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A MORE UNDERDEVELOPED MOZAMBIQUE A THEORETICAL REVISIT ON DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT

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A MORE UNDERDEVELOPED MOZAMBIQUE
A THEORETICAL REVISIT ON DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMEN

João Mosca[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to substantiate that Mozambique has been deepening its underdeveloped characteristics [2].

Underdevelopment and development are hot topics in academia, research centres and political circles. The debate began with Marx, authors from different schools of classical and neoclassical economics, the Russian revolutionaries (Lenin, Kautsky and Trotsky, Bucharin and others[3]), the Second International [4] and, afterwards, especially from the 1960s onwards, by academics from ECLAC [5] (known as the developmentalist theory), left-wing schools (also known as the new left) from Brazil, Chile and Mexico, Europeans (mainly France), Chinese and Africans/Egyptians[6].

The case of Mozambique is briefly mentioned on the basis of the discourses and political and economic choices made on the first years after independence and after 1987, with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), internally known as the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (ERP). The author argues that in Mozambique there were no internal conditions or external contexts that, in combination, allowed the socialist option to succeed. These conditions were the result of a combination of political factors in terms of the formation of social classes and national elites, class consciousness, the stage of development (of the productive forces), the nature of external relations in a capitalist world in the final stages of the Cold War and regional conflict. In addition to these factors, there was a party made up of an amalgam of militants from various clan, ethnic and racial backgrounds, academic backgrounds, different ideologies and different class backgrounds, but above all petty-bourgeois or aspiring petty-bourgeois.

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[2] The contrasting terms of underdeveloped or developing/in the process of developing; developed, poor/rich; center/periphery; low income/middle or high income, First World/Third World, are concepts that include political and ideological perceptions or positions, whether of the authors, schools of thought or target audiences. The author does not choose one of these terms and uses them interchangeably throughout the paper.

[3] There were major differences between Russian intellectuals. For example, Trotsky, one of the commanders of the Red Army and a Marxist intellectual, was arrested in 1927, after a heated argument with Stalin, and deported in 1927 to Siberia, then exiled to Mexico where he was killed (August 1940) by an agent of Stalin's police. https://www.infoescola.com/biografias/leon-trotski/.

[4] The Second International (1889-1916) or Socialist International or Workers' International was an organisation of socialist and workers' parties created mainly by the initiative of Friedrich Engels at the International Congress in Paris on 14 July 1889. It was abolished in 1916 as a result of the various national parties in relation to the Second World War, when each supported the respective countries.

[5] ECLAC is one of the five regional commissions of the United Nations based in Santiago de Chile. It was founded to contribute to the economic development of Latin America, coordinate actions aimed at promoting it, and strengthen the countries' economic relations with each other and with the other world nations. https://www.cepal.org.

[6] Considering the number of schools of thought and authors, and the nature of the debates, the author refrains from presenting a review of the debate, as he himself is not familiar with some of these theories. He limits himself to what is mentioned in section two.

The paper continues the theoretical and evidence-based analysis of developments after the 1987 economic reforms, seeking to understand the new model, the political and ideological changes of the same elite, previously the liberators of the homeland and with narratives of Marxist, neo-Marxist and Maoism variants, not excluding the ideological strands of capitalism, as well as the profound changes in politics, the economic model and their relations with international capital and new international "partners"/"allies".

In addition to the introduction, the text has four more sections. The second section summarises the most relevant theoretical contributions on the subject, taking into account the aim and rationale of the hypothesis reflected in the title. The third section is dedicated to the conditions, context and theorisation of development and underdevelopment in Mozambique, considering section 2 of this paper. The fourth section, Statistics of Mozambican Underdevelopment, presents and analyses economic data to support the title and objective of the paper. Finally, section 5 provides a summary.

2. BRIEF THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

2.1 On the construction of socialism

The concept of peripheral capitalism[7] is based on the interpretation of the General Law of Capitalist Accumulation, which states, in summary, that "an increasing mass of means of production (capital factor), thanks to the productivity of social labour, can be set in motion with a progressively decreasing expenditure of human power"[8]. In other words, capitalisation increases the relationship between capital and labour, reducing the demand for labour, thus leading to a decrease in real wages and the appropriation of the surplus value generated by workers (exploitation of labour). Consequently, the impoverishment of workers increases, the demand for industrialised goods decreases and, on the other hand, with the emergence of the petty bourgeoisie, the tendency to consume "luxury" goods increases. Savings in these economies decrease, increasing the underdevelopment of sectors and areas in one same country (in this case, labour-intensive sectors such as small-scale agriculture). From this perspective, Trotsky develops the law of combined, uneven development, resulting from capitalist development with different levels of absorption of surplus value extracted from underdeveloped areas which, together with

[7] The concept of peripheral capitalism is used to characterise countries that have entered the phase of capitalism (capitalist system) while still retaining elements of underdevelopment. In terms of the categories of modes of production, they are realities in transition between feudalism and capitalism. This Marxist theory of the evolution of societies is called into question, especially when the interpretation of Marx's evolutionary process in five phases is done in a mechanical and decontextualised way, for example, with the theory of Asian modes of production. See, for example, C.E.R.M. (1974). *O modo de produção asiático*. Seara Nova. It is argued that the phases, as described by Marx, did not occur in many countries, especially in Asia and Africa, because they have different pasts and presents from developed countries. Mosca (2002:76) says: "The relations between 'modern' bureaucracies and clan and ethnic powers, not only at local level but also at national level, is also a fundamental element of stability. ...:"it was (and is) the children of the local elites who studied (and study) who have greater access to resources and services, who occupy the privileged positions in the bureaucracies and are therefore the ones who hold formal power. The kinship relations of the elites are mixed up in the "traditional" and "modern" hierarchies, and, within them, the conflicts and rivalries of societies and of these with the apparatuses of parties, States and armies are reflected, where a small, recent technocracy emerges that seeks to professionalise 'public affairs'", Mosca, João (2002). Encruzilhadas de África*. Ênfase para os PALOP*. Lisboa, Editora Piaget. Piaget.

[8] The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation can be found in Marx, Capital, Book I, Chapter XXIII.

technology, generates greater labour productivity. To this extent, localised accumulation in developed areas is related to the reduction of real wages in other spaces among areas and within each country.

Trotsky's uneven and combined development means that the developed and underdeveloped zones establish relations that reproduce the stages of development, establishing long-lasting dependency mechanisms. This theory was also developed, after the 1960s, by ECLAC's school of structuralist economics, which supported, among other things, the centre-periphery theory, of which Raul Prebish was a precursor, who argued that Latin America should industrialise and retain the accumulation generated. However, the "theory of underdevelopment[9]" states that industrialisation in underdeveloped countries does not reach the technological (and therefore productivity) levels needed to turn these peripheral economies into developed, non-dependent ones. With the same paradigm comes the concept of the economy as a globalised capitalist system - world system (maintaining the categories of central, semi-peripheral and peripheral economies) and interrelated, based on the international division of labour, and on capital-intensive (technology) or labour-intensive capitalism, and unequal exchange, where development and underdevelopment feed off each other and generate the vicious circle of unequal development[10] .

Arghiri Emmanuel's theory of unequal exchange is considered non-Marxist because it is not based on the theory of value (according to Marx's concept) between economies. Arghiri[11] is based on the theory of comparative advantage, where "the low development of the productive forces and the low wages in the peripheral countries give them a greater production of surplus value and a higher rate of profit. Capital moves towards these regions in search of this greater profitability, initiating a worldwide trend towards the equalisation of profit rates[12]. For Emmanuel, one of the results of unequal exchange is the breakdown of working-class solidarity worldwide [13]. As this transfer of value takes place from backward to central countries, it allows part of this transfer to be appropriated by the working class of the advanced nations, who would tend to abandon the struggle in favour of a new form of social organisation" (Lucas pp. 158)[14]. This premise may be in line with what Emmanuel (1976, p. 122) says: "wage differentials and the equalisation of profit rates are therefore at the root of unequal exchanges".

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[9] Gunder Frank (1971), *Sociologia de Desarrollo y Subdesarrollo de la sociologia. El Desarrollo del Subdesarrollo*. Barcelona. Editora Anagrama.

[10] The main theorists of this theory are Immanuel Wallerstein, Theotonio dos Santos, André Gunder Frank and Giovanni Arrighi.

[11] Emmanuel, A. (1976). *A troca desigual*. Lisboa: Estampa.

[12] Marx says that the differentiated rates of profit per sector, due to the organic composition of capital, tend to equalise through competition. In Marx's terms, the organic composition of capital is the ratio between constant capital and variable capital.

