THE RISE AND FALL OF PROSAVANA: FROM TRIANGULAR COOPERATION TO BILATERAL COOPERATION IN COUNTER-RESISTANCE

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Os objectivos do OBSERVADOR RURAL são:
- Reflectir e promover a troca de opiniões sobre temas da actualidade moçambicana e assuntos internacionais.
- Dar a conhecer à sociedade os resultados dos debates, de pesquisas e reflexões sobre temas relevantes do sector agrário e do meio rural.

O OBSERVADOR RURAL é um espaço de publicação destinado principalmente aos investigadores e técnicos que pesquisam, trabalham ou que tenham algum interesse pela área objecto do OMR. Podem ainda propor trabalhos para publicação outros cidadãos nacionais ou estrangeiros.

Os conteúdos são da exclusiva responsabilidade dos autores, não vinculando, para qualquer efeito o Observatório do Meio Rural nem os seus parceiros ou patrocinadores.

Os textos publicados no OBSERVADOR RURAL estão em forma de *draft*. Os autores agradecem contribuições para aprofundamento e correções, para a melhoria do documento.
INTRODUCTION

What happened to the now infamous ProSAVANA program, one of the world’s largest land grabbing deals signed by Japan, Brazil and Mozambique in 2009? “Is it dead or alive?” --- these are frequent questions asked by those who have come to be interested in the triangular program and the peoples’ resistance to it. ProSAVANA has been attracting the attention of many journalists, scholars, practitioners and activists for more than 10 years. Grasping the program in its entirety, however, is not an easy task.

The once large-scale public-private agriculture development program of Japan and Brazil no longer exists due to strong opposition from local peasant movements and the unified civil society activism of the three associated countries. This could be considered a victory in the context of global land grabbing and resistance of social movements, as Alex Shankland & Euclides Gonçalves (2016) states:

“Noting that the latest ProSAVANA planning documents differ significantly from those expressing its initial vision, we argue that the contestation of ProSAVANA has had a series of productive effects even before the program has moved to full implementation. These productive effects are visible not only in the program itself but also in the wider context of state-society relations shaping debates on South–South cooperation in Mozambique, Brazil, and beyond”.

Al Jazeera also refers the following comment by Prof. Joseph Hanlon in its article released in February 2018:

“No to ProSavana has been one of Mozambique’s most successful civil society campaigns, proving that an alliance of local groups and international NGOs can change policy”.

Yet, the program itself continues to exist, although how and why it persist is unclear. This stems from the complexity and opacity of the Japanese public actors involved, who are the most crucial key players for the survival of the program as its funding source. Unless one understands the context and analyzes the primary sources of the Japanese actors, it is extremely difficult to gain a full understanding of ProSAVANA. This paper, therefore, focuses on the Japanese context and explores the history of ProSAVANA based on official documents and recordings, especially of the Japanese actors involved.

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3 The documents were requested of JICA and MOFA by Prof. Dr. Masao Yoshida using the Act for Establishment of the Information Disclosure
The story begins in 2009 when the triangular accord was signed by representatives of the three countries. The sections of this paper are in chronological order, largely based on the following periodization with the following titles: 1. The Rise of ProSAVANA (2009-2012); 2. Peasant Protest (2012-); 3. JICA’s counter-resistance strategy (End 2012-); 4. From triangular cooperation to bilateral cooperation (2014-); 5. Bilateral counter-resistance strategy (2015-); 6. Small victories and ‘Satyagraha’ (2017-); 7. Current situation and historical roots; and 8. Conclusion.

By going through the history of ProSAVANA, the paper will illustrate to the reader, the transition of the program from triangular cooperation to bilateral counter-resistance cooperation between Japan and Mozambique. In place of a conclusion, the paper will share an overview of the current situation (up to July 2019) as it relates to the historical roots of the Japanese involvement and their modus operandi.

[Notes]

The draft of this paper was written in response to a request from a German civic organization, KoordinierungsKreis Mosambik (KKM) between August and December 2018. Its short version in German is published in the 97th newsletter of KKM, “Mosambik Rundbrief”4. This is the updated and more complete version.

The author is preparing another academic paper based on this paper. This paper is to provide information about and the author’s analysis of ProSAVANA and Japanese involvement in the Nacala Corridor region to those interested in this topic outside of Japan.

More detailed analysis of the program during the period from 2009 to 2013 by the author should be consulted in the previous publications of the author: “ProSAVANA: Analysis of the discourse and background of the ProSAVANA programme in Mozambique–focusing on Japan’s role” (2013) and “Post-Fukushima Anatomy of Studies on ProSAVANA: Focusing on Natalia Fingermann’s “Myths behind ProSAVANA” (2014)5. Other analysis by the Japanese civil society groups was released as “ProSAVANA’s strategy and its impact: An analysis of JICA’s disclosed and leaked documents” (2016), in the formulation of which the author participated6.


4 http://kkmosambik.de/content/?portfolio=mosambik-rundbrief-97
6 Posted at https://farmlandgrab.org/26449 or Download the full report in PDF
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1. THE RISE OF PROSAVANA

(1) Bringing the ‘success of the Cerrado’ to Africa

To “transfer the success of Japan’s agricultural cooperation in the Brazilian Cerrado to the African Savannah” was the intention of JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) when signing the accord entitled “Japan-Brazil Cooperation for Agricultural Development in African Tropical Savannah” with its Brazilian counterpart, ABC (Brazilian Cooperation Agency), on April 3, 2009. The first trial targeted Mozambique due to its official language being Portuguese, the “similar agronomical conditions” with the Cerrado and the “unexploited agricultural area”. The parties aimed to cultivate soy.

For JICA it was a great success when the first accord for ProSAVANA (Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique – Japan, Brazil and Mozambique) was signed by all involved countries in September 2009. The motivation for Tokyo to promote such a large scale project has been not only to secure its food imports, but also to utilize it as an innovative and pioneer example of South-South and Triangular cooperation in order to raise Japan’s presence in the field of international cooperation and diplomacy. Thus, Japan aimed to demonstrate its leading role in formulating this triangular cooperation, at least until it faced severe domestic as well as international criticism.

(2) Rivalry with China and Japan’s international reputation

This was the time when the economic presence of China began to expand internationally, especially in Africa. For Japan, the rise of China was perceived as a threat due to their historical rivalry. The competition with China led Japan to expand its foreign assistance to Africa and plan large-scale aid programs in order to show its capacity as an innovative and leading traditional donor and gain support from African governments at the UN level. ProSAVANA was one of such program and it seemed to be positively regarded in diplomatic circles.

JICA reaffirmed its intentions when the Secretary of State of the United States, Hilary Clinton, praised ProSAVANA during the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness organized by OECD/DAC in the end of 2011 in Busan, Korea. Prior to this, Bill Gates celebrated the program as an “innovative partnership” at the G20 Summit. JICA highlighted those remarks in its 2011 annual report. Interestingly, most of the activities related to ProSAVANA had not begun at that point.

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10 See the third file on the right hand side of the following site. The first Minutes of Meeting signed by the representatives of three countries on September 17, 2009 is included. Annex 1 explains: “the area of the African Guinea Savannah is about 700 million hectares, of which 400 million hectares are arable. This is the largest non-used agricultural area in the world…In Mozambique…the exploitation rate of arable land is approximately 4%.” https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears
11 Sayaka Funada Classen, “Analysis of discourse and background of the ProSAVANA program in Mozambique – focusing on Japan’s role”, 2012. (Portuguese version is also available) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291148040_Analysis_of_the_discourse_and_background_of_the_ProSAVANA_programme_in_Mozambique_-_focusing_on_Japan%27s_role
(3) Japan’s initiative and leading role

Although Japan’s initiative and leading role for materializing ProSAVANA would be later denied by the Japanese and Mozambican governments, the disclosed and leaked documents from MOFA and JICA confirm this fact. The disclosed documents that circulated between Tokyo and the embassies in Mozambique and Brazil through diplomatic cable between 2008 and 2009 reveal how enthusiastic JICA and the Japanese diplomats were in order to make the first triangular agreement a reality.\(^{14}\)

The leading role of Japan in the initial period could be also confirmed by the following budget plan leaked and posted at the site of the international NGO, GRAIN (p.13)\(^{15}\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.1. PROJECT TITLE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of the Agriculture Development Master Plan for the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique (ProSAVANA-PD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.2. ESTIMATED DURATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 months after first assignment of the mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.3. ESTIMATED COSTS BY USE AND SOURCES:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazilian Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Above mentioned costs can be changed based on the progress of the Project</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Appendix 2 of the leaked minutes of memorandum of the 2\(^{nd}\) Joint Coordination Committee meeting among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique held in Maputo on July 28, 2011.

(4) The Japan-Brazil joint mission for promoting investment in Mozambique

ProSAVANA was given most attention during early 2012. JICA and ABC sent the Joint Mission for Promoting Agricultural Investment to the Nacala Corridor in Northern Mozambique in April 2012. The delegations from Japan and Brazil consisted of roughly 20 governmental officials and representatives of the food-agribusiness-related private sector, especially those dealing with production and/or processing of soy.

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\(^{14}\) For instance, diplomatic cables exchanged between the Japanese Embassy in Brazil and MOFA Tokyo on the visit of the then JICA Vice President Kenzo Oshima to Brazil (No. 692 and No. 693 dated April 2, 2009).

\(^{15}\) The third file posted at the following site: [https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears](https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears)
The Japanese delegation was led by Eiji Inui, ex-Africa Division Chief and later JICA’s board member, and the Brazilian one by Luiz Nishimori, a Nikkei Brazilian parliamentarian. The visit was widely broadcast and promoted in the three countries. Back in Brazil, Senator Nishimori enthusiastically talked about the importance of the program for opening the door for Brazilian farmers who do not have access to land in order to practice large-scale and modern mechanized farming in Mozambique during his media interviews.

This echoed the Reuter’s article published in August 2011 and entitled ‘Mozambique offers Brazilian farmers land to plant’. In the article, Mozambique’s Agriculture Minister José Pacheco offered “50-year concessions for Brazilian producers to develop 6 million hectares of its savanna”.

This positive momentum for the JICA program lasted until September 2012. JICA invited the participants of the mission and all the key players from all three countries to Tokyo and held an international symposium at JICA Research Institute in June 2012. The disclosed list of over 100 participants confirms the participation of the Japanese bureaucracy (MOFA, METI, MAFF) and Japanese companies. The disclosed agenda of the event places particular importance on the presentation given by the Brazilian institution, FGV (Fundação de Getúlio Vargas). Although the disclosure of the FGV’s presentation was officially denied by JICA due to “non-existence,” the Review Board of the Information Disclosure Law discovered the documents and ordered JICA to disclose all the presentations given during the JICA seminars.

(5) FGV’s Nacala Fund and JICA

The FGV’s presentation of June 2012 was entitled ‘Tropical Belt Nacala Corridor ProSAVANA Program’ and was divided into two parts: the explanations on FGV’s activities of promoting

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16 His is referred to as a backer of “a bill that eases pesticide licensing regulations” in the Ana Macalhães for Repórter Brasil on September 28, 2018 ‘Predatory agribusiness’ likely to gain more power in Brazil election: report, Mogabay. 

17 TV Câmara (Parliamentarian TV), Brasilia, June 24, 2012. Nikkei Shimbun (São Paulo), May 1, 2012. 

18 https://farmlandgrab.org/19081 Later the Mozambican government denied this offer. https://farmlandgrab.org/19123

19 https://websekai.iwanami.co.jp/posts/932 The disclosure of the list was requested using the Information Disclosure Law. The request was refused by JICA, but the Review Board ordered JICA to disclose it.

20 FGV’s PPT presentation used at JICA’s seminar on ProSAVANA in Tokyo (June 2013).
agribusiness in the ‘Tropical Belt’ around the world, especially in Africa, and on Nacala Corridor agricultural development. The latter includes the information regarding ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund.

The leaked Minutes of Meeting (MoM) of the 3rd Joint Coordination Committee meeting held in Nampula on December 3, 2012 confirms this. It reveals the pivotal role of the Brazilian actors in “financial mechanism and private investments for ProSAVANA” (p.27)\(^{21}\).

### 3.3. Joint Statement on Financial Mechanism and Private Investments for ProSAVANA-JBM

The Brazilian side informed about the preparation within the Government of Brazil a proposal for a Joint Statement on Financial Mechanism and Private Investments in the context of ProSAVANA-JBM, to be presented to the Mozambican and Japanese sides as soon as possible.

*The leaked MoM of the 3rd Joint Coordination Meeting among Japan, Brazil and Mozambique held in December 2012 in Nampula, p.20*

According to FGV, the Nacala Fund was an initiative organized by the foundation. It expected to collect 2 billion US Dollars from global investors (including those in Japan) for the initial phase of developing 356,000 hectares in the region along the Nacala Corridor, the ProSAVANA target area\(^{22}\). Surprisingly, FGV was also contracted by ABC in order to formulate the ProSAVANA Master Plan for agricultural development of the same region. This contract was under the Triangular cooperation project, one of three pillars of the ProSAVANA program, ProSAVANA-PD (support for formulation of the Master Plan for agricultural development of Nacala Corridor), jointly carried out by Japan, Brazil and Mozambique.

Later, in 2014, this dual role of FGV was emphasized in various debates at the Japanese parliament due to “conflict of interests”. Prior to that, none of the actors of the three countries considered that issue. For example, the signing ceremony for FGV’s consultancy contract with ABC and the Nacala Fund Kick-off event were held as one integral event organized by FGV. The event held in July 2012 in Brasilia was not only attended by the Japanese ambassador and the residential representative of JICA but also sponsored by JICA\(^{23}\). Because of the questionable dual role of FGV, JICA began to conceal its documents related to FGV and erased its involvements with the Nacala Fund.

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\(^{21}\) The third file posted at the following site: [https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears](https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears)

\(^{22}\) [https://farmlandgrab.org/20851](https://farmlandgrab.org/20851) or the presentation given by ex-Minister of Agriculture of Brazil and the head of FGV-agro, Roberto Rodrigues, who is behind the fund. [http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/7kai_chiryo/ref15.pdf](http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/7kai_chiryo/ref15.pdf)

\(^{23}\) See the disclosed document in the possession of JICA. [https://farmlandgrab.org/25546](https://farmlandgrab.org/25546)
Document that JICA reluctantly disclosed on the Nacala Fund provided by FGV in June 2012

Two months after the visit of FGV representatives to Japan, in August 2012, JICA organized another seminar on ProSAVANA in Tokyo using the same budget allocated by JICA for ProSAVANA-PD. This time there were no foreign participants. It was held precisely for the Japanese private and public sectors to discuss how they could engage with ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund.

Although JICA tried to hide the agenda and presentations distributed during the event, after 1 year of examination from the Information Disclosure and Personal Information Protection Review Board, it could not escape disclosing all the documents. These documents revealed that the presentation was about FGV’s activities in Northern Mozambique, ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund. Moreover, JICA admitted that the presentation was not given by FGV but by a JICA staff member who belongs to ‘Africa division’. The slides were similar to the ones shared during the international symposium in June, but there was a clear difference. JICA added two slides, in Japanese, entitled “condition of participation of Japan (in the Nacala Fund)” and “schedule” for the launching and implementation of the fund.

Slide added by JICA Africa Division in a presentation it made on behalf of FGV in August 2012. It

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24 JICA’s PPT presentation about Nacala Fund used at JICA’s seminar on ProSAVANA in Tokyo (Aug. 2012)
shows the intended schedule for the Nacala Fund: June 2012, Kick-off meeting; July 2012, Announcement of the establishment plan in Brazil and Mozambique; August 2012, Discussions among the three countries; April 2013, Finalization of the fund design and launching; and September 2013, Start of the preparation.

From these slides, it is clear that all the parties of the three countries were already discussing and negotiating the fund design at the time of the presentation (August 2012) in order to launch it in April 2013 and start implementing from September 2013. It is also important to point out that JICA’s name was included in the Fund’s ‘Advisory Board’ already in the presentation of June and in the ‘Social Board of Directors’ in the one of August25. JICA was deeply engaged in the formulation of the fund and ready to take part in it if nothing stood in its way.

Slide 28 of the presentation given by FGV during an international conference held in Dakar in 2012

(6) The ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund and Master Plan

In the following month, September 2012, JICA together with the Mozambican government announced that five ‘agribusiness companies’ were to receive support from the ProSAVANA Development Initiative Fund (PDIF)26. From the beginning, ProSAVANA aimed at promoting public-private partnership. This was a ‘mode’ among both traditional and new donors, and African governments were demanding “less aid, more investment” in order to avoid conditionality (of

25 See slide 32 of the above reference.
26 PDIF was later renamed DIF by JICA in order to avoid further criticism.
integrity and democratic and transparent governance).

