): história, estórias, actualidade. Revista Tempo e Argumento, vol. 11, núm. 27. Universidade do Estado de Santa Catarina. Brazil.

[76] Wedding dowry. It was usually paid in a variable number of heads of cattle, one of the symbols of wealth.

[77] In specialised language, some authors (for example, Judith Head, 1980, work cited) classify these phenomena as the de-structuring of peasant life and economy. The author prefers the terms transformation or restructuring, meaning that regardless of the changes, forced or not, resulting from processes of resistance and integration of the peasantry in the face of the penetration of capital, there are processes of adjustment of peasants and small producers.

[78] Most of the plantations are the result of the ending and division of the majestic companies by capital from different sources, including those that constituted the companies that became companies in different branches of activity.

[79] Known as the law of Say.

recruited in the form of forced labour). The monetisation of the peasantry increases, reinforcing integration into the labour market.

Thus, "... the economies were, before colonisation, in a phase of pre-capitalist development[80] (or feudal/slavery/patriarchal), where the maximisation of production functions did not have profit and markets as objectives, but rather the subsistence of families, the food basis, the reproduction of clans/"*regulados*" ethnic chiefs and families, as political, economic and social units to be reproduced. Formal markets, currency, cash taxes, wage labour, European techniques, etc. were introduced abruptly and often violently, without being the result of the overall evolution of the communities."[81] .

In short, the transformations of the farming from the end of the 19century until the 1930s were profound, through a functional system between wage labour and the monetisation of family economies with pre-colonial and capitalist ways of life and production. Forced wage labour, through migration and compulsory labour contracting, contained slave and feudal relations. The introduction of the hut tax, the maintenance of family farming and people's resistance involved violent practices to enforce certain obligations, some of which were legislated by Lisbon. In the alliances between the colonial power and the local hierarchies and *achicundas* (these were replaced by the *sipaios*, now under the command of locals or Goans, and integrated into the colonial administration). Interpreters, prison guards and *sipaios* emerged[82]. Despite the deepening of production relations from the previous period until the end of the 19th century, there were continuities, such as the extraction of value through labour, the alliances and conflicts between colonial agents and local powers, the creation of surplus production and the economic weakness of the colonising country.

2.4 The intensification of capital and agrarian and peasant transformations (1930-1975)

After Salazar took power, the Estado Novo introduced important changes in economic policy. The development of capitalism in Portugal demanded a growing quantity of raw materials and the expansion of the market for industrial goods, within the framework of a nationalist economic policy[83] and the containment of development in the colonies dependent on the needs of capitalism in Portugal. In the same context, Portuguese emigration to the countries of Central Europe, the United States, Canada and South Africa was partially "directed" towards the colonies[84]

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[80] As mentioned in the brief theoretical framework, the pre-colonial production model until the mid-19th century was dominated by clan and tribal-patriarchal systems, considering the autarchy (localism) of social relations and reproduction factors. The military leaders of the ethnic groups and their domination over other clans and ethnic groups meant that the subjects had to pay in kind. This tradition continues to this day.

[81] Mosca, João (1999) **-** *A experiência "socialista" moçambicana (1975-1986).* Lisboa: Editora Instituto Piaget.

[82] Locally recruited police force serving the colonial administrations in third and fourth territorial level divisions.

[83] Salazar avoided non-Portuguese capital, thereby delaying the capitalist development of the colonies. It is said that when he learnt that oil had been discovered in Angola, his first reaction was expressed in the following phrase: "one more problem". According to Hugon (1999: 38), the Colonial Pact was based on three pillars: (1) financial autonomy, which obliged the provinces to bear the costs of sovereignty, with centralisation accompanied by de-concentration; (2) attracting foreign currency: Angola represented 50% of the foreign trade of the Overseas Provinces and allowed for a *surplus* in the Portuguese balance of payments; (3) protected trade: the large Portuguese companies, linked to the State, created barriers to the entry of non-Portuguese competitors". Hugon, Philipp (1999): *Economia de África*. Lisboa, Editora Vulgata.

[84] Chilundo (1999: 223), referring to an observation by a native officer of the colonial administration, says that in Malema, at the beginning of the 1930s, "there is not a single commercial establishment. Ribaué has

. The intensification of the capitalisation of the economy in the colonies and the immigration of Portuguese settlers had the following objectives: (1) to increase the colonial presence as a way of occupying the territory; (2) to produce "commodities" for export and foodstuff to supply the emerging urban centres due to immigration; (3) to integrate more and more Mozambicans into the political and economic system of the colonies on the basis of local elites and the support of evangelisation, in order to strengthen alliances and fill positions in the public administration.[85]

Throughout colonisation, the churches played an important role of "evangelisation", in the process of "winning souls", in the production of alienated subjects, in inculcating a spirit of obedience in the colonised, in the cultural and political disorientation of the colonised object. Church missions existed from the beginning of colonisation, initially concentrated along the Zambezi River and then throughout the territory. These also produced goods based on the work of the pupils in their schools, which taught up to 4th grade and arts and crafts[86]. Samora Machel, in his speech at the 1st National Seminar on Agriculture, held in Marrupa in June 1975 (during the "Rovuma to Maputo" trip, just before independence), put it this way: "Through the Church, through Islam, they supported Portuguese colonialism. And there was the Catholic Church, which was the natural ally of colonialism." Frelimo limited "churches´ mobilization, since Frelimo is the only one that should mobilise the people".[87] Later, during the nationalisations, all churches´ property, except places of worship, was nationalised.

From the XX century 1950s onwards, settlements (*colonatos*) were set up to implement these strategies. Later, as a means of defence against the advance of the liberation struggle in the 1960s, several settlements were set up or reinforced, such as Matama, Unango, Montepuez, Sussundenga, Gorongosa (Canda), among others. After the end of their military mission, Portuguese soldiers received support to settle in these areas as farmers.