[13] Based on this assumption, Arghiri Emmanuel and Charles Bettelheim (1971) wrote the book *Um operariado explorador*? Iniciativas Editoriais, Lisboa. There may be no direct link with Marx and Engels' slogan, written in 1848, "Workers of the whole world, unite!". Karl, Marx; Engels, Friedrich (2017). Manifesto Communista. São Paulo: Boitempo. This phrase is understood as a call to all the workers of the world to unite in a revolutionary process, because "they had nothing to lose". This slogan can be a political response to the evolution of capitalism into its monopolistic phase and the expansion of financial capital (imperialism). For its expanded reproduction, the development of capitalism in its monopolistic phase imposes the export of capital in alliance with local powers and their elites (bourgeoisies). Lenin, V. I. (2021). Imperialismo, Estágio Superior do Capitalismo. Boitempo

[14] Rodrigues, Lucas (2017). *Transferência de Valor e Desenvolvimento Desigual: uma Análise Comparada*. Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.

There is a wide, non-convergent literature on the peasantry and its role in the socialist revolution, national liberation processes and in the evolution of societies. Marxism considers the peasantry to be a non-revolutionary class, mainly because it owns the means of production, is individualistic, politically unstable, lacks class consciousness and therefore takes circumstantial positions according to the benefits it can derive at any given time. For these reasons, it constitutes a class in "decomposition" in the process of capitalist industrialisation and in the transition between capitalism and socialism. There would be an alternation of tendencies between the concentration and parcelling of land and not the definitive disappearance of smallholdings." It would therefore be incorrect to think that 'small landholdings' were in the process of disappearing in 'modern' (capitalist) society, or even that they could simply be replaced by large agricultural establishments." Valério, *apud* Kautsky (1980). The Russian revolution envisaged the transformation of the peasantry into socialist cooperativists (known as "*kolkhozs")* and workers in State enterprises ("*sovkholzs*"), severely persecuting the *kulaks*[15]*,* and imposing rules on peasants who were not integrated into the socialist forms of production.

Other authors, such as Trotsky, Chayanov and Preobazhenky, had different positions in several respects. Chayanov (1974)[16] concentrates on the rationalities and logics of the productive and consumption choices of the family unit, as a productive (economic) and social unit, comparing peasants living in "traditional" contexts with those living in "modern" contexts, in order to ensure the reproduction of the family. "What differentiates the peasant unit from the capitalist enterprise is that the former accumulates capital resources to guarantee the reproduction of the family, being this factor the reason for its existence; the latter assumes the centrality of profit as the basis of the decision-making rationality on its components. Therefore, unlike enterprises that accumulate to maximise profit, the peasant unit accumulates to make family reproduction more efficient (...). In any case, the farmer, producer or family unit has the centre of production decisions in the family, in the changes that may occur and in the family's capacities and needs[17].

Mao Zedong's position and revolutionary choices indicate that "... although the peasants were the overwhelming majority of the combatants, they did not mobilise as a social force with greater cohesion, in the absence of a initiative of the 'external' forces (in relation to the countryside), coming from the revolutionary workers of the cities. Historical particularities led the Chinese communists to rely on the peasant masses, but with their urban based organisational tools , their proletarian ideology, party, armies and militias" (Chesneaux, 1976: 157-160). Contrary to what was tried to made believed after the victory of the revolution, in China there had indeed been a workers' revolution. The old term "Maoism" actually concealed this essential characteristic of the Chinese labour movement, that is, an adaptation of the revolutionary struggle to the country's specific social and historical conditions.

[15] The "*kulaks*" - large landowners before the October Revolution - were persecuted by Joseph Stalin, who believed them to be the last bastion of capitalism in the countryside. There was severe repression of the "*kulaks*" in order to eliminate them as private farmers, also known as the process of "deskulakisation".

[16] Chayanov, A. (1974). La Organización de la Unidad Económica Campesina. Buenos Aires: 1974.

[17] Santos Edilene de Jesus (2011). Questão agrária e desenvolvimento rural: Reflexões sobre o campesinato no Capitalismo. Jornada Internacional de Políticas Públicas. São Luis, Maranhão. Brasil.

2.2 The neoclassical

Neoclassical economists[18] also defend the thesis on the configuration, in sectoral terms within an economy or zone, of economies based on primary sectors where the existing resources, especially the labour factor, move towards industrialisation[19]. Industrialisation on the periphery can take place in goods where there are comparative advantages, supported by free international trade. In this context, the terms of trade are measured by the evolution of relative prices between two or more goods[20]. For Emanuel, there is a persistent deterioration in the terms of trade of goods exported by peripheral economies, which is one of the theoretical underpinnings of the reproduction of the underdeveloped.

Hirschmann[21] disagrees with many authors who claim that development requires the presence of a set of factors, such as natural resources, human capital, entrepreneurship, organisation and a "coordinator" (that is, the State), thus denying that development is linked to relations and markets or the existence/scarcity of these resources, contrasting the organisational capacity of organisations, the State as a "coordinator" and "manager", and also to the will and determination of the people. Schumpeter emphasises the role of the "successful entrepreneur" who, together with others, gives rise to "clusters". Technical innovation is another Schumpeterian pillar that underpins the concept of "creative destruction", replacing the factors hindering development with new arrangements, namely the launch of new products, the conquest of competitive markets (including capital), new raw materials, energy sources and new services.

Structuralist economists seek to study the parts of a whole and their interrelationships with the whole[22]. They analyse a given economy on the basis of supply and demand relationships between economic sectors and between these and macro-magnitudes, such as gross capital formation, value added through the market, taxes, wages, all of which produce multiplier effects on the economy as a whole, including the government[23]. Structuralists also analyse relations with other economies through external economic relations expressed in the balance of payments.

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[18] Peter Drucker is considered the main reference pn economic structuralism. From the perspective of growth and development, Solow, Lewis, Schultz and Schumpeter are references, each with different approaches, but with the common idea that transformations correspond to the laws of the market. Harrod-Domar, Ragnar Nurkse and Kuznets, for example, add that markets alone do not lead to growth with transformation, and that State intervention is necessary to correct market distortions and ensure transformation according to political choices.

[19] Lewis, with his theory of economic dualism - structural duality, argues that, in a context of limited labour supply, the transfer of resources (labour) from the "traditional" to the "modern" sector takes place due to the different labour productivity and the consequent higher wages in industry. Lewis does not present the economic structure as two isolated, non-dependent sectors. See Lewis, Arthur (1960). *Teoria do Desenvolvimento Económico*. Zahar.

[20] For example, how much of a good needs to be produced in a peripheral economy to purchased (exchanged) another good from a developed economy. If this ratio increases, then the purchasing power of the good produced in the peripheral economy loses "value" in relation to the good from the developed economy. In other words, "the barter trade index is calculated from the ratio between the indices of the unit value of exports and the indices of the unit value of imports", Banco Mundial (2023). Ibid.

[21] Hirschmann, Albert O (1961). *Estratégia do desenvolvimento económico*. Rio de Janeiro. Editora Fundo de Cultura.

[22] Ferdinand Saussure, a Swiss citizen, is considered the "father" of structuralism.

[23] Quantitative analysis, based on the so-called input-output model or, in reference to its creator, the Wassily Leontief model, is carried out on a matrix of the economy. For a study of the matrix, see, for example, André Fonte (20121). *Leontief's Input-Output de Leontief Aplicações da álgebra linear.* Instituto Superior Técnico,

In a broader sense, which is at the root of the theory, structuralists analyse the relationships between institutions and as a whole, criticising the evolutionist conception (such as Marx's or Rostow's phases[24]), and therefore having connections and disparities with historical and economic institutionalism in particular. As with all theories, structuralism has many critics, who consider it to be a mechanical, romantic theory, among other adjectives.

Economic relations between developed and developing countries are dominantly studied by the economic, political and social nature of relations between countries, elites and power, within the framework of political and military domains, both in the short and long term. Norman Long[25] considers that international relations are not between countries, but above all between the elites of developed and developing countries, who establish relations of interest between themselves, sidelining the relations and interests of countries and societies.

With regards to economic relations, the least developed countries are considered to export primary goods (e.g., natural resources - minerals, oil and gas, agricultural commodities - cotton, cocoa, coffee, tobacco, etc., timber, fish, labour - unskilled and skilled labour, the widely used term for which is the "brain drain") to developed countries, where they are industrialised and then exported to the countries where the raw materials originate.

In strictly functional and economic terms, the nature of this foreign trade to peripheral countries is justified by low levels of industrialisation, low technology and productivity, little technical knowledge, lack of infrastructure, a weak business community and a lack of knowledge of the international market, implying that industrialised (and other) goods are not competitive on the international market. In other words, a labour-intensive, low value-added, low-profit, uncompetitive model that ensures the deterioration of the terms of trade.

In recent years, environmental extractivism has been taking place, for example through the carbon market, with financial resources (external funding projects) for maintaining vegetation coverage, especially forests, and conserving biodiversity. This "exchange" clearly reveals a strong inequality in the "value" of the exchange: on the one hand, the right to pollute is transferred in exchange for resources for forest and biodiversity conservation, while on the other hand, it allows aggressive economic models and polluting lifestyles to continue, strangling the development of peripheral economies and maintaining polluting economic models in developed economies[26]

The fundamental paradigms of classical and neoclassical economic theory are based on the free market, non-intervention by the State in the economy, a "light" bureaucracy (measured, for example, by the percentage of public spending on the GDP), the creation of a good business environment (Doing Business), and a competitive market in an economy open to the outside world. The economy's resources would be allocated by the market according to their efficiency.