However, Japan lacked public funds that could be freely used for the sake of the private sector and overseas investments. PDIF was possible only because Japan had accumulated a ‘Counterpart Fund’ in Mozambique through pesticide aid under KRII (the second Kennedy Round). This aid lasted from the 1980s to the 2000s, including the war period. But the volume of the ‘Counterpart Fund’ was small, thus, it had to create another mechanism where global capital (including from Japan) could be gathered for Japan’s leading initiative, ProSAVANA.

For the Nacala Fund to be considered a public project and gain enough legitimacy, the ProSAVANA Master Plan was a key. Thus, the master plan was supposed to be complete in August 2013 and the projects related to the Nacala Fund were to be implemented as of September 2013 as the above-mentioned JICA’s additional slide revealed. In order to secure consistency between ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund, FGV made sure that the coordinator for both programs was the same person, Cleber Guarany. Everything seemed to be moving according to the plans and interests of JICA.

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**2. PEASANT PROTEST**

**(1) The first protest from the largest peasant movement: UNAC**

Things suddenly changed when the local peasants stood up.

In October 2012, the largest peasant movement in Mozambique, UNAC (*National Union of Peasants*) released the first statement (*Pronunciamento*) on ProSAVANA, and criticized the agricultural development model led by Japan in the 1980s in Brazil and opposed ProSAVANA,

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27 [https://farmlandgrab.org/23838](https://farmlandgrab.org/23838)

28 His interview on two programs can be viewed on the following Brazilian TV program. [https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/print/23739](https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/print/23739)
claiming large-scale land grabbing would take place in the target area. UNAC is the biggest peasant movement, with a membership of over 100,000 peasants, women and men, and 240 peasant organizations, and it operates in all provinces of the country. It also belongs to La Via Campesina, the largest transnational peasant movement in the world, and represents Mozambican peasantry around the world. This statement reached many corners of the world, but had the strongest impact on the civil societies of Brazil and Japan.

(2) The role of civil society in the traditional donors: Japan

However, compared to Brazil, Japanese civil society is weak, not mass-based and short-funded. Yet, it had leverage as citizens of a traditional donor. It has established an official policy dialogue platform between MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and NGOs since the 1990s. The platform is jointly run by Japanese NGOs and MOFA and three official meetings are held every year. Since the word-by-word minutes of all the discussions and handouts are published on its site, MOFA takes the meeting very seriously. Although JICA is the implementation agency for Japanese ODA (Official Developmental Assistance), it is MoFA that authorizes aid programs and projects. Thus, the Japanese NGOs decided to take ProSAVANA as a case to the dialogue platform in October and the very first discussion was held in December 2012 at MOFA.

The NGO’s presentation about the local resistance against ProSAVANA made MOFA worried since JICA shared only positive news about the program. MOFA agreed to organize a spin-off dialogue platform specifically on ProSAVANA between NGOs and MOFA-JICA and hold the first meeting in January 2013.

3. JICA’S COUNTER-RESISTANCE STRATEGY

(1) Minimizing peasant voices

Prior to the discussion with MOFA, the Japanese NGOs also took this case directly to JICA asking it to share the information on the program at a public event in November 2012. Most of the above information was not known to the public until then. JICA sent Kota Sakaguchi, who was in charge of JICA’s South-South cooperation section in Brazil and was one of the central figures in the formulation of ProSAVANA, to give the first public presentation on the program. He was accompanied to the event by the “Father of PRODECER (Japan’s cooperation program for the Brazilian Cerrado)” and the creator of ProSAVANA, Yutaka Hongo of JICA. At that time, both of them were working at the Africa Division of the JICA-HQ in Tokyo with the aim to materialize their newborn program, ProSAVANA.

More than half of Sakaguchi’s presentation was on JICA’s ‘success’ in the Brazilian-Cerrado. He did not mention anything about the negative socio-environmental impact that JICA’s cooperation program has brought to the Brazilian region. Furthermore, he did not mention anything about the Joint Mission for promoting agribusiness investment carried out earlier in the same year, PDIF that was launched a few month earlier, nor the Nacala Fund.

29 https://farmlandgrab.org/21211
32 The presentation was given at Meijigakuin University on November 12, 2012. http://www.ajf.or.jp/lang_ja/activities/20171112/1031_12.pdf
During Sakaguchi’s presentation, ProSAVANA was presented as a large-scale but ordinary public program composed of three pillars: technology investigation (PI), formulation for a Master Plan (PD) and examination of pilot projects (PEM). Regarding UNAC’s statement, Sakaguchi showed the slide with the following explanation: “UNAC misunderstood the program due to lack of information”. And he shared his intention of “trying to explain more to feed correct information”. During his speech, Sakaguchi did not forget to mention that there are thousands of farmer organizations in Mozambique, and UNAC is “just one organization”, and JICA was already “working with other farmer organizations” such as IKURU. When a member of ATTAC Japan asked about the Nacala Fund, Sakaguchi was silent for a moment but then said “JICA is considering its possibility and will join it if JICA finds it good.”

Later, the Japanese NGOs found out that IKURU, an OXFAM creation, was composed of local farmers and registered as a company, whose director was sent by GAPI. GAPI contributes 30% of PDIF’s fund and runs PDIF together with JICA. As IKURU is one of five companies that have received the first round of loans from PDIF, the ‘conflict of interest’ is obvious.
This kind of counter-argument given by Sakaguchi and Hongo, (1) treating UNAC as just one organization thus minimizing the weight of the local peasants’ voices delivered though the national union, and (2) stressing that “other” organizations are working with JICA/ProSAVANA, has been repeated over and over for years since that event.

JICA did not limit its counter-strategy to just arguments. Two years later, the Japanese NGOs came to know that JICA was planning and carrying out something more problematic in order to mitigate the impact of the peasants’ claims on ProSAVANA during the same period.

(2) The ProSAVANA Communication Strategy

A leaked document shows that, right after the public event, JICA’s Hongo and Sakaguchi flew to Nampula/Mozambique in order to participate in the official coordination meeting among the three countries with Naoki Yanase, the resident deputy representative of JICA Mozambique33. During this meeting, the ‘communication strategy’ was discussed and JICA gained consent for contracting local experts for designing and implementing the strategy.

Within 10 days, JICA Mozambique managed to contract 4 local consulting agencies. One of them was a Portuguese-Mozambican consulting firm, CV&A. Usually, such contracts are prepared at the Tokyo level at least a month beforehand since JICA is famous for bureaucratic procedure and late decision making. Thus, it could be assumed that the agenda related to ‘Communication Strategy’ gained internal consensus within JICA-HQ in Tokyo prior to the triangular meeting and brought by JICA staff from Tokyo.

Two years later, through a series of disclosure requests based on the Information Disclosure Law, the Japanese NGOs discovered that JICA had contracted with CV&A three times. None of these contracts were made public. The title of the second contract, signed on August 1, 2013, was to “define the ProSAVANA Communication Strategy”34.

Two months earlier, by the end of May, the representatives of Mozambican civil society led by UNAC president, the late Augusto Mafigo, came to Japan and handed an Open Letter to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe35. The letter was addressed to the heads of states of the three countries and demanding them to stop ProSAVANA immediately. The letter was signed by 23 Mozambican organizations and networks and 43 international organizations and social movements including those of Japan and Brazil36. The same letter was submitted to the Brazilian and Mozambican governments. It was during TICAD (Japan’s International Conference on African Development) where more than 30 heads of African states were gathering in Japan. The news of the Open Letter attracted immense attention from both Japanese and international media.

The Mozambican peasant movement did not stop their activism there. The announcement of the 1st Triangular Peoples’ Conference on ProSAVANA in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, to be held in August 2013 caused serious concern among JICA and MOFA officials. In order to “change the course” as quickly as possible, JICA gave only two months for CV&A to complete the following

33 The same document indicated in note 2. There is a list of participants who attended to the triangular coordination meeting.
34 Contract by JICA (in Portuguese) Terms of Reference by JICA (in Portuguese)
https://issuu.com/justicaambiental/docs/carta_aberta_das_organiz__es__e_mz (in Portuguese)
mandate.

The main objective of contracting CV&A was for JICA to know what kind of actors exist in the Mozambican society, how they influence the society, what kind of strategy should be taken for turning the negative image of ProSAVANA into a positive one. JICA’s ToR (Terms of Reference) stresses the importance of the hired consultant who could deliver “consultancy based on products”\(^{37}\). Meaning that the consultants were expected not only to formulate a strategy but also prepare and organize programs and articles for national TV, radio and newspapers\(^{38}\).

The ToR also demands CV&A hire someone who can contribute to "(b) the definition (of a) communication strategy the diverse range of ProSAVANA stakeholders’, "(d) the indication and design of an approach for each group of intervention (including civil society)” and “(h) the analysis of the result of the communication and possible change of course” (emphasis by the author)\(^{39}\).

It was only in January 2016 that the Japanese NGOs managed to obtain the outcome of this contract, ‘ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy’. JICA disclosed the Portuguese version of 50-page long report after postponing its disclosure\(^{40}\). It took another 10 months for JICA to share the English version of the same report\(^{41}\). The Japanese NGOs kept requesting the disclosure of the version during the NGO-MOFAs dialogue. JICA repeatedly refused to share it, but when a MOFA official affirmed the disclosure, JICA eventually submitted it to the NGOs.

The report shocked almost all the people who had access to it. The MOFA General Director for the Bureau of International Cooperation, Takio Yamada, was one of them (the details are at the end of this paper). The ‘Communication Strategy’\(^{42}\) was full of recommendations about how to divide: (a) the peasant associations opposed to ProSAVANA from local communities; (b) the Mozambican organizations from international organizations including those of Japan and Brazil; (c) and the Mozambican organizations opposed to ProSAVANA from national media\(^{43}\). For materializing the above goals, CV&A proposed formation of ‘District Collaborators’ in all 19 target districts.

The following points were also recommended under “4.3. Actions to be developed with the organized Civil Society”: (1) “The direct contact with communities…lessens these associations as spokespersons of communities or farmers’; (2) “Ways of minimizing the strength of these organizations…”; and (3) “if one withdraws importance to civil society organizations in Mozambique, one significantly weakens foreign NGOs operating in Mozambique, as these reduce their contacts with the media and …their influence” (p.33)\(^{44}\).

\(^{37}\) Strategy Paper by JICA (in English)
\(^{38}\) See page 3 of the above document.
\(^{39}\) See page 4 of the above document.
\(^{40}\) ProSAVANA ESTRATÉGIA DE COMUNICAÇÃO. Final | 2013 | Português
\(^{41}\) https://farmlandgrab.org/27437
\(^{42}\) As it was not a draft but the final report accepted by JICA, JICA had to admit that the ‘ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy’ was its own (The 18th and 19th NGOs-MOFAs dialogue on ProSAVANA on October 11 and on December 1 in 2016.)
\(^{43}\) https://farmlandgrab.org/26449
\(^{44}\) The English translation tends to be problematic. It may mean “Civil Society Organizations”. 
The English version of JICA’s ‘ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy’ (pp.33-34), prepared by CV&A in September 2013 and disclosed to Japanese civil society by JICA in 2017

JICA received the report with satisfaction and gave the third and exclusive contract to CV&A in 2014 in order to implement its own recommendations. Surely, this was done without public knowledge.

(3) Mozambican officials in the frontline of the ‘foreign conspiracy theory’

The ‘Communication Strategy’ also recommended something very disturbing: “However, if their influence persists, the following is advised: …questioning or criticizing (foster criticism by some Mozambican authorities) the role that foreign organizations are playing in Mozambique.

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45 JICA admitted this but claimed that “only some of the recommendations were implemented”. Yet, it refused to explain, during the dialogue between NGOs and MOFA-JICA in December 2016, which recommendations they requested CV&A carry out.
Mozambican authorities) the role that foreign organizations are playing in Mozambique" (p.34, emphasis by the author). This happened during August 2013, the period during the consultancy of CV&A.

In early August, the accusation of the Mozambican Agriculture Minister José Pacheco claiming that everything was “a conspiracy” from outside during the press interview upon the 1st Triangular Peoples Conference was widely broadcast\(^{46}\). Two weeks later, the theory was followed in an even stronger manner by the Provincial Agriculture Director of Nampula, Pedro Dzucula\(^{47}\). The title of the national newspaper article covering the meeting organized by DPA (Provincial Directorate of Agriculture) in Nampula on August 20 and 21 captures the theory very well: “ProSAVANA says that it will move forward despite the ‘fallacious propaganda’ coming from outside of the country”\(^{48}\). The article begins with the citation of a rather long remark given by Dzucula:

“We strongly believe that the fallacious propaganda to discredit ProSavana comes from outside the country. Their mentors use some national organizations that pose as spokespersons for civil society to discredit the Triangular Initiative, urging communities to revolt against the government” (translation and emphasis from Portuguese by the author).

All the directors of SDAE (District Service for Economic Activities) of the ProSAVANA target districts within the province were called to the meeting. SDAE functions as a district branch of PDA. The article ends with the following declaration made by the SDAE directors:

“This position was defended by the SDAE directors, who guaranteed to take over their role of monitoring the diffusion of ProSavana in order to remove potential obstacles” (translation and emphasis by the author).

The SDAE directors of the ProSAVANA target districts did perceive and digest the message from the central and provincial governments well. In fact, the importance of giving a role to SDAE under ProSAVANA is emphasized in the ‘Communication Strategy’ (p.10).

One must consider the communication with these entities through the government’s services already implemented on the field, namely the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture and, at the district level, the District Services for Economic Activities (SDAE), whose presence in all districts may be used as a mean of communication to send messages and receive inputs on ProSAVANA.

Communication process with the Communities

The English version of JICA’s ‘ProSAVANA: Communication Strategy’, p.10

The role of SDAE for promoting and diffusing information about ProSAVANA can be captured well in the following diagram shown on the same page. ProSAVANA-HQ located at the top of every communication on ProSAVANA is composed of the representatives of the three countries (JICA represents for Japan). Although the office is installed within the Ministry of Agriculture (currently Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security: MASA), its staff is contracted, sent and supervised by

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\(^{47}\) Sometimes spelled as Dzucula

\(^{48}\) 2【新聞記事】州農務局長 地元紙 Noticias 記事
JICA. Underneath ProSAVANA-HQ, provincial DPAs are situated which are immediately followed by SDAEs.

As shown in the graph JICA was in the position of controlling the information and communication to/from provincial directors through ProSAVANA-HQ and its contracted staff. Among the provincial directors of the ProSAVANA three target provinces, JICA invested in the DPA director of Nampula the most.

Director Dzucula was invited to Japan together with Minister Pacheco in March–April 2013, four months before the ‘conspiracy theory’ was launched. Dzucula was invited again in August–September 2015, together with the ProSAVANA coordinator, ex-vice minister, António Limbau, when JICA formulated another counter-resistance strategy (cited later). Both trips were covered by JICA under the budget of ProSAVANA-PD (Master Plan). The pivotal role of Dzucula for ProSAVANA (thus for Japan) was confirmed during the policy dialogue between NGOs and MOFA on March 1, 2018.

The key messages to be disseminated were also determined in the ‘Communication Strategy’ (p.18). One can see how hard JICA was trying to hide its leading role for promoting and materializing ProSAVANA. The document specifically lists up the following key message to make sure that JICA would not be made accountable for the ProSAVANA-related matters: “the government of Mozambique is responsible for the management of ProSAVANA”. This is an obvious lie since ProSAVANA-HQ is not a unilateral but a triangular institution, at least officially, but de facto is a bilateral institution. It cannot function unless JICA provides its budget, including its staff’s wages, therefore, it is also under the control of JICA and the Japanese government. So far, no financial contribution from the Brazilian government to ProSAVANA-HQ is confirmed.

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49 JICA’s reply to Michihiro Ishibashi, a parliamentarian, dated March 29, 2018.
50 JICA’s document submitted to Michihiro Ishibashi.
51 https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/about/shimin/page25_000194.html
The simple fact that the “Communication Strategy” has never been shared with either the Mozambican or Brazilian governments (according to JICA) confirms this point. As JICA admitted during the 19th dialogue meeting held in December 2016 in Tokyo, it was JICA and MOFA (not the Mozambican or Brazilian governments) who wanted to know how the Mozambican society functions in order to “improve communication related to ProSAVANA”.