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two shops, but it's a long way from Malema, and in the whole of Cuamba there is not a single shop."[84] Chilundo, Arlindo (1999): " O impacto da revolução dos transportes nas relações entre homens e mulheres na província nortenha de Nampula, Moçambique (1913-1961)". *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*, Nos 18-22, pp. 215-244.

[85] According to Morais (1960) quoted in Mosca (1988), "... the Limpopo irrigation construction is intended for colonisation, in the understanding that this work pf settlement to be valued by the Portuguese population, both white and black, and their activities. It was done without racial prejudice and with a view to national unity, which had been enlightened for centuries by the doctrine of Christ, who created and strengthened the fraternal coexistence of the multi-racial Portuguese world". The same author adds: "In it there is room for everyone. It is a work in which life together for whites and blacks will be fraternally linked by the yearning for the spiritual and material growth of the Nation. ... We are all inhabitants of a single Nation, and we must all share in the benefits of the work for the common good undertaken by the State in the Limpopo valley. It is true that we want as many white families from the metropolis as possible to settle in villages in the Limpopo valley, forming vigorous centres of colonisation, firmly rooted in the soil, owning the land where they work, exercising there the traditional virtues of the Portuguese farmer - tenacity, sobriety, attachment to work and love to the family, serving as an example to their brothers of Africa". Mosca, João (1988). Contribuição para o estudo do sector agrário do Ckokwé. Volume II. Ministry of Agriculture.

[86] "Catholic and Protestant missionaries, seeking to inculcate the ethic of work among the newly converted, reiterated this message from their pulpits and in the classrooms. Indeed, many saw no contradiction whatsoever between evangelisation and forcing students and their teachers to work in church-owned cotton fields." Isaacman, Allen (1991): " Camponeses, trabalho e processo de trabalho. O cultivo forçado de algodão em Moçambique colonial (1938-1961)". Em *Moçambique, 16 anos de Historiografia*. Maputo, colecção Painel Moçambicano.

[87] Carvalho, Joaquim de (1975): *Prioridades para a Agricultura*. Maputo, Imprensa Nacional.

In the case of the Limpopo Valley (mid-1950s), the direct objective was not military, but to satisfy the food needs resulting from the growth of the Portuguese population and other nationalities in the south (especially in the city of Lourenço Marques, now Maputo). The first farmers settled in 1954. Ten families from Alentejo were given 4 irrigated hectares and 24 rainfed hectares per family, with 175 Mozambican families in with the right to use ("fruição de *gleba*") 2 irrigated hectares per family. In 1960 there were around a thousand European families and the same number of assimilated and indigenous people[88]. Also in this case, , the "Mozambican settlers[89]" emerged from among the descendants of Gungunhana military elite hierarchies , the local social and religious hierarchies and emigrants to the South African mines[90]. In the Limpopo valley, the integration into the Portuguese political and economic system is clear.

Later, during the civil war, in 1984/85, part of the irrigated land was redistributed to farmers and small producers in the Limpopo valley, especially in Chokwé. The aim of this action was to prevent attacks by Renamo and to ensure the production of vegetables for Maputo (mainly tomato and cabbage[91]). In addition, there was a strong symbolism in the fact that the Chokwé district (Chilembene, one of the villages in the irrigation perimeter, was Samora Machel's birthplace) and the Limpopo valley had been defined as the "breadbasket of the Nation[92]" at the Third Frelimo Congress.

In the areas where settler peasants and traders were more established, from XX century 1950s onwards, small farmers began, to use inputs purchased on the market and there was an increase

[88] "There were three hierarchies: white, assimilated and indigenous. These levels represented different sizes of farming plots of, unequal conditions and access to credit, distribution by villages grouping races and, within these, by place of origin. For example, there were villages where the majority of the inhabitants came from one region of Portugal: villages of people from Trás-os-Montes, Madeira, etc.". Mosca (1988), work cited.
Hermele (1986:7) adds the following aspects: "Of the 197 tractors bought by the settlers between 1961 and 1973, only 12% belonged to Mozambicans; there was racial discrimination in the villages with a predominance of Portuguese or Mozambican settlers and the same in each village, in the type of houses they were offered to live in. For example, only three of the fourteen villages in the settlement had 88 per cent Mozambican farmers". Hermele, Keneth (1986): " Lutas contemporâneas pela posse de terra no vale do Limpopo. Estudo do caso do Chokwè, Moçambique, 1950-1985". *Estudos Moçambicanos*, n.º 5/6.
"The average plot size for the former was 8.5 hectares and for the latter 5.9 hectares of irrigated land; the installation of each Portuguese family costed 154 *contos*, while the Mozambicans had no subsidy; technical assistance for the Portuguese and assimilated people costed around 26.4 *contos* per family, while the same item for the indigenous people did not exceed 2.2 *contos* per family (8 per cent)." Morais, António Trigo de (1960): *Irrigação e Colonização do Limpopo. Apontamento.* Conselho Superior de Fomento Ultramarino.
[89] The Mozambican settlers were selected from the local elites to become farmers within the "*colonatos*" (for example, in the Limpopo river valley, Matama in Niassa, Canda in Gorongosa, among others), albeit in a less favourable situation than the Portuguese. This strategy was intended to reduce Frelimo's support bases and convey to the international community that there were colonial reforms in favour of Mozambicans.
[90] According to the study by the Centre for African Studies, around a third of the population in the area south of the River Save spent more than 50% of their working lives in the RSA. Only 10 per cent of Mozambicans south of the River Save spent less than 20 per cent of that time in the mines. Centre for African Studies (1978): *O mineiro moçambicano*. Maputo, Centre for African Studies.
[91] Chokwé was one of Maputo's major suppliers of vegetables and rice (in this case, in addition to imports) in the mid-1980s. Cabbage was popularly called "Mozambican steak" or "woe if it was not for me!". These expressions reflect the shortage of essential foodstuffs on the market at the time, with administrative prices and repression of informal economies.
[92] Mosca, João (2021). *Chokwé: Foi ou será celeiro da Nação*? Destaque Rural Nº 124. OMR. Maputo , questioned the potential and possibility of realising this slogan.

in productivity, which was marketed through the rural commercial network. One example is maize in Alta Zambézia and the neighbouring districts in Nampula and Manica provinces[93].