University of Lisbon. For an empirical application, see Carreira, Adelaide, Pinto, Gonçalo, Marques, Virgínia, Mosca, João, Maçãs; João e Renato dos Santos (1999): Cálculo *Matricial III - Aplicações*. Lisbon, Instituto Piaget.

[24] Stages in Marx's theory of modes of production: primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist, socialist and communist. Rostow's stages: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off proper, march towards maturity and the era of mass consumption.

[25] Long, Norman (2001). *Development Sociology. Actor Perspectives*. Routledge.

[26] Bruna, Natacha (2022). Variations in extractivism in Mozambique: a climate-smart world and the emergence of green extractivism. Observador Rural Nº 128. OMR.

Monetary policy (Milton Friedman[27] is considered the "father" of this school of thought) is much discussed among neoclassicals, considering the market a neutral element and, at the same time, a corrector of imbalances, above all through the money supply. Monetarism emerged in the 1950s to challenge Keynes and his post-war interventionist policies. In addition to Friedman, there are: (1) Say's law, which argues that supply (of a good or service) generates its own demand; (2) the quantity theory of money, which argues that the volume of money in circulation causes the general price level to vary; and (3) Keynes, who argues that money is a neutral link between transactions of assets and does not alter economic decisions (money as neutral in the economy)[28].

3. UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE

3.1 Brief description of the economy immediately before independence

In order to analyse the period immediately after independence, it would be important to briefly characterise the economy in this period[29], highlighting the following aspects:

- After the late 1950s, there was accelerated growth (an average of 7%), driven by: (1) an increase in demand and a corresponding (partial) response by the supply of agricultural production of foodstuff due to the growth of the immigrant population, mainly settlers and the Portuguese army, as well as by the manufacturing industry; (2) an increase in traffic on the ports and railways to and from the hinterland; (3) more civil construction of infrastructure and real estate as a result of accelerated urbanisation; (4) a rapid increase in the integration of the peasantry into the market through increased production and the creation of surpluses, which was encouraged by the supply of exchange goods by the expanding rural commercial network.
- Equilibrium or tendency to equilibrium of the balance of payments and the budget as principles of the colonial pact[30].
- Territorial expansion of the colonial administration in line with the development of the productive tissue, especially the rural commercial network, and the need to ensure the presence of the administrative and security apparatus in face of the expansion of African independence and, subsequently, the wars for independence.
- After the beginning of the national liberation struggle (25 September, 1964) and especially after the mid-1960s, important sectors of activity went into crisis or came to a standstill, or slowed down activities, especially in construction (for example the building

[27] For example, Friedman, Milton (1956). *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

[28] For a summary of monetarism, see Kremer Rodrigo L. Gentil Corazza (S/data). *Friedman and Monetarism - a velha teoria quantitativa da moeda e a moderna escola monetarista.* Departamento de Economia da UFRGS

[29] For further reading, see Centro de Estudos Africanos (1985): *A Estrutura Económica no Fim do Período Colonial.* Centro de Estudos Africanos. Maputo, and Mosca, João (2005). *Economia de Moçambique, século XX. Editora* Piaget. Lisbon. This section is fundamentally based on these two works, so it is recommended consulting them for more details.

[30] The Colonial Pact was based on three pillars: (1) financial autonomy, which obliged the provinces to bear the burdens of sovereignty, with centralisation accompanied by deconcentration; (2) attracting foreign currency: Angola represented 50% of the foreign trade of the Overseas Provinces, and allowed for a surplus in the Portuguese balance of payments; (3) protected trade: the large Portuguese companies, linked to the State, set up barriers to the entry of non-Portuguese competitors". HUGON, Philipp (1999): Economia de África. Lisbon, Editora Vulgata.

of the Cahora Bassa dam), in rural areas (commercial network and small industry): production and transport costs rose due to attacks on communication routes, reducing investment and economic activities, especially in the areas directly and indirectly affected by the war.

In addition to the economic situation, Portugal and Mozambique suffered from international political and diplomatic isolation, intruded, even if partially or secondarily, into the context of the Cold War, and with low foreign investment, which was also hampered by Salazar's economic nationalism. Nationalist awareness and resistance was spreading underground, despite successive openings to integrate Mozambicans into the public administration, health and education services, and in the army, in school and technical training.

The coup d'état in Portugal on 25 April led by the *Capitães de Abril*, which, due to its anti-fascist and anti-colonial motivation, accelerated the progress of the liberation wars in the colonies due to the demobilisation/demotivation of the Portuguese military and, on the other hand, as a result of an important part of the military hierarchies and Portuguese society wanting decolonisation. Mozambique gained independence on 25 June, 1975, after negotiations between Frelimo and the Portuguese government, which culminated in the Lusaka agreements on 20 September 1974.

3.2 Brief characterisation of the economy in the final phase of colonisation (1960s to independence)

The colonial economy in its final phase, known as late colonialism[31], was characterised above all by its reliance on services for neighbouring countries (ports and railways) and migratory labour, the latter with internal repercussions due to family remittances that remained in the areas of origin and with social implications.

At the same time, there was a rapid industrialisation of the economy, especially in the sectors processing locally produced raw materials, construction materials, equipment and inputs for agricultural mechanisation, packaging and beverages.

Agriculture experienced a boost in food production in response to the increase in demand caused by the immigration of the settler population and military contingents and, on the other hand, the increase in commodity production for exportation to supply some foreign markets, mainly Portugal. Labour on the remaining large plantations owned by the chartered companies gradually ceased to be forced.

There were clear differences between various forms of production and economies (the so-called "modern" and "traditional" sectors, the "A sector" and the "B sector", the "business sector" and the "family sector", the "formal sector" and the "informal sector", the "capitalist sector" and the "subsistence sector", etc.), which had discriminatory coverage (positive and negative) from the

[31] See, for example, Joana H. M. P. Pereira Leite (1989). *La formation de l'économie coloniale au Mozambique. Pacte colonial et industrialisation: du colonialisme portugais aux réseaux informels de sujétion marchand* - 1930/1974 (PhD Thesis, École de Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales.
Filipe, Eléusio Viegas (2018). Colonialismo tardio e política de povoamento: o colonato do Sábiè e a expropriação de terras dos camponeses africanos, 1956-1974. Afro-Asia, no. 58, pp. 155-185. Universidade Federal da Bahia.
Mosca, Joao (2007): "Salazar e a Política Económica do Estado Novo". *Lusíada. História*, Série II, Número 4, pp. 339-364.

political power and the legal system, and between which there were economic functionalities that supported patterns of accumulation centred on the external sector and capitalist forms of production.

The war for national independence led to changes in colonial economic policy. After 1960, policy elements characteristic of a war economy were introduced. Huge public investments were made for military and police purposes; there was a shift from a restrictive to an expansive monetary policy , with effects on inflation, allowing for faster economic growth in the short term; from economic nationalism there was a shift towards opening up to investments by non-Portuguese capital, preferably from political allies, which strengthened regional political relations with the regimes in RSA and Southern Rhodesia, and unbalanced development between the territories. The case of the construction of Cahora Bassa is paradigmatic, apart from its strategic military nature against the entry of Frelimo fighters to the south of the Zambezi River.

The construction of settlements with Portuguese and Mozambican farmers was one of the strategies for producing foodstuff demanded by the growing colonial population, reducing imports and increasing exports, as one of the ways to fulfil the colonial pact, according to Hugon (1999). As part of the colonial pact, Portugal wanted its economy to be more interconnected with the colonies in order to form a Portuguese economic space, thereby strengthening its administrative presence in the territory and resisting liberation movements. Successive development plans were drawn up with the aim of integrating the metropolitan economies with those of the colonies [32].

After 1969, the Mozambican economy experienced a significant upturn: the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was made up as follows: agriculture 19%; industry 23%; productive services 39%; and non-productive services 19%. The study by Pereira de Moura and Amaral (n.d.)[33] estimates similar sectoral percentage figures. Exports were mainly destined for Portugal (close to 60% in 1969, as well as 30% of imports). South Africa was the second largest partner with 11% and 15% respectively. Cashew, cotton, sugar, copra and tea were the most exported products and food, textiles, equipment and metals, totalling 70% of the value, were the main imported goods. The Mozambican economy was going through a phase of beginning to transition to industrialisation and tertiarisation.

In summary, it can be said that from the 1960s onwards, the Mozambican economy grew rapidly with the construction of productive, defence and security infrastructure, real estate growth as a result of colonial immigration, integration into the Portuguese political and economic space to feed Portuguese industrialisation and strengthen regional political alliances, these objectives being integrated into the colonial pact and the reduction of Salazar's economic nationalism. The transformation of the economic structure towards an economy based on industry and services was underway. The economic transformation was also based on a transformation of the agricultural sector with the emergence of commercial agriculture in settlements and large farms,

[32] In the case of Mozambique, there have been four development plans. The last one had limited implementation due to independence. These plans had two main objectives: (1) to programme State intervention and public investment in the creation of infrastructure to promote economic development; (2) to plan and integrate the economies of the colonies into the Portuguese capitalist system with a clear spatial division of labour. For example, there were crops that were not allowed in Mozambique and Angola, and some were possible in Angola but not in Mozambique, and vice versa.