(4) Mythologizing the linkage with the Cerrado and land grabbing

The “key messages” listed on page 18 clearly manifest the intention of JICA to disconnect from ProSAVANA not only its name but also the past emphasis on the Brazilian Cerrado. The ‘Communication Strategy’ even recommends that JICA emphasizes that “there are more fundamental differences with the Brazilian Cerrado ... than similarities” (emphasis by the author). The same kind of attempt also appears on page 33: “remove the link of Nacala Corridor (sic.) to the Brazilian Cerrado” in order to “devalue...some of the main arguments ...international NGOs”.

The removal of the linkage between the Cerrado and ProSAVANA had been tested since February 2013 after the Japanese NGOs brought the issue to the formal ODA dialogue table in Tokyo. This attempt became apparent right before the first visit of the UNAC delegation to Japan, in February 2013, when the then JICA president, Akihiko Tanaka, officially announced that ProSAVANA was for local smallholders and the program itself would not grab land. However, the reality on the ground was far from this announcement.

From February to April 2013, a series of stakeholder meetings on the ProSAVANA Master Plan was held in Mozambique. The main presentation was given by a Brazilian consultant for

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52 It carries the ProSAVANA logo made by JICA’s funds on every page.

53 When this was pointed out, JICA blamed CV&A for “using the logo without the authorization of ProSAVANA-HQ”. And the reason for not sharing it with their counterparts was “due to the contract was of JICA and for JICA to learn about how to communicate with the Mozambican society” (The 19th NGOs-MOFA/JICA dialogue on ProSAVANA on December 1, 2016).

54 The remark of JICA President (Akihiko Tanaka) made during his visit to Mozambique was posted on JICA’s site in February 2013.
ProSAVANA-PD, FGV. Its focus was on how ProSAVANA could be used for paving the way for agribusiness investment for exploiting arable land “in an effective and appropriate way”.

During the dialogue meeting held in April 2013 at MOFA, JICA kept denying such emphasis. A few days earlier, however, the Master Plan report, which was supposed to be a “blue print” of the entire plan, prepared by FGV, was leaked to civil society. Thus, despite JICA’s official announcement, it became apparent that ProSAVANA continued with its original direction. The report lists the creation of “land banks” and eight agribusiness pilot projects seeking “involuntary relocation” of local residents.

Soon after this, on May 3, 2013, the Brazilian agribusiness channel, Canal Terraviva, broadcast an interview with the FGV’s coordinator for ProSAVANA and the Nacala Fund, Cleber Guarany:

Guarany:
- (...) We should remember the geographical similarity between Africa and Brazil and Brazil’s high agricultural technology in grain production. Particularly, in Mozambique... has similar biological characteristics with the Brazilian Cerrado. Especially in Northern Mozambique, there is 14 million ha of land suitable for agriculture. Due to this opportunity, with our project, Brazilian producers will go to Mozambique, and with Mozambican producers, they will create a new "corridor of supply".

Terraviva:
- So, it is not true to say "Brazil is the last frontier of agriculture on the planet"...In other words, there is still “Land (espaço/space) for Growth”, also in Africa. Is this what you mean?

Guarany:
- Yes, yes. In summary, there is a lot of land (espaço/space). In African tropical savannah, we have a lot of land that has not been exploited yet...where we can produce food. The northern region of Mozambique is the central focus of our project since it has an exceptional climate, soil that is similar to the one of the Cerrado, and we have this opportunity to produce food there (translation and emphasis by the author).

The resistance from Mozambican peasants was growing rapidly and came to be known internationally. It was becoming too costly for the governments of Japan and Brazil since they had promoted ProSAVANA as an “innovative and horizontal South-South cooperation”. Brazil was still under the administration of President “Lula” of Labor Party (PT) whose supporters, Brazilian social movements, were the allies of the Mozambican peasant movement.

(5) Disconnecting ProSAVANA from the Nacala Economic Corridor Development

The ‘Communication Strategy’ became ready for JICA’s usage when JICA and MOFA were preparing for the first visit of Prime Minister Abe to Mozambique. Both institutions were very much concerned about how his visit might draw further local criticism and media attention. Although

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55 According to JICA’s ToR.
56 The leaked report is posted on the right hand side of in the following site: https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears
57 The detailed analysis is on the following article. The English version is also available from the site. http://omrmz.org/omrweb/publicacoes/observador-rural-12/
58 https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/print/23739
they tried everything to co-opt regional civic organizations in Nampula, it was still difficult since the Mozambican civil society as a whole did not find it worthwhile to take an obvious pro-government position then. Mozambique was still under Armando Guebuza's rein and armed confrontation between Frelimo and RENAMO was getting stronger, especially in the center and north regions.

The original idea and plan of ProSAVANA seems to have inspired the Guebuza family business. He established AgroMoz and began large-scale soybean production in a once dense forest area. This was implemented by one of the largest Brazilian soy company in 2012. It caused serious land grabbing problems for the local residents in Gurué (the ProSAVANA target district) of Zambézia Province. The most affected area was the Nampula Province since the district was right next to Zambézia Province and many peasants sought refuge and new farmland in Nampula.

Together with the local government, the local régulo (sort of a paramount chief) helped AgroMoz to occupy an immense amount of land where peasants were living and cultivating. This kind of development did not take place outside ProSAVANA. Until the end of 2012, JICA did not hesitate to show its engagement in promoting international and domestic agribusiness investment in Northern Mozambique. JICA was rather proud of it. JICA organized such international conferences in 2010 (Tokyo), 2011 (Brazil) and 2012 (Mozambique and Japan) under ProSAVANA, and it was ready to launch the Nacala Fund together with FGV.

Furthermore, FGV consultants have been providing agribusiness consultancy services to companies such as Galp Energia (owned by the Portuguese tycoon family, Amorim) and the Brazilian Vale and others. Galp Energia is owned by the Amorim family of Portugal who financially support the ex-president's business, AgroMoz.

59 The term and position created during the Portuguese colonial period. During the liberation period, régulos were accused of being “colonial collaborator” and the position was abolished after independence, but re-introduced by the Frelimo government after the war. For detailed discussions, see: Funada Classen (2013) The Origins of War in Mozambique: a history of unity and division, African Mind Publishers. http://www.africanminds.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/The%20Origins%20of%20War%20in%20Mozambique.pdf
60 https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears
Families whose land was taken by AgroMoz, Photo taken by Naoko Watanabe (JVC) and Clemente Ntauazi in Nampula Province in 2014

It is worthwhile mentioning that it was JICA who began to call this region “the Nacala Corridor region”. ProSAVANA was one of the programs under the wider framework of “the Nacala Economic Corridor Development Program”61. JICA and the Japanese government were strongly interested in the Nacala railway and port in order to assure that the commodities produced in the interior be exported smoothly to the Asian market, including Japan, for Japan’s economic interests. The main targets were soy and coal.

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61 See JICA’s Master Plan for Nacala Corridor economic development, PEDEC-Nacala
Slide 7 used by JICA’s Kota Sakaguchi during his presentation on November 15, 2012 in Tokyo

This ambition was also to be supported by the Brazilian “partners”. This ambition can be confirmed in the map distributed during JICA’s side event at the TICAD on June 2, 2013.

Slide from JICA PPT projected on June 1, 2013 during the TICAD V side event in Yokohama
Japan’s counterpart for the exploration of coal and the renovation of the Nacala Railway and Nacala port was the Brazilian Vale. In the early 2000s, Mitsui Corp., the biggest Japanese trading company, established a ‘strategic partnership’ with Vale, and designated board members to the Brazilian company.\(^{62}\) Mitsui also bought 15% of Vale’s Moatize Coal Mine and 50% of Vale’s Mozambican company managing the Nacala railway and port\(^{63}\). In 2017, Mitsui got a total of 3 billion US Dollars as a loan from JBIC (Japan International Cooperation Bank), Japanese commercial banks and AfDB (African Development Bank) which are funded by the Japanese government\(^{64}\). Trading insurance of 1 billion US Dollars was also given by NEXI (Nippon Export and Investment Insurance), 100% funded by the Japanese government\(^{65}\).

This turned out to be the first and biggest Japanese public-private investment happening in Sub-Saharan Africa. A Japanese newspaper reporting this ended the article with the following remark:

“China is also aiming at developing infrastructure and resources in Mozambique...China is actively engaging with the expansion of ‘One Belt, One Road’ (Chinese development strategy) towards Africa. Located in East Africa, Mozambique is in the strategically important position for security, and the government-led competition between Japan and China will be heated” (translation and addition by the author)\(^{66}\).

Thus, Japan’s ambition of securing its grip on the Nacala Corridor region and turning it into a center of commodity production for the Asian market with the Brazilian counterpart did not cease no matter how strong the local resistance was. It was no longer necessary for the Japanese-Brazilian public-private actors to fulfill their goal of turning the region into “the Cerrado of Africa” by using ProSAVANA. As long as the “value-chain” route enabling and facilitating the controlled commodity transportation and exportation by the Japanese-Brazilian actors could be established, private actors will do the rest.

Although the ProSAVANA Master Plan was to assist in drawing up the agricultural development plans and collecting investment and aid for materializing agribusiness projects to turn the region into a large-scale commodity production area, the necessary data on land-use, soil, climate and adequate soy varieties were already collected by the Brazilian and Japanese actors by March 2013. Thus, even if the large-scale agriculture development investments model were deleted from ProSAVANA, it did not harm too much those who were involved in and/or inspired by ProSAVANA. Once promoted, the drive for investment seeking land did not end there.

What the Japanese public-private actors feared was the local and triangular resistance being mounted against the larger and more important target, the Nacala Economic Corridor program. Thus, in January 2014, Prime Minister Abe brought two messages to Mozambique: (1) Japan was going to disburse 70 billion yen (approximately 700,000,000 US Dollars) for “Nacala Corridor development” by 2019; and (2) for ProSAVANA “(B)oth leaders reaffirmed their commitment to continue close dialogue with civil society and rural communities in the implementation of the project of ProSAVANA”\(^{67}\) ...(emphasis by the author). Obviously, it is a bilateral and not a triangular statement, and one can observe the disappearance of the Brazilian government from

\(^{63}\) https://www.mitsui.com/jp/a/release/2016/1220831_8913.html
\(^{64}\) https://mainichi.jp/articles/20171119/ddm/008/020/046000c
\(^{65}\) https://www.mitsui.com/jp/ja/release/2016/1220831_8913.html
\(^{66}\) https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXME2251037007A021C1EA4000/
\(^{67}\) https://mainichi.jp/articles/20171119/ddm/008/020/046000c

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the ProSAVANA’s decision-making circle.

(6) Disconnecting land grabbing cases

The Brazilians seemed to have lost their interest in ProSAVANA, but this did not mean the end of their involvement with agribusiness or other business along the Nacala Corridor region. Just like the case of AgroMoz, they played key roles in connecting the local actors with foreign actors. Agribusiness around the world sought profits by following the half-vanished path towards the creation of the “Cerrado of Africa”. By the end of 2014, 35 land deals were made targeting the Nacala Corridor region, and 11 of them were for producing soy. It was not only soy that foreign investors were after. The massive tree plantation projects that were already expanding in Niassa Province took faster pace. The tree plantation was included in the framework of the Nacala Economic Corridor development (see the previous map).

Portuguese investments in Northern Mozambique grew especially quickly after 2012. Mozambique was under colonial occupation until 1975. The Portuguese investment in the region was not only coming from abroad, but also from Maputo. The descendants of ex-

68 \url{https://www.grain.org/article/entries/5137-the-land-grabbers-of-the-nacala-corridor}

colonos began to take control over the farmland by obtaining DUAT (land usage rights) from local/central governments and began to chase local people away. One such case was Matharia Empreendimentos, financed by Japanese money, ProSAVANA DIF (PDIF).

After the discovery by Japanese NGOs of this “land grabbing case” and the result of the field research brought to public eyes in Tokyo on October 29, 2014, the fund quietly ceased to be called PDIF but began to be called DIF, without ProSAVANA’s P, by JICA.

69 The detailed research was carried out by the Japanese NGOs and the local peasant movements in 2014, 2015 and 2016.

70 日本のODAによるモザンビークの農業開発事業「プロサバンナ」に関する現地調査報告と提言

71 JICA never gave explanations about the reason of this modifications.
It was not only the Portuguese who returned in order to gain control over the land. The “régulos”, the colonial position installed to support local administration, regained definitive power over land management. The “régulos” were sought after by agribusiness investors and/or local governmental officials who want to provide land for them in order to obtain proof of “prior consultation with communities” required by the Land Law.

It is symbolic that JICA’s first contracted agency, the Portuguese owned CV&A, emphasized the importance of “régulos” in controlling communication at the community level and gave them the key role of “changing the course” of ProSAVANA in the ‘Communication Strategy’ (see the previous diagram). One should not neglect the fact that CV&A and JICA did not hesitate to use the word “district collaborators network” in the document.

4. FROM TRIANGULAR COOPERATION TO BILATERAL COOPERATION

(1) Unstoppable Japanese public projects/programs

As shown in the previous chapter, the weak presence of the Brazilian counterpart within ProSAVANA was noticeable by January 2014. This was confirmed by the parliamentary discussion in Tokyo. Upon the return of PM Abe from Mozambique, the Japanese parliamentarian, Mieko Kamimoto, asked a question about the FGV’s “conflicts of interest” during the plenary session at

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72 For the complex history of régulos in Makua-speaking area, see Origins of War in Mozambique.
the House of Councilors on January 29, 2014. From the cabinet’s response, it became clear that the Brazilian government decided to let the contract with FGV expire at the end of 2013. From the FGV’s viewpoint, ProSAVANA was no longer meaningful for their institutional ambition, rather, it was actually damaging its reputation both domestically and internationally. Also, as it has collected enough information, it does not need to work under ProSAVANA anymore.

“The ProSAVANA program” as envisaged by the initiators of Japan and Brazil no longer existed. Yet, JICA could not cease the program because traditionally public mega-projects/programs cannot be stopped in Japan. Cases like dams (Yamba), nuclear power plants (even after the TEPCO accident in Fukushima), US military Bases (Henoko) and bay reclamation (Isahaya Bay) are famous for “unstoppability”. No matter how big the local resistance is and even if the projects are not urgently needed, once the government decides to launch them, they cannot be abolished. Freezing projects (as in freezing the budget) during the same administration is politically impossible. In case of ProSAVANA, since Japan was still under the same administration (of Abe), it has been difficult to put an end to ProSAVANA.

From the viewpoint of JICA, there was another problem. This was explained in a simple manner by one of the consultants of MAJOL, the Mozambican consultant agency contracted by JICA (November 2015 – March 2016). The consultant confessed as follows during his visit to one of the Mozambican civil society organizations in mid-November:

“...from what we have heard from JICA here, it is a matter of civil servants trying to clear up the mess so they can do their job...But you know how Orientals are, very concerned with losing face. If JICA...fails to implement a program for which the Parliament has devoted money, then nobody gets any career advancement in the future, so that’s basically where they’re sitting” (extracted from the disclosed recording. Emphasis and addition by the author).

(2) The only exit strategy for JICA: dialogue as a fait accompli

JICA could not stop once it started a mega-program. The only exit strategy for JICA was to calm...
down local peasant movements and civil society organizations, carry out “dialogue”, persuade them and launch a Master Plan to finish ProSAVANA-PD and begin the implementation phase. The reason is to deny its failure in formulating the initial plan or its defeat by the civil societies of the three countries. JICA could not “lose face”, as the MAJOL consultant explained. Thus, a series of actions for chasing after the leaders of peasant movements and civil society organizations began. Yet, these actions, carried out by local agents like Director Dzucula supervised by JICA Tokyo and Japanese consultants in Nampula City, were not bringing results.

In May 2014, when opposition parliamentarian Michihiro Ishibashi, an ex-ILO official, brought this issue to the parliamentary debate at the Audit Committee of the House of Councilors. Then Foreign Minister Fumio Kishi promised that ProSAVANA would be carried out “courteously (teineini)” and in dialogue with local residents. These official promises made in early 2014 continued to haunt JICA and those involved with ProSAVANA. JICA launched attempts to dialogue with peasants and civil society that were almost comical but at the same time quite harmful.

(3) Public hearings like election rallies

Firstly, it was through “public hearings” of the Master Plan that JICA officials tried to complete the assignment to “dialogue” given by their superiors. After the official departure of FGV from ProSAVANA, JICA took entire control over the content of the Plan. In March 2014, JICA stated that it would reflect the civil societies’ comments on the Master Plan draft and that this would be taken cared by JICA’s Japanese consultants. Yet, this plan was not shared for a year. Suddenly, on March 31, 2015, MASA posted the “draft zero” of the Master Plan on its official site. The communiqué released on the same date announced the schedule for the public hearings. This information, however, was not shared with any organization of the three countries. Only on April 6 did the newspapers begin to disseminate the information.