In some areas, such as Manica province, organisations of medium and large producers emerged, whose functions included buying the farmer's production if he so wished, storing it to be sold in times of short supply, and selling inputs, as well as increasing the producers' negotiating capacity with the colonial administration and other economic actors[94]. The colonial administration had public institutions for the purchase of agricultural products[95] and livestock, to be transported from surplus areas for later sale in deficit areas, price regulation and the administration of a price stabilisation fund to try to ensure price stability.

The process of "assimilation" deepened. Schools trained Mozambicans in trades such as electricians, carpenters and construction workers. Benefits were granted to *régulos*, such as trips to Portugal. Mozambicans began to occupy subordinate positions in the public administration, such as chief of *sipaios* and secretariat. Albeit on a restricted basis[96] the University of Lourenço Marques began to admit black Mozambicans, , and primary teachers for rudimentary schools[97] and nurses were trained. The first black priests appeared in the Catholic Church. Many Mozambicans were incorporated into the Portuguese army, including in special forces, and some graduated as officers.

This integration had several objectives, above all political: (1) considering the scant immigration of settlers, compared to the needs, to make up for the lack of Portuguese to fill public functions and professions; (2) to convey the international image of the integration of Africans into the Portuguese community; (3) to halt the advance of the national liberation war.

In short, the final phase of colonisation saw the increasing integration of the peasantry/farmers into the labour and goods markets, the forced forms of recruitment/production were gradually abolished, and the emergence of medium size farmers in the *colonatos* and in areas with agricultural potential (the "*Kulaks*" in Mozambique).

The national liberation struggle and other anti-colonial guerrilla and political movements can be considered to have had social support bases as a result of the colonial situation (to use George Balandier's expression), colonial repression and aggressivity, the differences in political and economic opportunities between the Portuguese and Mozambicans of various races, a (proto)nationalist ideology, the memories of slavery, the hut tax, forced labour and repressive methods, symbolised by slapping, whipping, torture, etc. The leaders of these movements were, socially and mostly, from the local elites and not necessarily from a movement of peasants and workers in their struggles as a "class for themselves", and of intellectuals from different backgrounds and trained in European countries (mainly Portugal, France and Sweden) where

[93] See Mosca, João (2022). *Desenvolvimento local: uma opção para o desenvolvimento*. Destaque Rural Nº 186. OMR. Maputo

[94] This is the case of the Manica Plateau Farmers' Guild.

[95] Instituto de Cerais de Moçambique.

[96] Hermele states that the University of Lourenço Marques had graduated 40 Mozambican, in this case black Mozambicans (Hermele, 1988: 252), Hermele, Kenneth (1988): " *Guerra e Estabilização. Uma Análise e Médio Prazo do Programa de Recuperação Económica de Moçambique*. Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos, Nºs 8 e 9, pp. 247-293.

[97] There were two systems: official education for the children of settlers and assimilated people, and rudimentary education for the "indigenous".

many militated in leftwing parties and student movements, which confirms that, in addition to the feeling of revolt against colonial practices and feelings of independence, the leaderships of the liberation movements were, as Capela (1993[98]) points out, also class movements[99] .

The liberation movements proclaimed themselves to be the representatives of the people. The aim was to unite anti-colonial or anti-settler sentiments with a view to independence. Workers and peasants do not appear in the speeches as social bases, and instead of the peasantry, they mention the "people". After independence, some liberation movements, such as Frelimo, asserted themselves as Marxist-Leninist parties, although in realities where the workers were a social minority and still lacked class consciousness "for themselves" and "in themselves", and the small farmers still lacked a sense of nation or homeland[100]. However, it must be emphasiseds the existence of multiple events of resistance and revolt since the beginning of the colonial occupation, such as, for example, in the 20th century, in the sugar companies, in the ports and the Mueda massacre[101] .

2.5 The "political betrayal" of the peasantry and the de-structuring of the countryside and of small farmers and small producers (1975-1987)

After independence, at the Third Congress in 1977, Frelimo transformed itself from a liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist party and declared its intention to build a socialist State, taking agriculture as the basis for development[102]. It nationalised the land and planned to develop agriculture through state companies ("owned by all the people") and the cooperativisation of the countryside. Small farmers only received support when they were integrated into co-operatives and, indirectly, in the individual plots they were "allowed" to own as cooperativists. The communal villages were intended to be cities in the countryside, where there would be new forms of social

[98] Capela, José (1993). Ibid.

[99] The leaderships of the liberation movements, including in Mozambique, were mainly made up of local elites (sons of *régulos,* traditional chiefs, *sipaios* of the regime, assimilated, etc.), those who were already benefiting from colonisation. In the long term, they wanted to set up economic systems that would benefit them after independence. In some cases, there was a short period of an attempt to build "socialism" that did not work, for various reasons, including the fact that the socialist/communist ideology was held by a very minor group in Frelimo.

[100] It suggests that ethnic/regional sentiment was stronger than that of nation or homeland, which undermines the ruling narrative. After independence, the question arises as to whether there is a nation or a unitary State of various ethnic groups, which could be called, by some analogy, nations.