[33] Preparatory General Report for the IV Development Plan, 1973.

with Mozambicans still interacting in some *colonatos* (settlements), albeit under less favourable conditions[34].

3.3 Period of the "socialist experiment"

It cannot be considered that there are studies on Mozambique that seek to interpret the nature of development, as a political and social phenomenon and its relations with the outside world, in the light of Marxist, neo-Marxist and left-wing theories. This is also not the ambition of the author of this paper.

With independence, according to official documents and speeches, Mozambique opted for a path of socialist development that advocated: centralised planning to replace the market with the setting up of State companies in all economic and social activities, and agricultural production and consumer cooperatives (in this case consumer cooperatives, especially in the cities), on the basis of State ownership of the means of production and collectivisation of the usufruct of land and the means of production in the cooperatives, as well as the nationalisation of foreign trade and a large part of domestic trade, and the distribution of resources (credit, material and human resources) by the State, which led to the "drying up" of the market[35], making it difficult for the private sector to continue[36]. This option implied a concentration of resources and eventual accumulation in the State [37], with the ruling elites becoming the beneficiaries through the distribution system, as a result of privileges and benefits rather than the appropriation of value, materialised through finance and access to resources; however, with the evolution of the economic crisis (see below), the poorest social groups were the most affected.

As a strategy for agriculture, Frelimo advocated agriculture as the basis for development, light industry as a stimulating factor and the heavy industry as a means of achieving economic

[34] The indigenous Mozambicans had unequal opportunities compared to the Portuguese and the assimilated: the average plot size for the former was 8.5 hectares and for the latter 5.9 hectares of irrigated land; the installation cost of each Portuguese family was 154 thousand while the Mozambicans had no subsidy; technical assistance for the Portuguese and assimilated costed around 26.4 thousand per family while the same item for the indigenous did not exceed 2.2 thousand per family (8%), Morais, António Trigo de (1960): Irrigação e Colonização do Limpopo. Note. Conselho Superior de Fomento Ultramarino.
Hermele (1986:7) adds the following aspects: of the 197 tractors acquired between 1961 and 1973, only 12% belonged to Mozambicans; there was racial discrimination in the villages with a predominance of Portuguese or of Mozambican settlers and the same in each village, in the type of houses they were offered to live in. For example, only three of the fourteen villages in the *colonato* had 88% Mozambican farmers. Hermele, Kennnet (1986): "Lutas contemporâneas pela posse de terra no vale do Limpopo. Estudo do caso do Chokwè, Moçambique, 1950-1985". *Estudos Moçambicanos*, n.º 5/6. Centro de Estudos Africanos. UEM.

[35] In the sense that there are no goods or resources on the market that a company or citizen can access without being provided for in the plan. Almost all of the private sector remaining after the privatisations did not have their production and investment plans included in the *PEC (Plano Estatal Central)*, which prevented their reproduction.

[36] Mosca (2005). Mosca, João (2005). Ibid, e Frelimo (1977). *Directivas Económicas e Sociais*. Em Documentos do 3º Congresso da Frelimo.

[37] As a result of the crisis after the early 1970s, a large number of state-owned companies accumulated debts, production fell, underemployment worsened and there were deficits in macroeconomic balances. Mosca (2005), ibidem.

independence[38]. In this approach, the aim seems to be the formation of State capital and public investment for development with socially concentrated benefits in State companies and heavy industry. Peasants were marginalised and only considered when they were integrated into the processes of proletarianisation and cooperativisation. A lot of resources were mobilised for the formation of communal villages, the "cities in the countryside"[39], the base where the cooperativists and workers of the State-owned companies would live. The integration of peasants into these two forms of production was implicit and, as in the USSR, the disappearance ("disintegration") of the peasantry as a non-revolutionary social class prone to creating petty-bourgeoisie.

Monetary policy was based on the money supply decided by the Central Bank and carried out mainly by the Bank of Mozambique and the *Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* (BPD), according to the needs of money for the exchanges planned in the Central State Plan, to support the functioning of the State and State companies, and on controlling the exchange rate (undervaluation) and inflation, as a way of ensuring a low cost of living as well as wages. Both the State and the "socialist" productive sectors had "soft" budgets, that is, with or with few restrictions, and the objectives of maximising profit/profitability were not a primary concern of business management and nor were they objectives of the plan. Companies became loss-making and the State accumulated unpaid debts to the banking system.

Cooperation as the main promoter/ignition engine, especially for the socialist countries, in what was intended to be the liberation processes for the peoples of southern Africa, could be framed in the concept of "imperialism", considering South Africa's economic power and the region's natural resources. Some cooperating countries made speeches of "internationalist cooperation".

The above summary may express radicalised, decontextualised and theoretically questionable political and economic positions and options, as the first section of this paper reveals, considering, according to the evolutionists, that the less developed economies lacked a development of the productive forces (of the capitalist mode of production), as well as the nature of their integration into the international market, and there was no working class with class consciousness "in itself" and "for itself"[40], which would not enable the transition from dependent ("late") capitalism to socialism [41]. On the other hand, it was believed that peasants would be a support base for the "people's revolution" by transforming them, as in the former USSR, into workers in co-operatives

[38] "Industry is the dynamizing factor of our development, heavy industry being decisive for the conquest of economic independence". Frelimo (1977). Ibidem.

[39] In China there were communes, in Tanzania there were ujamaas, and in the USSR there were kolkholzs. The discourse in Mozambique justified communal villages as a way of facilitating access to services (health, education, water, energy, etc.) for rural populations.

[40] The difference between the "class in itself" and the "class for itself" lies in the realisation of the contradictions of capitalism and the possibility of revolutionary processes within the working class. In addition to these aspects of the political nature and organisation of the proletariat, those employed in the manufacturing industry numbered around 126,000, representing less than 1.5% of the population. Mosca, João (2005). Ibidem.

[41] This position does not converge with cases like China and Cuba, although in other cases, due to different circumstances, they were short-lived and unsuccessful "socialist experiments" (Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, etc.). Revolutionary discourses, such as those of Frelimo, were considered, above all by the socialist bloc in Europe, to be countries with a "socialist orientation", in line with what was described above, although they were considered to be their allies and received different support from them. Mozambique received military support and in development projects in the areas of agriculture, mining and fishing, among others, while relations with the capitalist countries were disrupted by political choices and military conflicts on both sides.

and State enterprises. The assumption of the role of the peasantry in a revolution stemmed, in the case of Mozambique, from the role of the rural population in the national liberation struggle, the nature of which is not class struggle[42] but the desire for independence from colonialism and its centuries-old ways of operating.

At the Third Congress (February 1977), Frelimo's leadership transformed the organisation from a liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist political party. In fact, almost all of its leaders came from the aristocracy of the "traditional" societies (heads of clans, ethnic groups, etc.) in which they and/or their children had assimilated, or elites educated mainly in the missions of the Catholic Church[43]; some of these had higher education abroad, where they militated (or were sympathisers) in political parties of a proto-nationalist nature or in youth organisations, as well as in academic associations. These groups played subordinate roles in the colonial administration and later, at the end of the colonial period, in the Portuguese army and in medium-level administrative positions. Others had greater access to small businesses and services. The national liberation leaders took power in the party and moved into management positions in State companies. A new group emerged, the children of settlers, mostly white and of Asian origin, who were "used" by the regime because of their left-wing political training. "The kinship relations of the elites are mixed in the 'traditional' and 'modern' ethnic hierarchies, and in them are reflected the conflicts and rivalries of the societies and of these with the apparatuses of the parties, the States and the armies," Mosca (2002: 76)[44]. It can be noted that Frelimo's power, before and after independence, was made up of various clan, ethnic and racial groups, dominantly coming from the aristocracy of local societies and an emerging petty bourgeoisie.

The Marxist discourse (dictatorship of the proletariat, workers' and peasants' State, heavy industrialisation, etc.) with Maoism elements (popular power, organisation of the masses, communal villages, the role of the peasants in the revolution, guerrilla war strategies, etc.) emerged in Frelimo's narrative, which reflected the choices of minority groups of the elite.

The objective conditions for a "socialist revolution", in the Marxist conception, did not exist, because, for example: there was a "vanguard party" made up of members from a miscellany of social backgrounds and transiently united by the cause of national liberation; a radicalised and decontextualised implementation of Marxist theory; a country without a working class in numbers and with class consciousness, and a peasantry instrumentalised during the national liberation and forgotten and betrayed after independence[45]; an incipient, labour-intensive industry with low

[42] The peasants were the social base of support for the guerrillas in the national liberation struggle, they transported material and supplies to the soldiers, they kept watch at outposts, the military of the National Liberation Front emerged from their midst, and they even produced a certain number of days a week in the "Frelimo field", the produce of which was used to feed the guerrillas.