Although the Master Plan was 204 page long and full of technical terms, the public hearings was set to begin from district level. The hearings at provincial and national levels were to be held at the end. The peasant organizations at the local level were stunned since they had only a week to read the draft which was available only online. Most of them could not read Portuguese well, so they needed some technical assistance to fully understand the contents to formulate their opinion. Thus, hurrying and starting the public hearings from district level meant that the organizers were not much interested in the opinions of local peasants. Clearly, the organizers wanted to avoid the civil society organizations and intellectuals at regional and national level coming up with a thorough analysis on the document.

Although it was JICA consultants who wrote the draft (MASA only modified some parts of the draft), JICA avoided sending its Japanese representatives to the hearings in order to show “ownership by the Mozambican government”. Yet, the entire cost of the hearings was paid by JICA. Brazil did not contribute financially to the hearings.

A few days before the inauguration of the public hearings, the Japanese parliamentarian Ishibashi brought this case to the Audit Committee at the House of Councilors. He asked: (1) how the draft

81 Member of the Constitutional Democratic Party (formerly the Democratic Party of Japan [DPJ]).
82 http://mazambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-103.html
83 The 8th NGO-MOFAs dialogue for ProSAVANA held on March 12, 2014.
84 http://www.prosavana.gov.mz The site is also funded by JICA.
85 JICA’s remark during the meeting organized by three parliamentarians and attended by NGOs and MOFAs on June 15, 2015.
86 The document prepared by JICA for the same meeting on June 15, 2015.
was formulated and diffused; (2) if the civil society organizations were consulted about this process prior to March 31; (3) who was invited and was not; and (4) if everyone had free access to the plan and the hearings.\textsuperscript{87}

The JICA President insisted that the Master Plan was posted on the internet, giving anyone who would go to local administrations the opportunity to read a copy. In other words, “the document was accessible to everyone”. President Tanaka got stuck in his answers about prior consultation with the Mozambican organizations. He sought support from a JICA person sitting behind him, Kota Sakaguchi. Then the president came to the microphone and declared that JICA did consult about this matter with “several organizations” prior to the MASA’s announcement on March 2015, but did not give any names. Ishibashi insisted on the submission of the names of the organizations JICA or MASA consulted with.

Two months later, JICA came back and said that: (a) it was during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Triangular Peoples Conference held in July 2014 that the idea of public hearings was born; (b) UNAC was insisting that the governments share the draft and discuss it widely, thus public hearings were planned; and (c) the answer given by the JICA president in parliament was not false.\textsuperscript{88} JICA’s lie and plan brought unexpected results for them.

The draft was quickly analyzed by regional and national Mozambican organizations and was not welcomed. Many organizations collected funding on their own to participate in the first round of district level hearings and came back with strong concerns. Although the presentations were made by the local SDAE or DPA staff, most of the hearings were chaired by local administration chiefs, i.e., high-ranking members of the ruling party, Frelimo. All the hearings were full of “régulos”, teachers, nurses and police. At some locations the police were armed. And majority belong to Frelimo and were men.

\textit{Public hearing at district level in Nampula Province. The picture taken by Naoko Watanabe (JVC) in 2015}

Where more than 80% of residents are peasants, only 36 % of participants were peasants.\textsuperscript{89} In many locations, Frelimo party members and “régulos” were called to a secret meeting prior to the

\textsuperscript{87} http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog
\textsuperscript{88} During the above mentioned meeting on June 15, 2015.
\textsuperscript{89} The number was shared by JICA and MOFA official on June 15, 2015.
official hearing in order to coordinate what they would say during the official meeting. Some meetings even began with the Frelimo song “Viva Frelimo” or a salute to ProSAVANA by “régulos”\textsuperscript{90}.

JICA insisted that the problems occurred because the Mozambican government is “inexperienced with democracy and public hearings” and the role of JICA is to support such short-comings\textsuperscript{91}.

\textbf{(4) Strengthening the local Frelimo apparatus}

The Mozambican civil society organizations and research institutes were shocked by this political show carried out by the Frelimo-State local apparatus promoted by foreign aid. Some of them gave the following comment: “it was like an election rally”.

Frelimo has been in power since 1975, i.e., since independence. Although the separation of State and party has been an issue for democratic governance and decentralization in the post-war period, the connection, or fusion, between the two entities became even stronger during the second term of Guebuza (2010-2015). If public sector employees do not have a party card, he/she suffers a lot. Guebuza also introduced the District Development Fund (FDD) in order to create a patron-client relationship at the local level and sustain its local agents\textsuperscript{92}. FDD was managed by newly installed district councils (concelhos), principle agents for ProSAVANA at the local level, together with the “régulos” in the above presented diagram drawn in the ‘Communication Strategy’.

JICA’s tactics based on the ‘Communication Strategy’ and promotion of local hearings played favorable roles in strengthening and financing Frelimo’s local apparatus. This was justified in the name of information diffusion and “listening to the voices of the local residents”. Interestingly, the draft included an idea for a Community Development Fund, similar to FDD, but to be used at a lower level. The community fund was to be given to all ProSAVANA target “communities” (at administrative post-level).

In past elections, Frelimo had struggled to win votes from the most populous provinces, Zambézia and Nampula. Especially in the ProSAVANA target districts, the opposition parties (RENAMO and MDM) won or competed well in general elections held in October 2014\textsuperscript{93}. Thus, the additional fund from foreign aid meant a lot for the legitimization of the Frelimo’s local apparatus, not only for local power holders, but also for those at provincial and national levels since their promotion within the party hierarchy depends on their success in elections.

The following two tables show the provincial and district results of the Presidential, Legislative Elections held in October 2014. With the first table, one can observe that the sum of the opposition candidates’ gained votes overtook the one of FRELIMO in the Northern three provinces under ProSAVANA.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Japanese civil society sent a representative, Naoko Watanabe, to cover the hearings in Nampula and Niassa, and provided detailed information with video and audio.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} JICA’s remarks during the above mentioned meeting held on June 15, 2015 and the 17\textsuperscript{th} dialogue on July 21, 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} The analysis of the election result was made by the author. The presentation is available at: \url{資料8：現在のモザンビーク政治・社会を何に基づき、どう理解するのか？}
\end{itemize}
Results at the provincial level of the Presidential and Legislative Elections in 2014 prepared by the author

While the second table indicates the heated rivalry between the opposition parties and the ruling party, Frelimo, in the ProSAVANA target districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National/Provincial (region)</th>
<th>Presidential/Legislative</th>
<th>Simango/MDM</th>
<th>Dhlakama/RENAMEO</th>
<th>Nyusi/FRELIMO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Presidential (%)</td>
<td>6.36%</td>
<td>36.61%</td>
<td>57.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>17 seats</td>
<td>89 seats</td>
<td>144 seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza (Sul)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>93.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala (Central)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>8.76</td>
<td>55.91</td>
<td>35.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampula (ProSAVANA)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>49.84</td>
<td>&gt; 44.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niassa (ProSAVANA)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>+ 44.42</td>
<td>&gt; 48.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia (ProSAVANA)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>8.21</td>
<td>52.75</td>
<td>&gt; 39.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results (number of seats) at the district level of the Legislative Elections in 2014 prepared by the author
5. BILATERAL COUNTER-RESISTANCE STRATEGY

(1) JICA-MASA intervention in UNAC and the death of its president

The political interests of Japan and Mozambique were clear. Japan wanted political stability for its mega-investment in Mozambique. The only “obstacle” was Mozambican civil society opposing or distancing itself from ProSAVANA. The bilateral accord required JICA to hold “dialogue” with them “cautiously”.

Yet, the disastrous outcome of the public hearings made the situation more difficult. By June 2015, five different and critical statements from over 30 organizations were issued against the hearings. This is the time when the official visit of the delegation of UNAC and ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ to Japan was announced. JICA and MOFA became very worried about the possible impact upon Japanese parliamentarians. Once again, “change of course” became JICA’s top agenda.

The tactic that JICA and MASA chose was to bring a peasant member of UNAC who received a benefit from ProSAVANA-PEM (pilot projects) to Japan in a governmental delegation to counter-balance the negative effect of the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ delegation. They targeted one of the leaders of a local peasant union in Zambézia who is a strong supporter of Frelimo, and he accepted the invitation from JICA and MASA.

This news was taken seriously by the UNAC leaders. Although the then UNAC president, the late Augusto Mafigo, was not in good health, he went from his home in Tete Province to Zambézia in order to find out what was happening. MASA’s pick refused to decline the invitation. Thus, President Mafigo asked all the unions and clubs in the district to discuss among themselves and come up with their position on ProSAVANA. For UNAC, the tradition of Mozambican associations, “associativismo”, or collective decision-making is key. It was hoped to bring back the control of decision-making from the hands of the government to the hands of the lower-level associations.

10 days later, President Mafigo went back to listen to the decisions, but he fell seriously ill. Within a day, he passed away.

The death of President Mafigo shocked not only all UNAC members, but the entire Mozambican society. He fought against the Portuguese colonialism and had been playing the pivotal role in unifying the peasants who began to confront massive land grabbing cases. Being an “antigo combatente” (ex-liberation soldier), he could occupy a unique position between the government/Frelimo and society. It was not his nature to “fight” since he was a shy, calm, modest person who loved peace and harmony, but the historical events made him “fight” again in independent Mozambique and the people needed him. And when the people needed him most, he departed.

The above incident happened during the field research conducted by Japanese NGOs in neighboring Nampula Province. Three days after the death, the researchers went to the district to find out what had happened. On August 10, they released a strong statement against JICA’s attempt to divide and rule.

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94 All of the statements are posted on the following site: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827
95 For the details of the history of ‘associativismo’ in Mozambique, see Origins of War in Mozambique
96 緊急声明 プロサバンナにおける農民の分断と招聘計画の即時中止の要求
(2) CIA-like intelligence leaked by unknown insiders

JICA had to give up inviting to Japan the peasant leader picked by MASA. Only the governmental officials, ProSAVANA Coordinator Limbau and Provincial Director Dzucula and one more high-ranking official from MASA visited Japan\(^7\). 

Two months after their visit to Japan, Mozambican civil society began to receive mysterious calls for individual meetings from the consulting company called MAJOL. From mid-November to early-December, the MAJOL consultant team, including “European-looking consultants”, was visiting all the Mozambican organizations that had signed the Open Letter and the statements on the public hearings asking “all sorts of questions”\(^8\). The team informed them that it was contracted by JICA.

From the same recording, in which a MAJOL consultant was explaining about the “unstopability” of ProSAVANA from the viewpoint of JICA, one can learn JICA’s motivation behind the contract\(^9\):

“...so that is their motivation of going...getting behind the Campaign (‘No to ProSAVANA’) to break the logjam and get parties to the table again” (extracted and underlined by the author).

Yet, no information about such a move was shared with Japanese NGOs. During the 13\(^{th}\) dialogue held on October 27, 2015, JICA’s Tsutomu Limura of the Africa Division did not only conceal this move but emphasized that no activities were carried out by saying: “MASA is still discussing” how to carry out further consultation on the Master Plan\(^10\). Three weeks earlier on October 7, JICA had already established the project called ‘Stakeholder Engagement’ under ProSAVANA-PD and sent requests to three Mozambican agencies to submit their proposals for consultancy\(^11\).

The contract between JICA and MAJOL was signed on November 2, 2015\(^12\). Yet, being asked about the consultation process during the 14\(^{th}\) dialogue meeting (December 14), JICA’s Limura and Masahiro Tawa, of the Rural Development Division, first denied the involvement of Japanese aid money and then refused to share any information on the contract “until things get done”\(^13\).

A few days later, the Japanese NGOs submitted to JICA a formal request for disclosure of the contract between JICA and MAJOL, but the process was deliberately delayed for a month\(^14\). It was only on February 5, 2016, a month before the end of the contract, that the documents were disclosed by JICA. According to these documents, JICA promised to pay 5,290,370 US Dollars for its 5 month-service. The objective of the contract was to gather information on each stakeholder in order to use it to establish a dialogue platform between Mozambican civil society and the

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\(^7\) The Japanese NGOs met with three officials at JICA HQ on September 1, 2015.  
\(^8\) According to the leaked reports, the consultants were: João Lameiras, Eduardo Costa, Harry C. van den Burg and Peter H. Bechtel. 
\(^9\) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vIAVPF8pd0 
\(^10\) JICA’s Request to MAJOL for Proposals on “Stakeholder Engagement (Oct. 7, 2015).” 
\(^11\) Two months earlier, in August 2015, MAJOL consultants visited JICA Mozambique as consultants of a foreign research institute. The research topic of the institute was about the issue of dialogue and consensus-building with various stakeholders under ProSAVANA. Thus, the research team was conducting interviews with local peasant groups and civil society groups as a “third party”. Yet, JICA offered its consultancy contract to MAJOL, and MAJOL accepted it. Since MAJOL’s contracts with this institute and with JICA overlapped without the knowledge of the institute, further contracts from the institute were not given to MAJOL due to question about “research independence” and “integrity”.

JICA targeted MAJOL knowing this fact. 
\(^12\) JICA’s Tsutomu Limura at a meeting (Nov. 12, 2015) 
\(^13\) JICA’s Tsutomu Limura at a meeting (Dec. 14, 2015)
governmental representatives including those of JICA. And the ToR made it clear that JICA, ProSAVANA-HQ and MASA would play the central role in supervision and deciding which organizations would be interviewed and invited to meetings. In February 2016, a “Civil Society’s Coordination Mechanism (MCSC) for Nacala Corridor Development” was established as planned but with all sorts of confusion. The disclosure of three reports submitted by MAJOL to JICA as outputs of the contract was denied by JICA “due to the refusal of the disclosure by the Mozambican government.” In April 2016, however, unknown persons, named “your friends,” sent files full of internal documents to the civil society members of Mozambique and Japan. Within these 34 files, there were MAJOL’s draft reports submitted to JICA. Obviously, the senders were someone inside who are or were at the core of the ProSAVANA operations. The contents of MAJOL’s reports were shocking. The first report, the inception report (draft), which was supposed to be submitted to JICA within 2 weeks of the contract signature, contained a section on the methodology of “Stakeholder Analysis.” The aim of the analysis was determined as “the identification and characterization of individuals and groups of people that impact on or might be impacted” by ProSAVANA. Then, MAJOL listed up what they were going to research, for instance: “(a) identification of potential conflicts...between the groups”; “(b) Identify and characterize relationships between the stakeholders that may promote or impede the development of alliances and consensus, or alternatively conflict”; and “(c) Identification of key groups and individuals who need to be the subject of targeted engagements”. Then, “influence and interests rating” and the position towards ProSAVANA of each organization and individual were rated. As the exact same description is confirmed in the final version of the report disclosed by JICA, one could conclude that JICA did not oppose the methodology. In the midterm report submitted in December 2015, MAJOL shared the research results by dividing the Mozambican organizations and individuals into 4 categories using colors: Red (“hardline against ProSAVANA”); Pink (“strongly against but will talk”); Yellow (“with no clear position”) and Green (“in favor of ProSAVANA”).

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105 JICA’s Contract with MAJOL for “Stakeholder Engagement Project” under the ProSAVANA-PD (Nov. 2, 2015).
106 9 JICA 文書] MAJOL 社への ToR（契約付随文書 2015 年 11 月）
108 The excuse was given to Michihiro Ishibashi by JICA in April 2016.
109 All are posted on the following site: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/post/view/26158-prosavana-files
110 MAJOL, Inception report on Stakeholder Engagement for JICA
111 After the leak, it disclosed the final versions.
112 The final version disclosed by JICA. MAJOL, INCEPTION REPORT Development of Engagement Plan and Toolkit for the ProSAVANA programme
113 results
They targeted not only Mozambican organizations, but also international NGOs, such as ActionAid, Oxfam and WeEffect, and rated their influence over local organizations “high” since they fund these organizations. MAJOL became particularly interested in WeEffect, and wrote: “(H)igh interest, high influence. One of the Most strategic partner. Need to be cultivated (sic.)” (p.20). These detailed results shown in the leaked draft (pp.16-32) were all blacked out in JICA’s disclosed midterm report.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁴ 36.【JICA 文書】ステークホルダーマッピング（開示・最終版）
Leaked mid-term report by MAJOL on WeEffect, p.20 (Contact details are concealed by the author)

This investigative research was carried out and used in order to identify who “may promote or impede the development of alliances” for ProSAVANA as determined in the inception report.