[101] The Mueda massacre on 16 June 1960 was used as a symbol of resistance to the occupation. The narratives about the military action and the number of dead differ when presented by Frelimo and the Portuguese commanders who operated in Mozambique, especially in the north.
Issue 14, October 1993, of the Boletim Semestrais do Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, dedicated to the province of Cabo Delgado, provides important clarifications on the subject: "An example of this is the contradiction between the 600 victims of the massacre, in the version of the nationalist movement (a figure arrived at by counting any bicycles left on the ground?) or the 17 dead according to some eyewitnesses (see interview with Daniel Muilundo)". The Portuguese military report speaks of 14 dead and some wounded, which is perfectly consistent with the number mentioned by the Mozambican witnesses to this unfortunate incident." At https://www.publico.pt/2002/06/16/jornal/quantos-morreram-em-mueda-171716.

[102] Article 103 of the Constitution of the Republic states in point 1: **"...** agriculture is the basis of national development" and adds in point 2: "The State guarantees and promotes rural development for the growing and multiform satisfaction of the needs of the people and the economic and social progress of the country".

organization[103]. Price-setting, the distribution of resources (capital, inputs, consumer goods, etc.) and investment were carried out through the central State plan, which was concentrated in state companies and in a few regions of the country, and in capital intensification (equipment and irrigation)[104].

The integration of small farmers into communal villages was not forced, except in areas of armed conflict during the civil war[105]. There, the structures of local/traditional power persisted in "silent conflict" with the new administrative and party structures[106]. Geffray and Pedersen[107] (1985) analyse specific cases of how populations and social hierarchies (lineage) adjusted (processes of resistance and of integration) to the movement of communal villages. The seizure of power (in the *Grupos Dinamizadores* – GD (Dynamising Groups), in the local administration, in the consumer cooperatives, in the collective farms and production cooperatives, etc.) by the lineages was almost always aimed at controlling local resources or the power to manage these resources (distribution of land, of foodstuffs in the consumer cooperatives, etc.) and, internally, the population was hierarchized according to belonging and position in the lineages and respective social structure. The following extract from Geffray and Pedersen's work (1985:190)[108] is enlightening: "The 155 members work 5 to 6 hectares of land. They are divided into 10 work teams, in which the representatives of the *mu-tthette* of *sumiha, uhanihera* and *mutuane*[109] are grouped mainly in the first five groups (mainly the notable in the lineage) and the structures are in the first group. When

[103] The communal villages would be the future cities in the countryside. Samora Machel had the dream of transforming Unango into a city where there would be a "people's university". A state-owned company was set up, which suspended its activities due to attacks by Renamo, it was one of the best-known re-education camps and later the UniLurio University´s Faculty for Agronomy was set up.

[104] For example, "investment in the agricultural sector between 1978 and 1983 was distributed as follows: 90% for the state sector, 2% for cooperatives and virtually nothing for family and small-scale farming. In order to realise the design of major projects (to accelerate growth) and development based on large state enterprises, investment was very concentrated. In 1977, the Limpopo valley alone accounted for around 50 per cent of investment in agriculture. Mechanisation and the construction of new irrigation systems brought these investments together." João Mosca (2005), Economia de Moçambique, século XX. Editora Piaget. Lisboa, em referência a Mackintosh, Mauren and Wuyts, Marc (1988): "Accumulation, social services and socialist transition in the third world: Reflections on decentralised planning based on the Mozambique experience". In E.V.K. Fitzgerald and M. Wuyts (eds.), *Markets Within Planning. Socialist Economic Planning in the Third World.* London, Frank Cass.

[105] "... Concentration in communal villages became compulsory in the mid-1980s with the worsening of the civil war ...". See, for example, J C. Geffray, 1991, *A causa das armas: antropologia da guerra contemporânea em Moçambique*, Lisboa, Afrontamento, and also A. Yañes Casal (1988). " A crise da produção familiar e as aldeias comunais em Moçambique», in *Revista Internacional de Estudos Africanos*,, 8-9.

[106] Geffray and Pedersen say, in relation to the Samora Machel village in Nampula province: "When the free election was held in 1977, ... the population immediately and unanimously brought their representatives, notable lineage leaders, to the delegation (Party and State teams that went to the villages to organise and control the elections).... The election was cancelled by the district, which then extended the ban on candidacies to lineage and segment leaders. Illiterate, reserved people were systematically elected, who did not know how to express themselves, 'who were not going to bother anyone' - consciously sterilising the new institution in its 'embryo'." Geffray, Christian and Pedersen, Mogens (1985): *Transformação da Organização Social e do Sistema Agrário do Campesinato no Distrito de Eráti: Processo de Socialização do Campo e Diferenciação Social*. Maputo, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane and Ministério da Agricultura. Mimeographed.

[107] Geffray and Pederson, work cited (1985).

[108] Ibid.

[109] The humu-land *chief* (*sumiha, motoela*, etc.) is the head of a family (lineage segment, 50 to 150 people) considered to be the first occupants of the territory, called *mu-tthetthe*.

the products are sold in the consumer cooperative, the working groups are called to the collective field always in the same order of numbering from 1 to 10, without the numbering ever having been rotated, between the arrival of one consignment of goods and the next, so that different working groups have access to the products to be sold. These products rarely reached members of the co-operative beyond the first 4 or 5 groups."

The model of socio-spatial organization in communal villages has favoured nuclearization and destruction or weakened inter-help labour relations and traditional redistribution practices. The food security of the elderly and single women has therefore been jeopardised. Temudo[110], in his research, says: "In the words of a group of elders: *it all started when the* Mwenés *ended and the Party Secretaries came, because then everyone chose their own house in the village and there was no longer any coordination (...) now there is disorder, we all live divided and we still cannot find each other*".