[43] The Catholic Church's missions consisted of the church, primary schools (known as elementaries), seminaries for training priests, agricultural fields where students and seminarians worked, health centres and other infrastructure for providing services to the local population. There were missions in various parts of the territory, generally accompanying the main actions of penetration by the colonial administration and economic activity.

[44] Work cited.

[45] See Mosca, João (2022). *Forgotten and betrayed peasant*. Destaque Rural Nº 191. OMR. In this paper it can be read: "The peasants were the social base of support for the guerrillas in the national liberation struggle, they transported material and supplies for the soldiers, kept watch at outposts, the Frelimo military came from their midst and spent a certain number of days a week in the 'Frelimo fields', the produce of which was used to feed the guerrillas". (...) "It was, above all after economic liberalisation in 1987, that the peasants were completely forgotten and betrayed. Public policies after independence, and especially since

wages; an economy with low productivity and competitiveness and unfavourable trade conditions on the foreign market; and a production structure typical of underdeveloped economies. In addition to the aforementioned aspects of the lack of conditions for a radicalised socialist option and development in terms of discourse and some practices, there were those generated by a war, initially destabilising in the context of regional political conflicts that turned into a civil war, the fall of the Berlin Wall and extreme climatic events that, as a whole, made the objectives of the narratives, genuine or not, unfeasible. This set of factors meant that the "socialist experiment" did not continue.[46]

3.4 Economic reforms

The economic crisis entailed changing the options from an illusory socialism to a liberalisation of the economy (privatisation of the state sector, the end of cooperatives, the market economy and the end of central planning and Marxist discourses). In 1987, Mozambique began a Structural Adjustment Programme to the BWI[47]. The civil war ended in 1992. This was followed by a period of the return of displaced people and war refugees, the rebuilding of destroyed infrastructure, the revival of the economy, especially agriculture and transport and construction. It was towards the end of the century that investment and the reactivation of the economy began.

The structural elements, presented in the next section, have been in place since the 19th century[48]. Contrary to what some analysts claim, the "socialist" period did not transform the main characteristics inherited from independence. "Socialism" nationalised the ownership of a large part of the "modern" sector and the plan introduced a deep crisis: it dismantled small-scale economies, due to the ruptures created in functionalities with the economy as a whole, taking away their capacity for reproduction, it facilitated the emergence of an increasingly large informal economy and, as a result of the crisis and the war, it developed significant macroeconomic distortions in the external and fiscal sector, inflation and indebtedness (internal and external). Changes in international partners maintained or deepened the nature of external relations. The State increased its intervention in the economy in different ways, but with objectives different

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the first decade of this century, have increasingly sidelined small producers and rural dwellers, with urban bias policies prevailing instead. These aspects can be confirmed by the budget allocation to provincial and district levels, the low public and private investment in agriculture as a proportion of total investment, the decreasing credit to the agricultural sector, the continuing very low productivity of foodstuff per hectare, This is reflected in the systematic deficit in the agricultural and food trade balance, the increase in the number of poor people and social inequalities, emigration to urban centres, where the informal and occasional jobs economy and marginalisation are on the rise, and long-term trends towards human desertification of vast areas of the country." Mosca, João (2022). Ibidem.

[46] Mosca, João (1999). *A experiência "socialista" moçambicana (1975-1986).* Lisboa: Editora Instituto Piaget.

[47] Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund - IMF, and World Bank - WB).

[48] Leite, Joana Pereira (1989): *A Guerra do Caju e as Relações Moçambique-Índia na Época Pós-Colonial*. Documento de Trabalho n.º 57, CEsA, Centro de Estudos sobre África e do Desenvolvimento. Lisboa, analyses the cashew trade and the World Bank's interventions to export the primary, unprocessed commodity. At the time, the cashew industry was the biggest employer (around 12,000 workers) and had a serious impact on exports and peasant incomes. In this paper, Leite refers to the historical relationship with India in the cashew circuit.

Leite, Joana Pereira (2000): " *A Formação da Economia Colonial em Moçambique. Pacto Colonial e Industrialização: Do Colonialismo Português às Redes Informais de Submissão Mercantil*, 1930-74". In Estudos de Desenvolvimento. África em Transição. UTL, ISEG, CEsA. TRINOVA, pp. 39-51.

See also Mosca (2005), work cited, presenting the evolution of the Mozambican economy, especially after the Berlin Conference and the chartered companies.

from those in the colonial period and during the "socialist experiment". Agriculture was systematically sidelined and peasants forgotten and betrayed. A process of deindustrialisation[49] and the emergence of service sectors (State, transport, communications, hotels, restaurants, banking, insurance, etc.) began.

The state remained important in the economy, although it took on some functions of a different nature, both compared to the "socialist" period and to some aspects of the colonial State. Macroeconomic imbalances persisted.

In addition to the lack of favourable internal conditions, and regional and international contexts for a process of socialisation, there were also economic imbalances.

The following aspects have always prevailed in economic policies and constitute long-term historical continuities:

- The mechanisms for transferring resources (labour and profits - capital) from the countryside to the city and from the "traditional" sector (small-scale agriculture - peasants) to the "modern" one, and from the country to abroad[50].
- The production structure and technology based on cheap labour and small-scale, subsistence agriculture with little integration into markets.
- The processes of concentration of social and spatial wealth remained similar: extractive economic activities (coal, minerals, timber and fisheries before independence, and the same products plus gas and heavy sands after independence); industrialisation (first the import substitution industry after the 1960s until independence; and then the manufacturing industry - MOZAL, beverages, and agricultural commodities - sugar, cotton, cashews, tobacco, cowpeas).
- Urban bias policies, with slight nuances in terms of the instruments used, favouring the centres of power and public administration and the existing and emerging petty bourgeoisie/power elites living in the cities and, on the other hand, as an instrument of defence and prevention against popular demonstrations as a result of increases in the cost of living.
- Dependence on foreign countries (first, mainly on Portugal, South Africa and some Western countries); after independence, mainly on socialist countries; and finally, after the end of the 1980s, the predominance of Western countries, South Africa and Portugal, with the latter losing weight in foreign relations); at the beginning of this century, partners such as China, India and Japan, and, more recently, the Arab countries, reappeared in a long-term perspective.
- The nature of foreign trade remained the same: exports of primary goods and imports of equipment and fuel, which meant that the terms of trade of foreign trade relations continued to deteriorate.

[49] Nova, Yara, and Mosa, João (2022). *Structural transformation of the economy* (1991-2020): *Three decades of marking the pace*. Destaque Rural Nº 154. OMR.
[50] Arthur Lewis's theory of the dual economy.

The entry of multinational capital into Mozambique took place with great intensity from the end of the first decade of this century in the extractive industry, agricultural commodities and some manufacturing sectors. Existing literature points to the following as the main critical aspects[51]:

- Capital-intensive investment, which does little to generate employment, with low-wage practices, few links to the local economic tissue and, therefore, does not create "clusters" or centres of development.
- Production almost entirely exported raw or with initial processing to enable export and therefore with little added value in the country, low local reinvestment, reporting low profits or high losses, and consequently reflected in the taxes payable, in addition to the tax benefits granted by the government.
- Spatially localised investment with territorial development imbalances, immigration movements in the expectation of employment, small businesses and other occupations not fully realised, causing marginalisation and other social phenomena in the population on the outskirts of pre-existing urban settlements. Population resettlements have also arisen of people whose living and working areas have been occupied, mainly by mining.
- Infrastructure overload (traffic intensity and weight), especially on communication routes (roads, bridges).
- Negative effects on the environment (air, water and soil) and on public health (especially respiratory diseases) in extended perimeters around mining centres.
- Exploitation of labour in subhuman conditions.
- The development of illegal mining, fuelling trafficking in gold and precious stones and involving illegal migration.

Positive aspects resulting from the entry of multinationals include the following:

- Contribution to exports, the value of which, after deducting the values of related imports, results in a positive but less significant trade and capital balance.
- Development of local sectors, especially services (railways, ports, road freight and passenger transport, hotels and restaurants).
- Training of technicians, as long as the training costs are lower than importing expatriates and when the investment in training can be recovered. These actions are mainly for basic specialised work skills, such as machine operators, technical assistance and construction personnel, among others.
- Carrying out different so-called social responsibility activities that are the responsibility of the State, transforming them into propaganda activities for the population. Multinationals must pay taxes and these must be used by the State for the benefit of the people in the areas covered by the multinationals' actions.

Monetary policy in the aftermath of the structural adjustment reforms, and above all when there was a massive influx of foreign capital, was established in such a way as to ensure inflation control, using the following instruments: (1) high interest rates to hinder credit (domestic demand for money); (2) overvalued exchange rates to reduce the effects of imported inflation on domestic prices (at the expense of exports); (3) cautious compulsory reserves by the central bank to reduce the credit capacity of commercial banks; and, (4) high international reserves given the risks of the economy. This monetary policy was more evident in some periods of crisis, such as COVID-19. To

[51] The Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR), the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP) and the Institute of Social and Economic Studies (IESE) have carried out several studies on the subjects summarised below.

summarise, Mozambique's monetary policy is excessively cautious, drying up the money market. In phases of worsening economic crises, monetary policy has been even more recessive, making it difficult for the productive tissue to react, for jobs to be created, and for social sacrifices to be reduced, especially for the poorest.