According to the contract document, JICA did not hesitate to give the mandate for preparing a draft ToR for “a civil society platform” to its sub-contractor. Thus, MAJOL included the 6 page long draft ToR in the inception report draft (p.24-29). In the leaked final report draft submitted in March 2016, MAJOL admits the following:

“The MAJOL team did develop most of the basic structure (and it was very time-consuming to develop the structure and then to “sell” the idea to civil society organizations)...” (P.18).

Believing none of the information would be exposed in the future, JICA proudly informed the Japanese NGOs that a dialogue platform (MCSC) was established “by the initiative of the civil society organizations” with the support from “independent and third-party-like consultants”, during the meetings held in February and March 2016.

115 The disclosed version is quite different from the draft. Thus, one can conclude that JICA intervened in correcting the text. See the above documents.
116 MAJOL Final report on Stakeholder Engagement for JICA, 1 March 2016
117 The 15th (February 19) and the 16th (March 9) dialogue meeting.
(3) Opening an access point to Mozambican civil society for JICA

The reason why MAJOL could easily extract information and create alliances with many organizations was that those consultants used to be coordinators of international NGOs such as WWF and ActionAid which give funding to national and local organizations in Mozambique.

The central figure of the contract, Peter H. Bechtel, ex-Peace Corps, was a coordinator for Northern Mozambique of WWF and is a businessman engaging in tourism and agribusiness in the same region. Although WWF Mozambique is one of the biggest NGOs in Mozambique dealing with land issues, no interview result about the organization was included in any of MAJOL reports. Yet, in the final report, MAJOL lists the following as one of three good contributions brought by MAJOL: “to give financial management responsibility for the Civil Society Mechanism to the WWF Mozambique, via the National Alliance” (p.18).

By hiring MAJOL, JICA gained access to Mozambican civil society organizations and their donor organizations to strengthen its position and control. Certainly, JICA did not want to tell anything “until things get done” to the Japanese civil society.

4.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The following table shows a summary of results of the consultations. Color Coding is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Color</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>No to ProSAVANA, unwilling to dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple</td>
<td>Will dialogue if certain conditions are met. Most NGOs have very clear that these conditions consisted of the following, as best summarized by Action Aid Director Amade Soe: 1) Genuine openness to co-create/ProSAVANA, looking at all the issues, everything must be on the table. 2) Discussion must include the development models to be used, including how it to involve agrobusiness in family-sector focussed agriculture development. 3) Due to doubts that co-creation process can be completed within current deadline, even deadlines must be negotiable. 4) Communications must be improved at all levels. Clear focal points, moments and mechanisms must be created. Most also liked the idea of 3-party mediation to solve current situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>No clear institutional position taken on ProSAVANA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Supportive of ProSAVANA. Note that every institution coloured ‘green’ as in favour of ProSAVANA also noted the need for it to change before they could endorse it fully. Not one ‘green’ organization was prepared to accept ProSAVANA as is. All called for better dialogue and for Civil Society input to be taken seriously. See Stakeholder Map above for details.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No colour Government Institutions. By their nature, these do not have independent positions vis a vis ProSAVANA.

118 http://clarke.dickinson.edu/devel-mozambique/
119 MAJOL Final report on Stakeholder Engagement for JICA, 1 March 2016
120 4 【議事録】第14回 ProSAVANA 事業に関する意見交換会（2015年12月8日）
Leaked “Stakeholder Mapping” report to JICA (pp.28-29) prepared and submitted by MAJOL in December 2016. JICA admitted this draft was accepted as the final document and a midterm contract fee was paid to MAJOL.

(4) Disempowering the common enemies: ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’

From the leaked reports, it is clear that JICA and MAJOL considered and treated the organizations opposing ProSAVANA as enemies. In particular, the final report draft by MAJOL vividly confirms this.

“We decided to try to build as broad-based a consensus as possible...would hopefully be wide enough that extremists and diehards would be an isolated minority. After the results of the stakeholder mapping, we were very confident that those diehard institutions did not have broad-based support, and, once isolated, other members of civil society would react negatively to them which would only increase their isolation” (p.19, emphasis by the author).

Foreign public aid consultants calling local peasant movements and civic organizations “extremists” and “diehards” is certainly inappropriate. This kind of hostile remarks towards these organizations is not new to ProSAVANA. Surely, JICA gave the English version of ‘Communication Strategy’ to MAJOL before their activities began, despite JICA’s efforts to conceal this fact.121

No matter how JICA tries to erase the previous records, it is evident that the main objective of its contract with MAJOL was not only for establishing a dialogue platform controllable by JICA and the governmental parties, but also for intervening to divide Mozambican civil society in order to isolate the organizations opposing the program and de-power them. For a moment, MAJOL seemed to succeed in its mandates including hidden ones.

Yet, JICA had a problem. MAJOL did not manage to drag UNAC into the newly formed platform, MCSC.

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121 It is listed as a reference on the leaked inception report draft. This reference is deleted from JICA’s disclosed version.
(5) Targeting UNAC and minimizing its role in society

MAJOL devotes almost 1 full page to explaining why it could not fulfill the task given by JICA and added the following analysis:

“The fact that the UNAC president and provincial representatives did not attend the final meeting should not be seen as a setback. Indeed, it should be seen as progress, because UNAC was subject to intensive lobbying from a visiting Japanese delegation during the time of this meeting. The fact that there was no UNAC attendance, but also no public reaction to the meeting, shows that the UNAC position is in flux, and this creates an opportunity, with proper engagement, to bring them fully into the negotiation process” (p.19, emphasis by the author).

MAJOL also urged: “ProSAVANA should not simply let civil society dialogue with UNAC since there are tensions within civil society…” (p.20). This shows clearly that they did not want UNAC and other organizations to share secrets behind the process and favored keeping the tension created within Mozambican civil society under the control of JICA and MASA.

MAJOL admits that UNAC remaining outside of MCSC was “a worst-case scenario” for JICA. And it offered the following tip for minimizing the negative affect of UNAC’s absence: (1) “MAJOL made calculations and shared them with the ProSAVANA team showing that at absolute (sic.) maximum, UNAC represents a mere 2.5% of Mozambican farmers”; and (2) “We are aware that some elements of Japanese civil society see UNAC as being the largest organization of farmers and thus the de facto representative of Mozambican farmers in the Nacala corridor” (p.20).

This description shows that MAJOL understood that one of the most important hidden mandates given by JICA was to counter-argue against Japanese civil society.

MAJOL did not hide the role of its civic allies for offering the ammunition for JICA’s counter-argument. This is clear in the following text:

“(T)he tactic of the Nampula civil society organizations to invite Provincial and National Parliamentarians…to the February seminar goes some way towards responding to this argument…After all, who is better placed to represent farmers than their own elected representatives?” (ibid).

From this description, it can be concluded that the reason why JICA and MAJOL wanted to have UNAC in MCSC was not to reflect the voices of the peasants on the Master Plan, but rather to dismantle the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ by co-opting and taking UNAC away from it and destroying the argument of Japanese civil society.

JICA, however, attempted to avoid its responsibility for the outcome. JICA’s Shinjiro Amameishi and Masahiro Tawa insisted that JICA gave “freedom” to MAJOL, and thus did not give many orders relating to their activities. Yet, the record of meetings between MAJOL and JICA, obtained by the Japanese parliamentarian, Ishibashi, confirms that the parties were meeting frequently. They met at least 22 times during the period from November 2015 to February 2016, and five meetings were attended by ProSAVANA Coordinator Limbau.

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122 The 16th (March 9) and 17th (July 21) dialogue meetings on ProSAVANA.
123 The document submitted by JICA to the meeting organized by the Japanese parliamentarian Michihiro Ishibashi on April 23, 2018.
The JICA document revealed that no-one from the Brazilian government participated in these meetings. The leaked final report clarifies to whom the responsibility of their service belongs: “This document is produced in response to ToR issued by JICA. For further information, please contact: Hiroshi Yokoyama, JICA, Mozambique Office” (abbreviation by the author).  

### Notes and Acknowledgements:
This document is produced in response to Terms of Reference issued by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. For further information, please contact:

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**Leaked MAJOL final report (draft) to JICA dated March 2016**

Although JICA did not extend its contract with MAJOL due to mounting criticism from the civil societies of the three countries, JICA found it indispensable to keep local agents who could act on its behalf to continue its intervention in Mozambican civil society. It was unthinkable for JICA to let the newly formed tool for “dialogue”, MCSC, collapse or fail. Therefore, JICA did not hesitate to re-hire Eduardo Costa, MAJOL’s consultant, to send him to ProSAVANA-HQ in July 2016.

JICA did not hire MAJOL’s Costa just to continue what could not be completed during the term of MAJOL’s contract. This time, with the detailed internal information of Mozambican civil society in its hands, MAJOL’s Costa operates from the heart of ProSAVANA, ProSAVANA-HQ (or the ProSAVANA Coordination Unit: Unidade/Gabinete de Coordenação de ProSAVANA) at MASA.

(6) **Divide and rule by giving a consultancy contract to a local NGO**

A few months before this new contract was to be realized, however, JICA was desperate to mobilize its Mozambican civil society ‘allies’ gathered around MCSC. They organized several meetings in the three ProSAVANA target provinces with MAJOL but nothing followed. On March 9, 2016, JICA officials could not help but share their frustration towards MCSC. JICA’s Tawa complained that MCSC was “not so active”, so some kind of “financial support was urgently needed”.

A month later, a secret meeting was held among JICA, MCSC and MASA at JICA Mozambique. According to the leaked minutes, the meeting was attended by JICA resident representative, Katsuyoshi Sudo, and his staffer in charge of ProSAVANA (and of MAJOL’s contract), Hiroshi Yokoyama. MCSC Coordinator, António Mutoua, Jerónimo Napido of WWF Mozambique and ProSAVANA Coordinator Limbau also joined the meeting among others. There were no participants from the Brazilian government.

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124 [MAJOL 文書] ファイナルレポート（ドラフト）2016年3月1日  
125 The 16th dialogue 15【進歩的】第16回ProSAVANA事業に関する意見交換会（2016年3月9日）。  
126 MAJOL Final report on Stakeholder Engagement for JICA, 1 March 2016.
The meeting began with the explanation by JICA’s Sudo about 4 ways of supporting MCSC financially. Sudo lamented that JICA was not able to channel funds to MCSC quickly, but assured them that there were several ways to materialize the financial necessity. Then, MCSC’s Mutoua, also Vice President of Nampula Provincial Civil Society Platform and Executive Director of an NGO (Solidariedade Mozambique), informed everyone as follows:

“The work carried out at the level of Maputo (capital) and provinces was in order to sensitize NGOs and other interveners who support the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ and have them align with the vision and objective of the Mechanism (MCSC)” (translation by the author).

And he asked JICA’s financial support to “implement the MCSC’s actions at community level”. This was agreed by JICA right away. JICA promised to offer funds through the Japanese consultant team for ProSAVANA-PD. Later, the Japanese parliamentarians found out that about 30,000 US Dollars were given to MCSC member organizations in Nampula Province for 2 week-activities in districts. Strangely enough, almost 7,000 Dollars was used for “meetings”, but no details have been disclosed until now despite repeated requests from these parliamentarians.

In August 2016, JICA suddenly informed the Japanese NGOs that it was launching a tender for a consultancy work to review and finalize the Master Plan. In September, when Japanese parliamentarians asked who got the contract, JICA answered “a company chosen out of 4 candidates”. It also revealed that value of the 6 months contract was 22,848,500 US Dollars. Logistical expenses were excluded from the contract, thus this amount was mainly for consultants’ rewards. The value was 4 times larger than the amount paid to MAJOL. JICA continued to refuse to disclose who got the contract.

127 Minutes from meeting between MCSC, JICA and MASA (PT), 12 April 2016
By the end of October, a sudden communiqué released by MCSC shocked many. It declared that Solidariedade Mozambique, the NGO directed by the MCSC’s coordinator Mutoua, got the contract. Japanese parliamentarians immediately sought an explanation and the contract-related documents. JICA delayed the answer for 2 months. By the end of December, JICA finally disclosed the contract, signed by MCSC’s António Mutoua, after the formal Memorandum of Questions was submitted to a Ministerial Meeting by parliamentarian Ishibashi 128.

This was what JICA’s claim, “the initiative of civil society”, meant, making the coordinator of the “civil society dialogue platform” its subcontractor and consultant. JICA defended its choice, saying it was based on “fair and impartial judgment and on the proposals and skills” of Solidariedade.

(7) Divide and rule by accepting the tendentious inception report

After this revelation, Ishibashi requested the disclosure of the inception report submitted by the organization for receiving 20% of the contract value (40,000 US Dollars). After lengthy and repeated requests, the report was disclosed. Strangely enough, the report was signed by MCSC with the logos of 4 civil society platforms and forums of the ProSAVANA target provinces, and not by Solidariedade, which is the actual subcontractor. Although the goal of the contract is determined as “collecting stakeholder’s opinions and making suggestion (sic.)” (p.3) and the report is supposed to be a public (third-party-like) product, it continued the hostile tone, similar to that of CV&A and MAJOL, towards those who are opposed to the program.

128 For this, Ishibashi had to submit formal questions to Cabinet. http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/192/syuisyo.htm
The report is full of accusations against the Mozambican and Japanese civil society organizations (but not Brazilian ones) which are opposed to the program, but without any supporting evidence. The references given at the end are not relevant to their arguments (pp.11-12; p.20). The typical remark is the following one on Japanese civil society (p.12). Interestingly enough, there are no sources related to Japanese civil society listed in the references. Since these MCSC related Mozambicans do not read Japanese, it is more than natural to assume that this kind of information was provided by JICA and that the authors wrote what would please their tender.

All the primary sources the author of this paper used were obtained by and are in the possession of the Japanese civil society groups. If one reads Japanese, it is not difficult to understand the importance of fact-based advocacy to their activities. Almost all the sentences of their statements and policy recommendations are with footnotes/endnotes backing their claims\(^{129}\). These notes are composed of mostly primary sources, especially from JICA. Japanese civil society has carried out with provincial peasant unions/local peasant associations and organizations belonging to the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ ten times. Through this research, the previously mentioned land-conflict case of Matharia Empreendimentos (hereafter, Matharia E.) was discovered.

(8) Landgrabbing by a company supported by ProSAVANA?

On August 8, 2015, 42 residents from two communities of Matharia in Ribaue District of Nampula

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\(^{129}\) [https://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy/prosavana-jbm.html](https://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy/prosavana-jbm.html) The Japanese civil society groups offered 200 items, mostly JICA's own documents, to the JICA Examiners. All the documents are listed and disclosed at the following site: [http://www.af.jp.jp/lang/ja/activities/jp20171105.html](http://www.af.jp.jp/lang/ja/activities/jp20171105.html)
Province submitted a formal petition regarding the landgrabbing by Matharia E. (whose owner is Mr. dos Santos) to the local district administrator. According to the petition, the petitioners claim that the land that they had been living and cultivating from 1983 was taken suddenly during the colonial period and again by Mr. dos Santos without any consultation or compensations. The DUAT of 2850 hectares of land was quietly given to Mr. dos Santos, who is the son of a Portuguese colono and lives in Maputo, by the Mozambican authority. In 2011, Mr. dos Santos visited the area and, showing freshly obtained DUAT, told the local residents to leave "his land". The residents resisted but in 2012 Mr. dos Santos forced the residents to leave the land by releasing cows into the fields they were cultivating. The cows damaged the machambas (fields). He also used "a tractor" to fell trees and grade the land. By July 2013, some parts of the area were enclosed.\footnote{The report submitted to JICA Examiners. \url{www.arsvi.com/i/prosavana/20171112/1006_matharia.pdf}}

Left: Matharia Empreendimentos’ fence. Right: petition to the local administrator. Photos taken by Naoko Watanabe (JVC) in Matharia, Nampula Province, September 2016

The ill-equipped Matharia E. (Mr. dos Santos) needed means or/and funds to begin effective utilization of the land. Thus, it applied to and obtained money from ProSAVANA DIF to repair and purchase the following items to materialize the ‘effective occupation’ of the vast area. According to the documents disclosed by GAPI (JICA refused to disclose the documents until the last moment), the company took out a two-year loan of 1,640,000 MZN from ProSAVANA DIF in order to repair a tractor, construct a water storage pond and purchase another tractor, 5 chainsaws and so on.