Honwana (2003: 170)[111], quoting Ottaway and Wattaway (1986), refers to a document by Sérgio Vieira which states: "Traditional feudal society is a conservative, immobile society with a rigid hierarchy... It is one that excludes youth, excludes innovation, excludes women. Gerontocracy is the correct term."

The aspects mentioned above reveal, on the one hand, the instrumentalization of the peasantry as guerrillas and hosts of the war. The narrative of the elites of the liberation movement and the local elites (as social allies in the countryside where the war was taking place) focused on "mobilising" the small farmers/"the people" by motivating feelings of revolt. On the other hand, the political and economic choices made after independence did not take into account the peasantry, its social structures, production systems and ways of life, which resulted in various processes of resistance and revolt, with the peasantry being incorporated into the civil war soon after independence, also in the role of soldiers (guerrillas) and with various forms of support, and also led by an elite that disagreed with Frelimo that came from the same social groups[112] .

The medium-sized farmers that were emerging in the areas of agricultural potential and in the *colonatos* also did not have access to land and the means and factors of production to continue their activities, as was the case, for example, in the Limpopo valley. Some of them were employed by state companies.

The rural commercial network, the emerging local economy and rural-city-rural economic and commercial relations broke down and, consequently, the process of integration, first in a forced and repressive way and then (especially after the mid-1950s in the last century) according to the markets, broke down. As a result, there was a new de-structuring of the peasant and small-scale

[110] Temudo, M. P. (2002). "The erosion of local practices of post-harvest management in times of war: A case study from the North of Mozambique", in *IOBC Bulletin*, 25 (3).

[111] Honwana, Alcinda Manuel (2003): *Espíritos Vivos Tradições Modernas. Possessão de Espíritos e Reintegração Social Pós-Guerra no Sul de Moçambique.* Lisboa, , Ela por Ela.

[112] "instrumentalization, through policy choices and military, economic and electoral strategies, used in relation to peasants whenever they were a necessary social group for the power elites to achieve these objectives. Later, once the objective was achieved, the majority of the population was marginalised, particularly those living in rural areas, keeping them in poverty with deepening inequalities and without a role in the new political systems and regimes to which they contributed, suggesting that they became a forgotten and betrayed social group". Mosca, João (2022). *Camponês esquecido e traído*. Destaque Rural, Nº 191. OMR. Maputo.

economy for a large part of the families who lived in the countryside with agriculture as their main source of income.

The production crisis, due to various factors, and the consequent shortage of supply of several goods, generated an informal trade, first in the cities and later in the villages, with prices higher than those officially established. Commercial agents involved in these activities were persecuted by the police and labelled "*candongueiros*"/"*xiconhocas*[113]".

There was pauperisation of the peasantry, a reduction in integration into the markets, and the withdrawal of land ownership as property and only as a right of use and according to customary rights. The incentive to increase production by increasing needs (demand-side incentives) ceased to exist or fell drastically. The reduction in emigration to South Africa and in work on the plantations, due to the plantation crises, reduced wage labour, and the non-existence of any tax on the peasantry[114], reduced the need for money, causing the demonetisation of the rural and family economy.

The recovery of the land occupied by colonisation was one of the expectations of the peasants after independence. However, as Hermele (1988, cited work) points out, "the elements of conflict remained: the struggle for land continued due to the great differences between the productive sectors and between private producers; the process of social differentiation became more rapid, considering not only the size of the land, but also the accessibility to the large quantity of resources that arrived from 1983 onwards[115]".

According to some authors, such as Geffray[116], Renamo's social support was motivated by resistance to the choices made by Frelimo and its government and not as an alternative form of power. This assertion can be questioned by the mass support for Renamo by populations in vast areas of the country, which was reflected in the results of the first elections after the General Peace Agreement in 1994, where Renamo won 37.78 per cent of the votes and Frelimo 44.33 per cent. For the presidential elections, Chissano won 53.3 per cent and Dhlakama 33.73 per cent. Frelimo won the majority of the votes in the capital and the southern provinces, and Renamo was the political force with the most votes in the central and northern provinces, especially in rural areas. However, the transformation of the post-colonial war into a civil war was based on the way in which peasants were marginalised, impoverished, repressed in communal villages and forced cooperativization, etc. Why not consider the existence of a peasant revolt which, in order to do so, needed, as in other historical periods, a petty-bourgeois class organization (elite) with aspirations of power and money.

To summarise, the period of the "socialist experiment" saw a significant de-structuring of the rural economy, of local economic relations and of rural-city-rural relations. Peasantry´s impoverishment

[113] *Xiconhoca* was an expression used to express a set of pejorative adjectives of a personal nature, such as lazy, undisciplined, bum, petty thief, etc.

[114] The taxes that existed during the colonial period no longer exist. It can be understood that this option stems from the fact that, during the national liberation struggle, the hut tax was one of the elements of Frelimo's action to mobilise the population.

[115] From the late 1980s onwards, there were major investments in agriculture, above all in state-owned companies, with some "convenient" distribution of resources to private individuals, along the lines of colonialism in the *colonatos*.

[116] Geffray Christian (1991). *A causa das armas: antropologia da guerra contemporânea em Mocambique*. Edicões Afrontamento. Porto

occurred due to the reduction in migration, wage labour, of the collapse of the commercial network and the consequent short-term discontinuity in the process of integrating family economies into the markets for inputs, consumer goods and the labour market, de-structuring the production systems that existed at the time. Social and spatial organization was disrupted. The peasants were disappointed and there were various forms of resistance, such as non-participation in the rice harvests in the Limpopo valley and strategies to integrate communal villages in order to preserve relations and the social fabric of the lineage and, of course, the social support for Renamo during the civil war in vast areas of Mozambican territory.