Multinationals´ "businesses" are often linked to situations of corruption at different levels, non-transparency and various exceptional benefits. The State and business are full of proven situations of corruption, which has become endemic and is an important element in the weakening of executive power, the partidirization of the public administration and the judicial system, which is reflected, for example: (1) in the weak capacity for auditing and tax inspection; (2) in the capital flight and money laundering and financing of terrorism[52]; (3) in the fight against the crime of kidnapping with police officers involved[53]; (4) in police and judicial control and action over the channels of trafficking in gold and precious stones, timber, ivory and rhino horns, fish, human beings, among others; (5) ineffective legislation for certain crimes, in terms of prevention, monitoring or prosecution; (6) participation in the corporate structures of companies and commissions paid to political and economic decision-makers, as payment for favours, for facilitating administrative procedures, protection and political cover.

These almost opposite (antidote) processes of political, economic, and institutional change have essentially taken place with the same elites and people from the "ruling" classes. Those who claimed to be against capitalism and spoke in favour of socialisation are today the main beneficiaries of privatisation and have interests in multiple national and international companies (international capitalism in its imperialist form).

Frelimo, which claimed to be against oppression, itself organised re-education camps[54] (similar to deportation and forced labour in colonial times) and passed the whipping Act (similar to the colonial palmatory). In the period after independence, the State was present in all sectors of activity as a result of central planning and the nationalisation of the economy and advocated the "creation of a State apparatus that materialises the power of the worker-peasant alliance as a basic condition for the realisation of our economic and social policy" [55]". This State has become a platform for the hierarchical distribution of resources and business by the elites at various levels, contributing to a wild and deregulated market [56], on the one hand, but intervening in the sectors that support and indirectly finance Frelimo in power and public institutions, maintaining a large

[52] At a conference on "Money Laundering and the De-Dollarisation of the Economy", the recently published Basel Index indicates that, out of a total of 125 countries assessed, Mozambique ranks first as the country most at risk of money laundering and terrorism financing. Figures from the Central Office for the Prevention and Combat of Drugs indicate that, from 2012 to 2016, just over 27 tonnes of *cannabis sativa*, known as *soruma,* six tonnes of hashish, more than 1 tonne of ephedrine, 553 kg of heroin and almost 100 kg were seized." At https://www.voaportugues.com/a/mo%C3%A7ambique-%C3%A9-um-grande-corredor-de-hero%C3%ADna/5077453.html.

[53] There are several published cases of seizures and investigations into drug trafficking gangs involving members of the Mozambican police (PRM) and SERNIC (National Criminal Investigation Service).

[54] In the Mozambican, Soviet and Chinese processes, which are taken up with greater reference in this paper, there were decisions and measures of extreme violence, such as the re-education camps in Mozambique, similar to the deportations to Siberia of the kulaks and peasants, and the Chinese communes.

[55] Frelimo (1977). Work cited.

[56] Mosca, João, Abbas, Máriam e Bruna, Natacha (2013): *Economia de Moçambique 2001-2010: um "mix" de populismo económico e mercado selvagem*. Escolar Editora. Maputo.

number of companies, known as "structuring the economy" with high losses, protected by the State and Frelimo.[57].

In essence, economic policies have always sought to integrate Mozambique into the framework of logics and objectives whose centre of interest is located abroad and where exogenous variables have had, and continue to have, a major influence on the behaviour of the economy and economic agents. Internally, the traditional sectors were subject to the influence of variables that they did not control and, due to persistent crises and conflicts, were subject to productive and social oscillations and instabilities that led to absolute poverty for a high percentage of the population[58].

Economic strategies have always been short-term, implemented with the mechanical import of models unsuited to social realities (during the socialist period and after the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme - SAP), the logic and reproduction mechanisms of local economies and the cultural values of the people. Bureaucracies and institutions have always been weak and debilitated; and they have played economic roles in defence of social classes that constituted elites in the initial accumulation phase, therefore using forms of accumulation supported by authoritarian regimes. The economy was disconnected from the construction of a nation state[59] around elements of identity that would bring together national consensus and mobilise all political, economic and social forces around national strategic objectives. Many of the regime's actions were characterised as those of an authoritarian and repressive state, with no respect for citizens' fundamental rights.

In short, the State that workers and peasants wanted has been transformed, by its own elites, into a weakened State apparatus[60], dominated by different personalities from different class and ethnic

[57] The example of LAM is paradigmatic.

[58] The total number of poor people in 2015 is similar to that in 1997; around 12 million inhabitants, (Ministério da Economia e Finanças 2016. *Pobreza e bem-estar em Moçambique: Quarta avaliação nacional*. Direcção Nacional de Estudos Económicos. Governo de Moçambique; Ministry of Planning and Development (2010). *Poverty and Wellbeing in Mozambique: Third National Poverty Assessment*. Governo de Moçambique. Ministry of Planning and Finance (2004), Ibidem e Ministry of Planning and Finance (1998). *Understanding Poverty and Well-being in Mozambique: The First National Assessment, 1996–97*. Governo de Moçambique. However, according to the same criteria used in Mozambique, the proportion of poor people in this period went from around 69.7% in 1997 to around 46% in 2014 (Ministério da Economia e Finanças 2016, Ibidem. Ministry of Planning and Finance (1998) Ibidem. Poverty, considering the poverty threshold of 1.9 dollars a day used by the World Bank between 1996 and 2014, showed the lowest percentage in 2014 (64.7%). The average percentage of poverty in this period was 73.8%, with a minimum of 64.7% and a maximum of 82% in 1996, (Banco Mundial, 2023) Ibidem. The percentage of poverty, when considering the poverty line of 3.2 dollars a day, between 2002 and 2014, showed a downward trend, with the lowest in 2014 (82.4%) and the highest in 2002 (92.2%), (World Bank 2023). Ibidem.

[59] Bangura (1992) Yssuf (1992): "Authoritarian Rule and Democracy in Africa. A Theoretical Discourse". Authoritarianism, Democracy and Adjustment. The Politics of Economic Reforms in Africa. Peter Gibbon, Yssuf, Bangura and Arve Ofstad. Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, emphasises the importance of public services provided by the State as elements of national cohesion and stability. The needs are immense and the State's capacity to provide services is limited by budgetary constraints and the capacity to generate public revenue, as well as by restrictive fiscal policies, aggravated by structural adjustment programmes, which lack transparency.

[60] The State has been weakened when it comes to exercising its economic and supervisory functions, such as taxation, making the business sector of the economy efficient, adopting and implementing legislation against capital flight, for fighting corruption, maintaining public infrastructure, improving health and education, territorial and urban planning, in particular "*tô pidir*" economic diplomacy, among other functions. Conversely, it is effective in repressing or banning demonstrations, in assassinating politically inconvenient

backgrounds, with economic interests, a strong ally of multinational capital and with sovereignty alienated by the pressures and conditionalities of international organisations and some cooperating countries, with a repressive apparatus in defence of capital, incapable of promoting development that reduces the number of poor people, that is sustained, stable, socially and spatially balanced, that protects the rights of workers and peasants,

In addition to the lack of objective conditions for socialist transformation (either in the Marxist conception or in the Trotskyist or Maoism approaches referred to here) and the radicalisation of the Mozambican process, influenced by unfavourable contexts, the changes in political and economic options and positions allowed for the long-term continuation of the transformation of the economy to a peripheral capitalist system with a deepening of the dependent and underdeveloped nature.

4. STATISTICS OF MOZAMBICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT

The period considered for this work is between 1992 and the most recent available information, generally 2020. 1992 was taken because it was the year the civil war ended, with the General Peace Agreement signed on 4 October. From then on, a new phase of development began, with the return of displaced people and war refugees, the recovery of infrastructure and the start of foreign investment (especially at the end of the century). The 16-year war plunged the country into a deep economic crisis, resulting in the need to sign agreements with the Bretton Woods institutions and the implementation of a Structural Adjustment Programme since early 1987, and, previously with South Africa, the N'Komati agreement (1984), which provided for a non-aggression pact and the withdrawal of Maputo's support to the African National Congress (ANC). The statistics on previous years have a lot of gaps in the information and, on the other hand, the period of almost thirty years is sufficient for descriptive analyses of economic trends.

4.1 Gross Domestic Product

The selected indicators are related to the first three sections and aim to characterise the Mozambican economy as underdeveloped. The statistics considered cover the period between 1992 and, in most cases, 2019, 2020 or 2021, depending on their availability. This period coincides with the end of the civil war because, before that, the economy went through a long period of economic, political and social crisis that should not be used for comparison. After independence (1975) the country went through a period of persistent crisis, due to various factors, summarised as follows: (1) maladaptation and incoherence in the application of the "socialist" model; (2) the collapse of the socialist economies in Europe with which Mozambique received a large part of the co-operation and of foreign investment and political and diplomatic support; the start of the civil war which deepened the post-independence crisis, reflected in more than 1 million displaced people and refugees, a generalised fall in production and the unsustainability of companies, the destruction of infrastructure, very high inflation (above 40%), worsening external debt, public and external deficits, among other aspects and indicators. As a result of these and other aspects, the indicators from that period are not comparable.

people, it does not fully defend human rights, etc. In short, it is effective in defending the economic interests of allied political and economic elites, it is very effective in defending power in situations of peace, and it is incompetent in the fight against terrorism and situations of armed conflict.