The items are to clear land and forest to expand farming area. From this contract document, it can be confirmed that ProSAVANA DIF’s role in Mr. dos Santos starting his business and occupying the land under his DUAT was pivotal.
The 1st ProSAVANA DIF contract between Matharia Empreendimentos and GAPI signed in November 2012

According to the research report by the Japanese civic groups, a Matharia E. employee shared the following information during an interview in July 2014\(^\text{131}\):

"There are about 200 peasants who still use the company's land to farm. But we shall eventually chase them out. We let them farm it as long as they sell their products to the company. Once they sell their products to others, they will be removed from the land"\(^\text{132}\).

Another employee gave the following account to the joint research team\(^\text{133}\):

"This March, 5 ProSAVANA people visited Matharia. They said that ProSAVANA is a triangular project for working with peasants...one needs DUAT and cannot use the company's land without permission. One must sign a contract with the company...ProSAVANA loans money to the company. That's why there is a tractor".

The outcomes of the field research were repeatedly shared with JICA during the dialogue meetings about ProSAVANA at JICA and MOFA\(^\text{134}\). JICA, however, insisted that the company and Mr. dos Santos deny the claim of land-grabbing/conflict and that ProSAVANA DIF is for supporting local producers through local agribusiness companies.

In the beginning of the discussion, JICA did not disclose the name of the companies that ProSAVANA DIF is financially supporting. After the leak of ProSAVANA Report No.2 on Quick Impact Project (PDIF was included)\(^\text{135}\), JICA insisted the loan was given to Matharia E. in order for the company: (1) to produce soy seeds on its own farm (5 ha); (2) to promote soy and vegetable production among small-scale farmers. JICA, however, refused to disclose the contract document. The document disclosed by GAPI (above) clearly shows the objective and expected outcome of the loan do not comply with JICA's claim.

\(^{131}\) Interview (July 30, 2014), “Field Research Report” (p.5), included in the report submitted to JICA Examiners.

\(^{132}\) According to the female peasant who refused to leave the land, she has to sell her products to Matharia Empreendimentos and the company decides which crops she cultivates (ibid).

\(^{133}\) Interview (July 30, 2014), ibid (p.6), included in the report submitted to JICA Examiners.

\(^{134}\) The meeting with JICA and MOFA at JICA, Tokyo, October 14, 2014. The 10th dialogue meeting (February 6, 2015), the 11th dialogue meeting (April 29, 2015), the 13th dialogue meeting (October 27, 2015).

\(^{135}\) https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears
Both the company and local administration deny the land-grabbing/conflict claims of the local residents. During the filmed interview by a Mozambican NGO, ADECRU, the company representative insists that (1) when the company was established, there was nobody living in the area; (2) there is only a small number of people living in the neighboring area and no one is living on the company's land; (3) the premise of the petition is false; and (4) if there are anyone who are suffering from an incursion, it is the company.

JICA refused the repeated suggestions of the Japanese civic groups to establish a joint fact-finding team to investigate this case. What JICA did, however, was to remove ProSAVANA's "P" from the fund name and begin re-writing and writing all the documents with “DIF”.

Despite the leaders of MCSC working on the issue of land conflicts in Nampula Province, it seems that they do not recognize this case and none of them is interested in working with provincial and/or local peasant associations to find out what is actually happening in the ProSAVANA target area or ask JICA and GAPI to disclose their documents on ProSAVANA DIF and Quick Impact Projects. Yet, they are ready to accuse those in Mozambique and Japan who oppose the program are groundless.

(9) Assisting JICA with counter-discourse

The authors of the inception report even went further, making the following table to suggest how to counter the Open Letter that they once endorsed and signed (p.12-13). The similarity of the objective and description observed in the inception report to the previously introduced reports by CV&I and MAJOL to JICA is obvious.

136 Interview with district administrator (August 12, 2013) and with local administrative post chief (August 25, 2014).
137 ADECRU “ProSavana:Terra Usurpada, Vida Roubada” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZQ82-C6sHRo&tc=150s
138 When Prof. Koichi Ikegami, who did the research on the case of Matharia E., asked the reason behind for changing PDIF to DIF, JICA did not give any answers (the 18th dialogue meeting, October 11, 2016).
Table 4: Principal issues raised by civil society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues raised in the Open Letter</th>
<th>Approach to solve problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quick impact projects</td>
<td>Explain that they are intended to derive concepts and practices that promote family farming through the involvement of local businesses. Consider the evaluation and dissemination of these results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient and contradictory information</td>
<td>Provide clear and transparent information of the Master Plan review process through the mass media (radio, TV, websites, newspapers and social networks) and local authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious and imminent threat for usurpation of land from peasants and forced removal from community areas that currently occupy</td>
<td>Clarify land possession and security issues for farmers. Evaluate the potential for transformation of small family sector farmers to associations and cooperatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Inception Report submitted by MCSC and 3 provincial platforms to JICA as outcome of the contract, pp.11-12

From this table, one can understand that the MCSC leaders of the provincial civic platforms are not interested in truly "solving problems" raised in the Open Letter, that is, finding out what the program has been doing and what kind of impacts the program and related projects are having on the people in the ProSAVANA target area. Rather, what they wanted to “solve” with JICA was to win the debate against those who oppose the program in order to create a positive image of ProSAVANA and the promoters of the program including themselves.

Although they, as JICA’s new and long sought partners, gained a better position to push JICA to be accountable for the “insufficient and contradictory information” — they themselves signed the Open Letter demanding this — they instead just recommended that JICA "provide clear and transparent information about the Master Plan review process" (emphasis by the author) that they were going to be involved in.

The table clearly shows the abandonment of (1) independence from the government as civil society members and (2) the spirit of inquiry for truth and transparency, i.e., democratic governance. This was true not only with ProSAVANA but also with JICA’s ProSAVANA umbrella program, the Nacala Economic Corridor Development.

The report also lacks integrity and decency as a product issued by a Japanese public subcontractor. Although JICA could have noticed these problems, it did not request a revision. Rather, it gave the green light to Solidariedade- and MCSC-related people who became JICA consultants in exchange for 40,000 US Dollars.
JICA’s record of the money transfer to Solidariedade submitted to the Japanese parliamentarian Ishibashi in March 2018. The amount is mostly for salaries and rewards of the MCSC leaders and excludes logistical expenses.\(^{139}\)

As for the conclusions and recommendations, the report declares: “We must strengthen the direct engagement by the Mechanism to (sic.) the peasants, reaching the voice directly, rather than being passed by intermediaries” (p.14). Intentionally or unintentionally forgetting the fact that those who are continuously and firmly resistant to ProSAVANA are the UNAC peasants on the ground.

So, it was local peasant leaders who most felt the impact of this (some regional civil society leaders received a huge amount of money from JICA for assisting this foreign agency which had been trying to spy, interfere and damage Mozambican civil society).

In the inception report, there is not a single explanation of the existence of the continued opposition and resistance of the local peasants where the MCSC leaders are operating. Their existence and voices were totally ignored. In the middle of this calamity, the peasants’ leaders from Nampula Province, where the Mutoua’s Solidariedade works, came to Japan and shared their pain in the following manner:

“We now know JICA’s secret. We now understand why things went the way they went. Everything was manipulated...”

“...We feel pain in our bones everyday because we are divided from our brothers and sisters”. (during the public event in Tokyo on November 28, 2016, translated by the author)

(10) Press tour to diffuse counter-discourse

JICA board member Hiroshi Kato\(^{140}\) admitted that the reason JICA tried to bring MASA’s Limbau and another high-ranking official to Japan was in order to let them counter argue with the peasant leaders during the above-mentioned public event held at the parliamentarians’ office building on November 28, 2016.

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\(^{139}\) As it will be explained later, the contract between JICA and Solidariedade ended in May 2017 due to the decision made by MOFA’s general director. Solidariedade was instructed to refund 27,348.55 US Dollars.

\(^{140}\) https://www.jica.go.jp/about/jica/vakuin.html
The above two JICA documents related to the trip of the high-ranking MASA officials confirm Kato’s explanation. The approval sheet entitled “Business trip of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security to Japan” (left) is classified as “urgent” and it took only 4 days to receive institutional approval, which is not common in JICA. Although the departure of the delegation was on November 26, the proposal for the trip was submitted on November 17, only 9 days earlier, and the approval only came on November 21. The proposed schedule attached to the approval document (right) describes the objective of the trip as: (1) discussion with MOFA and JICA; (2) farm visit; and (3) exchange of opinions with Japanese parliamentarian and civil society.

Kato insisted: “The peasants come to deny the importance of the program in front of our parliamentarians and the general public. But JICA is not in a position to defend ProSAVANA. It’s a Mozambican program. Thus, we thought it most appropriate for MASA officials to share their opinion.” Since this sudden trip was JICA's idea (to let MASA defend the program for JICA), the JICA officials in charge of ProSAVANA were really worried they would not be able to arrange the participation of the Mozambican delegation.

This is the reason for the JICA official's sudden appearance at Hiroshima University where the Japanese civic groups held an academic workshop with the Mozambican peasant leaders on November 26. By then the Mozambican officials had already left for Japan. Yet, the organizers of the event, parliamentarians, did not allow them to participate since the peasant leaders were to share cases of human rights abuses that occurred during the program at the event. They criticized JICA’s action as indiscreet and inappropriate for a responsible donor.

This is the environment where the local peasant leaders shared their suffering. Although six representatives from JICA and three from MOFA participated in the event and listen to the voices of the peasant leaders, they did cease their counter-resistance activities.

141 Conversation with the author on November 26, 2016.
142 The author observed the series of events since she was in Japan during this period.
On December 23, an article entitled “Civil Society Organizations of Niassa, Nampula and Zambezia were ‘liberated’ from Maputo thanks to the dollars brought by ProSAVANA” was published by one of the most independent newspapers in Mozambique, @Verdade143. The article was based on an interview with “António Mutoua of MCSC”. His on-going contract with JICA as a consultant is not mentioned anywhere in the article. It mentioned only that MCSC is financially supported by JICA. How JICA’s money was going to be spent was not reported, either.

@Verdade’s article published on December 23, 2016. The interview with “Mozambican civil society representatives” of MCSC was attended and supported by JICA’s staff and Japanese consultants.

According to an international NGO, when he pointed out this fact to the editor of @Verdade, the editor explained that the Japanese consultants who organized the interview and sat with the MCSC leaders during the interview did not mention anything about it. JICA confirmed this during the 20th dialogue held on January 24, 2017. Makoto Asai, of the Rural Development Division, vindicated himself by saying: “We forgot to inform the interviewer of the fact. But we did share the information with the newspaper later” (emphasis by the author).

Suddenly, in early January, however, the following explanation, “this article was based on the trip organized by the Japanese Embassy”, was inserted at the very end of the online article published on December 23.

The press trip to Nacala Corridor was recommended in CV&A’s ‘Communication Strategy’ (p.31). After prevaricating for more than 5 years, JICA and MOFA finally arranged one. The Japanese embassy in Maputo took the careful step of inviting all the media listed in the document. The particular target was the independent newspapers that have been supporting the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’, such as @Verdade.

Documents related to the press trip and disclosed by MOFA, reveal that “MCSC’s Mutoua” was appointed by the Japanese embassy as an only information provider of the civil society. His identity

as JICA’s contracted consultant was not mentioned anywhere in the documents.

These trips require a great planning, either technical or budgetary, and a careful follow-up, in order to secure that the published news are positive for the programme.

**JICA’s ‘Communication Strategy’ provided by CV&A in September 2013, p.31**

JICA and MOFA went even further and intervened in the Mozambican media and manipulated one of the most independent media in Mozambique, putting its integrity at risk.

**6. SMALL VICTORIES AND ‘SATYAGRAHA’ (THE FORCE OF TRUTH)**

(1) **Open Letter to JICA President**

On February 14, 2017, an open letter entitled ‘Protest against JICA’s impacts on Mozambican society in relation to the ProSavana programme’ was submitted to JICA President Shinichi Kitaoka, protesting against its intervention in Mozambican civil society using official foreign aid, and listed the violations committed by JICA as follows:144:

“The documents that the Campaign informally accessed reveal at least 4 JICA contracts under ProSavana-PD for financing, planning, implementing and initiating the intervention in Mozambican society. It should be emphasised that the first three projects were designed and implemented without any civil society’s knowledge (sic.).”

The letter demanded two things: (1) “(t)he immediate stopping of all JICA’s activities related to ProSavana (sic.)”; and (2) “(t)he urgent review of JICA’s activities in ProSavana (sic.), through (sic.) the establishment of an independent commission, for the recognition of its errors, reparations for the damage caused to its victims and Mozambican society, in accordance with the norms and principles clearly expressed in its Compliance Policy and Guidelines”.

JICA did not directly respond to these demands, but kept writing that it has been “faithful” and “placed importance on dialogue with stakeholders” thus wanting to meet with the campaign in cover-letter-like notes145. They were not even from the JICA President.

A month later, at the end of April 2017, 11 residents, mostly peasants of the ProSAVANA affected area, filed an official objection with JICA based on the JICA Guidelines for Environmental and Social Considerations146.

(2) **The force of truth and MOFA’s General Director**

A month later, in May 2017, without any announcement, MOFA and JICA quietly ended the contract not only with Solidariedade but also with the Japanese consulting company for ProSAVANA-PD147. It was the MOFA’s General Director, Takio Yamada, who put an end to these contracts.

144 [https://farmlandgrab.org/26965](https://farmlandgrab.org/26965)
145 [K.I. X](#)
146 Request (English Translation) (PDF/1.41MB)
147 This was confirmed by JICA’s document submitted to Michihiro Ishibashi.
Prior to the decision, the Japanese civic groups were invited to MOFA by its General Director Yamada in order to brief him on what was happening with the JICA program, ProSAVANA. Yamada became concerned after listening to the discussion between the representative of the Japanese NGOs and the MOFA official in charge of ProSAVANA at the ODA Policy Dialogue Meeting held on December 1, 2016.\(^{148}\)

During the meeting with the general director, the groups handed the JICA documents they had obtained through leaks and the Information Disclosure Law. According to Naoko Watanabe of JVC (Japan International Volunteer Center), who participated in all these meetings that took place from December 2016 to March 2017, Yamada was particularly astonished to see JICA-CV&A’s ‘Communication Strategy’. The general director also showed his concern about the contract between JICA and Solidariedade. And he promised to “deal with” the contract issue. Yet, it took him another few months in order to carry out what he had promised.

JICA and MOFA officials in charge of ProSAVANA mobilized all possible resources to “change the course” of ProSAVANA, not only for their institutional reputations but also for their personal promotion. Yet, they did not achieve the result they longed for, the collapse or disappearance of the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ and the triangular solidarity among the civil societies of the three countries. Their secrets kept being revealed, no matter how strongly they tried to delete and conceal them. Gandhi’s ‘Satyagraha’ (the force of truth)\(^{149}\), or hold on firmly to the truth, did move some of the key figures within the Japanese government.

(3) JICA’s manipulation of the Objection Inspection Procedures

This decisive judgment by the MOFA general director, however, did not put an end to ProSAVANA or to JICA’s manipulative activities. JICA did not accept its failure and manipulated the objection inspection procedure.\(^{150}\) On November 1, 2017, the Examiners released the investigation report, concluding “JICA cannot be found to have committed violations of the Guidelines as alleged by the Requesters”\(^{151}\).

The parliamentarian Ishibashi sought various documents related to the inspection, and found out that JICA itself had contracted several lawyers to “support the examiners’ inspection”\(^{152}\). JICA and the examiners even let them organize the inspection issues, which constitute the basis of Chapter 3 of the report, where the claimed violations are examined. Another obtained document, the schedule of the inspection in Mozambique, which JICA tried to conceal, indicated the participation of Solidariedade in the 3 hearings although the organization was also accused by the residents of helping JICA in the violations\(^{153}\). The Examiners even let Solidariedade organize the hearings of civil society organizations of Nampula and Zambézia. Thus, who was to be invited to which hearings and what was to be said could be controlled by Solidariedade.

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148 https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/about/shimin/page22_000265.html

149 The author is aware of the debate regarding Gandhi’s attitude towards the black liberation while he was living in South Africa (see, Ashwin Desani & Goolam Vahed, The South African Gandhi: Stretcher – Bearer of Empire Stanford University Press, 2015. This point will be examined in future works by the author.