Peasants and small producers did not get their land back and medium-sized Mozambican producers were often evicted from their properties. Families and rural societies suffered new forms of social disruption and condemnation of the "traditional" authorities, who were accused of being obscurantist and counter-revolutionary, even though there were many forms of resistance and strategic adaptation to the new authorities. The process of market integration was interrupted (or declined) and informal economies emerged that were persecuted by the police.

As in other revolutions and transitions between modes of production, according to the Marxist theory, political alliances during "revolutionary" processes or class struggles, and in this case national liberation, change after Frelimo conquered power. In Mozambique, peasants were Frelimo's main allies during the liberation struggle and later Renamo's. They were marginalised after independence, and only a situation of armed conflict, the civil war, mitigated the more radicalised post-independence measures[117]. Although considering the historical differences and contexts, this was the case in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong''s China (see Chapter 1).

A period of 10 to 12 years was not enough for some of the long-lasting characteristics of the peasantry and small producers to be recovered after the change of political regime and the liberalisation of the economy, a subject presented in the next section.

2.6 Economic liberalisation and the recovery of long-term continuities

With the liberalisation of the economy, which began in 1983/84, with small adjustments towards the "de-radicalisation" of the centrally planned economy and, above all, after the peace accords in 1994 and the intensification of the penetration of agrarian and commercial capital from the beginning of this century[118] , some of the economic and social dynamics from before the "socialist" period have resumed.

[117] The communal villages were abandoned, cooperatisation along "socialist" lines disappeared, prices were no longer controlled, the "guia-de-marcha" was no longer necessary for people to move around, and the repression and control of the promoter groups was lessened. The guia-de-marcha was a document issued by the dynamizing groups that allowed people to move around (the equivalent of the "pass" in the colonial period, until the end of the 50s).

[118] This is the case with the recovery of investment in agribusiness in sugar, tobacco, cotton and, more recently, pigeon peas and sesame, and, after the end of the first decade of this century, the commercialisation of some products through traders, mostly temporary and foreigners who come to Mozambique for this purpose.

The main changes in context, compared to the period of the centralised economy, were the following:

- Return of people internally displaced by war and emigrants to neighbouring countries[119] , with the support of various international organisations and bilateral cooperation. Allocation of housing spaces and land for agriculture, generally in the places they had left because of the conflict;
- Privatisation of state companies, including agricultural companies, and their equipment, to Mozambican entrepreneurs, most of whom with no vocation, knowledge or interest in productive activity;[120]
- Abandonment of cooperativization and communal villages;[121]
- Return of investment in large farms, the same as before nationalisation, in cotton, tobacco, cashew (processing), sugar, and bananas;[122] .
- Investments by multinational companies in the exploitation of natural resources[123] and the emergence of traffick of these resources (mines, forests, *commodities*, wildlife);
- Continued deindustrialisation, an increase in food imports, making the food and agricultural trade balance increasingly negative, and exports of *commodities* with no or decreasing added value[124] ;
- Entry of large distribution companies favouring imports, thereby making it difficult for medium and large producers in the country to ensure the sale of their products (regularity of supply, quality and uniformity of goods and packaging)[125];
- Intensification of the capital factor in companies producing goods for export and in small and medium-sized farmers producing vegetables for urban consumption (potatoes, tomatoes and onions), where there was a significant increase in productivity per hectare;[126]

[119] When the figures were first compiled in 1982, it was estimated that there were 1.2 million displaced people in 11 countries, Cohen, Roberta and Francis, Deng (1998) "Exodus within Borders: The uprooted who Never Left Home", *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, Volume 77, Number 4.

[120] Mosca, João (2005) Economia de Moçambique, século XX. Piaget Publishing House. Lisbon.

[121] *Ibid*.

[122] See Destaque Rural No. 169 by Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022). *Investimento directo estrangeiro: "Extractivisando" a economia moçambicana*. OMR.

[123] Investments by multinationals to extract coal, gas, heavy sands, gold and timber.

[124] See Destaque Rural No. 156 by Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022). Ciclos políticos coincidentes com o comportamento das agriculturas em Moçambique. OMR.

[125] The majority of these companies' capital comes from South Africa and Portugal.

[126] See Rural Highlight No. 156, by Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022). *Ciclos políticos coincidentes com o comportamento das agriculturas em Moçambique*. OMR, which highlights the different behaviours of production, cultivated areas and crop yields depending on the type of producer.

What were the continuities of agrarian development and peasants/small producers?

- Little allocation of financial resources through the State budget, credit and cooperation for the agricultural sector and, in this context, the marginalisation of peasants and the family sector;[127]
- Scarce resources and few results from agricultural research and the weakness of rural extension to transmit knowledge and appropriate practices.[128]
- The continued high weight of the State in the budget, as measured by the public budget/GDP indicator, and the permanence of companies, now known as public companies or with State participation, in some of the economy's structuring sectors, whose financial and technical results are far from satisfactory, in addition to the poor quality of the services provided to users (clients).
- Institutional weaknesses and inefficiencies and a shortage of resources for the State to fulfil its social functions and those of an economy in transition;
- Worsening intensity and periodicity of climate shocks, without fundamental measures to increase resilience.
- Usurpation of land from peasants by large projects[129] without the State enforcing the law, often being the very offender. Accelerated deforestation[130] due to population growth, particularly in densely populated areas[131], and illegal logging for export, illegal mining, trafficking in ivory and rhino horn, etc.

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[127] In the text *A falácia da prioridade da agricultura* by Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022), Destaque Rural Nº 162, the authors present the allocation of resources from the State Budget to agriculture, which reads: the agriculture budget represented a small percentage (an average of around 4% between 2001 and 2021) of the government's total budget, with an average execution percentage of 59% and centralisation in the central bodies that varied between 52% and 94% over the same period. "The percentage of credit earmarked for agriculture over the period analysed was around 3% in relation to total credit to the economy", in Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022), Destaque Rural Nº 165, OMR.