GDP in 1992 was 2.8 thousand million USD and in 2021 it was around 18.4 thousand million USD, which means a 6.5-fold increase. In the same period, GDP per inhabitant went from 203.9 to 573.1 dollars, which represents a 2.8-fold increase.

In terms of GDP volume and at constant prices, Mozambique ranked 127th out of 199 countries in 2000, 128th out of 204 countries in 2010, and 128th out of 216 countries in 2021[61]. In terms of GDP per capita, in the three years mentioned, Mozambique ranked 180th out of 201 countries, 196th out of 203 countries, and 179th out of 186 countries, respectively. These figures indicate that Mozambique is a country where its citizens have the lowest incomes in the world, being a medium-sized country in terms of GDP size. In 2021, Mozambique had a GDP roughly equivalent to 0.07% of the GDP of the world's largest economy (the United States of America) (Banco Mundial, 2021). Compared to some countries in the region, Mozambique's economy had a GDP of approximately 3.8% of South Africa's, 22.2% of Angola's, 23.8% of Tanzania's and 61.4% of Zimbabwe's.

Chart 1
Trend of GDP and GDP per capita in thousand million dollars between 1992 and 2020, at 2015 prices



Note: GDP per capita is on the secondary scale (right) in USD.
Source: Prepared by the author based on World Bank data.

Chart 2 shows that agriculture is losing weight in GDP formation, in favour of an increase in extractive industry (mainly gas, coal and mining) and manufacturing (SASOL, beverages and food). Services grew from the middle of the last decade of the last century. It should be noted that in agriculture, the crops that are mainly exported (sugar, cotton, cashews, cowpeas, sesame and tobacco) have had positive production and productivity trends, as well as consumer goods (potatoes, onions and tomatoes), which are essentially produced by medium and large producers.

[61] In 2021, out of 206 countries assessed, the GDP of the world's ten largest economies concentrated 68.34% of the world's GDP (the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, France, Italy, Canada and South Korea), which represented a global Gini index of 88.36.

Chart 2
Trend in the proportion of GDP (in USD) by sector of activity between 1992 and 2020



Source: Prepared by the author based on BdeM data

4.2 Population and employment

Chart 3 shows a rapid increase in the population (2.3 times more in 2021 than in 1992) and that this increase has been more significant in urban areas (3.37 times more), due to the attraction of better living conditions (access to basic services) and greater job opportunities, especially in informal activities. There has also been migration to rural areas crossed by development corridors, which generally have a tighter network of villages and urbanised population settlements, and the emergence of new economic activities (mainly large projects creating jobs, but above all job expectations).

Chart 3
Total population trend by area between 1992 and 2020



Source: Prepared by the author based on World Bank data.

Chart 4 shows that the population has grown more than the employed population, which means that the number of citizens without formal jobs has grown more than the employed population. Although the labour force in agriculture has increased by 1.6 times, 6.4 times in industry and 3 times in services, the number of people employed in agriculture is increasing. This indicates a low capacity for job creation outside of agriculture, including precarious employment, which is easily verified by the definition of employment used[62].

Chart 4
Evolution of the labour force employed by sector of activity between 1992 and 2017



Source: Prepared by the author based on Tradingeconomics data.

Chart 5 shows that although the volume of the employed population has increased in all sectors in percentage terms, agriculture has reduced its share and has been partially offset by the services sector and industry (especially mining and the manufacturing subsectors mentioned above).

[62] Employee is defined as a person aged 15 or more who is in one of the following situations: (1) has worked for at least one hour in the last 7 days prior to the survey, for the production of goods or services, for payment in cash or in kind; (2) has helped a family member in the production of goods and services, without pay; (3) has not worked, but was employed during the reference period. In other words, they were on holiday, on maternity leave, on strike, etc. Banco Mundial (2023) - https://datos.bancomundial.org/pais/mozambique.

Chart 5

Changes in the proportion of the labour force employed by sector of activity between 1992 and 2017



Source: Prepared by the author based on Tradingeconomics data.

Between 1992 and 2017, agriculture accounted for 78% of total employment in the period, 17% for services and 5% for industry[63].

If the definition of vulnerable employment[64] is considered, the reality that can be inferred is very different: In 1992, of the total employed population in Mozambique, 89.2% were in vulnerable employment, rising to 83.1% in 2018.

4.3 Savings and investment

Chart 6 mainly shows the economy's weak savings capacity and a high level of investment, especially since the first years of the second decade of this century, in sectors that do not reflect the internal growth of the economy and its accumulation processes. The investment level is only justified by FDI and external loans, as shown in Chart 7.

[63] Data calculated from the same source, considering the total for the period under analysis.

[64] Vulnerable employment refers to unpaid family workers and the self-employed. The data is based on information on employment status (Banco Mundial, 2020).

Chart 6
Changes in the proportion of gross domestic savings and national investment to GDP between 1992 and 2021



Source: Prepared by the author based on data from INE (Statistical Yearbooks between 2010 and 2021) on national investment and the World Bank for gross domestic savings.

Chart 7 shows that foreign investment (FDI), domestic investment (NDI) and loans fluctuate greatly over the analysed period and it is not clear that there are trade-offs between the three forms of financing the economy. However, NDI has grown in almost every year. In the period from 2001 to 2017, total FDI represents 38% of total investment, NDI 12% and loans 50%. Of the total investment made between 2001 and 2017, around 88% is of foreign origin (Banco de Moçambique, 2021).

The fluctuations in foreign investments and loans can have various interpretations, such as: (1) external demand for energy sources (coal and gas), precious and strategic minerals (heavy sands and gold), agricultural commodities for industrial purposes (cotton and tobacco) and for food chains (cowpeas and sesame); (2) the internal environment for investment, especially the existence of conflicts; (3) the "facilities" offered by the Mozambican government and the business environment.

Chart 7
Evolution and trend of investment in Mozambique between 2001 and 2017[65]



Source: Prepared by the author based on BdeM data.

4.4 External trade

Chart 8 shows a persistent and growing trade deficit.

Chart 8
Trends in exports, imports and the trade balance between 2001 and 2020



Source: Prepared by the author based on BdeM data.

Chart 9 shows a rapid increase in imports in all categories of goods (including capital goods). Intermediate and capital goods are temporally related to investments in major projects (the start of these projects and the import of capital goods and intermediate goods) from 2010 and 2011 onwards. Consumer goods are associated with the increase in population, particularly urban

[65] NDI does not include public investment. Loans correspond to the total (internal and external).

population, the increase in income per inhabitant and the reduction in agricultural production per inhabitant[66].

Chart 9
Import trends in millions of USD between 2000 and 2020



Source: Prepared by the author based on BdeM data.

Charts 10, 11 and 12 show the evolution of the terms of trade (price ratios) between the main exported goods and the main imported goods. It can be seen that: (1) when the exported good is industrial (aluminium), the terms of trade with the main imported food goods (rice and wheat) is unfavourable for Mozambique (unfavourable terms of trade), as well as in relation to oil imports; (2) when the exported good is agricultural for industrial purposes (cotton), its relationship with rice and oil imports is unfavourable for Mozambique and the opposite in the case of wheat; (3) when the export is coal, the terms of trade are favourable to imports of rice and wheat, and the opposite for oil; (4) oil has less pronounced terms of trade with exported goods; (5) coal has favourable terms of trade for Mozambique; (6) there is great variability in the terms of trade, particularly in 2008 and 2009, which coincides with the international crisis in that period, and in the short term there was a worsening of the terms of trade for the imported goods considered in the charts.

[66] See Nova, Yara, and Mosca, João (2022). The fallacy of prioritising agriculture. OMR. Destaque Rural Nº 162.

Chart 10

Evolution of the terms of trade according to the price of aluminium between 2001 and 2019



Chart 11

Evolution of the terms of trade according to the price of cotton between 2001 and 2019



Chart 12

Evolution of the terms of trade according to the price of coal between 2001 and 2019



Source: Prepared by the author based on IMF data.

Chart 13 shows the evolution of the terms of trade for all goods imported and exported by Mozambique. There has been a marked and persistent worsening of the unfavourable terms of trade for the Mozambican economy, that is, a loss in the purchasing power of the goods exported by the country.

Chart 13

Evolution of the direct trade index[67] (2000=100) between 1992 and 2018



Source: Prepared by the author based on World Bank data

4.5 Internal and external debt

Chart 14 shows the evolution of internal and external debt and Chart 15 shows the percentage of external debt to GDP. We can see the dramatic increase in both, emphasising that the domestic debt has increased more rapidly since 2016/2017, while at the same time the external debt has decreased. These changes can be explained by the reactions of multinationals and cooperation to the discovering of illegal and hidden debts[68].