150 See the “Opinion of the Requesters” in English at 調査報告書に対する当事者からの意見書. Thorough analysis has already been carried out by the author. Some of the results are shared in the online article published in Japanese by Iwanami on the following site: https://webseikai.iwanami.co.jp/posts/463

151 All the related documents of the Objection in English and Portuguese are posted by JICA on the following site: https://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/social_environmental/objection/mozambique_01.html The Investigation(inspection) Report, p.52.

152 JICA’s reply to Michihiro Ishibashi and the contract between JICA and the lawyers were submitted in May 2017.

Despite “JICA consultant” being written right next to MAJOL’s name in the schedule prepared by the “Examiners Office” run by a high-ranking JICA official, an ex-director of JBIC Pakistan, who was appointed by JICA’s President, the same title was not given to Solidariedade (see the document). It is clear that even at this point, JICA continued its efforts to hide the fact that Solidariedade was a subcontractor. And the examiners, Prof. Yuka Kaneko (Kobe University) and Prof. Kazuhisa Matsushita (Kyoto University) who carried out the inspection\(^{154}\), did not correct any of the above irregularities.

\begin{itemize}
\item MCSC関係者（南スーダラ州、ニアッサ州）
  \begin{itemize}
  \item NWETi / PPOS-C-N
  \item AFDC / REPROCRINA
  \item Solidariedade Mozambique
  \item ニアッサ州 UPC
  \item FONAGNI
  \item ORAM NPC
  \item AMADISU / AFDEC / AMACENAMO
  \end{itemize}
\item Solidariedade Mozambique
\item Observatòrios do meio Rural (OMR)
\item 土地・環境・農村開発省（MITADER）
\item 世界銀行モザンビーク事務所
\item JICAコンサルタント（MAJOL社）
\item JICAモザンビーク事務所
\end{itemize}

\textit{Schedule for the field inspection prepared by JICA’s Examiners’ Office, dated July 2017}

It seems that for these JICA examiners, who currently belong to national academic institutions, Gandhi’s ‘Satyagraha’, or the academic principles of inquiry into the truth (\textit{lux et veritas}), did not have much weight in their professional activities.

\textbf{(4) ‘The orientation’ by the Japanese Foreign Minister}

The last chapter of the investigation (inspection) report, seemingly written by someone other than the authors of the previous chapters who did not discover any violations by JICA, concluded the following: \textit{“provided, however, it does not mean that the measures taken by the Mozambican government and JICA on (sic.) pursuing the Project did not have any issues at all”} (p.53). Then, it pointed out the necessity of “return(ing) to and once again consider(ing) the Requesters’

\(^{154}\) All the examiners belong to, or used to belong to, Japanese national universities. Prof. Kaneko seems to be the leading writer of the inspection report, probably Chapter 2 and 3. Before becoming an academic, she used to work for Japan Export-Import Bank (currently JBIC). More detailed analysis is given in Japanese magazine Sekai at the following site. \url{https://websekai.iwanami.co.jp/posts/862}
allegations” (pp.54-55) and suggested that JICA: (i) promotes “efforts to fill the lack of information and transparency”; (ii) promotes “discussions on the Project under the rules of participatory decision-making procedures”; and (iii) requests “appropriate approach by the Mozambican government” (pp.58-56).155

After receiving the inspection report in November 2017, on March 4, 2018, without waiting for an opinion letter on the investigation report from the Requesters, the JICA President published a simple statement which said his agency would follow the recommendations of the Examiners.

A few days prior to the statement, the following “orientation” of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, regarding ProSAVANA was transmitted by a high-ranking official to the Japanese NGOs (on March 1, 2018): “MOFA and JICA will support the efforts led by the Mozambican government to undertake discussions based on the rule of participatory decision-making that includes those who oppose the program, if necessary.”156

According to the minutes of the meeting between MOFA and Japanese NGOs where the above orientation was transmitted, this means that the ProSAVANA Master Plan cannot be finalized with Japanese money, as was previously authorized, unless the opposition groups, such as UNAC and the organizations of the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’, participate in the discussions regarding the plan and agree with the process157. After 6 years of struggle, official recognition from the Japanese government is what the peasant movements and the campaign organizations gained from the Japanese government, although the program has not disappeared and in reality it continues, though differently (see the next section).

(5) Maputo Administrative Court condemns ProSAVANA

Nine months after the announced JICA examiners conclusion of “not being able to find violation” by ProSAVANA, the Administrative Court in Maputo unanimously agreed with all the claims against the ProSAVANA Coordination Unit of MASA made by the Mozambican Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados de Moçambique: OAM) on August 30, 2018.158

OAM sued the ProSAVANA Coordination Unit for human rights violations (“right to information”) under the Mozambican constitution and the newly established Information Disclosure Law. The ministry was ordered “to make available to the public any general information of public interest relating to the organization, operation and decisions likely to interfere with the rights and freedoms of citizens, particularly those relating to land, food and nutrition of communities under ProSAVANA in 10 days.”159

155 (iii) “JICA should continue to request the Mozambican government to give careful consideration to the Requestors to ensure that the government’s treatment is not received as being authoritative or abusive of the Requesters’ human rights” (p.58).
156 http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-342.html
157 http://mozambiquekaihatsu.blog.fc2.com/blog-entry-320.html
158 https://farmlandgrab.org/28460
159 An excerpt from the ruling of the Administrative Court of Maputo City
Although the undemocratic and secrecy-prone nature of ProSAVANA was officially condemned as unconstitutional and a human rights violation by the local judicial authorities, the representatives of JICA (Kenichi Shishido) and MOFA (Yoshiyasu Iseki), who is supported by his assistant Akiko Kawabe, repeatedly claimed that it would not affect their decision about closing down or reviewing the program since it is a “Mozambican domestic matter” and “between the governmental institutions of the same country (Mozambique)” ignoring the JICA Guidelines and separation of power between judicial and administrative authorities. Furthermore, when asked to revise the investigation report or re-establish a new inspection process by the opposition parliamentarian Satoshi Inoue during the debate at the ODA Committee on March 19, 2019, JICA refused.

(6) JICA and the sued ProSAVANA Coordination Unit

JICA and MOFA have been positioning themselves as if the sued ProSAVANA Coordination Unit is merely a Mozambican institution of MASA and has no relationship with them. They insisted that they did not know anything about the trial case until they saw the international news in September 2018.

The ProSAVANA official site, however, gives the following explanation under the page entitled “Who we are – ProSAVANA Coordination Unit”: “For the effective operation of ProSAVANA, the co-ordinating (sic.) institutions (MASA, JICA and ABC) agreed on the establishment of a ProSAVANA administrative coordination unit in Maputo, namely ProSAVANA-HQ”. During the official dialogue between MOFA and Japanese NGOs on July 22, 2019, MOFA admitted that ProSAVANA Coordination Unit is the same as ProSAVANA-HQ that is run under the coordination

160 During the Triangular Peoples’ Conference in Tokyo on November 21 and 22, 2018. Also during the public event held at the parliamentarian office building on September 4, 2019.
161 http://www.inoue-satoshi.com/movie/2019/03/oda-2019319oda.html
162 https://www.prosavana.gov.mz/who-we-are/
of MASA, JICA and the Brazilian International Cooperation Agency, ABC.

Newly discovered JICA documents reveal more than this. According to the ProSAVANA Progress Report, the monthly report made and submitted by the JICA ProSAVANA program coordinator, it was JICA who established ProSAVANA-HQ. In the report, dated on March 31, 2012, the JICA coordinator explains that he purchased office equipment and a vehicle and arranged a driver for ProSAVANA-HQ. Not only that, ProSAVANA-HQ was installed inside the JICA Mozambique office in 2012 because the Mozambican ministry of agriculture “did not have space to offer (for ProSAVANA)” (p.1).

JICA’s deep involvement with ProSAVANA-HQ is not limited to the office and equipment. Prior to the dialogue held in July 2019, the Japanese NGOs submitted questions regarding the composition of the ProSAVANA Coordination Unit, and MOFA revealed that there are only three people under the unit: a ProSAVANA Coordinator (ex-Vice-Minister Limbau); an Assistant Coordinator and a staffer. The staffer is hired and sent by JICA to the unit. According to the 8th ProSAVANA Progress Report, dated November 1, 2012, the role of this JICA staffer (contracted from October 2012 to June 2016) was to take care of daily administrative tasks of ProSAVANA-HQ.

163 The different JICA document reveals that the equipment was computers, a printer, a projector, a camera, a modem, a vehicle and mobile phones (Mozambique Shutcho Hokoku, May 2, 2016).

164 The 1st ProSAVANA Progress Report (February – March 2012), dated March 31, 2012. The document was requested to and obtained from JICA by Prof. Masao Yoshida using the Japanese Information Disclosure Law.
which the JICA coordinator, the author of the report, used to carry out (p.1).

When the end of the contract of this non-Japanese staffer approached, JICA did not only try to hire a new staffer but also sent a Japanese official from the Rural Development Division of JICA-HQ in order to control from Tokyo ProSAVANA-related matters more closely at ProSAVANA-HQ\textsuperscript{165}. It was, however, not easy. To send a Japanese official to ProSAVANA-HQ permanently, JICA and MASA had to go through time-consuming bilateral bureaucratic paper work. Thus, JICA-HQ sent a Japanese official to Maputo temporarily, from April 13 to 30 and from June 18 to 31 July.

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\textit{JICA-HQ record of the overseas business trips under ProSAVANA provided to the Japanese parliamentarian Ishibashi in May 2018}

According to the reports of these visits, the JICA official, whose name is concealed, wrote proudly:

\textit{The JICA Mozambique contract with the staffer X ended on June 30 and the one with the successor XX began on July 19. I think I could fulfil the vacuum created (at ProSAVANA-HQ)\textemdash (p.2)\textsuperscript{166}.} The same document also confirms that the annual budget of ProSAVANA-HQ, approximately 50,000 US Dollars (5,000,000 Yen), is supported by JICA\textsuperscript{167}. These documents show clearly that ProSAVANA-HQ cannot function without financial and human support and equipment from JICA\textsuperscript{168}. There is no trace of a contribution from the Brazilian counterpart to ProSAVANA-HQ in any of JICA’s documents.

It is not known if JICA’s attempt to send a Japanese staffer from JICA-HQ to ProSAVANA-HQ permanently was successful. Whatever the result was, this attempt, carried out in April 2012, reveals the crushing frustration of JICA and MOFA in Tokyo after the establishment of MCSC. JICA and MOFA did manage to create a local tool for pushing ProSAVANA forward, but things were not moving as they planned. They understood the reason for this as \textit{“lack of financial support to MCSC”}\textsuperscript{169} and lack of effective staff at ProSAVANA-HQ.

JICA found an ideal candidate for the staff position for ProSAVANA-HQ, Mr. XX, in order to fulfill its ambition. Even though his name was concealed in JICA documents, at the dialogue with Japanese NGOs in July 2019, MOFA revealed that the newly installed staffer is Eduardo Costa, one of MAJOL’s consulting team members who conducted the CIA-like investigation of Mozambican civil society for JICA (from November 2016 to March 2017).

\textsuperscript{165} Mozambique Shutcho Hokoku (May 2, 2016), pp.1-5.
\textsuperscript{166} Mozambique Shutcho Hokoku (August 2, 2016).
\textsuperscript{167} Mozambique Shutcho Hokoku (May 2, 2016), p.2.
\textsuperscript{168} Mozambique Shutcho Hokoku (May 2, 2016), pp.1-5.
\textsuperscript{169} Minutes from meeting between MCSC, JICA and MASA (PT), 12 April 2016.
Although JICA had once insisted that the MAJOL consultants were “independent/third-party-like” actors, by July 2017 JICA quietly hired one of MAJOL’s consultants who gathered information about and a connection with the Mozambican civil society organizations and peasant organizations in order to play a pivotal role in promoting and saving ProSAVANA at the heart of the operations.\(^\text{170}\)

JICA knew the advantage of hiring Eduardo Costa and sending him to ProSAVANA-HQ. By hiring Costa, JICA sought to more effectively control not only Mozambican civil society, but also the Mozambican ministry (MASA). This can be observed in the dramatic change reflected in his TOR compared to his predecessor’s.

\[\text{JICA’s TOR given to its ProSAVANA-HQ staff. Left: the TOR used up to June 2016. Right: the TOR used from July 2016 until today.}\]\(^\text{172}\)

According to the new TOR, the objective of the contract with Eduardo Costa is: “....to coordinate interests and intentions between JICA and the related stakeholders”. And Eduardo Costa’s number one task determined in the TOR is to “support the JICA ProSAVANA Coordinator in carrying out the following activities...” (p.1). “Assisting to strengthen the functions of ProSAVANA-HQ” comes only after this task (p.2).

From the new TOR, one can learn that the objective and the most important activities given by JICA to Eduardo Costa is not to support ProSAVANA-HQ or MASA, it is rather to support JICA in order to make sure its interests and intentions are “appropriately considered” by MASA and the Brazilian government (pp.1-2).

\[\begin{array}{l}
\text{Under such circumstances, JICA is planning to put a new staff in ProSAVANA Headquarters (HQ), one department of MASA, to coordinate interests and intentions between JICA and the related stakeholders.}
\end{array}\]

\[\begin{array}{l}
\quad \text{1. Coordination within the framework of ProSAVANA}
\quad \text{To support JICA ProSAVANA Coordinator in carrying out the following activities:}
\quad \quad \text{- To promote information sharing and consensus building among JICA, the Government of Mozambique (GOM) and Brazil (GOB) for facilitating the implementation of ProSAVANA projects}
\end{array}\]

JICA did not forget to insert the task of “collecting information on actions and happenings in

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\(^{172}\) The documents were obtained by parliamentarian Ishibashi in April 2018.
politics, government organizations, civil society, private sector (sic.), academia and the media that may have an impact on ProSAVANA” for the ex-MAJOL consultant (p.2). He was also obligated to “make sure that the important information on ProSAVANA is shared within MASA management, and with JICA and GOB in a timely manner” and send a monthly report to JICA (not to MASA) (p.2). And yet, JICA and MOFA insist that they did not know about the court case until the Mozambican bar association issued a press release one month after the closure of the case.

JICA’s deep involvement in establishing, shaping and running the ProSAVANA-HQ and its desire to keep a tight grip on how things go inside and outside ProSAVANA-HQ is clear.

Yet, JICA denies the knowledge of the trial and its responsibility.

7. CURRENT SITUATION AND HISTORICAL ROOTS

(1) JICA returns to its old tricks and promotion of ‘local beneficiaries’

Despite all the above events in 2017-2018, ProSAVANA managed to survive due to the Japanese political and bureaucratic principle of “unstoppability” of public programs/projects. After all, Japan has been under the same Abe administration since 2012. As a result, JICA is up to its old tracks again. Another round of chasing Mozambican civil society, calling meetings for “dialogue”, and using JICA’s funds and local partners, also resumed.

JICA expanded the tactics commonly used for unwanted large public projects in Japan. As is often the case, the Japanese government tries to weaken local resistance by creating local interest groups/allies by pouring in huge sums of money and dividing the communities and residential groups. In deprived areas where these unwanted projects are implemented, the financial gains and increased status of the governmental allies have had a great impact on the continuity of the resistance. The most obvious case is Henoko, Okinawa (the previously mentioned unwanted US naval base), where the Japanese government gave subcontracts to small local enterprises and also a huge amount of money to some tiny residential groups or a local fishery union, while the majority of Okinawa people repeatedly showed their opposition through every-day resistance and elections.

In the case of ProSAVANA, as we have seen in this paper, despite the clear objection from local peasants to the program since 2012, JICA did not halt the program, rather, it went on to pour almost 14,000,000 US Dollars into “pilot projects” under ProSAVANA-PEM to showcase the “positive outcome of ProSAVANA helping local farmers” in the target area. It is, thus, not only those who were involved with JICA’s consultancy, but also “small pilot projects of ProSAVANA” that were used to “Divide & Rule” the Mozambican peasantry and society.

JICA and MOFA proudly announced the outcome of their support, to the tune of millions of dollars, for “4,800 local farmers” while continuing to stress that “ProSAVANA is still in the investigation and research phase and implementation has not begun” in order to counter the campaign’s argument.

This contradiction was pointed out to the representatives of JICA and MOFA by the campaigners during the debate at the Triangular Peoples’ Conference held on November 23, 2018 at the Japanese parliamentarians office building in Tokyo172. The Japanese governmental representatives

172 The video is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h2dQ8ZzWQ
could not rebut and remained silent.

**2. Pushing forward the Nacala Economic Corridor (natural gas) Development**

While JICA and MOFA keep using their tactics of divide and rule and trying to wear out the civil societies of the three countries, Mitsui, JBIC and MOF have gone ahead with the original ProSAVANA plan by advancing the Nacala Economic Corridor Development Program with their Brazilian partner, Vale.