[128] In the text by Yara Nova and João Mosca (2022). *Transformação estrutural de enxada na mão*, Destaque Rural Nº157, states, for example, that 13.5% in 2002 and 6.9% in 2020 of small and medium-sized producers received information or technical advice from the rural extension network. In the same paper it is stated: the budget allocation for investment in agricultural research is very low, receiving an average of 0.08% of agricultural GDP and 0.02% of total GDP. It should be noted that the level of investment in agricultural research in relation to agricultural GDP considered ideal for obtaining the desired results in agricultural research and innovation is 2%, Uaiene, Rafael (2012). *Estrutura, conduta e desempenho da agricultura familiar em Moçambique*. Em: Mosca, J. (coordenação) (2012). Contributos para o debate da agricultura e desenvolvimento rural. Escolar editora, Maputo – Moçambique.
In other words, public spending on research represents 4 per cent of what could be considered desirable.

[129] There are countless cases. Some of them have been studied and have had major impacts on communities, such as Portucel's investment in Zambézia, Vale's in Tete (Moatize), and the gas companies in Palma and Inhambane.

[130] In the text by Ibraimo Hassane Mussagy, João Mosca, Mélica Chandamela and Natasha Ribeiro (2021). *Os determinantes do desmatamento em Moçambique: uma abordagem econométrica para o período de 2000-2016* Observador Rural Nº 112. OMR, it can be read: "It is estimated that the average deforestation between 2003 and 2013 was 269,000 hectares per year. During this period there was a historical rate of deforestation of 0.79 per cent per year (...). The national REDD+ strategy estimates that by 2030 deforestation could reach 514,000 hectares per year (MITADER, 2016) (...) The data shows that the forest area at the start of this period was around 35.5 million hectares in 2001 and fell to 32.5 million hectares in 2016, which means that 2,973,581.48 hectares of forest were cleared, corresponding to 9.15% of the forest cover."

[131] Mosca, João and Arafat Dadá, Yasser (2022). *Bomba demográfica e pobreza na base do desmatamento. O caso da Zambézia*. Destaque Rural No. 153. OMR.

- Weak institutions (agricultural and other sectors with links to the agri-food system's value chains) and unstable, ineffective and centralised public policies[132] .
- Limited impact on medium and large producers who have access to tax benefits and subsidies (fuel, water, energy and customs tariffs),[133] and inaccessibility for small producers;
- Expansion of the subcontracting system (*out grower*) in the production of exportable goods;[134]
- Slow recovery of the commercialisation of surplus food production (maize, beans, peanuts, sweet potatoes, cassava, etc.) from small farmers, with no public institutions or companies for this purpose, generating high post-harvest losses and unmarketed surpluses.[135] According to IAI (2020)[136], post-harvest losses are, on average, close to the volume of production surpluses sold, varying significantly according to province and commodity;
- Accelerated urbanisation[137] without job creation, with disruption to urban infrastructures and an increase in marginalisation and crime.

After this presentation about the change of political regime with the same protagonists as before, it can be seen that the short-term socialist utopia has brought back and deepened the long-standing characteristics of agriculture and of the small farmer: (1) capital, with legislative support and institutional cover, has sidelined the peasants and small producers, usurping land to set up legal and illegal exploitations of mines, forests, plantations, etc.; (2) communities have been

[132] "Economic policy and public policies, in addition to being incoherent and unstable, are largely the result of the irregularity in time and volume of external resources, generating doubts and increased risks for entrepreneurs and the productive choices of small and medium-sized producers and household consumption. The instability of policies is also due to changes in the organisational structure of State administration, low transparency and widespread corruption, the constant replacement of management and technical staff, and the crisis generated by the hidden debts, which have had serious effects on the economy and society". João Mosca and Yara Nova (2022). *Políticas públicas: não às opções por "percepções" ou somente por justificativos "políticos".* Destaque Rural No. 176. OMR.

[133] See Mosca, João, Amreén, Katya and Dadá, Yasser Arafat (2014). Subsídios à agricultura. Observador Rural No. 13. OMR.

[134] Most of the agricultural products exported (cotton, cashews, cowpeas, tobacco and partly sugar) are produced by small producers and there are some cases of goods for local processing, such as cassava (for beer production).

[135] As mentioned above, there were public institutions (in the colonial period and in the "socialist" period with these functions - Instituto dos Cereais, Grémio de Lavoura de Manica, etc.) and the rural commercial network has not been restored. Most of the shops and small warehouses are in ruins. In recent years, large silos have been built in various locations, but for various reasons (technical, maintenance, management and advantages for producers), few of these infrastructures are carrying out the functions for which they were designed: storing as purchased by the State or renting space to producers for marketing or storing production.

For cashews, for example, there are temporary traders (during the harvest period), many of them foreign, without any local investment in infrastructure, who buy the product from farmers and then export it legally and illegally. These traders have competitive advantages over others because they have money from external credit at lower interest rates, they invest nothing and therefore operate with no fixed costs and few variable costs, and they do not declare the goods they sell, evade tax, etc.

[136] Abbas, Máriam and Mosca, João (2022). *Análise do inquérito integrado – IAI 2020*. OMR.

[137] This is mainly due to the following factors: (1) continued low levels of migration compared to the colonial period, with many of these emigrants remaining as city residents; (2) the growth of informal economies and greater and better chances of survival than in rural areas and greater proximity to services; (3) the non-return of some of the displaced people from the wars.

expelled to housing sites (resettlements) in worse conditions than those that existed before the investments were made; (3) seasonal wage labour and the accommodation of workers (semi-proletarians) in camps without healthy and dignified living conditions, have continued; (4) "poverty wages" are determined by the State (minimum wage[138]), lower in agriculture than in the other sectors; (5) there has been an increase in the exploitation of resources abroad without any benefit to the communities, with the knowledge of the State. We can therefore say that the political economy of agriculture and of the peasant in colonial times is still the matrix of agriculture and peasantry today.