Chart14

Trends in the stock of domestic debt (in billions) and external debt in millions of USD



Chart 15

External debt trend (% of GDP) between 2009 and 2020



[67] See definition of terms of trade above, at the footnote 20.

[68] The hidden debts were incurred during Emílio Guebuza's second term in office, involving around 2.2 billion dollars. They are called "hidden" because the legal procedures for authorising their contraction, which had to be approved by the Assembly of the Republic and the IMF, were not followed. Subsequently, with the unveiling of the facts, legal proceedings have continued in Mozambique and abroad, also involving decisions by important and large international financial institutions. There are cases of corruption or uncertainty over the application of external funding. For three to five years, there has been a major reduction in foreign investment and in direct support for the State budget, which has led to a slowdown in economic growth, inflation and a domestic economic crisis. There is a huge body of literature on this subject.

Source: Prepared by the author based on data from BdeM (external debt), MEF (domestic debt) and World Bank (external debt (% of GDP).

4.6 International indices

The indices below, shown in chart 16, are directly related to economic activities and their performance. Mozambique is among the 15% (in 2013) and 5% (in 2010) of countries with the least innovation and between 1% (in 2013) and 3% of the least competitive (in 2019) of the countries assessed. Mozambique has a better ranking in the Doing Business (DB) index: between 30% in 2016, 21% in 2013 and 27% in 2020, with the worst DB.

Chart 16
Trend of Mozambique's ranking ratio among the countries assessed[69]



Source: Doing Business annual reports, global competitiveness and global innovation.

4.7 Summary

The statistics of the Mozambican economy indicate:

- The economy is small in size, with a growing GDP and one of the lowest GDP per capita in the world. Services account for the largest share of GDP, remaining at around 40%; agriculture is in second place and is on a accentuated downward trend, falling from 40% in 1992 to 27.2% in 2020. The State and the manufacturing and extractive industry sectors remain similar, with a share of around 15% each. Since the early years of this century, manufacture has experienced a significant increase in its contribution to GDP, as a result of investments in the sectors already listed.
- The population is growing at a quite high rate, with the percentage of the urban population increasing the fastest (from 25% of the total population in 1992 to 37% in

[69] The values were calculated based on the following ratio:
Ratio of ranking X (in this case, Mozambique) in year t/Total number of countries assessed in year t, in%. These ratios show the percentage of Mozambique's position among the countries assessed. The higher the percentage, the worse the position; 100% means the worst ranked country. In the case of competitiveness, Mozambique had an indicator of 97% in 2019, which means that only 3% of the countries assessed are less competitive.

2021). The employed labour force is concentrated in agriculture (compared to manufacture and services), with a smaller percentage increase in this sector, but a larger increase in the number of employees.

- Domestic savings as a proportion of GDP were negative between 1992 and 1997, peaked at 19% in 2001 and then fell below 10% until 2021 (except in 2021 with 12%), which is low considering the impact of new investments on growth and the amortisation of fixed and working capital. External savings rose sharply after 2011, reaching levels above 50% of GDP by 2021. In other words, the economy invests on the basis of external savings (investment and loans, which have reached almost 90% of investment), above all in the export sectors and in the domestic sectors associated with major projects.
- The external sector of the economy is chronically in deficit, with a tendency to export primary goods (gas, coal and other minerals and agricultural commodities - sugar, cotton, bananas, cowpeas, sesame, and tobacco) and import foodstuff (mainly rice, wheat and cooking oils). The terms of trade between some of the most imported and most exported products are negative in most cases; at the level of the economy as a whole, there has been a sharp and persistent decline in the national economy's terms of trade in its external relations.
- Domestic and foreign debts have steadily worsened in volume and as a percentage of GDP over the period surveyed, which places the country in 2019, after an upgrade by the Standard & Poor's (S&P) rating agency to the CCC+/C indicator, as a country of high vulnerability and risk for investors - "taking into account the country's current financial capacity and uncertainties regarding future revenues". Before 2019, the country was rated SD (selective default)[70].
- Some of the main international economic indices show that the country is among the worst of the countries assessed, with a worsening trend since 2016/2017.

To summarise, the descriptive statistical analysis shows that: (1) the Mozambican economy is small; (2) it has a fast-growing population mostly living in rural areas practising low-productivity agriculture; (3) there is still a high percentage of poor citizens and strong social inequalities; (4) it is dependent on external factors for growth (investment, financing and cooperation) and low external savings which strangle the national business community; (5) it has a productive structure concentrated on natural resources, commodities for export and increased food dependency with a deterioration in foreign trade exchange relations.

In recent decades, there has been a deindustrialisation of the sectors consuming raw materials and producers of goods and equipment for the domestic market, a decrease in the production and productivity of some basic food products, the marginalisation of peasants, who account for the majority of the population, rapid urbanisation and forced migration (economic, due to political and military instability) and the deterioration of important infrastructure (roads and bridges, real estate, irrigation and defence against climate shocks, etc.). Climate shocks have increased in frequency and intensity without local measures to increase economic and social resilience.

The sidelining of the productive sectors (agriculture and manufacture), little job creation and the decline in income from agriculture, the poor quality of education, rapid population growth and the deterioration of infrastructure have led to a greater number of poor people, an increase in economic dependence and the underdeveloped nature of the economy.

[70] https://www.jornaldeangola.ao/ao.

5. CONCLUSION

The underdeveloped structure of the Mozambican economy results from a long-term process that began mainly at the end of the 19th century, with short-term reforms without structural effects, mainly the following: the reforms of the colonial model after the establishment of the *Estado Novo* in Portugal and after the 1950s; with independence, there was the period of the "socialist experiment" between 1975 and 1986, and finally the structural adjustment programme in 1987[71]. The characteristics of the economy remained the same, namely : (1) the base of small-scale, low-productivity agriculture with poor market integration;; (2) the population and rural employment in "family"/"subsistence"/small-scale agriculture; (3) the extroversion of the economy, firstly with the production of commodities for Portuguese industrialisation, and then to carry out initial processing to enable exports or to prepare imported goods for final consumption in the country; the final colonial phase in which a manufacturing industry for raw materials and domestic consumption developed (only to become deindustrialised after SAP implementation); (4) after the first decade of the 21st century, a natural resources industry emerged with few links to the economy and society and promoting social and spatial inequalities.

Development models or strategies, especially after independence, were imported, decontextualized, radically applied, with political and economic violence and negative social effects, with the aim of the ideological transformation of the economy and society; after the SAP, there were, and still are, predatory forms of action by foreign capital, configuring a market that is both savage and controlled by the sectors that support power, whose exclusive aim is the extraction of wealth, with little or no links to the domestic economy, and with little job creation or consideration for social and environmental effects.

The institutions (bureaucracies) after independence were always dominated by minority elites from the aristocracies of local societies who assimilated and established inter-ethnic alliances (in a supposed "national unity") and short-lived tactical compromises with elements mostly descended from the colonial petty bourgeoisie, usually whites and Indians. The liberators of the homeland (leaders of Frelimo, as a liberation movement), with multiple narratives within the Marxist framework or a new European and Africanist left, were transformed, after the SAP, for the most part, into a rentier, corrupt and business elite, linked to external investors, transforming themselves from liberators into exploiters of the people.

[71] For an overview of these periods, see, for example, Centro de Estudos Africanos (1985) *A Estrutura Económica no Fim do Período Colonial.* Maputo, CEA/UEM, Mosca (1999 and 2005) and Leite (2000), works cited above.

The organisation of State institutions and State-owned companies, firstly, and then companies with State participation, had bureaucratic centralism[72], militaristic methods and forms [73] of authoritarian command and unquestioning obedience as their organisational philosophies.

A party with the characteristics of Frelimo and a State that is authoritarian, centralising and representing the economic interests of political elites who, although with internal contradictions, maintain "unity" for the sake of greater objectives, such as guaranteeing the self-feeding circle between power and business, are functional for the implementation of a "socialist" model unsuited to realities and in a context of conflict and, equally, a model subordinated to international capitalism and the economic, political and geostrategic interests of certain countries. The situation of a fragile and bankrupt State, with evident signs of corruption at different levels, is a convenient construction for the reproduction of external economic interests in alliance with internal ones, using the State as a platform for the hierarchical distribution of wealth (income).

[72] A debated concept and one of the reasons for the internal struggles in Marxist and left-wing parties, starting with the former USSR Communist Party (CP) , where Stalin, Bukharin Zinoviev and others represented the methods characterising bureaucratic centralism. Trotsky was one of the great opponents of the bureaucratisation of the CP of the former USSR, especially during the Stalinist period and while he was a militant there (until his deportation): bureaucratic structures meant a complex, normative, hierarchical administrative organisation. These bureaucracies adapt to daily routines and a lack of debate, with many procedures that are out of touch with national realities and objectives and, where appropriate, the class nature of power, and respond with (sometimes " canine ") loyalty to their hierarchical superiors. These organisations predominate in the administrative apparatuses of the parties and the State.

[73] Frelimo's origins lie in a guerrilla national liberation movement.

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