The linkage between ProSAVANA and the Nacala economic development program continued even after JICA officially pronounced the shift to "ProSAVANA for small-scale farmers". The JICA document dated December 15, 2014 confirms the fact that JICA’s Africa Division sent Tsutomu Iimura and two other officials to Mozambique, under the ProSAVANA budget, in order to negotiate the second phase of the Nacala Port Development Program with the Mozambican government. According to another JICA document provided to the parliamentarian Ishibashi on May 25, 2018, JICA had been sending its officials, with the title ‘planning and research officer for Nacala (Economic) Corridor Development’, to Mozambique using the budget allocated for ProSAVANA.

The creation of the civil society group, Civil Society’s Coordination Mechanism (MCSC) for Nacala Corridor, and its agreement to be a subcontractor of JICA, were a positive change for the Japanese public and private actors who have been investing tremendous amount of money in the Nacala Economic Development Corridor.

Mitsui and its financiers (JBIC and MOF) have been faced with claims from the Nampula provincial peasant union (UPC-Nampula) and the Japanese civic groups who have been carrying out field research, of landgrabbing, insufficient compensation, fatal accidents and air pollution caused by the extension of the Nacala Railway. The dismantlement of the unified civil society group that was responding to the cries of local peasants in the region, especially in the heart of the Nacala Economic Development Corridor in Nampula Province, was a welcome outcome for investors. It may not be a coincidence that the person who led the contract with MAJOL was Iimura from JICA’s Africa Division (and not from the Rural Development Division, which is supposed to take care of agricultural development programs). He is the person who organized the bilateral agreement of the Nacala Port Development Program.

Japanese economic interests are deliberately concentrated in Northern Mozambique and not limited to the region along the Nacala Corridor. As one can see in the following map, JICA includes natural resource rich Cabo Delgado province in the greater economic corridor of Nacala. Their target is natural gas, the mining concession of which is held by US oil-related giant, Anadarko. Mitsui, together with the government funded JOGMEC (Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation), is the second biggest shareholder (20%), after Anadarko, of the Rovuma Offshore Area 1 Block concession.

The Commoditization of local nature, natural resources and agriculture by "transforming the local agriculture" determined in the Master Plan drafts is on track. The economic drives stimulated by

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173 Shutcho Fukumeisho (business trip report), December 15, 2014. The trip was scheduled from November 30 to December 6 for Iimura. The other two stayed until December 13.


the renovation of the infrastructure are already drastically transforming the regional landscape. The release of the ProSAVANA Master Plan, prepared by those who promote “economic corridor development”, “market-oriented agricultural/rural development with a competitive edge” and an “African green revolution”, will further accelerate this shift.\textsuperscript{176}

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\textbf{JICA’s Nacala Economic Development Corridor strategy visualized in the report prepared under the bilateral cooperation between the Mozambican government and JICA, PEDEC-Nacala.}

\textbf{(3) Historic legacy: Northeast China/’Manchuria’}

“Divide & Rule” has always been a tactic and strategy of colonizers. So is the model of commoditization of nature by building a high-volume, high-speed “interior to port” commodity route. This is not new to Japan. It experimented with this process in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century in Northeastern China/’Manchuria’. It was timber, coal and soy that Japan was after, and the development of railways and port by Mitsui played a central and indispensable role in this development.\textsuperscript{177} So is social intervention and manipulation. In fact, JICA’s approach for formulating  

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{176} The ProSAVANA Master Plan (Draft Zero and Provisional Version) kept its basic view of the local peasants as ignorant, incapable producers, and promotes “transformation” to green revolution type agriculture (https://www.prosavana.gov.mz/lib-master-plan/). See also the analysis of Prof. Koichi Ikegami (President of International Rural Sociology Association): 1. [20]. Analysis of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 Ver 2. (10 January 2019). Prior to the signing of the first trilateral accord on ProSAVANA in Maputo, JICA Vice President Kenzo Oshima joined AGRA (Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa). Also, Hiroto Mitsugui, head of JICA’s Rural Division, attended the Africa Green Revolution Forum 2016 in Kenya (September 7–9, 2016) prior to his ProSAVANA business trip to Mozambique using the ProSAVANA budget (Approval Sheet, August 25, 2016).

\textsuperscript{177} DW interview with the author (November 20, 2018) “O império colonial do Japão e as origens do projeto agrícola ProSavana em Moçambique” http://www.dw.com/pt-002/o-imp%23B3rio-colonial-do-jap%C3%A3o-e-as-origens-do-projeto-agr%C3%ADcola-prosavana-em-moz%23B3%23A7ambique/a-46376399

English translation https://farmlandgrab.org/29131
\end{footnotesize}
master plans is based on the experience of the research division of the South Manchuria Railway Company, once on the front line of the colonial occupation in China. One wonders if it is a mere coincidence that the grandfather of Prime Minister Abe was Shinsuke Kishi, who prepared the Five-Year Industrial Development Plan for ‘Manchuria’ in 1939 and was called one of “5 big personalities of Manchuria”, together with Hideki Tojo, Class A war criminal.

In the 21st century, almost 100 years after its colonization attempts in China, Japan is following in Africa the unfulfilled dream of the stained past in the name of “international cooperation” and “public-private partnership”.

The difference between the past and present is that the peasants of Mozambique are more unified and organized for protecting their sovereign rights. Also, the current international environment is very different. In the post-World War II era, the horizon of human and collective rights has expanded thanks to transnational social movements and their allies. The adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and People Working in Rural Areas (Peasants Declaration), in December 2018, is a good example. It is rather symbolic that the Japanese government repeatedly cast abstention votes for the declaration draft while insisting that the Japan contributes a large sum to assist small-scale farmers around the world.

The Triangular Peoples’ Conference, held in November 2018, in the midst of the final negotiation of the Peasants Declaration at the UN, concluded by pointing out the deep contradiction between what the Japanese government promises/declares and what it promotes on the ground and released “TOKYO DECLARATION: We reiterate our rejection of ProSAVANA and MATOPIBA and defend the food sovereignty of the peoples.”

“ProSAVANA and MATOPIBA represent a clear attack on the peasant class. As a result of the way these processes have been conducted so far, peasants in the regions of implementation are being denied the right to decide on (sic.) their own food systems. They continue to be treated as passive objects and to see denied their key role and accumulated knowledge and values linked to peasant agriculture, as well as the importance of their cooperation and solidarity with each other. Imposing agricultural practices and options that are foreign to its conception, not only jeopardizes the food sovereignty of peoples, but also hampers the social, cultural, economic and environmental organization of peasants in these regions…”

It seems that Ghandi’s ‘Satyagraha’ and the campaign’s slogan “A luta continua!” continue to have significance in the triangular peoples’ struggle of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan.

8. CONCLUSION

This paper explored 10 years of history of ProSAVANA, focusing on the activities of the Japanese actors such as JICA, MOFA and Japanese civil society, based on primary sources, especially those of JICA. This paper sought to reveal the process by which a once high-profile “successful triangular/south-south cooperation” became bilateral “assistance”, which then drifted into

178 Tsuyoshi Hashimoto, Kaihatsu to iu shikake, Soseisha, 2008.
179 Kishi was imprisoned on suspicion of Class A war crimes but never tried. He was allowed to leave the Sugamo Prison as the Korean War approached and became prime minister in 1957.
180 During the 5th session of the inter-governmental working group at the UN Human Rights Council on April 13, 2018.
181 https://farmlandgrab.org/28608
activities to counter peasant resistance. From the detailed analysis of more than 20,000-pages of JICA sources, including leaked and disclosed documents, and of minutes of periodical dialogue meetings between MOFA, JICA and Japanese NGOs, one can conclude that this shift was driven by JICA and MOFA who used the budgets allocated for ProSAVANA allegedly as agriculture development assistance.

JICA’s intervention in Mozambique not only resulted in divisions among the Mozambican civil society actors. It also raised questions about the independence and accountability of Mozambican civil society and media. While ProSAVANA, with JICA’s counter activities, weakened the already fragile democracy and transparency of governance in Mozambique, the verdict by the Administrative Court in Maputo that ProSAVANA was violating the citizens’ right to information under the Constitution and national law, however, leaves hope for the future.

Japan’s interventions in Mozambique should be understood with the following three basic facts in mind: (1) in Japan, “unwanted” mega public programs and projects are traditionally “unstoppable”; (2) Japan has been under the same authoritarian regime, the Abe-Aso administration, since December 2012, two months after the first denunciation of the ProSAVANA program by UNAC and, and (3) the current administration is pro-business/US/multi-national corporations. This overall “unstoppability” is the root cause of JICA’s spying on, and manipulation of, the activities of Mozambican civil society. As its budget and policymaking processes are controlled by MOFA and the administration (as is the selection of its presidents), the freedom that JICA has is very limited. This helps to explain its aggressive efforts to “change the course” of the international and domestic fourth estate for the sake of its reputation and survival, as the national budget shrinks every year. The tactic chosen by JICA in Mozambique was planning and implementing a ‘Communication Strategy’.

The ‘Communication Strategy’ that was planned and carried out under ProSAVANA to counter the peasant resistance, is not a unique strategy within Japanese diplomacy. In January 2017, for example, the Sunday Times reported that the Japanese embassy in the UK was paying 10,000 pounds a month to the Henry Jackson Society to encourage British politicians to voice opposition to China’s foreign policy based on a ‘Communication Strategy’ scheme.

In March 2017, the then Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida admitted that MOFA had been organizing press tours for the local media in Japanese development cooperation project sites in more than 60 countries since 2015. This information and the analysis of MOFA documents indicate that JICA’s activities to counter resistance in Mozambique should not be considered as independent actions by JICA, but rather, joint actions together with MOFA.

In order to fully understand the development process of countering peasant resistance under ProSAVANA, it is also important to bring the internal dynamics of the Mozambican government and civil society into the analysis. The fact that the same political party (Frelimo) has been in power since 1975 seems to influence the responses of the Mozambican governmental actors (and some

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182 ProSAVANA was designed and prepared during the Aso administration (September 2008- September 2009). Taro Aso agreed to promote Japan-Brazil cooperation in “African Savannah” during the L’Aquila Summit in July 2009. He is currently deputy minister and financial minister under the Abe administration. Aso was the 3rd president of the Aso Group whose coal mining company used prisoners of war and Korean people as forced labor during WWII.

183 It promoted privatization of the public water service and demolished the Seed Law.

184 The current JICA President Shuichi Kitaoka and his predecessor Akihiko Tanaka were picks of Prime Minister Abe. These professors of International Relations are supporters of the participation of Japan in the Iraq War.


of the civil society actors) to be in favour of JICA’s requests. This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, and the author therefore hopes that other researchers working on this issue will consider and expand on the facts shared in this paper.

This paper also fails to fully analyse why the participation of the Brazilian counterpart in this program faded\footnote{Report on the ProSAVANA meeting in Brasilia and summary of the result (Burajiria niokeru ProSAVANA kaigo – kekka gaiyo hokoku) dated on June 6, 2016. The document says: “I understand that the objective of the meeting was also bringing back the presence of the Brazilian side in each (ProSAVANA) projects” (p.1).}. It is important to note, however, that ProSAVANA began during the Lula administration (January 2003 – January 2011) and continued under the Dilma administration (January 2011 – August 2016).

A JICA document and recordings from the Coordination and Monitoring Joint Mission – ProSAVANA, held in Brasilia from May 30 to June 03, 2016, revealed the difficulty of getting the Brazilian government to actively participate, even though the event was held in Brazil\footnote{The audio of the event (June 1, 2016).}. JICA’s analysis concluded that the reason for the weak Brazilian participation stemmed from the anti-ProSAVANA attitude of the Brazilian civil society.

JICA tried hard to send to Brazil some actors from Mozambican civil society who were supportive of the program, in order to weaken Brazilian contestation. This attempt failed, however, when representatives of Brazilian organizations aligned with the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ pointed out that the largest Mozambican peasant movement, UNAC, continued to oppose ProSAVANA. In this way, they indicated to the participants that the supposed civil society delegation (MCSC and WWF Mozambique) was not representative of the rights’ holders of the region affected by ProSAVANA. As a result, Brazilian civil society maintained its position\footnote{https://farmlandgrab.org/28719}. In addition, one should not forget the following two facts: (1) the Brazilian counterparts, FGV and EMBRAPA, had already obtained the information they needed for planning, such as land-use and appropriate soy varieties for Northern Mozambique, by 2013 under ProSAVANA-PI and PD; and (2) there was no advantage in aligning with ProSAVANA after JICA shifted away from promoting large-scale foreign agriculture investment and land-related projects. Further analysis should be made in the future.

The above mentioned shift by JICA observed under ProSAVANA should be attributed to the continuous resistance of the Mozambican peasant movements and the organizations belonging to the ‘No to ProSAVANA Campaign’ and the solidarity of the peoples of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan\footnote{Jingzhong Ye, Jan Douwe van der Ploeg, Sergio Schneider & Teodor Shanin, “The incursions of extractivism: moving from dispersed places to global capitalism”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, February 2019.}. This case should be reviewed in the context of global resource grabbing and ‘extractivism’ by public-private actors and local/transnational resistance\footnote{This paper is also lacking in bringing the regional and international context of ProSAVANA, such as the African Agriculture Growth Corridor adopted at the UN and its promotion decided during the World Economic Forum in 2011, into the analysis. Since this is already dealt with in the papers of Ikegami and Okada, readers may consult them.}. The case could also be examined in the context of state-civil society relations and democratization, in Africa.

Ten years after “global land-grabbing” became a hot issue, civil society actors are facing attempts of co-optation and interventions from governmental actors and investors. “Multistakeholderism”
and “dialogue” tend to mislead those whose rights and interests should be prioritized\(^\text{192}\). As the UN declaration underlines the rights of peasants to participate “in the preparation/implementation of policies/programs/projects that may affect their lives, land and livelihoods” under Article 10, all actors including JICA are required to reconsider and improve their \textit{modus vivendi}.\(^{\text{192}}\)

Certainly, the ProSAVANA Master Plan that was framed and prepared based on 7 to 8 year-old research and carried out by Brazilian and Japanese consultants without the participation of local peasants and their representative organization is obsolete no matter how many additional revisions are made.

As the author ends this paper, she would like to thank the anonymous whistle-blowers and the Japanese parliamentarians and civic groups for their tireless efforts to expose the secrets of ProSAVANA and, by way of numerous information requests, make JICA accountable. Their pursuit of the truth certainly played a pivotal role along with the triangular solidarity and resistance in bringing about some changes.

When the author began analysis of ProSAVANA seven years ago, she did not think that the skills gained from her previous specialization (War and Conflict Studies), such as reading military and secret service documents, would be useful for the analysis of ‘international cooperation’\(^\text{193}\). The similarity of the series of JICA documents submitted by its subcontractors, starting from the ‘Communication Strategy’, and the colonial documents prepared by the officers, informants and researchers working for the Portuguese secret service (PIDE/DGS and SCCI\(^\text{194}\)) is disturbing. Yet, as a Japanese national, the author should not forget to emphasize that this was carried out by Japanese public actors with public funds. And JICA was able to commit those misdeeds due to a weak civil society and the stagnation of democracy in Japan.

Forty-five years ago, the peasants of Mozambique took up arms in order to resist colonialism and win “the liberation of the people of the land”. From 2012, through the prolonged struggle of the Mozambican peasants for their sovereignty, dignity and land, the author observed their non-violent and transnational ‘Satyagraha’ bringing some changes in accordance to Gandhi. The truth is ‘non-destructible’, and it incorporates the ‘force for change’, as long as the non-violent movements keep their patience and keep firm.

It is the author’s hope that all those involved with ProSAVANA would be open to this century-old wisdom of human kind, ‘Satyagraha’ — also translatable as ‘soul force’ — which emerged in the struggle for a world without “oppression and exploitation”. The ideals the Mozambican people once fought for – the liberation of the Mozambican peasants – seems increasingly complicated in the 21st century, but it is fundamentally the same quest for the rights to determine their lives, livelihoods and future as a sovereign people, and to resist what they consider unacceptable.


\(^{\text{193}}\) See The Origins of War in Mozambique

\(^{\text{194}}\) PIDE (Polícia Internacional Defesa do Estado), DGS (Delegacia Geral de Segurança) and SCCI (Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações)
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All the primary and secondary sources are listed in the endnotes with the URL when it is available.

Most of the JICA documents used in this paper are accessible at the following sites:
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https://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy/prosavana-jbm.html
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