3. SUMMARY

On the basis of the theoretical framework presented in the paper, one can say that, on a long-term perspective, relations between capital and peasants have been maintained similar characteristics from the time of colonisation to the present day, albeit with different practices depending on political systems and regimes, international contexts and the development of capitalism and political economy in Mozambique.

Theoretical gaps persist in the concept of peasant in Mozambique, especially when it is studied in its original concept: as a form of production, of livelihood and in its clan relations, and these with capitalist societies or in colonial contexts. The processes of transition between peasants and producers integrated and absorbed into ways of life that are "external" to the "traditional" and historical environment, through integration into the different political and economic systems, are accompanied by processes of resistance and integration/absorption, faced with dilemmas of the advantages or disadvantages of these processes in the families' lives. This is one of the reasons why, throughout the paper, the terms peasant and small producer are used almost as synonymous.

Land, as is universally the case, always appears as the main reason for conflicts and processes of peasants´resistance and revolts.

As a persistent feature throughout the period, peasants and small producers were always exploited, within the framework of the primitive accumulation of capital, the surplus value[139] extracted, including by violent processes, were instrumentalised by the regimes of local powers, colonisation and the multiple alliances between the elites of the different types of local organization and by the existing pre- and post-colonial political regimes. Alliances with the peasantry and small producers were always circumstantial at each stage, altered or restructured after political and economic objectives were achieved. The case of the national liberation struggle and the secondarization/marginalisation of the peasantry after independence is illustrative, as was the case, according to Marx, in the transition processes between the different modes of production. Similar scenario happened during and after the civil war.

There was the absorption and integration of peasants and small producers into the capitalist system on an international scale, to the extent necessary for the expanded reproduction of capital

[138] The minimum monthly wage in agriculture, as of August 2022, is 4,829 MZN, which is roughly equivalent to 75 dollars, or 2.5 USD per day. Considering an average family of 4.5 people, the average income per day and per person would be 0.56 USD. The minimum income at the poverty line, according to the World Bank, is 1.9 USD/person/day.

[139] Surplus value according to the Marxist concept.

and the profitability of investments, exploiting labour under compulsory/slave labour regimes, through semi- proletarianization, with the practice of low wages, and the unfavourable integration (unfavourable trend in the relative prices of agriculture in relation to non-agricultural goods and services) of the peasantry into the markets.

The construction of infrastructure, which involved forced migration, pushed male peasants to emigrate and leave their ways of life behind. This situation has led to the de-structuring of the role of the man as head of the family within the social division of labour.

The penetration of different forms of capital, since the earliest relations between "natives" and "outsiders", has always been covered by the political systems. This was the case with trade, slavery and forced labour, hired labour for plantations and construction, emigration to other countries, the entry of commercial capital into rural areas, mining, etc. Many cases were presented of institutional cover for non-compliance with the law, where the State has often been the very offender.

The colonial and post-colonial States established different types of alliances with local hierarchies, since the period of slavery (slave hunting) and alliances with local chiefs in their internal struggles and between ethnic groups; through recruitment agents for forced labour, emigration and tax collection (*régulos*, village leaders and *sipaios*); the process of assimilation, through the mestizaje of people of various races and origins ("*donas da Zambézia*", Goans in the police and public administration, the emergence of different types of "mulatto"), through basic training in the missions and rudimentary primary schools and later, at higher levels of education, in arts training (arts and crafts schools in the religious missions and later in basic and medium technical schools); the promotion of local hierarchies and small producers and the emergence of medium-sized farmers in the *colonatos*; specialised workers becoming "foremen of the construction works[140]". Would colonisation have been possible without these networks of alliances and mutual interests?

The churches, especially the Catholic church, before and after independence, were allies of the political power, and the same happened after independence with other churches in functional (mutually beneficial) alliances between the State and the churches. At the same time, the churches played an important role in the formation of the nationalist elites and leaders of the independence movements.

The majority of the peasants, the poorest and those without opportunities or who were not integrated, adopted different forms of resistance, since the beginning of colonisation, to its various modes and methods of action, and later to the repressive processes of the socialist period and the forms of penetration of the multinationals, as well as, before that, to the forms of intervention of slave and feudal, industrial and agrarian capital. The main forms of resistance were against slavery (between groups and with the colonial agents), on the plantations and in the factories (demonstrations, seed burning, fligt to the forests and strikes), against colonial occupation and post-independence abuses of power (support for the liberation movements and Renamo during the civil war), against land occupation in the *colonatos*, in the big mining investments and on the plantations, and due to the living conditions in the resettlements (demonstrations and strikes).

[140] People who, with some training and skills in the arts (bricklayers, carpenters, material clerks, tractor drivers, mechanics, electricians, etc.), were in charge of labourers in construction sites and agricultural fields.

Apart from nationalist motivations, peasant protest and struggle movements have been local, isolated, short-lived and in response to conditions of oppression, discrimination, working and living conditions, especially when they involve the de-structuring of ways of producing and living, and relations with the territory, where there is a feeling of socio-cultural territoriality as a non-tangible asset. From this perspective, Mozambique also faces the old theoretical question of whether the peasantry is a "class in itself" and "for itself". There are no known peasant movements that continue over time, structured and organised internally, as happens with peasant social movements, in defence of their cultural identities, their ways of producing and living, especially in South America. Throughout history, peasants have not shown that their movements of revolt have become movements for the transformation of power, either at the level of countries or locally. This seems to be an open subject for research.

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